CHAPTER XIII

POLITICAL HYDROPHOBIA

I

Philip Hone, seated in the little Senate Chamber, and still entranced

with Clay’s theatrical appeal to Van Buren, was awakened from his

reverie by observing Webster beckoning him out of the room. The

entertainer of the Whig celebrities followed the god of his idolatry to

one of the committee rooms, where, for more than an hour, the orator

“unburdened his mind fully on the state of affairs and future

prospects.” The burden of it all was the importance of carrying the

spring elections. When Hone called on Clay, he found him of the same

opinion. “He says that the only hope is the election in our State and in

Pennsylvania.” Meeting John Quincy Adams, “that sagacious man,” he found

that the former President shared the belief that “our only hope lies in

the elections in New York and Pennsylvania, particularly our charter

election.”[753] That the Administration forces and the Kitchen Cabinet

were equally impressed with the strategic value of victories in New York

City is disclosed in a letter from Major Lewis to James A. Hamilton,

“Have you any doubt of succeeding at your election?” he wrote. “I hope

not; yet I confess I have my fears. The strongest ground to take with

the people is the fact, that under the existing arrangements with the

State banks, the whole revenue collected through your customs house is

left to be dispensed in your own city, instead of being transferred to a

neighboring rival city. Our friends should ring the changes upon this

view in every quarter of the city.”[754] It is thus evident that the

contending forces were concentrating for the election of aldermen and a

mayor in a city then numbering few more than 200,000 people.

Early in March the Opposition deliberately made the Bank the issue by

nominating Gulian C. Verplanck, driven from Congress by the Democrats

because of his fidelity to the Bank, and planning for a popular

vindication of that institution. Two days later the Democrats nominated

Cornelius W. Lawrence, who had been exceedingly bitter against the Bank

while in Congress. Accepting Hone’s opinion that “the personal

characters of both the gentlemen is above reproach,”[755] the election

would definitely determine the drift of public opinion on the contest

then in its most bitter stage. The election returns were confusing. The

mayoralty candidate, who had been ousted from his seat in Congress

because of his support of Biddle, was defeated by the man whose

bitterness against the Bank while in Congress had been notable. The

Democrats won here, and the Opposition lost. The fact that the latter

elected a majority of the aldermen was loudly hailed as a vote against

Jackson on the Bank question, although, in the more spirited contest for

the more important office, the Bank champion was overwhelmed by the

Democrat. The Opposition was jubilant, or pretended to jubilation. A

great celebration was held at Castle Garden, and the faithful poured

forth by the tens of thousands to sit about the tables “spread in a row”

and to do full justice to the “three pipes of wine and forty barrels of

beer placed in the center under an awning.” Full of fire and froth, the

exuberant partisans, learning that Webster was the guest of a lady at

her home, moved thence _en masse_, where the orator, who had declined to

appear among the beer kegs in the Garden, presented himself at the

window and delivered “an address full of fire” which “was received with

rapturous shouts.”[756] All over the Eastern country the Whigs insisted

on accepting the defeat of the Bank candidate for mayor as a victory

for the Bank, and the Philadelphians had “a grand celebration at

Powelton on the Schuylkill”; the Whigs of Albany “fired one hundred

guns”; the Whigs of Buffalo “made a great affair of it with guns and

illuminations”; those of Portsmouth “received the news with one hundred

guns” and “had a town meeting and made speeches.”[757] Meanwhile the

Democrats were proclaiming the election of Lawrence a Jacksonian

triumph. After the various salutes from Portsmouth to the Battery of a

hundred guns, and the celebration in the Garden among the beer kegs, the

Democrats arranged their celebration for the day that Lawrence was to

make his triumphant entry. A steamboat went down to Amboy to receive the

mayor-elect, and “with colors flying and loud huzzas,” the Jacksonians

sat down to a dinner on board, “where Jackson toasts were drunk and

Jackson speeches were made.” Landing at Castle Garden, the new mayor was

conducted in a “barouche drawn by four white horses, and paraded through

the streets.”[758]

But the desperate Opposition, hard pressed, and requiring encouragement

for its followers, succeeded, through exaggerations and red fire, in

convincing the rank and file that an anti-Jackson wave had swept the

Nation. Rhode Island, never a Jackson State, went against the Democrats,

and this was celebrated with as much enthusiasm as though a stronghold

of the enemy had been taken. The triumph of the Whigs in the

Philadelphia ward elections was exploited as a signal triumph. Virginia,

anti-Bank as well as anti-Jackson, was lost to the Democrats, and the

Opposition interpreted it as a pro-Bank as well as an anti-Jackson

verdict. In Louisiana the Whigs won on the tariff, but the impression

was given that the result reflected a popular resentment of the

mistreatment of Nicholas Biddle. As a matter of fact, no intelligent

politician could have attached any particular significance to the

results of the spring elections, and the leaders immediately began

their preparations for the congressional elections in the fall.

II

In these elections the Opposition to Jacksonian Democracy was to fight

for the first time under its new party name. In February, 1834, James

Watson Webb, the unscrupulous speculator in Bank stock, and editor of

the “Courier and Enquirer” of New York City, had proposed that the

combination against the policies of Jackson should be known as the Whig

Party. “It is a glorious name,” said John Forsyth, “and I have no doubt

they will disgrace it.” Within six months the National Republicans and

the Anti-Masons disappeared--united under the Whig banner. In September,

1834, Niles records, in his “Register,” that, “as if by universal

consent, all parties opposed to the present Administration call

themselves Whigs.” And all who called themselves Whigs denounced the

Jacksonians as Tories. It was a pretty conceit. The Whigs of England had

fought the battles of the people against the usurpations of the throne,

and the Whigs of America were fighting the usurpations of Jackson. The

Constitution against anarchy, the people against the Power--such was the

fight of Nicholas Biddle, Henry Clay, and John C. Calhoun against

Jackson.

