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THE STUDY OF WORDS

ON THE STUDY OF WORDS

BY

RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D.

ARCHBISHOP

'Language is the armoury of the human mind, and at once contains the

trophies of its past, and the weapons of its future, conquests'

--COLERIDGE

'Out, idle words, servants to shallow fools!'--SHAKESPEARE

TWENTIETH EDITION revised by

THE REV. A. L. MAYHEW

Joint Author of 'The Concise Middle English Dictionary'

PREFACE TO THE TWENTIETH EDITION.

In all essential points this edition of The Study of Words is the same

book as the last edition. The aim of the editor has been to alter as

little of Archbishop Trench's work as possible. In the arrangement of

the book, in the order of the chapters and paragraphs, in the style, in

the general presentation of the matter, no change has been made. On the

other hand, the work has been thoroughly revised and corrected. A great

deal of thought and labour has of late been bestowed on English

philology, and there has been a great advance in the knowledge of the

laws regulating the development of the sounds of English words, and the

result has been that many a derivation once generally accepted has had

to be given up as phonetically impossible. An attempt has been made to

purge the book of all erroneous etymologies, and to correct in the text

small matters of detail. There have also been added some footnotes, in

which difficult points are discussed and where reference is given to

recent authorities. All editorial additions, whether in the text or in

the notes, are enclosed in square brackets. It is hoped that the book

as it now stands does not contain in its etymological details anything

inconsistent with the latest discoveries of English scholars.

A. L. MAYHEW.

WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD: _August_, 1888.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

These lectures will not, I trust, be found anywhere to have left out of

sight seriously, or for long, the peculiar needs of those for whom they

were originally intended, and to whom they were primarily addressed. I

am conscious, indeed, here and there, of a certain departure from my

first intention, having been in part seduced to this by a circumstance

which I had not in the least contemplated when I obtained permission to

deliver them, by finding, namely, that I should have other hearers

besides the pupils of the Training-School. Some matter adapted for

those rather than for these I was thus led to introduce--which

afterwards I was unwilling, in preparing for the press, to remove; on

the contrary adding to it rather, in the hope of obtaining thus a

somewhat wider circle of readers than I could have hoped, had I more

rigidly restricted myself in the choice of my materials. Yet I should

greatly regret to have admitted so much of this as should deprive these

lectures of their fitness for those whose profit in writing and in

publishing I had mainly in view, namely schoolmasters, and those

preparing to be such.

Had I known any book entering with any fulness, and in a popular manner,

into the subject-matter of these pages, and making it its exclusive

theme, I might still have delivered these lectures, but should scarcely

have sought for them a wider audience than their first, gladly leaving

the matter in their hands, whose studies in language had been fuller

and riper than my own. But abundant and ready to hand as are the

materials for such a book, I did not; while yet it seems to me that the

subject is one to which it is beyond measure desirable that their

attention, who are teaching, or shall have hereafter to teach, others

should be directed; so that they shall learn to regard language as one

of the chiefest organs of their own education and that of others. For I

am persuaded that I have used no exaggeration in saying, that for many

a young man 'his first discovery that words are living powers, has been

like the dropping of scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of

another sense, or the introduction into a new world,'--while yet all

this may be indefinitely deferred, may, indeed, never find place at all,

unless there is some one at hand to help for him, and to hasten the

process; and he who so does, will ever after be esteemed by him as one

of his very foremost benefactors. Whatever may be Horne Tooke's

shortcomings (and they are great), whether in details of etymology, or

in the philosophy of grammar, or in matters more serious still, yet,

with all this, what an epoch in many a student's intellectual life has

been his first acquaintance with _The Diversions of Purley_. And they

were not among the least of the obligations which the young men of our

time owed to Coleridge, that he so often himself weighed words in the

balances, and so earnestly pressed upon all with whom his voice went

for anything, the profit which they would find in so doing. Nor, with

the certainty that I am anticipating much in my little volume, can I

refrain from quoting some words which were not present with me during

its composition, although I must have been familiar with them long ago;

words which express excellently well why it is that these studies

profit so much, and which will also explain the motives which induced

me to add my little contribution to their furtherance:

'A language will often be wiser, not merely than the vulgar, but even

than the wisest of those who speak it. Being like amber in its efficacy

to circulate the electric spirit of truth, it is also like amber in

embalming and preserving the relics of ancient wisdom, although one is

not seldom puzzled to decipher its contents. Sometimes it locks up

truths, which were once well known, but which, in the course of ages,

have passed out of sight and been forgotten. In other cases it holds

the germs of truths, of which, though they were never plainly discerned,

the genius of its framers caught a glimpse in a happy moment of

divination. A meditative man cannot refrain from wonder, when he digs

down to the deep thought lying at the root of many a metaphorical term,

employed for the designation of spiritual things, even of those with

regard to which professing philosophers have blundered grossly; and

often it would seem as though rays of truth, which were still below the

intellectual horizon, had dawned upon the imagination as it was looking

up to heaven. Hence they who feel an inward call to teach and enlighten

their countrymen, should deem it an important part of their duty to

draw out the stores of thought which are already latent in their native

language, to purify it from the corruptions which Time brings upon all

things, and from which language has no exemption, and to endeavour to

give distinctness and precision to whatever in it is confused, or

obscure, or dimly seen'--_Guesses at Truth, First Series_, p. 295.

