ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF
MORALITY.
Whatever attention the Stoics paid to the study of nature and to logic,
the real kernel of their system lies, as has been already observed, in
their Ethics; even natural science, that ‘most divine part of
philosophy,’ was only pursued as an intellectual preparation for
Ethics. In the field of Ethics the true spirit of the Stoic system may
therefore be expected to appear, and it may be anticipated that this
subject will be treated by them with special care. Nor is this
expectation a vain one; for here the springs of information flowing
freely give ample data respecting the Stoic doctrine of morality.
Nevertheless, respecting the formal grouping of these data only vague
and contradictory statements are forthcoming. Moreover, the Stoics
appear to have followed such different courses and to have been so
little afraid of repetition, that it is hardly possible to obtain a
complete survey of their whole system by following any one of the
traditional divisions. [520]
Proceeding to group the materials in such a way as to give the clearest
insight into the peculiarities and connection of the Stoic principles,
the first distinction to be made will be one between morality in
general and particular points in morality. In considering morality in
general, those statements which give the abstract theory of morals will
be distinguished from those which modify it with a view to meet
practical wants. The former again may be grouped round three
points:—the enquiry into the highest good, that into the nature of
virtue, and that relating to the wise man.
[A. The highest good.]
[(1) Nature of the highest good.]
The enquiry into the destiny and end of man turns, with the Stoics, as
it did with all moral philosophers since the time of Socrates, about
the fundamental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary
to make up the highest good or happiness. [521] Happiness, they
consider, can only be sought in rational activity or virtue. Speaking
more explicitly, [522] the primary impulse of every being is towards
self-preservation and self-gratification. [523] It follows that every
being pursues those things which are most suited to its nature, [524]
and that such things only have for it a value (ἀξία). Hence the highest
good—the end-in-chief, [525] or happiness—can only be found in what is
conformable to nature. [526]—Nothing can be conformable to nature for
any individual thing, unless it be in harmony with the law of the
universe, [527] or with the universal reason of the world; nor, in the
case of a conscious and reasonable being, unless it proceeds from a
recognition of this general law—in short, from rational intelligence.
[528] In every enquiry into what is conformable to nature, all turns
upon agreement with the essential constitution of the being, and this
essential constitution consists, in the case of a man, simply in
reason. [529] One and the same thing, therefore, is always meant,
whether, with Zeno, life according to nature is spoken of as being in
harmony with oneself, or whether, following Cleanthes, it is simply
said to be the agreement of life with nature, and whether, in the
latter case, φύσις is taken to mean the world at large, or is limited
to human nature in particular. [530] In every case the meaning is, that
the life of the individual approximates to or falls short of the goal
of happiness, exactly in proportion as it approaches to or departs from
the universal law of the world and the particular rational nature of
man. In a word, a rational life, an agreement with the general course
of the world, constitutes virtue. The principle of the Stoic morality
might therefore be briefly expressed in the sentence: Only virtue is
good, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue. [531] If, however,
following Socrates, the good is defined as being what is useful, [532]
then the sentence would run thus: Only Virtue is useful; advantage
cannot be distinguished from duty, whilst to a bad man nothing is
useful, [533] since, in the case of a rational being, good and evil
does not depend on what happens to him, but simply on his own conduct.
[534] A view of life is here presented to us in which happiness
coincides with virtue, the good and the useful with duty and reason.
There is neither any good independently of virtue, nor is there in
virtue and for virtue any evil.
[(2) The good and evil.]