A more incongruous combination of contradictions and a more sinister and

unholy alliance than that of the Whigs of the Jacksonian period has

never appeared in the political life of the Republic. These men held

common opinions on none of the fundamental principles of government. A

few years, and few of the leaders and founders could agree as to the

character of the combination.[759] The only plank in the platform of

this ragged array on which all could stand was a hatred of Andrew

Jackson. That was the open sesame to the temple. Beyond that no

questions were asked. Born with the seed of inevitable disintegration,

it was to stagger along through twenty years, to end without a mourner,

and to leave no record worthy of an epitaph. And about the time of its

birth, and after its insignificant successes in the spring elections,

that astute journalist and politician, Thomas Ritchie, of the “Richmond

Enquirer,” foresaw its future with the clear light of a prophet. “When

it comes to act upon any policy or principle,” he wrote, “not connected

with a hatred of Jackson, it must fall to pieces and commence a war

_inter se_. It contains all the elements of dissolution, and is destined

to share the fate of other monstrous alliances.”[760]

But its creators were not concerned in 1834 with anything further than

the overthrow of Jackson and his followers. Not daring to advance a

constructive programme, for the very effort would have wrecked the

party, they confined themselves to extravagant and absurd denunciations

of Jackson as a tyrant usurping power and clambering to a throne. The

congressional campaign opened with a rush. All over the land the Whigs

were raising liberty poles--because they were fighting the battle of

liberty against the despot. And Nicholas Biddle and his Bank, as usual,

wore the liberty cap. When Congress adjourned in June, the moneyed

institution was in a dying condition, and the money market was again

about normal. Only a signal Whig triumph could now save the institution

on Chestnut Street.

III

With the adjournment of Congress, Jackson, with his customary

complacency and confidence in the support of the people, set forth for

the Hermitage for a much-needed rest. He had just again reorganized his

Cabinet because of the failure of the Senate to confirm Taney and the

resignation of Louis McLane. The motive for the latter’s retirement is

only conjectural. That he had never felt at home in the Cabinet circle,

we may well believe. While in the Cabinet, he was not of it. But for the

constant friendship and support of Van Buren, his position would have

been delicate indeed. He was out of sympathy with Jackson at every stage

of the Bank fight. He would have renewed the old charter without a

change; would have renewed it with concessions from the Bank; but he

would have renewed it. With the removal of the deposits he was entirely

out of sympathy. He would not have removed them at all; but, if removed,

he would not have removed them until Congress had convened. His social

affiliations were largely with the old official aristocracy. That he

entertained presidential aspirations was generally understood, and it is

quite possible that he considered a complete separation from the

Administration advantageous to his interests. His associations were such

that he could not have heard much that was not venomously hostile to

Jackson and the Jacksonians. But, a gentleman of dignity, he withdrew

gracefully, plunging into no undignified recriminations.[761]

In appointing his successor, Jackson turned to John Forsyth, whose

services as Administration floor leader in the Senate had been of

immense value, and whose urbanity, wisdom, conservatism, diplomatic

experience, fitted him for the post better than any of his Jacksonian

predecessors. To the place left vacant by Taney, he transferred Mr.

Woodbury, and to the navy he appointed Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, a

gentleman of extensive public experience as a Senator for sixteen years.

Just previous to his appointment, he had declined the Russian Mission.

This was the only Cabinet upheaval of Jackson’s time which had not been

accompanied with much bitterness, with charges and countercharges.

Thus, with affairs in Washington in capable hands, with victory in the

Bank fight on his side, with the delights of the Hermitage just beyond,

the iron man set forth in high spirits and with no regrets or fears. The

Biddle threat of more “discipline” for the people during the summer and

autumn, because of the failure of Congress to recharter the Bank, had

not disturbed him so much as it had alarmed the Whigs. Those in Boston

met the threat with a counter-threat of denunciation, and those in New

York warned Biddle that more distress would certainly prove disastrous

to the Whigs in the fall elections. Biddle deeply resented the criticism

of the Whigs, who, under the leadership of Clay, had practically

blackmailed him into using the Bank’s power against the Democrats. When

those of Boston warned that more discipline of the people might “even

create a necessity for the Whigs, in self-defense, to separate

themselves entirely” from his institution, he wrote in defiant mood to

the president of his Boston branch that “if ... any political party or

association desires to separate itself from the Bank--be it so.” He had

not read the letter to the board of directors lest the members favorable

to the Democrats might use it to the disadvantage of the Whigs.[762] But

he was to find that his frown had lost its force. Another Whig from New

York wrote of much dissatisfaction in that city and State among the

Bank’s friends and “those of influence in the Whig Party--and sure I am

that it is increasing every day.” The feeling was prevalent, encouraged

by the views of Albert Gallatin, that the Bank could have relieved the

distress had it so desired. And Alexander Hamilton, the brother of

Jackson’s friend, and son of the father of the National Bank, wrote a

little later to a correspondent that “it has been found expedient to

abandon the Bank in our political pilgrimage.” He found that “the people

are now familiarly acquainted with the immense power of a national bank

and apprehend all kinds of terrible consequences from its

exercise.”[763] Thus, instead of more “discipline,” the Bank found it

possible to take steps, which, according to Catterall, justified

Jackson, the following December, in saying in his Message that “the Bank

... announced its ability and readiness to abandon the system of

unparalleled curtailment ... and to extend its accommodations to the

community.”

Just, as in 1832, when floating down the Ohio on his last visit to the

Hermitage during the presidential campaign, Andrew Jackson was at peace

with himself and the world. But his friends had given orders to take

nothing for granted and to open the fighting along the whole line. They

had a twofold purpose--to hold the line in Congress, and to defeat,

wherever possible, any senatorial enemies who were candidates for

reëlection. Blair, of the “Globe,” began to issue special editions and

to send them broadcast all over the country.

The fight, as it was waged in New York, Virginia, and Mississippi, will

suffice to illustrate the general character and method of the campaign.

In all three States the Bank was the issue. Even the most hopeful of the

Whigs entertained no illusions as to Pennsylvania, where the most

powerful financial and commercial interests were arrayed with the Bank.

The two parties in the Empire State were mobilized, organized on a

military footing, and ready and eager for the fray.[764] The elections

in New Jersey and Pennsylvania were held in October, a month before

those in New York, and the first shock to the Whigs came in the returns

from these two States. That Pennsylvania, the home of Biddle, Sergeant,

and Duane, should have gone against the Bank and for Jackson, was not

disappointing, for little had been expected there. But much was expected

in New Jersey. There the issue was distinct. The two Senators from that

State had voted with the Bank on the deposits question. The Legislature

had adopted resolutions commendatory of Jackson’s actions, and in his

Protest the fighting President had not scrupled to quote these

resolutions to prove that the Senators had deliberately misrepresented

their people. Senator Frelinghuysen, in commenting upon these

instructions, had boasted that he and his colleague had “dared to meet

the frowns of their constituents,” and would not “bow the knee to these

instructions.”[765] Now he was before the people for reëlection, and the

issue was plain. The people’s verdict was unmistakable. The little State

swept into the Jackson column with a substantial majority, and

Frelinghuysen was retired.

