THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED BY PRACTICAL NEEDS.
[A. Things to be preferred and eschewed.]
The Stoic theory of Ethics is entirely rooted in the proposition, that
only virtue is a good and only vice an evil. This proposition, however,
frequently brought the Stoics into collision with current views; nor
was it without its difficulties for their own system. In the first
place, virtue is made to depend for its existence upon certain
conditions, and to lead to certain results, from which it is
inseparable. These results, we have already seen, [699] were included
by the Stoics in the list of goods. Moreover, virtue is said to be the
only good, because only what is according to nature is a good, and
rational conduct is for man the only thing according to nature. But can
this be so absolutely and unconditionally stated? According to the
Stoic teaching the instinct of self-preservation being the primary
impulse, does not this instinct manifestly include the preservation and
advancement of outward life? The Stoics, therefore, could not help
including physical goods and activities among things according to
nature—for instance, health, a right enjoyment of the senses, and such
like. [700] Practically, too, the same admission was forced upon them
by the consideration [701] that, if there is no difference in value
between things in themselves, rational choice—and, indeed, all acting
on motives—is impossible. At the same time, they reject the notion that
what is first according to nature must therefore be perfect or good,
just as in theory they allow that the source of knowledge, but not
truth itself, is derived from the senses. When man has once recognised
the universal law of action, he will, according to their view, think
little of what is sensuous and individual, and only look upon it as an
instrument in the service of virtue and reason. [702]
[(1) Secondary goods.]
Still, there remains the question, How can this be possible? and this
is no easy one to answer. The contemporary opponents of the Stoics
already took exception to the way in which the first demands of nature
were by them excluded from the aims of a life [703] according to
nature; and we, too, cannot suppress a feeling of perplexity at being
told that all duties aim at attaining what is primarily according to
nature, but that what is according to nature must not be looked upon as
the aim of our actions; [704] since not that which is simply according
to nature, but the rational choice and combination of what is according
to nature constitutes the good. [705] Even if the Stoics pretend to
dispose of this difficulty, they cannot, at least, fail to see that
whatever contributes to bodily well-being must have a certain positive
value, and must be desirable in all cases in which no higher good
suffers in consequence; and, conversely, that whatever is opposed to
bodily well-being, when higher duties are not involved, must have a
negative value (ἀπαξία), and, consequently, deserve to be avoided.
[706] Such objects and actions they would not, however, allow to be
included in the class of goods which are absolutely valuable. [707] It
was therefore a blending of Peripatetic with Stoic teaching when
Herillus, the fellow-student of Cleanthes, enumerated bodily and
outward goods as secondary and subsidiary aims besides virtue. [708]
[(2) Classes of things indifferent.]
Nor were the Stoics minded to follow the contemporary philosopher,
Aristo of Chios (who in this point, too, endeavoured to place their
School on the platform of the Cynic philosophy), in denying any
difference in value between things morally indifferent [709] and in
making the highest aim in life consist in indifference to all external
things. [710] Virtue with them bears, in comparison with the Cynic
virtue, a more positive character, that of an energetic will; they,
therefore, required some definite relation to the outward objects and
conditions of this activity which should regulate the choosing or
rejecting—or, in other words, the practical decision. Accordingly, they
divided things indifferent into three classes. To the first class
belong all those things which, from a moral or absolute point of view,
are neither good nor evil, but yet which have a certain value; no
matter whether this value belongs to them properly, because they are in
harmony with human nature, or whether it belongs to them improperly,
because they are means for advancing moral and natural life, or whether
it belongs to them on both grounds. The second class includes
everything which, either by itself or in its relation to higher aims,
is opposed to nature and harmful. The third, things which, even in this
conditional sense, have neither positive nor negative value. The first
class bears the name of things preferential (προηγμένον), or things
desirable; the second is the class of things to be eschewed
(ἀποπροηγμένον); the third is the class of things intermediate. [711]
The last is called, in the strict sense, indifferent, ἀδιάφορον. [712]
It includes not only what is really indifferent, but whatever has such
a slight negative or positive value that it neither enkindles desire
nor aversion. Hence the terms προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον are defined
to mean respectively that which has an appreciable positive or negative
value. [713] Under things preferential, the Stoics include partly
mental qualities and conditions, such as talents and skill, even
progress towards virtue, in as far as it is not yet virtue; partly
bodily advantage—beauty, strength, health, life itself; partly external
goods—riches, honour, noble birth, relations, &c. Under things to be
eschewed, they understand the opposite things and conditions; under
things indifferent, whatever has no appreciable influence on our
choice, such as the question whether the number of hairs on the head is
even or uneven; whether I pick up a piece of waste paper from the
floor, or leave it; whether one piece of money or another is used in
[(3) Collision of modified and abstract theory.] payment of a debt.