ITCHENSTOKE: Oct. 9, 1851.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I. INTRODUCTORY LECTURE

LECTURE II. ON THE POETRY IN WORDS

LECTURE III. ON THE MORALITY IN WORDS

LECTURE IV. ON THE HISTORY IN WORDS

LECTURE V. ON THE RISE OF NEW WORDS

LECTURE VI. ON THE DISTINCTION OF WORDS

LECTURE VII. THE SCHOOLMASTER'S USE OF WORDS

INDEX OF WORDS

ON THE STUDY OF WORDS

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE.

There are few who would not readily acknowledge that mainly in worthy

books are preserved and hoarded the treasures of wisdom and knowledge

which the world has accumulated; and that chiefly by aid of books they

are handed down from one generation to another. I shall urge on you in

these lectures something different from this; namely, that not in books

only, which all acknowledge, nor yet in connected oral discourse, but

often also in words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of

moral and historic truth, and no less of passion and imagination, laid

up--that from these, lessons of infinite worth may be derived, if only

our attention is roused to their existence. I shall urge on you how

well it will repay you to study the words which you are in the habit of

using or of meeting, be they such as relate to highest spiritual things,

or our common words of the shop and the market, and of all the familiar

intercourse of daily life. It will indeed repay you far better than you

can easily believe. I am sure, at least, that for many a young man his

first discovery of the fact that words are living powers, are the

vesture, yea, even the body, which thoughts weave for themselves, has

been like the dropping of scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of

another sense, or the introduction into a new world; he is never able

to cease wondering at the moral marvels that surround him on every side,

and ever reveal themselves more and more to his gaze.

We indeed hear it not seldom said that ignorance is the mother of

admiration. No falser word was ever spoken, and hardly a more

mischievous one; implying, as it does, that this healthiest exercise of

the mind rests, for the most part, on a deceit and a delusion, and that

with larger knowledge it would cease; while, in truth, for once that

ignorance leads us to admire that which with fuller insight we should

perceive to be a common thing, one demanding no such tribute from us, a

hundred, nay, a thousand times, it prevents us from admiring that which

is admirable indeed. And this is so, whether we are moving in the

region of nature, which is the region of God's wonders, or in the

region of art, which is the region of man's wonders; and nowhere truer

than in this sphere and region of language, which is about to claim us

now. Oftentimes here we walk up and down in the midst of intellectual

and moral marvels with a vacant eye and a careless mind; even as some

traveller passes unmoved over fields of fame, or through cities of

ancient renown--unmoved, because utterly unconscious of the lofty deeds

which there have been wrought, of the great hearts which spent

themselves there. We, like him, wanting the knowledge and insight which

would have served to kindle admiration in us, are oftentimes deprived

of this pure and elevating excitement of the mind, and miss no less

that manifold instruction which ever lies about our path, and nowhere

more largely than in our daily words, if only we knew how to put forth

our hands and make it our own. 'What riches,' one exclaims, 'lie hidden

in the vulgar tongue of our poorest and most ignorant. What flowers of

paradise lie under our feet, with their beauties and their parts

undistinguished and undiscerned, from having been daily trodden on.'

And this subject upon which we are thus entering ought not to be a dull

or uninteresting one in the handling, or one to which only by an effort

you will yield the attention which I shall claim. If it shall prove so,

this I fear must be through the fault of my manner of treating it; for

certainly in itself there is no study which _may_ be made at once more

instructive and entertaining than the study of the use and abuse, the

origin and distinction of words, with an investigation, slight though

it may be, of the treasures contained in them; which is exactly that

which I now propose to myself and to you. I remember a very learned

scholar, to whom we owe one of our best Greek lexicons, a book which

must have cost him years, speaking in the preface of his completed work

with a just disdain of some, who complained of the irksome drudgery of

such toils as those which had engaged him so long,--toils irksome,

forsooth, because they only had to do with words. He disclaims any part

with those who asked pity for themselves, as so many galley-slaves

chained to the oar, or martyrs who had offered themselves for the good

of the literary world. He declares that the task of classing, sorting,

grouping, comparing, tracing the derivation and usage of words, had

been to him no drudgery, but a delight and labour of love. [Footnote:

It is well worth the while to read on this same subject the pleasant

_causerie_ of Littré 'Comment j'ai fait mon Dictionnaire.' It is to be

found pp. 390-442 of his _Glanures_.]