Goaded by the sting of the New Jersey defeat, the New York Whigs

redoubled their efforts. “The Whigs are raising liberty poles in all the

wards,” wrote Hone. “I went to one of these ceremonies yesterday at the

corner of the Bowery and Hester Street. The pole, a hundred feet high,

with a splendid cap and gilt vane with suitable devices, was escorted by

a procession of good men and true.”[766] Thus, if the “mob” could make

the welkin ring at Democratic meetings, the more aristocratic Whigs

could sally forth from their counting-rooms and libraries to rub

shoulders with the common herd at Hester Street and the Bowery and shout

approval of the raising of a pole. But all was in vain. By nine o’clock

on the evening of the first day, Hone and his fellow Whigs realized that

“enough was known to satisfy us to our hearts’ content that we are

beaten--badly beaten; worse than the least sanguine of us

expected.”[767] The jubilant Democrats, however, were determined that

the Whig leaders should not feel utterly deserted, and a crowd of them

surged before Hone’s house with hisses and catcalls which kept him awake

all night. The Lord Holland of the American Whigs, who was sick at the

time, was inclined to resent it, but the next evening he found

consolation in dining with Webster who “was in a vein to be exceedingly

pleasant.”[768]

Such was the intensity of feeling and the bitterness of the struggle

that enthusiastic partisans partook of the nature of mobs in the larger

centers. Nowhere were the Democrats so intense as in Philadelphia,

where, on election day, the warring partisans exchanged shots, the

headquarters of the Whigs was sacked and burned by a mob which drove

back the firemen that attempted to quench the flames. A number of houses

were completely reduced to ashes. Such was the panic of Nicholas Biddle

that the day before the election he sent his wife and children into the

country, filled his house with armed men, and prepared for a siege. The

Bank building bristled with the bayonets and muskets of guards. But when

the gray dawn came, the one-time financial dictator found that none of

his property had been molested. It was blow enough to him to learn that

the Whigs, the country over, had gone down before the popular uprising.

But the bitterest fight was waged in Virginia, where the situation was

mixed to the point of chaos. The State was anti-Bank, but it was

anti-Jackson. Opposed to the Bank, it had been equally opposed to the

removal of the deposits. The feeling in Richmond was so inflamed that

only personal respect for Ritchie saved the “Enquirer” from mob

violence, for the courageous editor stuck to his guns and tried to

divert attention to the Bank itself. Administration papers were

established throughout the State with instructions to follow the lead of

his pen. The Virginia plan was twofold: to make the most of the

unpopularity of Leigh, who was again a candidate for the Senate, and to

divide and distract the Whigs by playing Clay against Calhoun. Nowhere

did the Democrats appreciate, as they did in Virginia, the impossible

nature of the Whig combination, and they dwelt upon its inconsistencies

from the beginning. Clay announced that he was not a candidate for the

presidential nomination in 1836. “But Mr. Clay knows not himself,” wrote

Ritchie. “But ambition does not burn so intensely in his bosom as it

does in the heart of another leader of the Senate (Mr. Calhoun). If

recent signs do not deceive us, this extraordinary man (extraordinary

every way for the vigor of his mind, the variety of his principles, and

the intensity of his ambition) will soon take the field, with feeble

hopes of winning the votes of the South, as well as the support of the

Bank. Then we shall see under which king the various members of the

opposition will range themselves.”[769] This irrepressible conflict of

Whig ambitions and interests was played upon by the Democratic press of

Virginia all through the summer and autumn of 1834.

But the immediate purpose of the Virginia Democrats was to humiliate

Leigh, who was unpopular with the masses because of his bitter fight in

the Constitutional Convention against the extension of the suffrage. And

he was as strongly with the Bank as Virginia was against it. A

house-to-house canvass was made, and in districts where a majority were

found against him it was proposed to evoke the right of instructions to

Assemblymen. The plan succeeded to the extent of disclosing a majority

hostile to the reëlection of Leigh, but the Whigs, who carried the

State, succeeded after a bitter struggle in returning him through a

flagrant disregard of the expressed will of the constituencies. The

battle was thus but half lost. The Democrats were supplied with

ammunition they were to use with deadly effect, and within little more

than a year they were to drive the two anti-Jackson Senators of Virginia

into private life. Ritchie began the next year’s battle without delay.

The “Enquirer” was flooded with resolutions and letters protesting the

election of Leigh over the instructions of the majority of the

people.[770]

In Mississippi the Jacksonians determined to prevent the reëlection of

Senator Poindexter, long the idol of the Mississippi Democracy, who had

turned upon Jackson with a virulence scarcely equaled by any old-line

Federalist, and cast his lot with Clay. With the adjournment of

Congress, the Mississippi Senator hastened home, where the enemies of

the Administration had planned a series of banquets at which he was to

denounce the President and vindicate himself. The Whigs were with him.

The Democrats, delighted with a slashing and brilliant assault on

Poindexter by Robert J. Walker, put that able publicist in the field,

and within a week he was engaged in one of the most spectacular

canvasses Mississippi had ever known, firing enormous open-air meetings

of frenzied Jacksonians. The outcome was the election of Walker--a

victory sweet to Jackson, for it was the vanquished who had sponsored

the resolution attacking his Protest.[771] And the triumph was all the

sweeter from the fact that, while Poindexter had supported the

Nullifiers, Walker had taken the lead against them in Mississippi, on

the platform, and through the press.

Thus the elections of 1834 were more than pleasing to Jackson and his

party. Two of his strongest senatorial opponents had lost their seats as

a result of their opposition, and Leigh had been saved only by a

disreputable betrayal of the people. In the Senate the Administration

was strengthened; and in the House the Democratic majority was reduced

but eight votes, leaving it a clear majority of 46 out of 242 members.