The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction,
sanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of philosophers, between
various kinds and degrees of good; nor would they allow bodily
advantages and external circumstances to be included among good things,
together with mental and moral qualities. A certain difference between
goods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds are mentioned by them
in their formal division of goods. [535] But these differences amount,
in the end, to no more than this, that whilst some goods are good and
useful in themselves, others are only subsidiary to them. The existence
of several equally primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at
variance with the conception of the good. That only is a good,
according to their view, which has an unconditional value. That which
has a value only in comparison with something else, or as leading to
something else, does not deserve to be called a good. The difference
between what is good and what is not good is not only a difference of
degree, but also one of kind; and what is not a good per se can never
be a good under any circumstances. [536] The same remarks apply to
evil. That which is not in itself an evil can never become so from its
relation to something else. Hence only that which is absolutely good,
or virtue, can be considered a good; and only that which is absolutely
bad, or vice, [537] can be considered an evil. All other things,
however great their influence may be on our state, belong to a class of
things neither good nor evil, but indifferent, or ἀδιάφορα. [538]
Neither health, nor riches, nor honour, not even life itself, is a
good; and just as little are the opposite states—poverty, sickness,
disgrace, and death—evils. [539] Both are in themselves indifferent, a
material which may either be employed for good or else for evil. [540]
The Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked by the
Stoics for including among goods external things which are dependent on
chance. For how can that be a good under any circumstances, which bears
no relation to man’s moral nature, and is even frequently obtained at
the cost of morality? [541] If virtue renders a man happy, it must
render him perfectly happy in himself, since no one can be happy who is
not happy altogether. Were anything which is not in man’s power allowed
to influence his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of
virtue, and man would never be able to attain to that imperturbable
serenity of mind without which no happiness is conceivable. [542]
[(3) Pleasure and the good.]
Least of all, can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it
was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who
places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue; [543] he who
considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and
the peculiar value of virtue; [544] he appeals to feelings, rather than
to actions; [545] he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is
unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments
of the lower animals. [546] Pleasure must never be the object of
pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably
involved in virtue. That it no doubt is. [547] It is true that there is
always a peculiar satisfaction, and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of
mind, in moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack of
inward peace; and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone
knows what true and lasting pleasure is. [548] But even the pleasure
afforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but only a
natural consequence, of virtuous conduct; otherwise the independent
value of virtue is impaired. [549]
Nor may pleasure be placed side by side with virtue, as a part of the
highest good, or be declared to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure
and virtue are different in essence and kind. Pleasure may be immoral,
and moral conduct may go hand in hand with difficulties and pains.
Pleasure is found among the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good;
virtue is dignified, untiring, imperturbable; pleasure is grovelling,
effeminate, fleeting. Those who look upon pleasure as a good are its
slaves; those in whom virtue reigns supreme control pleasure, and hold
it in check. [550] In no sense can pleasure be allowed to weigh in a
question of morals; seeing it is not an end-in-itself, but only the
result of an action; [551] not a good, but something absolutely
indifferent. The only point on which the Stoics are not unanimous is,
whether every pleasure is contrary to nature, [552] as the stern
Cleanthes, in the spirit of Cynicism, asserted, or whether there is
such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure. [553] Virtue, on the
other hand, needs no extraneous additions, but contains in itself all
the conditions of happiness. [554] The reward of virtuous conduct, like
the punishment of wickedness, consists only in the character of those
actions, one being according to nature, the other contrary to nature.
[555] And so unconditional is this self-sufficiency of virtue, [556]
that the happiness which it affords is not increased by length of time.
[557] Rational self-control is here recognised as the only good;
thereby man makes himself independent of all external circumstances,
absolutely free, and inwardly satisfied. [558]
[(4) Negative character of happiness.]
The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a very marked feature in
Stoicism—is thus more negative than positive. It consists in
independence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment which moral
conduct brings with it. In mental disquietude—says Cicero, speaking as
a Stoic—consists misery; in composure, happiness. How can he be
deficient in happiness, he enquires, whom courage preserves from care
and fear, and self-control guards from passionate pleasure and desire?
[559] How can he fail to be absolutely happy who is in no way dependent
on fortune, but simply and solely on himself? [560] To be free from
disquietude, says Seneca, is the peculiar privilege of the wise; [561]
the advantage which is gained from philosophy is, that of living
without fear, and rising superior to the troubles of life. [562] Far
more emphatical than any isolated expressions is the support which this
negative view of moral aims derives from the whole character of the
Stoic ethics, the one doctrine of the apathy of the wise man
sufficiently proving that freedom from disturbances, an unconditional
assurance, and self-dependence, are the points on which these
philosophers lay especial value.
[(5) The highest good as law.]
The Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the
world, to which the individual is subordinate, appears to man in the
character of Law. Law being, however, the law of man’s own nature, the
Good becomes the natural object of man’s desire, and meets his natural
impulse. The conception of the Good as law was a view never unfamiliar
to moral philosophy, but it was cultivated by the Stoics with peculiar
zeal; [563] and forms one of the points on which Stoicism subsequently
came into contact, partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the
ethics of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics considered
that the Reason which governs the world is the general Law of all
beings, [564] so they recognised in the moral demands of reason the
positive and negative aspects of the Law of God. [565] Human law comes
into existence when man becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises
its claims on him. [566] Civil and moral law are, therefore, commands
absolutely imperative on every rational being. [567] No man can feel
himself to be a rational being without at the same time feeling himself
pledged to be moral. [568] Obedience to this law is imposed upon man,
not only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The
good is for him that which deserves to be pursued—the natural object of
man’s will; on the other hand, evil is that against which his will
revolts. [569] The former arouses his desire (ὁρμή), the latter his
aversion (ἀφορμή): [570] and thus the demands of morality are called
forth by the natural impulse of a reasonable being, and are, at the
same time, also the object towards which that impulse is naturally
directed. [571]
[B. Emotions and virtue.]
[(1) The emotions.]
[(a) Their nature.]
However simple this state of things may be to a purely rational being,
it must be remembered that man is not purely rational. [572] He has,
therefore, irrational as well as rational impulses. [573] He is not
originally virtuous, but he becomes virtuous by overcoming his
emotions. Emotion or passion [574] is a movement of mind contrary to
reason and nature, an impulse transgressing the right mean. [575] The
Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with
nature, was flatly denied by the Stoics. [576] The seat of the
emotions—and, indeed, of all impulses and every activity of the soul
[577]—is man’s reason, the ἡγεμονικόν. [578] Emotion is that state of
the ἡγεμονικόν in which it is hurried into what is contrary to nature
by excess of impulse. Like virtue, emotion is due to a change taking
place simultaneously, not to the effect of a separate extraneous force.
[579] Imagination, therefore, alone calls it into being, as it does
impulse in general. [580] All emotions arise from faults in judgment,
from false notions of good and evil, and may therefore be called, in so
many words, judgments or opinions; [581]—avarice, for instance, is a
wrong opinion as to the value of money, [582] fear is a wrong opinion
as regards future, trouble as regards present ills. [583] Still, as
appears from the general view of the Stoics respecting impulses, [584]
this language does not imply that emotion is only a theoretical
condition. On the contrary, the effects of a faulty imagination—the
feelings and motions of will, to which it gives rise—are expressly
included in its conception; [585] nor is it credible, as Galenus
states, [586] that this was only done by Zeno, and not by Chrysippus.
[587] The Stoics, therefore, notwithstanding their theory of necessity,
did not originally assent to the Socratic dictum, that no one does
wrong voluntarily. [588] Younger members of the School may have used
the dictum as an excuse for human faults, [589] fearing lest, in
allowing freedom to emotions, they should admit that they were morally
admissible and give up the possibility of overcoming them. [590] Nay
more, as all that proceeds from the will and impulse is voluntary,
[591] so too emotions are also in our power; and it is for us to say,
in the case of convictions out of which emotions arise, as in the case
of every other conviction, [592] whether we will yield or withhold
assent. [593] Just as little would they allow that only instruction is
needed in order to overcome emotions; for all emotions arise, as they
say, from lack of self-control, [594] and differ from errors in that
they assert themselves and oppose our better intelligence. [595] How
irregular and irrational impulses arise in reason was a point which the
Stoics never made any serious attempt to explain.
[(b) Varieties of emotion.]
Emotions being called forth by imagination, their character depends on
the kind of imagination which produces them. Now all impulses are
directed to what is good and evil, and consist either in pursuing what
appears to be a good, or in avoiding what appears to be an evil. [596]
This good and this evil is sometimes a present, and sometimes a future
object. Hence there result four chief classes of faulty imagination,
and, corresponding with them, four classes of emotions. From an
irrational opinion as to what is good there arises pleasure, when it
refers to things present; desire, when it refers to things future. A
faulty opinion of present evils produces care; of future evils, fear.