And if this may be true in regard of a foreign tongue, how much truer

ought it to be in regard of our own, of our 'mother tongue,' as we

affectionately call it. A great writer not very long departed from us

has borne witness at once to the pleasantness and profit of this study.

'In a language,' he says, 'like ours, where so many words are derived

from other languages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or

more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek for the

etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in

which more knowledge of more value may be conveyed by the history of a

word than by the history of a campaign.' So writes Coleridge; and

impressing the same truth, Emerson has somewhere characterized language

as 'fossil poetry.' He evidently means that just as in some fossil,

curious and beautiful shapes of vegetable or animal life, the graceful

fern or the finely vertebrated lizard, such as now, it may be, have

been extinct for thousands of years, are permanently bound up with the

stone, and rescued from that perishing which would else have been their

portion,--so in words are beautiful thoughts and images, the

imagination and the feeling of past ages, of men long since in their

graves, of men whose very names have perished, there are these, which

might so easily have perished too, preserved and made safe for ever.

The phrase is a striking one; the only fault one can find with it is

that it is too narrow. Language may be, and indeed is, this 'fossil

poetry'; but it may be affirmed of it with exactly the same truth that

it is fossil ethics, or fossil history. Words quite as often and as

effectually embody facts of history, or convictions of the moral sense,

as of the imagination or passion of men; even as, so far as that moral

sense may be perverted, they will bear witness and keep a record of

that perversion. On all these points I shall enter at full in after

lectures; but I may give by anticipation a specimen or two of what I

mean, to make from the first my purpose and plan more fully

intelligible to all.

Language then is 'fossil poetry'; in other words, we are not to look

for the poetry which a people may possess only in its poems, or its

poetical customs, traditions, and beliefs. Many a single word also is

itself a concentrated poem, having stores of poetical thought and

imagery laid up in it. Examine it, and it will be found to rest on some

deep analogy of things natural and things spiritual; bringing those to

illustrate and to give an abiding form and body to these. The image may

have grown trite and ordinary now: perhaps through the help of this

very word may have become so entirely the heritage of all, as to seem

little better than a commonplace; yet not the less he who first

discerned the relation, and devised the new word which should express

it, or gave to an old, never before but literally used, this new and

figurative sense, this man was in his degree a poet--a maker, that is,

of things which were not before, which would not have existed but for

him, or for some other gifted with equal powers. He who spake first of

a 'dilapidated' fortune, what an image must have risen up before his

mind's eye of some falling house or palace, stone detaching itself from

stone, till all had gradually sunk into desolation and ruin. Or he who

to that Greek word which signifies 'that which will endure to be held

up to and judged by the sunlight,' gave first its ethical signification

of 'sincere,' 'truthful,' or as we sometimes say, 'transparent,' can we

deny to him the poet's feeling and eye? Many a man had gazed, we are

sure, at the jagged and indented mountain ridges of Spain, before one

called them 'sierras' or 'saws,' the name by which now they are known,

as _Sierra_ Morena, _Sierra_ Nevada; but that man coined his

imagination into a word which will endure as long as the everlasting

hills which he named.

But it was said just now that words often contain a witness for great

moral truths--God having pressed such a seal of truth upon language,

that men are continually uttering deeper things than they know,

asserting mighty principles, it may be asserting them against

themselves, in words that to them may seem nothing more than the

current coin of society. Thus to what grand moral purposes Bishop

Butler turns the word 'pastime'; how solemn the testimony which he

compels the world, out of its own use of this word, to render against

itself--obliging it to own that its amusements and pleasures do not

really satisfy the mind and fill it with the sense of an abiding and

satisfying joy: [Footnote: _Sermon_ xiv. _Upon the Love of God_.

Curiously enough, Montaigne has, in his Essays, drawn the same

testimony out of the word: 'This ordinary phrase of Pass-time, and

passing away the time, represents the custom of those wise sort of

people, who think they cannot have a better account of their lives,

than to let them run out and slide away, to pass them over and to baulk

them, and as much as they can, to take no notice of them and to shun

them, as a thing of troublesome and contemptible quality. But I know it

to be another kind of thing, and find it both valuable and commodious

even in its latest decay, wherein I now enjoy it, and nature has

delivered it into our hands in such and so favourable circumstances

that we commonly complain of ourselves, if it be troublesome to us or

slide unprofitably away.'] they are only 'pastime'; they serve only, as

this word confesses, to _pass_ away the _time_, to prevent it from

hanging, an intolerable burden, on men's hands: all which they can do

at the best is to prevent men from discovering and attending to their

own internal poverty and dissatisfaction and want. He might have added

that there is the same acknowledgment in the word 'diversion' which

means no more than that which _diverts_ or turns us aside from

ourselves, and in this way helps us to forget ourselves for a little.