Strangely enough, so reliable an historian as McMaster has described

these elections as a triumph of the Whigs. Such was not the

interpretation of the Whigs themselves. Hone thought that they were

“badly beaten--worse than the least sanguine of us expected.”[772]

Webster accepted the verdict as final, and, much to the distress and

indignation of Biddle, announced that he was through. But the most

conclusive evidence of the contemporary opinion of the Whigs comes from

Thurlow Weed, the sagacious Whig journalist of the “Albany Journal.”

More prescient than most of the Whig leaders of the time, he had

foreseen the inevitable result of an attempt to win upon the Bank issue.

Quite early, when Webster’s keynote speech on the Bank, delivered at a

mass meeting in Boston, was sent for publication to all the party

papers, the copy that reached Weed never found its way into the “Albany

Journal.”[773] And immediately after the election in 1834, he

editorially expressed the feeling which appears to have taken possession

of the party generally. “There is one cause,” he wrote, “for

congratulations, connected with the recent election, in which even we

participate. It has terminated the United States Bank war.... We have

from the beginning deprecated the successive conflicts in defense of the

Bank.... But we have gone with our friends through these three

campaigns, under a strong and settled conviction that in every issue to

be tried by the people to which the Bank was a party, we must be beaten.

After struggling along from year to year with a doomed Bank upon our

shoulders, both the Bank and our party are finally overwhelmed.[774]”

Nor is it surprising that Clay, whose selfishness had forced Biddle into

making the recharter a campaign issue, was glad to dump the doomed Bank

from his shoulders. It is impossible to follow his course, pointing as

every act does to a purely party purpose, without arriving at the

conviction that he really cared little about the institution on Chestnut

Street. As the fight became more hopeless, he found the importunities of

Biddle more irksome. Viewed purely as a political or party contest, the

clever politicians who dominated the Jacksonian camp had shown far more

prescience and sagacity than the wisest of the Whigs. Amos Kendall had

a better understanding of the psychology of the masses than Clay or

Webster. Among the Whigs, Weed alone saw the end from the beginning. The

attempt to arouse the people in behalf of a great moneyed institution

against the attacks of a popular hero was in itself a grotesque and

ghastly absurdity. But after the decision had been made to undertake it,

the methods of Biddle and his political allies made defeat a certainty.

Frank Blair, of the “Globe,” was evidently sincere in his assertion that

had he been permitted to dictate the policy of the Whigs, he could not

have hit upon a plan more satisfactory to the Democrats.

That Jackson knew little of banking and advanced some strange theories

in the course of the fight; that he resorted to methods of violence in

some instances; and that he fought to kill, rather than to reform, may

be admitted. But the very nature of the fight he waged compelled the

Bank to disclose its tremendous power over the prosperity of the people.

No matter what they may have thought in the beginning, no one could have

doubted toward the end that the Bank did have the power to precipitate

panics, to punish the people for legislation it resented, to dominate,

in the end, the legislation of the future by the threat of reprisal upon

the business of the Nation. No one, in 1834, doubted that the National

Bank, in the hands of a man like Biddle domineering over pliant

directors, and assuming dictatorial authority over the members of

Congress, possessed powers incompatible with the preservation of the

rights and liberties of the people. From that day on, the Bank has had

its apologists among historians, and Jackson has been excoriated as an

ignorant usurper, but there has never been a time since when the

American people would have tolerated a return to the system that was

destroyed. Through several years the country was to be disturbed by the

sometimes stumbling processes of transition from the old to the new

system, but the Bank fight ended with the verdict of the polls in 1834.

Only the censure of the Senate remained to poison the mind of the iron

man in the White House. The Bank lingered on, a little while, under the

laws of Pennsylvania, and then crashed to the earth, ruining many of its

supporters.[775] And on the banker’s death, Hone copied into his diary

the comment of William Cullen Bryant in the “New York Evening Post,”

that Biddle “died at his country seat where he passed the last of his

days in elegant retirement, which, if justice had taken place, would

have been spent in the penitentiary.”[776]

The prolonged battle has left a lasting impression upon the political

life and methods of the Republic. It aroused, as never before, that

class consciousness, to which politicians have ever since appealed; it

gave dignity to demagogy, and made it pay. It marked the beginning of

the active participation of powerful corporations, as such, in the

politics of the country, witnessed the adoption of the methods of

intimidation and coercion, of systematic propaganda, of the

subsidization of disreputable newspapers. From that day on, the powerful

corporation has been anathema to the masses, monopoly has been a red

rag, and the contest between capital and labor has been a reality. If

this has been unfortunate, the fault has been no less with Clay, who

sought and made the issue, and with Biddle and his arrogant reliance on

the power of money, than with Jackson and the Kitchen Cabinet who

challenged the political pretensions of the Bank.

IV

The Whig leaders entered upon the congressional session of December in a

bitter mood. Calhoun was especially vicious and in a chronic rage

against the President and the Administration. The fury of the Whigs was

not moderated by the fact that State Legislatures were beginning to

demand the expunging from the records of the resolution of censure.

Benton, in the previous session, had served notice of his intention to

move to expunge, and the Kitchen Cabinet in the meanwhile had been busy

in building backfires against the offending Senators among their

constituents. The first State to act was Alabama. The day before Senator

King presented the Alabama resolutions, during a running discussion of

the revelations of mismanagement and crookedness in the Post-Office

Department, Senator Preston suggested that the Senate should censure

some one. Just whom he would censure was not made clear, but he did

refer to the previous declaration of Jackson that he was responsible for

the Executive departments. “Does any one doubt the turpitude of the

Post-Office?” asked Preston. “When hardly the age of man, it is found

steeped in corruption the most foul, the most melancholy. If the

President is responsible, and the officers acted improperly, is this the

house to present the subject? And shall we stand by without saying or

doing anything in regard to the present state of things in that

department?”

Calhoun was instantly on his feet. He had listened to the report on the

Post-Office “with sorrow and deep mortification.” After twenty-two years

of connection with the Government he was able to say that “in all that

time the charges of corruption against all the departments of the

Government that he had ever heard of were not equal to the disclosures

here made.” In truth he thought that “the exhibition would disgrace the

rottenest age of the Roman Republic.” He hoped some resolution would be

presented.