[597] Zeno had already distinguished these four principal varieties of
emotions. [598] The same division was adopted by his pupil Aristo,
[599] and afterwards became quite general. Yet the vagueness, already
mentioned, appears in the Stoic system in the definition of individual
emotions. By some, particularly by Chrysippus, the essence of emotions
is placed in the imagination which causes them; by others, in the state
of mind which the imagination produces. [600] The four principal
classes of emotions are again subdivided into numerous subordinate
classes, in the enumeration of which the Stoic philosophers appear to
have been more guided by the use of language than by psychology. [601]
In treating the subject of emotions in general, far less importance was
attached by the Stoics to psychological accuracy than to considerations
of moral worth. That the result could not be very satisfactory, follows
from what has been already stated. [602] Emotions are impulses,
overstepping natural limits, upsetting the proper balance of the soul’s
powers, contradicting reason—in a word, they are failures, disturbances
of mental health, and, if indulged in, become chronic diseases of the
soul. [603] Hence a Stoic demands their entire suppression: true virtue
can only exist where this process has succeeded. As being contrary to
nature and symptoms of disease, the wise man must be wholly free from
them. [604] When we have once learnt to value things according to their
real worth, and to discover everywhere nature’s unchanging law, nothing
will induce us to yield to emotion. [605] Hence the teaching of Plato
and Aristotle, requiring emotions to be regulated, but not uprooted,
was attacked in the most vigorous manner by these philosophers. A
moderate evil, they say, always remains an evil. What is faulty and
opposed to reason, ought never to be tolerated, not even in the
smallest degree. [606] On the other hand, when an emotion is regulated
by and subordinated to reason, it ceases to be an emotion, the term
emotion only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed to reason.
[607] The statement of the Peripatetics, that certain emotions are not
only admissible, but are useful and necessary, appears of course to the
Stoics altogether wrong. [608] To them, only what is morally good
appears to be useful: emotions are, under all circumstances, faults;
and were an emotion to be useful, virtue would be advanced by means of
what is wrong. [609] The right relation, therefore, towards
emotions—indeed, the only one morally tenable—is an attitude of
absolute hostility. The wise man must be emotionless. [610] Pain he may
feel, but, not regarding it as an evil, he will suffer no affliction,
and know no fear. [611] He may be slandered and ill-treated, but he
cannot be injured or degraded. [612] Being untouched by honour and
dishonour, he has no vanity. To anger [613] he never yields, nor needs
this irrational impulse, not even for valour and the championship of
right. But he also feels no pity, [614] and exercises no indulgence.
[615] For how can he pity others for what he would not himself consider
an evil? How can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake of
others, which he would not tolerate for his own sake? If justice calls
for punishment, feelings will not betray him into forgiveness. We shall
subsequently have an opportunity for learning the further application
of these principles.
[(2) Idea of virtue.]
[(a) Positive and negative aspects.]
Virtue is thus negatively defined as the being exempt from emotions, as
apathy. [616] There is also a positive side to supplement this negative
view. Looking at the matter of virtuous action, this may be said to
consist in subordination to the general law of nature; looking at its
manner, in rational self-control. [617] Virtue is exclusively a matter
of reason [618]—in short, it is nothing else but rightly ordered
reason. [619] To speak more explicitly, virtue contains in itself two
elements—one practical, the other speculative. At the root, and as a
condition of all rational conduct, lies, according to the Stoics, right
knowledge. On this point they are at one with the well-known Socratic
doctrine, and with the teaching of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural
virtue, or virtue acquired only by exercise, they reject altogether.
After the manner of Socrates, they define virtue as knowledge, vice as
ignorance, [620] and insist on the necessity of learning virtue. [621]
Even the avowed enemy of all speculative enquiry, Aristo of Chios, was
on this point at one with the rest of the School. All virtues were by
him referred to wisdom, [622] and, consequently, he denied the claims
of most to be virtues at all. [623]
However closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is based
on knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, they are not
content with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above practical
activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. As we have seen already,
knowledge with them was only a means towards rational conduct, [624]
and it is expressly mentioned, as a deviation from the teaching of the
School, that Herillus of Carthage, Zeno’s pupil, declared knowledge to
be the end of life, and the only unconditional good. [625] Virtue may,
it is true, be called knowledge, but it is, at the same time,
essentially health and strength of mind, a right state of the soul
agreeing with its proper nature; [626] and it is required of man that
he should never cease to labour and contribute towards the common good.