[714] Yet they drew a sharp distinction between the purely relative
value of things preferential, and the absolute value of things morally
good. Only the latter are really allowed to be called good, because
they only, under all circumstances, are useful and necessary. Of things
morally indifferent, on the other hand, the best may, under certain
circumstances, be bad, and the worst—sickness, poverty, and the
like—may, under certain circumstances, be useful. [715] Just as little
would they allow that the independence of the wise man suffered by the
recognition outside himself of a class of things preferential. For the
wise man, said Chrysippus, [716] uses such things without requiring
them. Nevertheless, the admission of classes of things to be preferred
and to be declined obviously undermines their doctrine of the good.
Between what is good and what is evil, a third group is introduced, of
doubtful character; and since we have seen the term ἀδιάφορον is only
applied to this group in its more extended meaning, it became
impossible for them to refuse to apply the term good to things
desirable, [717] or to exclude unconditionally from the highest good
many of the things which they were in the habit of pronouncing
indifferent. [718] Nor was this concession merely the yielding of a
term, as will appear when particular instances are considered. Not only
may Seneca [719] be heard, in Aristotelian manner, defending external
possessions as aids to virtue—not only Hecato, and even Diogenes,
uttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted and forbidden gains
[720]—not only Panætius giving expression to much that falls short of
Stoic severity [721]—but even Chrysippus avows that in his opinion it
is silly not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from pain, [722] and
that a statesman may treat honour and wealth as real goods; [723]
adding that the whole Stoic School agrees with him in thinking it no
disparagement for a wise man to follow a profession which lies under a
stigma in the common opinion of Greece. [724] He did not even hesitate
to assert that it is better to live irrationally than not to live at
all. [725] It is impossible to conceal the fact that, in attempting to
adapt their system to general opinion and to the conditions of
practical life, the Stoics were driven to make admissions strongly at
variance with their previous theories. It may hence be gathered with
certainty that, in laying down those theories, they had overstrained a
point.
[B. Perfect and intermediate duties.]
By means of this doctrine of things to be preferred and things to be
eschewed, a further addition was made to the conception of duty. Under
duty, or what is proper, [726] we have already seen, the Stoics
understand rational action in general, which becomes good conduct, or
κατόρθωμα, by being done with a right intention. [727] The conception
of duty, therefore, contains in itself the conception of virtuous
conduct, and is used primarily to express what is good or rational.
Duty thus appears to have a twofold meaning, in consequence of the
twofold characters of things desirable and things good. If the good
were the only permitted object of desire, there would, of course, be
but one duty—that of realising the good; and the various actions which
contribute to this result would only be distinguished by their being
employed on a different material, but not in respect of their moral
value. But if, besides what is absolutely good, there are things
relatively good, things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases
in which they may be pursued without detriment to the absolute good or
virtue—if, moreover, besides vice, as the absolute evil, there are also
relative evils, which we have reason to avoid in the same cases—the
extent of our duties is increased likewise; a number of conditional
duties are placed by the side of duties unconditional, differing from
the latter in that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred, and
avoiding things to be eschewed. From this platform, all that accords
with nature is regarded as proper, or a duty in the more extended sense
of the term; and the conception of propriety is extended to include
plants and animals. [728] Proper and dutiful actions are then divided
into those which are always such and those which are only such under
peculiar circumstances—the former being called perfect, the latter
intermediate duties; [729] and it is stated, as a peculiarity of the
latter, that, owing to circumstances, a course of conduct may become a
duty which would not have been a duty without those peculiar
circumstances. [730] In the wider sense of the term, every action is
proper or in accordance with duty which consists in the choice of a
thing to be preferred (προηγμένον) and in avoiding a thing to be
eschewed. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only fulfilled by
virtuous action. A virtuous life and a wish to do good constitute the
only perfect duty. [731]
Some confusion is introduced into this teaching by the fact that in
setting up the standard for distinguishing perfect from imperfect
duties, the Stoics sometimes look at the real, sometimes at the
personal value, of actions, without keeping these two aspects distinct.