This implied threat was not lost on the ever alert Benton, and on the

following day he took the floor, reminded the Senate of his promise,

declared that nothing less than the expurgation of the offensive censure

would suffice, and served notice of his intention to present the

resolution. This opened the first debate on expurgation. Clay, with a

personal fling at Benton, saltily expressed the hope that before acting

the Missourian would carefully examine the Constitution, and concluded

that he would “oppose such a resolution at the very threshold.” Preston

conceded that his party had been “beaten down,” and demanded to know

whether “everything that we have done shall be expunged.” Calhoun would

“like to see a resolution which proposed to repeal the journal--to

repeal a fact.” If the thing could be done, “the Senate itself could be

expunged,” and the Government itself was at an end. He was “anxious to

see who would attempt to carry out the doctrines of the Protest of last

year--doctrines as despotic as those which were held by the autocrat of

all the Russias.”

To this, King took vigorous exception. The resolution of censure was not

“a fact.” “The Democracy of this land has spoken and pronounced its

condemnation of the proceeding.” He had hoped, when Calhoun declared on

a previous occasion that he would act for the country, he would have

little more to do with party, but he had since manifested a very

different feeling. Stung by the taunt, Calhoun made no half-hearted

denial of partisan bias. “I have no purpose to serve,” he said. “I have

no desire to be here.” And then, with evident insincerity, he added,

“Sir, I would not turn upon my heel to be entrusted with the management

of the Government.”[777]

When, a few weeks later, the day before the expiration of the session,

the discussion was renewed, Hugh Lawson White, now rapidly cooling to

frigidity toward Jackson, moved to amend Benton’s resolution by striking

out the word “expunge” and substituting “rescind, reverse, and to make

null and void.” This incident has been given an historical importance

beyond its due by many who have attributed to the motion the final break

between Jackson and White. The action of the Tennessee Senator

unquestionably outraged the Jacksonians, who ascribed it to hostility,

but such was not the dominating motive. He took the position that he

could not vote to “obliterate and deface the journal of the Senate.”

Benton protested that the word “expunge” was strictly parliamentary. To

his astonishment and chagrin, he discovered that White was not the only

Democrat who objected to his phrasing of the resolution, as others

crowded about him to urge the acceptance of the amendment. Finding

himself almost deserted, he afterwards said that he “yielded a

mortifying and reluctant consent.”[778] All this the proud Missourian

could stand. But when Webster immediately arose, and, after sounding the

pæan of triumph, moved that the resolution be laid upon the table; and

after Clay and Calhoun had spoken with bitterness and contempt, the

spirit of compromise died out in his heart, and he then and there

promised himself to continue the battle. The debate was acrimonious in

spirit, and in the midst of “great excitement.”[779] This was the

preliminary battle which was to have a spectacular ending in a

Jacksonian triumph a short time before the expiration of the iron man’s

Presidency.

V

To the Jacksonians, the most distressing feature of the short session

was the disclosure of the utter incompetency, blackened by positive

crookedness, in the rapidly growing Post-Office Department, which called

for the management of a man of more than ordinary organizing and

business ability. Major Barry possessed neither qualification. An honest

man himself, without the slightest business sense, easily imposed upon,

surrounded by subordinates who were scamps, and forced to deal with mail

contractors who were criminals, he lost control early in his

administration. When the Clayton investigation was completed, the

department was found honeycombed with fraud, plastered with forgeries,

and in a hopeless financial condition. And yet no one seriously

suspected Barry of complicity. Clay, who had lost the support of Harry,

his neighbor in Lexington, on the “bargain” story, did not hesitate to

exonerate him from culpability. But there was no defense for the

conditions, and Jackson, in his Message, had recommended a complete

reorganization of the department better to safeguard the public

interest. The two parties stood together on the Reorganization Bill, and

no member of either party attempted any justification of the conditions.

But the Democrats were on their toes throughout the-session to prevent

any personal condemnation of either Barry or Jackson. The Whigs lost no

opportunity to capitalize the scandal. The public money had been

squandered. Crooked contractors had been permitted to loot the Treasury.

They did not know the extent of the corruption, nor the responsibility

of the head of the department, but they did know that the putridity of

the thing had never been approached in American history. The majority

report of the investigating committee found a deficit of $800.000; the

minority placed the amount at $300,000; but both agreed that it was due

in part at least to maladministration.[780] Felix Grundy, who had charge

for the Administration, rejoiced in the fact, “to the honor of his

countrymen,” that no one “had been found to accuse the

Postmaster-General of corruption”;[781] and Senator Bibb of Kentucky, a

supporter of Clay, paid tribute to the personal qualities of Barry and

ascribed the failure to “the good disposition and kindness” of the head

of the department, which had been imposed upon by “interested and

selfish persons to further their own private interests.” Thus, in the

Senate, the debate on the Reorganization Bill was conducted with decorum

and without exciting personalities. An utter lack of system, a director

deficient in business sense and over-credulous, and all preyed upon by

dishonest subordinates and criminally inclined speculators--such was the

sense of the Senate.

But in the House, Barry’s personal integrity was not to go unchallenged.

In the lower branch he was unfortunate in friends who loved, not wisely,

but too well, who thought to prevent assault by challenging it. Some of

these had avowed a disposition to consider such an assault a personal

offense. During a night session, William C. Johnson of Maryland, a

promising and eloquent young Whig of imposing personal appearance,

sought an opportunity to affront Representative Hawes of Kentucky, a

member of the special dueling club. An insignificant incident during the

discussion of a post-route bill sufficed. On obtaining the floor,

Johnson looked significantly at Hawes, and with sinister deliberation

began: “It has been broadly hinted by some gentlemen ... that he who

shall have the temerity to criticize the acts of the Postmaster-General

must answer therefor elsewhere than in this hall.... Sir, I come from a

portion of the country where the law of personal responsibility is

recognized among gentlemen. I hold myself amenable to that law ...; and

now, in the face of those menaces which have been thrown out on this

floor, and intending to be responsible for what I am about to say, I

declare that the Post-Office Department is corrupt from head to foot,

through and through, and I believe that the head of the department,

William T. Barry, is as culpable as any officer under his control.”