[627] Thus, according to Stoic principles, virtue is a combination of
theory and practice, in which action is invariably based on
intellectual knowledge, but, at the same time, knowledge finds its
object in moral conduct—it is, in short, power of will based on
rational understanding. [628] This definition must not, however, be
taken to imply that moral knowledge precedes will, and is only
subsequently referred to will, nor conversely that the will only uses
knowledge as a subsidiary instrument. In the eyes of a Stoic, knowledge
and will are not only inseparable, but they are one and the same thing.
Virtue cannot be conceived without knowledge, nor knowledge without
virtue. [629] The one, quite as much as the other, is a right quality
of the soul, or, speaking more correctly, is the rightly endowed
soul,—reason, when it is as it ought to be. [630] Hence virtue may be
described, with equal propriety, either as knowledge or as strength of
mind; and it is irrelevant to enquire which of these two elements is
anterior in point of time.
[(b) The virtues severally.]
But how are we to reconcile with this view the Stoic teaching of a
plurality of virtues and their mutual relations? As the common root
from which they spring, Zeno, following Aristotle, regarded
understanding, Cleanthes, strength of mind, Aristo, at one time health,
at another the knowledge of good and evil. [631] Later teachers, after
the time of Chrysippus, thought that it consisted in knowledge or
wisdom, understanding by wisdom absolute knowledge, the knowing all
things, human and divine. [632] From this common root, a multiplicity
of virtues was supposed to proceed, which, after Plato’s example, are
grouped round four principal virtues [633]—intelligence, bravery,
justice, self-control. [634] Intelligence consists in knowing what is
good and bad, and what is neither the one nor the other, the
indifferent; [635] bravery, in knowing what to choose, what to avoid,
and what neither to choose nor to avoid; or, substituting the
corresponding personal attitude for knowledge, bravery is fearless
obedience to the law of reason, both in boldness and endurance. [636]
Self-control consists in knowing what to choose, and what to eschew,
and what neither to choose nor eschew; [637] justice, in knowing how to
give to everyone what is his due. [638] In a corresponding manner, the
principal faults are traced back to the conception of ignorance. [639]
Probably all these definitions belong to Chrysippus. [640] Other
definitions are attributed to his predecessors, [641] some more nearly,
others more remotely, agreeing with him in their conception of virtue.
Within these limits, a great number of individual virtues were
distinguished, their differences and precise shades of meaning being
worked out with all the pedantry which characterised Chrysippus. [642]
The definitions of a portion of them have been preserved by Diogenes
and Stobæus. [643] In a similar way, too, the Stoics carried their
classification of errors into the minutest details. [644]
[(c) Mutual relation of the several virtues.]
The importance attaching to this division of virtues, the ultimate
basis on which it rests, and the relation which virtues bear, both to
one another and to the common essence of virtue, are topics upon which
Zeno never entered. Plutarch, at least, blames him [645] for treating
virtues as many, and yet inseparable, and at the same time for finding
in all virtues only certain manifestations of the understanding. Aristo
attempted to settle this point more precisely. According to his view,
virtue is in itself only one; in speaking of many virtues, we only
refer to the variety of objects with which that one virtue has to do.
[646] The difference of one virtue from another is not one of inward
quality, but depends on the external conditions under which they are
manifested; it only expresses a definite relation to something else,
or, in the language of Herbart, an accidental aspect. [647] The same
view would seem to be implied in the manner in which Cleanthes
determines the relations of the principal virtues to one another. [648]
It was, however, opposed by Chrysippus. The assumption of many virtues,
he believed, rested upon an inward difference; [649] each definite
virtue, as also each definite fault, becoming what it does by a
peculiar change in the character of the soul itself; [650] in short,
for a particular virtue to come into being, it is not enough that the
constituent element of all virtue should be directed towards a
particular object, but to the common element must be superadded a
further characteristic element, or differentia; the several virtues
being related to one another, as the various species of one genus.
All virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in
different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction,
[651] which is only to be found where it is to be found perfect, and
ceases to exist the moment it is deprived of one of its component
parts. [652] They are, indeed, distinct from one another, each one
having its own end, towards which it is primarily directed; but, at the
same time, they again coalesce, inasmuch as none can pursue its own end
without pursuing that of the others at the same time. [653]
Accordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from its other parts.