They therefore use the terms perfect and imperfect sometimes to express
the difference between conditional and unconditional duties; at other
times, to express that between morality and law. [732] Far worse than
the formal defect is the grouping in this division under the conception
of duty things of the most varied moral character. If once things which
have only a conditional value are admitted within the circle of duties,
what is there to prevent their being defended, in the practical
application of the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repugnant to
the legitimate consequences of the Stoic principles?
[C. Emotions.]
[(1) Permitted affections.]
In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic system sought in another
respect to meet facts and practical wants by abating somewhat from the
austerity of its demands. Consistently carried out, those demands
require the unconditional extirpation of the whole sensuous nature,
such as was originally expressed by the demand for apathy. But just as
the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of
προηγμένα, so this demand was modified in two ways; the first elements
of the forbidden emotions were allowed under other names; and whilst
emotions were still forbidden, certain mental affections were
permitted, and even declared to be desirable. Taking the first point,
it is allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels pain, and that at
certain things he does not remain wholly calm. [733] This admission
shows that their system was not identical with that of the Cynics.
[734] It is not required that men should be entirely free from all
mental affections, but only that they should refuse assent to them, and
not suffer them to obtain the mastery. [735] With regard to the other
point, they propound the doctrine of εὐπάθειαι, or rational
dispositions, which, as distinct from emotions, are to be found in the
wise man, and in the wise man only. Of these rational dispositions,
they distinguish three chief besides several subordinate varieties.
[736] Although this admission was intended to vindicate the absence of
emotions in the wise man, since the permitted feelings are not
emotions, still it made the boundary-line between emotions and feelings
so uncertain that in practice the sharply-defined contrast between the
wise and the foolish threatened wellnigh to disappear altogether.
[(2) Modification of apathy.]
This danger appears more imminent when we observe the perplexity in
which the Stoics were placed when asked to point out the wise man in
experience. For not only do opponents assert that, according to their
own confession, no one, or as good as no one, can be found in actual
history who altogether deserves that high title, [737] but even their
own admissions agree therewith. [738] They describe even Socrates,
Diogenes, and Antisthenes as not completely virtuous, but only as
travellers towards virtue. [739] It was of little avail to point to
Hercules or Ulysses, [740] or, with Posidonius, [741] to the mythical
golden age, in which the wise are said to have ruled. The pictures of
those heroes would have to be changed altogether, to bring them into
harmony with the wise man of the Stoics; and Posidonius might be easily
disposed of on Stoic principles, by the rejoinder that virtue and
wisdom are things of free exercise, and, since free exercise was
wanting in the case of the first men, their condition can only have
been a state of unconscious ignorance, and not one of perfection. [742]
If, in reality, there are no wise men, the division of men into wise
and foolish falls at once to the ground: all mankind belong to the
class of fools; the conception of the wise man is an unreal fancy. It
becomes, then, difficult to maintain the assertion that all fools are
equally foolish, and all the wise are equally wise. If, instead of
producing real wisdom, philosophy can only produce progress towards
wisdom, it can hardly be expected to take such a modest estimate of its
own success as to allow that there is no real distinction between a
zealous student and a bigoted despiser of its doctrines.
[(3) The state of progress.]
It was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithstanding their own
maxims, found themselves compelled to recognise differences among the
bad and differences among the good. In reference to their system these
differences were, indeed, made to depend in the case of the bad upon
the greater or less difficulty of healing the moral defects, or, in the
case of the good, upon qualities morally indifferent. [743] It was also
natural that they should so nearly identify the state of προσκοπὴ—or
progress towards wisdom, the only really existing state—with wisdom
that it could hardly be distinguished therefrom. If there is a stage of
progress at which a man is free from all emotions, discharges all his
duties, knows all that is necessary, and is even secure against the
danger of relapse, [744] such a stage cannot be distinguished from
wisdom, either by its want of experience or by the absence of a clear
knowledge of oneself. For has it not been frequently asserted that
happiness is not increased by length of time, and that the wise man is
at first not conscious of his wisdom? [745] If, however, the highest
stage of approximation to wisdom is supposed still to fall short of
wisdom, because it is not sure of its continuance, and though free from
mental diseases, it is not free from emotions, [746] how, it may be
asked, do these passing emotions differ from the mental affections
which are found in the wise man? Is there any real distinction between
them? If the progressing candidate has attained to freedom from
diseased mental states, is the danger of a relapse very great? Besides,
the Stoics were by no means agreed that the really wise man is free
from all danger. Cleanthes held with the Cynics that virtue can never
be lost; Chrysippus admitted that, in certain cases, it is defectible.
[747] After all this admission is only one among many traits which
prove that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the original severity
of their demands.