The House was instantly in an uproar as Hawes rose to ask if Johnson

meant that the department was corrupt from Barry down. The young blade

from Maryland jauntily replied in the affirmative. Hawes said that Barry

was “as honest and honorable as any man who has a seat on this floor,”

and asked Johnson for the grounds for his charge. In the spirit of

swashbuckler he had set out to be, the latter merely reiterated what he

had said. There was no misunderstanding the meaning of the situation--it

meant a duel unless Johnson would agree to a qualification of his

statement. To all such appeals he was adamant. When, as a result, he was

challenged by Barry’s son, he began to hedge with the demand that the

duel take place “immediately.” He would not even consent to a day’s

delay, and young Barry withdrew the challenge. The incident proved

nothing except that in the Thirties young men carried chips on their

shoulders, and bandied words lightly.

The contemporaries of Barry exonerated him, and history has acquiesced

in their verdict.[782] But it was apparent that his usefulness in the

Cabinet was over. He had never been qualified. While the debate on the

Reorganization Bill was still in progress, Jackson summoned Amos Kendall

to the task of assuming charge and placing the department on a business

basis. At that time, the wizard of the Kitchen Cabinet, in ill health,

and without private means, was planning to retire from the public

service to serve his family more satisfactorily in a financial way. He

demurred--Jackson insisted--and in the end, like the good soldier that

he was, he yielded.

Barry, gracefully let out with the mission to Spain, sailed away, to die

in London on the way, and Kendall took charge. It is amazing that the

party prejudices of ninety years ago should still persist and refuse

justice to the genius of this exceptional man. Professor MacDonald does

not overstate when he describes him “as a man of remarkable

administrative power.”[783] Nor is it probable that so seasoned an

observer of public men as Senator Foote was unduly impressed when he

described him as “discoursing upon the gravest and most important

questions with a profundity and power which left a lasting

impress.”[784] Brilliant with the pen, sagacious beyond almost any man

of his time as a politician, wise in counsel, and yet capable of

managing the dry-as-dust details of the most practical of departments,

Amos Kendall is probably one of the greatest all-around publicists the

Republic has produced.

His first step on taking charge was thoroughly to familiarize himself

with the minute details of his office, with the special functions of

each subordinate, and the character of the man. He soon discovered the

secret of the good-natured Barry’s undoing, when a clerk, suspected of

having relations with a contractor as agent, approached him

ingratiatingly with the announcement that he “had control of funds and

would be happy to accommodate him with loans.” He was promptly

discharged.[785] After a thorough survey, Kendall concluded that “a few

powerful mail contractors, through favors to the officers and more

influential clerks, had really controlled the department, and for their

own selfish ends, and been the cause of all its embarrassments.”[786] He

adopted stringent rules for the guidance of employees. The acceptance of

a gift was to mean dismissal. So, too, with free rides on stage-coaches,

steamboats, or railroad cars carrying mail. Applying the rules as

rigidly to himself as to others, he promptly returned all presents and

free tickets, and thenceforward the Postmaster-General paid his way. But

the task confronting him was tremendous. The department was deeply in

debt and was sinking deeper. Not satisfied with the showing of

corruption by the congressional committee, he went over the ground and

uncovered crookedness it had overlooked. The postmaster of New York was

caught in the net and instantly dismissed. Some powerful and influential

contractors who had carried the mail between Washington and Philadelphia

were suspected, and Kendall made a searching investigation. Major Barry,

still in Washington at this time, became seriously disturbed, and

conceived the notion that his successor was bent on embarrassing him,

and Kendall, who had no suspicion of his predecessor, sent for him and

personally reassured him. But there were other embarrassments within the

Administration household. Mrs. Eaton, then in Washington, and intimate

with the family of one of the contractors who was pressing a claim that

Kendall was examining, called one day on Mrs. Kendall with the bald

proposition that if the claim were allowed, the contractor would present

the wife of the Postmaster-General with “a carriage and a pair of

horses.” The incident was promptly reported to Kendall, who recorded the

story many years later.[787] Applying himself and his administrative

genius diligently to his task, driving out the incompetent and corrupt,

practicing economy while extending the scope of the department’s

services, he soon put it on a paying basis, and before the expiration of

Jackson’s Administration, less than two years later, wiped out the

deficit. This is the man some historians have described as a vulgar

politician and a “printer.”

VI

No incident of this session so well illustrates the partisan bitterness

and the venomous nature of the hates engendered by the struggles of the

preceding years as the attempt on the life of Jackson at the Capitol on

January 30, 1835.[788] Under normal conditions and in ordinary times the

incident would have been dismissed, and, properly, ascribed to the

insanity of the assailant. But it was the first time an attempt had been

made upon the life of a President--and it was a President who had been

intemperately denounced as a tyrant, despot, and wrecker of American

institutions and liberties. Just as John Tyler had instantly thought of

“political effect,”[789] the ardent friends of Jackson caught the same

idea from the opposite angle. And two days later, Frank Blair in the

“Globe” threw out the suggestion of a conspiracy. “Whether Lawrence [the

assailant] has caught, in his visits to the Capitol, the mania which has

prevailed the last two sessions of the Senate,” he wrote, “whether he

has become infatuated with the chimeras which have troubled the brains

of the disappointed and ambitious orators who have depicted the

President as a Cæsar who ought to have a Brutus; as a Cromwell, a Nero,

a Tiberius, we know not. If no secret conspiracy has prompted the

perpetration of the horrid deed, we think it not improbable that some

delusion of intellect has grown out of his visits to the Capitol, and

that hearing despotism and every horrible mischief threatened to the

Republic, and revolution and all its train of calamities imputed as the

necessary consequence of the President’s measures, it may be that the

infatuated man fancied that he had reason to become his country’s

avenger. If he had heard and believed Mr. Calhoun’s speech of day before

yesterday, he would have found in it ample justification for his attempt

on one who was represented as the cause of the most dreadful calamities

of the Nation; as one who made perfect rottenness and corruption to

pervade the vitals of the Government, insomuch that it was scarcely

worth preserving, if it were possible.”[790]

The intimation here thrown out was bitterly resented by the Opposition

leaders, and particularly by Calhoun, who was mentioned. The very fact

that the intemperate and insincere denunciations of high officials as

responsible for the distress of the people, acting upon the diseased

brain, can very easily persuade the madman to constitute himself the

executioner, served to infuriate the orators who had given themselves

full play. Stung to the quick, Calhoun denounced the “Globe” as “base

and prostitute,” and described it as “the authentic and established

organ” of Jackson, “sustained by his power and pampered by his

hands.” “To what are we coming?” he exclaimed. “We are told that

to denounce the abuse of the Administration even in general terms,

without personal reference, is to instigate the assassination of the

Chief Executive.... I have made up my mind as to my duty. I am no

candidate for any office--I neither seek nor desire place--nothing

shall intimidate--nothing shall prevent me from doing what I believe is

due to my conscience and my country.”[791] Mr. Calhoun sat down--and

Mr. Leigh immediately rose to present a report from the Committee on

Revolutionary Claims.