Where one virtue exists, the rest exist also, and where there is one
fault, there all is faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains
all other virtues, for the moral tone of which it is the outcome
includes in itself all the rest. [654] What makes virtue virtue, and
vice vice, is simply and solely the intention. [655] The will, although
it may lack the means of execution, is worth quite as much as the deed;
[656] a wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification of that
desire. [657] Hence only that action can be called virtuous which is
not only good in itself, but which proceeds from willing the good; and
although, in the first instance, the difference between the discharge
and the neglect of duty (κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα) depends on the real
agreement or disagreement of our actions with the moral law, [658] yet
that alone can be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty which
arises from a morally perfect character. [659]
[(d) Unity of virtue.]
Such a character, the Stoics held, must either exist altogether, or not
at all; for virtue is an indivisible whole, which we cannot possess in
part, but must either have or not have. [660] He who has a right
intention and a right appreciation of good and evil, is virtuous; he
who has not these requisites is lacking in virtue; there is no third
alternative. Virtue admits neither of increase nor diminution, [661]
and there is no mean between virtue and vice. [662] This being the
case, and the value of an action depending wholly on the intention, it
follows, necessarily, that virtue admits of no degrees. If the
intention must be either good or bad, the same must be true of actions;
and if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing bad, and a bad
intention has in it nothing good, the same is true of actions. A good
action is unconditionally praiseworthy; a bad one, unconditionally
blameworthy, the former being only found where virtue exists pure and
entire; the latter, only where there is no virtue at all. All good
actions are, on the one hand, according to the well-known paradox,
equally good; all bad actions, on the other, equally bad. The standard
of moral judgment is an absolute one; and when conduct does not
altogether conform to this standard, it falls short of it altogether.
[663]
[C. The wise man.]
[(1) Wisdom and folly.]
From what has been said, it follows that there can be but one
thoroughgoing moral distinction for all mankind, the distinction
between the virtuous and the vicious; and that within each of these
classes there can be no difference in degree. He who possesses virtue
possesses it whole and entire; he who lacks it lacks it altogether; and
whether he is near or far from possessing it is a matter of no moment.
He who is only a hand-breadth below the surface of the water will be
drowned just as surely as one who is five hundred fathoms deep; he who
is blind sees equally little whether he will recover his sight
to-morrow or never. [664] The whole of mankind are thus divided by the
Stoics into two classes—those who are wise and those who are foolish;
[665] and these two classes are treated by them as mutually exclusive,
each one being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly, among the
foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible. [666] The wise man is
absolutely free from faults and mistakes: all that he does is right; in
him all virtues centre; he has a right opinion on every subject, and
never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what is merely an opinion. The bad
man, on the contrary, can do nothing aright; he has every kind of vice;
he has no right knowledge, and is altogether rude, violent, cruel, and
ungrateful. [667]
The Stoics delight in insisting upon the perfection of the wise man,
and contrasting with it the absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in
a series of paradoxical assertions. [668] The wise man only is free,
because he only uses his will to control himself; [669] he only is
beautiful, because only virtue is beautiful and attractive; [670] he
only is rich and happy (εὐτυχὴς), because goods of the soul are the
most valuable, true riches consisting in being independent of wants.
[671] Nay, more, he is absolutely rich, since he who has a right view
of everything has everything in his intellectual treasury, [672] and he
who makes the right use of everything bears to everything the relation
of owner. [673] The wise only know how to obey, and they also only know
how to govern; they only are therefore kings, generals, pilots; [674]
they only are orators, poets, and prophets; [675] and since their view
of the Gods and their worship of the Gods is the true one, only amongst
them can true piety be found—they are the only priests and friends of
heaven; all foolish men, on the contrary, are impious, profane, and
enemies of the Gods. [676] Only the wise man is capable of feeling
gratitude, love, and friendship, [677] he only is capable of receiving
a benefit, nothing being of use or advantage to the foolish man. [678]
To sum up, the wise man is absolutely perfect, absolutely free from
passion and want, absolutely happy; [679] as the Stoics conclusively
assert, he in no way falls short of the happiness of Zeus, [680] since
time, the only point in which he differs from Zeus, does not augment
happiness at all. [681] On the other hand, the foolish man is
altogether foolish, unhappy, and perverse; or, in the expressive
language of the Stoics, every foolish man is a madman, he being a
madman who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most closely
affects him. [682]
[(2) Universal depravity.]