And thus it would appear that, even according to the world's own

confession, all which it proposes is--not to make us happy, but a

little to prevent us from remembering that we are unhappy, to _pass_

away our time, to _divert_ us from ourselves. While on the other hand

we declare that the good which will really fill our souls and satisfy

them to the uttermost, is not in us, but without us and above us, in

the words which we use to set forth any transcending delight. Take

three or four of these words--'transport,' 'rapture,' 'ravishment,'

'ecstasy,'--'transport,' that which _carries_ us, as 'rapture,' or

'ravishment,' that which _snatches_ us out of and above ourselves; and

'ecstasy' is very nearly the same, only drawn from the Greek. And not

less, where a perversion of the moral sense has found place, words

preserve oftentimes a record of this perversion. We have a signal

example of this in the use, or rather misuse, of the words 'religion'

and 'religious' during the Middle Ages, and indeed in many parts of

Christendom still. A 'religious' person did not then mean any one who

felt and owned the bonds that bound him to God and to his fellow-men,

but one who had taken peculiar vows upon him, the member of a monastic

Order, of a 'religion' as it was called. As little did a 'religious'

house then mean, nor does it now mean in the Church of Rome, a

Christian household, ordered in the fear of God, but a house in which

these persons were gathered together according to the rule of some man.

What a light does this one word so used throw on the entire state of

mind and habits of thought in those ages! That then was 'religion,' and

alone deserved the name! And 'religious' was a title which might not be

given to parents and children, husbands and wives, men and women

fulfilling faithfully and holily in the world the duties of their

several stations, but only to those who had devised a self-chosen

service for themselves. [Footnote: A reviewer in Fraser's Magazine, Dec.

1851, doubts whether I have not here pushed my assertion too far. So

far from this, it was not merely the 'popular language' which this

corruption had invaded, but a decree of the great Fourth Lateran

Council (A.D. 1215), forbidding the further multiplication of monastic

Orders, runs thus: Ne nimia _religionum_ diversitas gravem in Ecclesia

Dei confusionem inducat, firmiter prohibemus, ne quis de cetero novam

_religionem_ inveniat, sed quicunque voluerit ad _religionem_ converti,

unam de approbatis assumat.]

But language is fossil history as well. What a record of great social

revolutions, revolutions in nations and in the feelings of nations, the

one word 'frank' contains, which is used, as we all know, to express

aught that is generous, straightforward, and free. The Franks, I need

not remind you, were a powerful German tribe, or association of tribes,

who gave themselves [Footnote: This explanation of the name _Franks_ is

now generally given up. The name is probably a derivative from a lost

O.H.G. _francho_, a spear or javelin: compare A.S. _franca_, Icel.

_frakka_; similarly the Saxons are supposed to have derived their name

from a weapon--_seax_, a knife; see Kluge's _Dict_. (s.v. _frank_).]

this proud name of the 'franks' or the free; and who, at the breaking

up of the Roman Empire, possessed themselves of Gaul, to which they

gave their own name. They were the ruling conquering people, honourably

distinguished from the Gauls and degenerate Romans among whom they

established themselves by their independence, their love of freedom,

their scorn of a lie; they had, in short, the virtues which belong to a

conquering and dominant race in the midst of an inferior and conquered

one. And thus it came to pass that by degrees the name 'frank'

indicated not merely a national, but involved a moral, distinction as

well; and a 'frank' man was synonymous not merely with a man of the

conquering German race, but was an epithet applied to any man possessed

of certain high moral qualities, which for the most part appertained to,

and were found only in, men of that stock; and thus in men's daily

discourse, when they speak of a person as being 'frank,' or when they

use the words 'franchise,' 'enfranchisement,' to express civil

liberties and immunities, their language here is the outgrowth, the

record, and the result of great historic changes, bears testimony to

facts of history, whereof it may well happen that the speakers have

never heard. [Footnote: 'Frank,' though thus originally a German word,

only came back to Germany from France in the seventeenth century. With

us it is found in the sixteenth; but scarcely earlier.] The word

'slave' has undergone a process entirely analogous, although in an

opposite direction. 'The martial superiority of the Teutonic races

enabled them to keep their slave markets supplied with captives taken

from the Sclavonic tribes. Hence, in all the languages of Western

Europe, the once glorious name of Slave has come to express the most

degraded condition of men. What centuries of violence and warfare does

the history of this word disclose.' [Footnote: Gibbon, _Decline and

Fall_, c. 55. [It is very doubtful whether the idea of 'glory' was

implied originally in the national name of _Slav_. It is generally held

now that the Slavs gave themselves the name as being 'the

intelligible,' or 'the intelligibly speaking' people; as in the case of

many other races, they regarded their strange-speaking neighbours as

'barbarian,' that is 'stammering,' or even as 'dumb.' So the Russians

call their neighbours the Germans _njemets_, connected with _njemo_,

indistinct. The old name _Slovene_, Slavonians, is probably a

derivative from the substantive which appears in Church Slavonic in the

form _slovo_, a word; see Thomsen's _Russia and Scandinavia_, p. 8.