But Mr. Calhoun’s attack on the “Globe” was not unnoticed by Blair, who

replied by quoting from the most venomous portions of Calhoun’s and

Preston’s tirades on the Post-Office report. A week later the

Administration organ was still harping on conspiracy. “Every hour,”

wrote Blair, “brings new proof to show that Lawrence has been operated

on to seek the President’s life, precisely as we had supposed from the

moment we learned that he had been an attendant on the debates in

Congress.”[792]

Very soon the capital was startled with the connection of Senator

Poindexter’s name with that of the assailant. The obsession took

possession of Jackson that his Mississippi enemy had instigated the

attempt at assassination. The examination of Lawrence had clearly

established his insanity; just as clearly shown that he had taken to

heart the charges of Jackson’s enemies that he was responsible for the

distress of the people. Finding himself hard pressed by fate, and

ascribing his unhappiness to the tyranny of Jackson, he had determined

to kill him. That explanation was convincing and sufficient. But the

suggestion that Poindexter had planned the deed fell on receptive soil.

Affidavits had been placed in Jackson’s hands to the effect that “a

gentleman who boarded in the same house informed him that Mr.

Poindexter had interviews with Lawrence but a few days before the

attempt on the President’s life.” Some time before the attack, “a

captain in high standing in the navy” had said that Poindexter, on a

voyage to New Orleans, had threatened to demand personal satisfaction of

Jackson, and if he refused “he would shoot him wherever he saw him.”

This had caused such anxiety to Jackson’s friends that the Reverend Mr.

Hatch, chaplain of the Senate, had personally informed Jackson of the

threat. All this, followed, after the assault, with an affidavit that

Lawrence had been seen to “go repeatedly to Poindexter’s residence,”

thoroughly convinced Jackson, who appears to have been in a morbid

condition like his enemies.[793] He excitedly charged it in conversation

with callers at the White House. Miss Martineau, who was friendly with

the Poindexters, and apparently fond of the Senator, was literally

forced to leave the White House by the abusive denunciation of the

Mississippian. She became his ardent partisan, and took pains to record

in her book that, on visiting the Poindexters on the night of the

assault, she had “greatly admired the moderation with which Mr.

Poindexter spoke of his foe.”[794]

Hearing from many quarters of Jackson’s charges, Poindexter wrote him

that he would discredit the reports unless confirmed by the President,

but that a failure to reply would be accepted as a confirmation. Jackson

displayed Poindexter’s letter to visitors, but made no response. Thus a

perfectly foolish notion of Jackson’s was forced to an issue. To

understand the feeling behind it all, and to appreciate the bitter

hostility of Poindexter, to which frequent reference has been made, it

is necessary to know more of the character and career of this really

remarkable but tragic figure.

George Poindexter was something of a genius, and, until his break with

Jackson, an idol of Mississippi. From the beginning he had been

accorded the leadership of the Democratic or Jeffersonian Party in that

Territory. His early congressional career was a justification of his

leadership. One who knew him in those days tells us that “his mind was

logical and strong; his conception was quick and acute; his powers of

combination and application were astonishing; his wit was pointed and

caustic, and his sarcasm overwhelming.”[795] These qualities made him a

tremendous power upon the stump with the then primitive people of his

State. In the gubernatorial office he rendered invaluable service which

strengthened his hold upon the masses. On the bench, he was noted for

his ability and justice, and, among the lawyers, he was conceded to have

few equals before a jury. During the War of 1812 he had further endeared

himself to the Mississippians by his patriotic appeal for preparation,

and, after he had aroused the Territory to fever heat, and Jackson had

appeared upon the scene, he became a volunteer aid upon the staff of the

future President. It was to Poindexter that the negro or soldier carried

the infamous British countersign, “Booty and Beauty,” and it was

Poindexter who conveyed it to Jackson. Later his enemies charged that he

had forged it to win the favor of the General. That such a man should

have made enemies was inevitable. So bitter were his denunciations of

his political enemies, so unscrupulous his use of terms, that at one

time a conspiracy was formed to force him into a duel and kill him. The

opportunity came after a peculiarly vitriolic attack upon a wealthy

merchant who affiliated with the Federalists. The merchant challenged

and was killed. Then Poindexter’s enemies charged that he had fired

before the word was given.

Nowhere in the campaign of 1828 did Jackson receive more ardent support

than in Mississippi where his old friend Poindexter directed his forces,

and one year after his inauguration, the lieutenant entered the Senate,

and almost immediately the feud between the erstwhile friends began.

The sordid feature of the story is the fact that it grew out of a

patronage controversy. Jackson had determined on the appointment of a

Tennesseean, a neighbor of the Hermitage, to the land office of

Mississippi. Poindexter protested that this patronage belonged to his

State and to him. Jackson refused to yield. Poindexter prevented the

confirmation of the Tennesseean. Jackson made a recess appointment, and

thenceforward the two comrades of 1812 were at swords’ points. Thus far

Jackson was manifestly in the wrong. His loyalty to friendship cannot

explain his disloyalty to Poindexter--who was also a friend, and a

friend in need. But such was the Mississippian’s prejudice and hate that

he abandoned, not only the President and purely Administration measures,

but the principles he had espoused and advocated for a generation. He

crossed the Rubicon, burned the bridges, and became a special favorite

of Clay’s. In every great fight of the Jackson period, Poindexter was

found arrayed with the Opposition. He stood with the Bank, favored the

censure, and offered the resolutions denunciatory of the Protest. In the

Nullification contest, he had essayed to lead the Nullifiers, and became

more offensive than Calhoun.

