THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The Republican National Convention of 1876--The Platform--The
Nominees--The National Democratic Convention of 1876--The Platform--The
Nominees--The Campaign and the Election--The Count and the
Twenty-second Joint Rule--Views in Regard to the Power to Count the
Electoral Vote--The Republicans in Advantage in the Count of the
Vote--The Electoral Commission Bill--The Passage of the Bill--The
Members of the Commission--The Fifth Justice--Justice David Davis--The
Counting of the Electoral Vote by Congress--The Double Returns from
South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana and Oregon--The Counsel before the
Commission--The Republican Position--The Democratic Position--The
Decisions of the Commission--Mr. Hayes Declared President--The Truth in
Regard to the Election--Mr. Hayes's Southern Policy--The Result of His
Policy--Reconciliation between the North and the South.
[Sidenote: The Republican National Convention of 1876.]
[Sidenote: The platform.]
When the managers of the Republican party met in National nominating
convention at Cincinnati, on the 14th of June, 1876, they rightly
divined the policy which alone could lead them to victory in the
elections of the following autumn. They constructed their platform in
such a way as to place the financial issue in the foreground, with the
pledges of the party to uphold the public credit, and to place the
currency of the country on a coin basis. They also declared the
pacification of the South to be a sacred duty, and pledged the {281}
party to a thoroughgoing reform of the civil service. Connected
therewith were, of course, the usual platitudes about the civil and
political liberty and equality of every American citizen and of
everybody else.
[Sidenote: The nominees.]
While there was no name before the convention commanding universal
popular assent, as had been the case at the second nomination of
Lincoln and the two nominations of Grant, still there was one which, in
so far as its possessor was known, inspired strong, if not
enthusiastic, confidence. It was not pronounced in the first balloting
so loudly as that of the brilliant Blaine, or the stolid Morton, or the
arrogant Conkling, but, as the voting continued, more and more of the
ballots contained it, and at last on the seventh round, it received a
majority of the votes. The choice was a wise one. Mr. Hayes had been a
good soldier, a valuable member of the National legislature, and an
excellent Governor of his native "State," in which office he was
serving for a third term at the time of his nomination for the
Presidency. He was a man of sound sense, unimpeachable character,
generous feeling, pleasing manners, and resolute will. There was a
tendency at first on the part of the friends of some of the
disappointed aspirants to belittle his qualities, and to represent him
as a weak man, and his conciliatory methods were often mistaken for
weakness by those who were not his rivals or his enemies, or the
friends of his rivals or his enemies; but as history sets his character
and his work in their proper perspective they both stand out more and
more strongly, and make his Administration appear to be one of the most
important in American annals. Especially does it honor him for his
earnest, faithful and successful battle for sound money and the
maintenance of the public faith, and for his determination to put an
end to the support by Federal {282} bayonets of the "carpet-bag," negro
"State" governments of the South.
[Sidenote: The National Democratic Convention of 1876.]
[Sidenote: The platform.]
A fortnight after the nomination by the Republican convention of
Rutherford B. Hayes for President and William A. Wheeler for
Vice-President, the Democratic leaders met at St. Louis for the purpose
of issuing the campaign creed of their party and choosing its candidate
for the chief magistracy of the Nation. The platform put forward by
them was remarkable for its length, its language of fierce
vituperation, and its loud calls for reform. Its specific propositions
were the reduction of the duties on foreign imports to a revenue basis,
and the repeal of the Resumption Act of 1875, on the strange ground
that it obstructed the return to specie payments.
[Sidenote: The nominees.]
Their candidate had virtually been determined on before they met. It
could be nobody else than the popular Governor of New York, Samuel J.
Tilden, shrewd in business, rich, the most successful political manager
New York had produced since Van Buren, greatly heralded as the very
archpriest of reform, the hope of the young men in politics; but not a
statesman in the highest sense of the word, nor a demagogue in the
lowest sense of that word--a genuine American politician of the first
order. He was nominated on the second ballot, and by a unanimous vote.
With him was placed as candidate for the second place the popular Mr.
Hendricks of Indiana. It was a strong ticket, and it was generally
believed that it would win. Mr. Tilden himself felt sure of the
electoral votes of all the Southern "States" and of New York, Indiana,
New Jersey and Connecticut.
[Sidenote: The campaign and the election.]
Mr. Tilden quietly managed his own campaign, while Mr. Hayes left his
political interests in the hands of the {283} very astute chairman of
the National committee of the Republican party, Senator Chandler of
Michigan. There was not much doubt on the morning following the
election, the morning of the 8th November, that the Democrats had
triumphed. Almost all of the Republican newspapers conceded it. But the
Republican managers knew that they could do what they pleased with the
electoral votes of South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana, through their
canvassing boards in these "States," with the power in these boards to
throw out the returns from any place where, in their opinion, there had
been any violence, intimidation, fraud or bribery exercised or
attempted; and when the managers found that they were pretty sure of
the electoral votes of all of the Northern Commonwealths, except
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Indiana, they simply added to the
one hundred and sixty-six electoral votes of which they were
practically sure the nineteen votes of Louisiana, Florida and South
Carolina, of which they were absolutely sure, if needed, and sent out
from their head-quarters the positive announcement that Hayes and
Wheeler had been elected by a majority of one electoral vote.
[Sidenote: The count and the twenty-second joint rule.]