_Slovo_ is closely connected with the old Slavonic word for 'fame'--

_slava_, hence, no doubt, the explanation of _Slave_ favoured by

Gibbon.]]

Having given by anticipation this handful of examples in illustration

of what in these lectures I propose, I will, before proceeding further,

make a few observations on a subject, which, if we would go at all to

the root of the matter, we can scarcely leave altogether untouched,--I

mean the origin of language, in which however we will not entangle

ourselves deeper than we need. There are, or rather there have been,

two theories about this. One, and that which rather has been than now

is, for few maintain it still, would put language on the same level

with the various arts and inventions with which man has gradually

adorned and enriched his life. It would make him by degrees to have

invented it, just as he might have invented any of these, for himself;

and from rude imperfect beginnings, the inarticulate cries by which he

expressed his natural wants, the sounds by which he sought to imitate

the impression of natural objects upon him, little by little to have

arrived at that wondrous organ of thought and feeling, which his

language is often to him now.

It might, I think, be sufficient to object to this explanation, that

language would then be an _accident_ of human nature; and, this being

the case, that we certainly should somewhere encounter tribes sunken so

low as not to possess it; even as there is almost no human art or

invention so obvious, and as it seems to us so indispensable, but there

are those who have fallen below its knowledge and its exercise. But

with language it is not so. There have never yet been found human

beings, not the most degraded horde of South African bushmen, or Papuan

cannibals, who did not employ this means of intercourse with one

another. But the more decisive objection to this view of the matter is,

that it hangs together with, and is indeed an essential part of, that

theory of society, which is contradicted alike by every page of Genesis,

and every notice of our actual experience--the 'urang-utang theory,' as

it has been so happily termed--that, I mean, according to which the

primitive condition of man was the savage one, and the savage himself

the seed out of which in due time the civilized man was unfolded;

whereas, in fact, so far from being this living seed, he might more

justly be considered as a dead withered leaf, torn violently away from

the great trunk of humanity, and with no more power to produce anything

nobler than himself out of himself, than that dead withered leaf to

unfold itself into the oak of the forest. So far from being the child

with the latent capabilities of manhood, he is himself rather the man

prematurely aged, and decrepit, and outworn.

But the truer answer to the inquiry how language arose, is this: God

gave man language, just as He gave him reason, and just because He gave

him reason; for what is man's _word_ but his reason, coming forth that

it may behold itself? They are indeed so essentially one and the same

that the Greek language has one word for them both. He gave it to him,

because he could not be man, that is, a social being, without it. Yet

this must not be taken to affirm that man started at the first

furnished with a full-formed vocabulary of words, and as it were with

his first dictionary and first grammar ready-made to his hands. He did

not thus begin the world _with names_, but _with the power of naming_:

for man is not a mere speaking machine; God did not teach him words, as

one of us teaches a parrot, from without; but gave him a capacity, and

then evoked the capacity which He gave. Here, as in everything else

that concerns the primitive constitution, the great original institutes,

of humanity, our best and truest lights are to be gotten from the study

of the first three chapters of Genesis; and you will observe that there

it is not God who imposed the first names on the creatures, but Adam--

Adam, however, at the direct suggestion of his Creator. _He_ brought

them all, we are told, to Adam, 'to see what he would call them; and

whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name

thereof' (Gen. ii. 19). Here we have the clearest intimation of the

origin, at once divine and human, of speech; while yet neither is so

brought forward as to exclude or obscure the other.

And so far we may concede a limited amount of right to those who have

held a progressive acquisition, on man's part, of the power of

embodying thought in words. I believe that we should conceive the

actual case most truly, if we conceived this power of naming things and

expressing their relations, as one laid up in the depths of man's being,

one of the divine capabilities with which he was created: but one (and

in this differing from those which have produced in various people

various arts of life) which could not remain dormant in him, for man

could be only man through its exercise; which therefore did rapidly bud

and blossom out from within him at every solicitation from the world

without and from his fellow-man; as each object to be named appeared

before his eyes, each relation of things to one another arose before

his mind. It was not merely the possible, but the necessary, emanation

of the spirit with which he had been endowed. Man makes his own

language, but he makes it as the bee makes its cells, as the bird its

nest; he cannot do otherwise. [Footnote: Renan has much of interest on

this matter, both in his work _De l'Origine du Langage_, and in his

_Hist. des Langues Semitiques_. I quote from the latter, p. 445: Sans

doute les langues, comme tout ce qui est organisé, sont sujettes à la

loi du développement graduel. En soutenant que le langage primitif

possédait les éléments nécessaires à son intégrité, nous sommes loin de

dire que les mécanismes d'un âge plus avancé y fussent arrivés a leur

pleine existence. Tout y était, mais confusément et sans distinction.