Unfortunately for Poindexter, in the fighting that followed he was far

from invulnerable on the personal side. Having been unfortunate in his

domestic relations, he had divorced his wife, denied the paternity of

his children, and plunged into the most reckless dissipation.[796] His

indecent reflections upon the purity of his wife drove her family,

extensive and influential, to his enemies; his intemperate tirades

against Jackson alienated the dominant Democratic sentiment of the

State; and while he fought boldly and bitterly to sustain himself, he

failed, and, at the time of the attack on Jackson by the madman at the

Capitol, was so discredited in Mississippi that he was planning to leave

the State, with his second wife, on the expiration of his term. A man

of genius whose morals failed to sustain his mentality--such the epitaph

of George Poindexter.[797]

Three weeks after Lawrence had fired and failed, Poindexter called the

Senate’s attention to an anonymous letter stating that affidavits were

in the hands of the President charging that interviews had taken place

between the assailant and himself a few days before the attempt on

Jackson’s life, and asking the appointment of a special committee of

investigation. Henry Clay, avowing that the rumors “inspired him with

nothing but the deepest mortification and regret,” and that it was

“impossible to credit the statement that affidavits should have been

procured at the instance of the Chief Executive for the purpose of

implicating a Senator of the United States in so foul a transaction,”

reluctantly consented to an investigation. Without further discussion, a

committee, consisting of John Tyler, chairman, Smith, Mangum, King, and

Silas Wright, was appointed, with permission to sit during the sessions

of the Senate; and three days later it unanimously exonerated Poindexter

from suspicion. Webster asked for the yeas and nays on its acceptance;

every Senator voted yea, and thus ended the most unfortunate incident in

the career of Andrew Jackson. The “Washington Globe,” which had

published the affidavits, wholly discredited them about the same

time.[798]

VII

The Calhoun inquiry “into the extent of federal patronage, the

circumstances which have contributed to its great increase of late, the

expediency and practicability of reducing the same, and the means of

such reduction,” served further to fan the flames of partisan madness

during this session. Persisting in the fallacy that he was not moved by

partisan or political considerations, he suggested that the committee be

composed of two members of each party. The Senate, however, was not

deceived as to his purpose, and selected four enemies of the

Administration, Calhoun, Webster, Southard, and Bibb, and two Democrats,

Benton, and King of Georgia. In due time an elaborate report was

submitted. It set forth that 60,294 persons were in the employ of the

Government; that together with the pensioners this meant more than

100,000 dependent on the Treasury. Implying that these constituted a

federal machine, Calhoun added all engaged in business who wished to

furnish supplies as part of the organization, influenced by patronage.

Worse--there were thousands who wished to get upon the pay-roll who

would willingly play the part of pliant tools to curry favor with

Executive power. And how was this to be remedied? Since one of the

causes contributing to the enlargement of the President’s patronage was

the increase in governmental expenditure, the statesmanlike thing to do

would be to reduce the revenue. A great amount of public land had been

thrown upon the market, calling for an army of receivers, registers, and

surveyors--all of whom were tools of Jackson. The Jacksonian policy of

removing men from office to make way for henchmen had reduced the

efficiency of the public service by making reappointments dependent on

something other than faithful service. This, by making the officials

dependent upon the President, tended to make them all subservient to his

will, and little better than his slaves. More: the power assumed by the

President to select the banks for the public deposits made them a part

of the presidential machine. If the public revenue could be reduced, and

the Government thus starved, many would be forced from the public crib,

but unhappily this could not be done. He proposed, therefore, a

constitutional amendment permitting the annual distribution of the

surplus till 1843 by a division of it into as many shares as there were

Senators and Representatives, with ten shares for each Territory and the

District of Columbia. And in addition to all this, he would enact a law

to regulate the deposits of public money, and another to repeal that

part of the Act of 1820 which limited the terms of customs officers.

When the report was submitted to the Senate, Poindexter made it the

occasion for mournful and indignant reflections upon the growing tyranny

of Jackson. He was profoundly moved by the revelations. Surely as many

as thirty thousand extra copies of the report should be published for

distribution. “The question now submitted to the Nation,” he said, “is

whether power is to be perpetuated in the hands of him who now wields

it, and the one he may select as his successor.” It was most unfortunate

that the people would not awaken to the sinister attacks upon their

liberties and institutions. The thoughtful, however, could not but see

the trend.

But why print thirty thousand copies, asked King of Georgia, if not to

serve a party purpose at the expense of the taxpayers? “What a spectacle

we do present from day to day!” he exclaimed. “The Senate has been a

week making war on the extras of the Post-Office Department. We are now

warring against the extravagance of the Executive; and whilst

brandishing the sword in one hand in defense of the public Treasury

against the ravages of the Executive, we are, with the other, slipping

it into our own pockets, or scattering it in profuse and wasteful

extravagance.”

The Senate compromised on ten thousand copies, and a rather dull debate,

in which the Bank question was revived, resulted. The bills proposed by

the Whig committee passed the Whig Senate to be promptly rejected in the

Democratic House. These measures merely served as pegs on which to hang

further denunciations of Jackson and his policies.

And the Democrats countered with an enthusiastic banquet in celebration

of the wiping-out of the national debt for the first time in history.

This had been one of Jackson’s ambitions--a consummation Clay had

determined should not come before the presidential election of 1832. But

it could not be prevented; and while the Whigs were expanding on

extravagance and the crowded public crib, the Jacksonians were pointing

to the extinguishment of the public debt as an answer to the attacks.

Benton, who presided as toastmaster at the banquet, was in flamboyant

mood.

“The national debt is paid,” he said. “This month of January, 1835, in

the fifty-eighth year of the Republic, Andrew Jackson being President,

the national debt is paid, and the apparition, so long unseen on

earth--a great nation without a national debt--stands revealed to the

astonished vision of a wondering world. Gentlemen, my heart is in this

double celebration, and I offer you a sentiment, which, coming directly

from my own bosom, will find its response in yours: President Jackson:

may the evening of his days be as tranquil and as happy for himself as

their meridian has been resplendent, glorious, and beneficent for his

country.”

Such was the partisan madness of this short session that a resolution,

offered and urged by Preston, the Whig, for the purchase of some

pictures for “the President’s house,” was promptly voted down, and

Preston’s efforts to have the vote reconsidered were unavailing. It was

into this madhouse of partisan rancor that the French crisis,

threatening war, involving the world prestige of the Republic, had been

thrown by Jackson; and we shall now note how nearly partisanship came to

compromising and weakening the Nation in the face of a foreign

antagonist.

The party battles of the Jackson period · 第 13 / 17 章