This assertion is all the more trenchant because the Stoics recognised
neither virtue nor wisdom outside their own system or one closely
related to it, and because they took a most unfavourable view of the
moral condition of their fellow-men. That they should do so was
inevitable from their point of view. A system which sets up its own
moral idea against current notions so sharply as that of the Stoics can
only be the offspring of a thorough disapproval of existing
circumstances, and must, on the other hand, contribute thereto.
According to the Stoic standard, by far the majority, indeed, almost
the whole of mankind, belong to the class of the foolish. If all
foolish people are equally and altogether bad, mankind must have seemed
to them to be a sea of corruption and vice, from which, at best, but a
few swimmers emerge at spots widely apart. [683] Man passes his
life—such had already been the complaint of Cleanthes [684]—in
wickedness. Only here and there does one, in the evening of life, after
many wanderings, attain to virtue. And that this was the common opinion
among the successors of Cleanthes, is witnessed by their constant
complaints of the depravity of the foolish, and of the rare occurrence
of a wise man. [685]
No one probably has expressed this opinion more frequently or more
strongly than Seneca. We are wicked, he says; we have been wicked; we
shall be wicked. Our ancestors complained of the decline of morals; we
complain of their decline; and posterity will utter the very same
complaint. The limits within which morality oscillates are not far
asunder; the modes in which vice shows itself change, but its power
remains the same. [686] All men are wicked; and he who has as yet done
nothing wicked is at least in a condition to do it. All are thankless,
avaricious, cowardly, impious; all are mad. [687] We have all done
wrong—one in a less, the other in a greater degree; and we shall all do
wrong to the end of the chapter. [688] One drives the other into folly,
and the foolish are too numerous to allow the individual to improve.
[689] He who would be angry with the vices of men, instead of pitying
their faults, would never stop. So great is the amount of iniquity!
[690]
No doubt the age in which Seneca lived afforded ample occasion for such
effusions, but his predecessors must have found similar occasions in
their own days. Indeed, all the principles of the Stoic School, when
consistently developed, made it impossible to consider the great
majority of men as anything else than a mass of fools and sinners. From
this sweeping verdict, even the most distinguished names were not
excluded. If asked for examples of wisdom, they would point to
Socrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes, [691] and, in later times, to Cato;
[692] but not only would they deny philosophic virtue, as Plato had
done before them, to the greatest statesmen and heroes of early times,
but they would deny to them all and every kind of virtue. [693] Even
the admission that general faults belong to some in a lower degree than
to others can hardly be reconciled with their principle of the equality
of all who are not wise. [694]
[(3) Conversion.]
The two moral states being thus at opposite poles, a gradual transition
from one to the other is, of course, out of the question. There may be
a progress from folly and wickedness in the direction of wisdom, [695]
but the actual passage from one to the other must be momentary and
instantaneous. [696] Those who are still progressing belong, without
exception, to the class of the foolish; [697] and one who has lately
become wise is in the first moment unconscious of his new state. [698]
The transition takes place so rapidly, and his former state affords so
few points of contact with the one on which he has newly entered, that
the mind does not keep pace with the change, and only becomes conscious
of it by subsequent experience.
In this picture of the wise man, the moral idealism of the Stoic system
attained its zenith. A virtuous will appears here so completely
sundered from all outward conditions of life, so wholly free from all
the trammels of natural existence, and the individual has become so
completely the organ of universal law, that it may be asked, What right
has such a being to call himself a person? How can such a being be
imagined as a man living among fellow-men? Nor was this question
unknown to the Stoics themselves. Unless they are willing to allow that
their theory was practically impossible, and their ideal scientifically
untenable, how could they escape the necessity of showing that it might
be reconciled with the wants of human life and the conditions of
reality? Let the attempt be once made, however, and withal they would
be forced to look for some means of adapting it to those very feelings
and opinions towards which their animosity had formerly been so great.
Nor could the attempt be long delayed. Daily a greater value was
attached to the practical working of their system, and to its agreement
with general opinion. The original direction of Stoic morality aimed at
the absolute and unconditional submission of the individual to the law
of the universe, yet, in developing that theory, the rights of the
individual asserted themselves unmistakably. From this confluence of
opposite currents arose a deviation from the rigid type of the Stoic
system, some varieties of which, in the direction of the ordinary view
of life, deserve now further consideration.