Le temps seul et les progrès de l'esprit humain pouvaient opérer un

discernement dans cette obscure synthèse, et assigner à chaque élément

son rôle spécial. La vie, en un mot, n'était ici, comme partout, qu'à

la condition de l'évolution du germe primitif, de la distribution des

rôles et de la séparation des organes. Mais ces organes eux-mêmes

furent détermines dès le premier jour, et depuis l'acte générateur qui

le fit être, le langage ne s'est enrichi d'aucune fonction vraiment

nouvelle. Un germe est posé, renfermant en puissance tout ce que l'être

sera un jour; le germe se développe, les formes se constituent dans

leurs proportions régulières, ce qui était en puissance devient en

acte; mais rien ne se crée, rien ne s'ajoute: telle est la loi commune

des êtres soumis aux conditions de la vie. Telle fut aussi la loi du

langage.]

_How_ this latent power evolved itself first, how this spontaneous

generation of language came to pass, is a mystery; even as every act of

creation is of necessity such; and as a mystery all the deepest

inquirers into the subject are content to leave it. Yet we may perhaps

a little help ourselves to the realizing of what the process was, and

what it was not, if we liken it to the growth of a tree springing out

of, and unfolding itself from, a root, and according to a necessary

law--that root being the divine capacity of language with which man was

created, that law being the law of highest reason with which he was

endowed: if we liken it to this rather than to the rearing of a house,

which a man should slowly and painfully fashion for himself with dead

timbers combined after his own fancy and caprice; and which little by

little improved in shape, material, and size, being first but a log

house, answering his barest needs, and only after centuries of toil and

pain growing for his sons' sons into a stately palace for pleasure and

delight.

Were it otherwise, were the savage the primitive man, we should then

find savage tribes, furnished scantily enough, it might be, with the

elements of speech, yet at the same time with its fruitful beginnings,

its vigorous and healthful germs. But what does their language on close

inspection prove? In every case what they are themselves, the remnant

and ruin of a better and a nobler past. Fearful indeed is the impress

of degradation which is stamped on the language of the savage, more

fearful perhaps even than that which is stamped upon his form. When

wholly letting go the truth, when long and greatly sinning against

light and conscience, a people has thus gone the downward way, has been

scattered off by some violent catastrophe from those regions of the

world which are the seats of advance and progress, and driven to its

remote isles and further corners, then as one nobler thought, one

spiritual idea after another has perished from it, the words also that

expressed these have perished too. As one habit of civilization has

been let go after another, the words which those habits demanded have

dropped as well, first out of use, and then out of memory and thus

after a while have been wholly lost.

Moffat, in his _Missionary Labours and Scenes in South Africa_, gives

us a very remarkable example of the disappearing of one of the most

significant words from the language of a tribe sinking ever deeper in

savagery; and with the disappearing of the word, of course, the

disappearing as well of the great spiritual fact and truth whereof that

word was at once the vehicle and the guardian. The Bechuanas, a Caffre

tribe, employed formerly the word 'Morimo,' to designate 'Him that is

above' or 'Him that is in heaven' and attached to the word the notion

of a supreme Divine Being. This word, with the spiritual idea

corresponding to it, Moffat found to have vanished from the language of

the present generation, although here and there he could meet with an

old man, scarcely one or two in a thousand, who remembered in his youth

to have heard speak of 'Morimo'; and this word, once so deeply

significant, only survived now in the spells and charms of the so-

called rainmakers and sorcerers, who misused it to designate a fabulous

ghost, of whom they told the absurdest and most contradictory things.

And as there is no such witness to the degradation of the savage as the

brutal poverty of his language, so is there nothing that so effectually

tends to keep him in the depths to which he has fallen. You cannot

impart to any man more than the words which he understands either now

contain, or can be made, intelligibly to him, to contain. Language is

as truly on one side the limit and restraint of thought, as on the

other side that which feeds and unfolds thought. Thus it is the ever-

repeated complaint of the missionary that the very terms are well-nigh

or wholly wanting in the dialect of the savage whereby to impart to him

heavenly truths; and not these only; but that there are equally wanting

those which should express the nobler emotions of the human heart.

Dobrizhoffer, the Jesuit missionary, in his curious _History of the

Abipones,_ tells us that neither these nor the Guarinies, two of the

principal native tribes of Brazil, possessed any word in the least

corresponding to our 'thanks.' But what wonder, if the feeling of

gratitude was entirely absent from their hearts, that they should not

have possessed the corresponding word in their vocabularies? Nay, how

should they have had it there? And that in this absence lies the true

explanation is plain from a fact which the same writer records, that,

although inveterate askers, they never showed the slightest sense of

obligation or of gratitude when they obtained what they sought; never

saying more than, 'This will be useful to me,' or, 'This is what I

wanted.' Dr. Krapf, after laborious researches in some widely extended

dialects of East Africa, has remarked in them the same absence of any

words expressing the idea of gratitude.

Nor is it only in what they have forfeited and lost, but also in what

they have retained or invented, that these languages proclaim their

degradation and debasement, and how deeply they and those that speak

them have fallen. For indeed the strange wealth and the strange poverty,

I know not which the strangest and the saddest, of the languages of

savage tribes, rich in words which proclaim their shame, poor in those

which should attest the workings of any nobler life among them, not

seldom absolutely destitute of these last, are a mournful and ever-

recurring surprise, even to those who were more or less prepared to

expect nothing else. Thus I have read of a tribe in New Holland, which

has no word to signify God, but has one to designate a process by which

an unborn child may be destroyed in the bosom of its mother. [Footnote:

A Wesleyan missionary, communicating with me from Fiji, assures me I

have here understated the case. He says: 'I could write down several

words, which express as many different ways of killing an unborn

child.' He has at the same time done me the favour to send me dreadful

confirmation of all which I have here asserted. It is a list of some

Fiji words, with the hideous meanings which they bear, or facts which

they imply. He has naturally confined himself to those in one domain of

human wickedness--that, namely, of cruelty; leaving another domain,

which borders close on this, and which, he assures me, would yield

proofs quite as terrible, altogether untouched. It is impossible to

imagine a record more hideous of what the works of the arch-murderer

are, or one more fitted to stir up missionary zeal in behalf of those

dark places of the earth which are full of the habitations of cruelty.

A very few specimens must suffice. The language of Fiji has a word for

a club which has killed a man; for a dead body which is to be eaten;

for the first of such bodies brought in at the beginning of a war; for

the flesh on each side of the backbone. It has a name of honour given

to those who have taken life; it need not have been the life of an

enemy; if only they have shed blood--it may have been the life of a

woman or a child--the title has been earned. It has a hideous word to

express the torturing and insulting of an enemy, as by cutting off any

part of his body--his nose or tongue, for instance--cooking and eating

it before his face, and taunting him the while; the [Greek:

hakrotaeriazein] of the Greeks, with the cannibalism added. But of this

enough.] And I have been informed, on the authority of one excellently

capable of knowing, an English scholar long resident in Van Diemen's

Land, that in the native language of that island there are [Footnote:

This was written in 1851. Now, in 1888, Van Diemen's Land is called

Tasmania, and the native language of that island is a thing of the

past.] four words to express the taking of human life--one to express a

father's killing of a son, another a son's killing of a father, with

other varieties of murder; and that in no one of these lies the

slightest moral reprobation, or sense of the deep-lying distinction

between to 'kill' and to 'murder'; while at the same time, of that

language so richly and so fearfully provided with expressions for this

extreme utterance of hate, he also reports that a word for 'love' is

wanting in it altogether. Yet with all this, ever and anon in the midst

of this wreck and ruin, there is that in the language of the savage,

some subtle distinction, some curious allusion to a perished

civilization, now utterly unintelligible to the speaker; or some other

note, which proclaims his language to be the remains of a dissipated

inheritance, the rags and remnants of a robe which was a royal one once.

The fragments of a broken sceptre are in his hand, a sceptre wherewith

once he held dominion (he, that is, in his progenitors) over large

kingdoms of thought, which now have escaped wholly from his sway.

[Footnote: See on this matter Tylor, _Early History of Mankind_, pp.

150-190; and, still better, the Duke of Argyll, _On Primeval Man_; and

on this same survival of the fragments of an elder civilization, Ebrard,

_Apologetik_, vol. ii. p. 382. Among some of the Papuans the faintest

rudiments of the family survive; of the tribe no trace whatever; while

yet of these one has lately written:--'Sie haben religiöse Gebräuche

und Uebungen, welche, mit einigen anderen Erscheinungen in ihrem Leben,

mit ihrem jetzigen Culturzustande ganz unvereinbar erscheinen, wenn man

darin nicht die Spuren einer früher höhern Bildung erkennen will.'

Sayce agrees with this.]

But while it is thus with him, while this is the downward course of all

those that have chosen the downward path, while with every

impoverishing and debasing of personal and national life there goes

hand in hand a corresponding impoverishment and debasement of language;

so on the contrary, where there is advance and progress, where a divine

idea is in any measure realizing itself in a people, where they are

learning more accurately to define and distinguish, more truly to know,

where they are ruling, as men ought to rule, over nature, and

compelling her to give up her secrets to them, where new thoughts are

rising up over the horizon of a nation's mind, new feelings are

stirring at a nation's heart, new facts coming within the sphere of its

knowledge, there will language be growing and advancing too. It cannot

lag behind; for man feels that nothing is properly his own, that he has

not secured any new thought, or entered upon any new spiritual

inheritance, till he has fixed it in language, till he can contemplate

it, not as himself, but as his word; he is conscious that he must

express truth, if he is to preserve it, and still more if he would

propagate it among others. 'Names,' as it has been excellently said,

'are impressions of sense, and as such take the strongest hold upon the

mind, and of all other impressions can be most easily recalled and

retained in view. They therefore serve to give a point of attachment to

all the more volatile objects of thought and feeling. Impressions that

when past might be dissipated for ever, are by their connexion with

language always within reach. Thoughts, of themselves are perpetually

slipping out of the field of immediate mental vision; but the name

abides with us, and the utterance of it restores them in a moment.'

Men sometimes complain of the number of new theological terms which the

great controversies in which the Church from time to time has been

engaged, have left behind them. But this could not have been otherwise,

unless the gains through those controversies made, were presently to be

lost again; for as has lately been well said: 'The success and enduring

influence of any systematic construction of truth, be it secular or

sacred, depends as much upon an exact terminology, as upon close and

deep thinking itself. Indeed, unless the results to which the human

mind arrives are plainly stated, and firmly fixed in an exact

phraseology, its thinking is to very little purpose in the end.

"Terms," says Whewell, "record discoveries." That which was seen, it

may be with crystal clearness, and in bold outline, in the

consciousness of an individual thinker, may fail to become the property

and possession of mankind at large, because it is not transferred from

the individual to the general mind, by means of a precise phraseology

and a rigorous terminology. Nothing is in its own nature more fugacious

and shifting than thought; and particularly thoughts upon the mysteries

of Christianity. A conception that is plain and accurate in the

understanding of the first man becomes obscure and false in that of the

second, because it was not grasped and firmly held in the form and

proportions with which it first came up, and then handed over to other

minds, a fixed and scientific quantity.' [Footnote: Shedd, _History of

Christian Doctrine_, vol. i. p. 362; compare _Guesses at Truth_, 1866,

p. 217; and Gerber, _Sprache als Kunst_, vol. i. p. 145.] And on the

necessity of names at once for the preservation and the propagation of

truth it has been justly observed: 'Hardly any original thoughts on

mental or social subjects ever make their way among mankind, or assume

their proper importance in the minds even of their inventors, until

aptly selected words or phrases have as it were nailed them down and

held them fast.' [Footnote: Mill, _System of Logic_, vol. ii. p. 291.]

And this holds good alike of the false and of the true. I think we may

observe very often the way in which controversies, after long eddying

backward and forward, hither and thither, concentrate themselves at

last in some single word which is felt to contain all that the one

party would affirm and the other would deny. After a desultory swaying

of the battle hither and thither 'the high places of the field' the

critical position, on the winning of which everything turns, is

discovered at last. Thus the whole controversy of the Catholic Church

with the Arians finally gathers itself up in a single word,

'homoousion;' that with the Nestorians in another, 'theotokos.' One

might be bold to affirm that the entire secret of Buddhism is found in

'Nirvana'; for take away the word, and it is not too much to say that

the keystone to the whole arch is gone. So too when the medieval Church

allowed and then adopted the word 'transubstantiation' (and we know the

exact date of this), it committed itself to a doctrine from which

henceforward it was impossible to recede. The floating error had become

a fixed one, and exercised a far mightier influence on the minds of all

who received it, than except for this it would have ever done. It is

sometimes not a word, but a phrase, which proves thus mighty in

operation. 'Reformation in the head and in the members 'was the

watchword, for more than a century before an actual Reformation came,

of all who were conscious of the deeper needs of the Church. What

intelligent acquaintance with Darwin's speculations would the world in

general have made, except for two or three happy and comprehensive

terms, as 'the survival of the fittest,' 'the struggle for existence,'

'the process of natural selection'? Multitudes who else would have

known nothing about Comte's system, know something about it when they

know that he called it 'the positive philosophy.'

We have been tempted to depart a little, though a very little, from the

subject immediately before us. What was just now said of the manner in

which language enriches itself does not contradict a prior assertion,

that man starts with language as God's perfect gift, which he only

impairs and forfeits by sloth and sin, according to the same law which

holds good in respect of each other of the gifts of heaven. For it was

not meant, as indeed was then observed, that men would possess words to

set forth feelings which were not yet stirring in them, combinations

which they had not yet made, objects which they had not yet seen,

relations of which they were not yet conscious; but that up to man's

needs, (those needs including not merely his animal wants, but all his

higher spiritual cravings,) he would find utterance freely. The great

logical, or grammatical, framework of language, (for grammar is the

logic of speech, even as logic is the grammar of reason,) he would

possess, he knew not how; and certainly not as the final result of

gradual acquisitions, and of reflexion setting these in order, and

drawing general rules from them; but as that rather which alone had

made those acquisitions possible; as that according to which he

unconsciously worked, filled in this framework by degrees with these

later acquisitions of thought, feeling, and experience, as one by one

they arrayed themselves in the garment and vesture of words.

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