But the final count of the electoral vote must be in the presence of
the two Houses of Congress assembled in one place, and the Democrats
were in majority in one of the Houses, and the twenty-second joint
rule, as it was called, which had been applied since the count of the
electoral vote of 1864 for the ascertainment of the result of the
returns to Congress, ordained that the electoral vote of any "State"
might be thrown out by either House. If this rule should be considered
as still in force, and be applied in the impending count, the
Democratic House of Representatives could reject the returns of the
{284} Republican authorities in South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana,
and thus secure the election of Mr. Tilden. This rule, however, was not
necessarily binding upon this Congress, as it had not been re-enacted
by the Houses composing it. That is, either House could lawfully refuse
to acquiesce in its further application. The Republicans now repudiated
it, although it was their predecessors who had created it.
[Sidenote: Views in regard to the power to count the electoral vote.]
Some of the Republicans now claimed that the Constitution vested the
Vice-President, or rather the President of the Senate, with the power
to count the electoral votes. The language of the Constitution was, and
still is, "the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the
votes shall then be counted." No President of the Senate had, however,
ever ventured to determine whether a disputed return, in case any such
had been received by him, was to be counted, and Mr. Ferry, the
President of the Senate, gave his Republican friends to understand that
he did not feel like assuming any such responsibility.
[Sidenote: The Republicans in advantage in the count of the vote.]
Nevertheless, the Republicans were in decided advantage. They had the
President of the United States to execute by force whatever they might
resolve upon, and they had the President of the Senate, whose scruples
the Democrats had not discovered, and, of course, they had one House of
the Congress, the Senate.
[Sidenote: The Electoral Commission Bill.]
The Democrats felt that they must make an effort to change the
situation. They, therefore, quickly seized upon a suggestion made by a
Republican member of the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives, Mr. G. W. McCrary, and voted a measure in the House
for the appointment of {285} members to a joint committee of the two
Houses, which committee should immediately report a proposition for
counting the electoral votes. This was the 14th of December, 1876. The
Senate agreed to this measure on the next day. Three Republicans and
four Democrats were appointed by the House, and four Republicans and
three Democrats by the Senate, and the committee so constituted
reported, on the 18th of January, 1877, the famous Electoral Commission
bill.
[Sidenote: The passage of the Bill.]
The essential provisions of the bill were, first, the creation of a
Commission composed of five members of the House of Representatives,
five members of the Senate, and five Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States, the members from the House to be chosen by the
House, the members from the Senate to be chosen by the Senate, while
the Justices of the Supreme Court from the first, third, eighth and
ninth circuits were designated in the bill, and they were authorized to
select a fifth from among the other members of the Court; second, the
fixing of the rule that the electoral vote of any "State" from which
only a single return had been received should be counted unless _both_
Houses should decide otherwise, and of the other rule that when more
than one return had been received from any "State," the Commission
should forthwith decide which return should be counted, and this return
should be counted unless _both_ Houses should reject the decision, or
order otherwise; and third, the reservation of any right existing under
the Constitution and laws to question before the courts of the United
States the titles of the persons who should be declared elected
President and Vice-President to these respective offices. The bill was
subjected to a most thorough discussion in _both_ Houses. It passed the
Senate on the 24th of January by a vote of forty-seven to seventeen.
Twenty-one {286} Republicans and twenty-six Democrats voted in favor of
it, and sixteen Republicans and one Democrat voted against it. It
passed the House on the 26th by a vote of one hundred and ninety-one to
eighty-six. Thirty-three Republicans and one hundred and fifty-eight
Democrats voted for it, and sixty-eight Republicans and eighteen
Democrats voted against it. It is certainly fair, therefore, to call it
a Democratic measure. The President signed the bill, nevertheless, on
the 29th.
[Sidenote: The members of the Commission.]
The Senate immediately chose Messrs. Edmunds, Frelinghuysen and Morton,
Republicans, and Messrs. Bayard and Thurman, Democrats, to represent it
upon the Commission, and the House chose Messrs. Garfield and Hoar,
Republicans, and Messrs. Abbott, Hunton and Payne, Democrats. The
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the bill as members of the
Commission were Messrs. Clifford, Strong, Miller and Field. Strong and
Miller were understood to be Republicans, and Clifford and Field
Democrats. Upon these four the duty was imposed to select the fifth
Justice.
[Sidenote: The fifth Justice.]
Since without the fifth Justice the Commission would consist of seven
Republicans and seven Democrats, it was evident that this Justice would
be the umpire in every question of disputed returns which the two
Houses could not themselves settle by concurrent agreement. The
responsibility which this Justice would have to bear would be one of
the most onerous and solemn duties ever imposed upon any mortal. It
could be no less than the making of a President, and it might be the
determination of the question whether there should be another civil
war. It was not a responsibility to be courted, but no man upon whom it
might fall could, with honor, refuse to accept it.
It was the general feeling throughout the {287} discussion of the bill
that the man who would be chosen was Judge David Davis. He had been a
Republican and a close personal friend of Lincoln, but had latterly
inclined toward the Democracy, and, it was thought, had favored the
election of Mr. Tilden. He was regarded as the man of least political
prejudice among a set of men of very little political prejudice. The
Democrats, however, were entirely willing to risk their cause in his
hands, because they believed it was strong enough on its merits to
convince any unprejudiced mind, and there is little question that the
Republicans were afraid to risk their cause in his hands, because they
knew that they must win on every point or lose altogether, and they
hesitated to take such desperate chances unless whatever political
prejudice might exist in the mind of the umpire should be on their
side.
[Sidenote: Justice David Davis.]
But to the apparent surprise of everybody and to the consternation of
the Democrats, Justice Davis was chosen by the Illinois legislature, on
the 25th of January, the day after the bill passed the Senate, and the
day before it passed the House, United States Senator, and a few days
after the bill passed the House, he accepted the position, which act
involved his resignation at an early day of his judicial office; and as
he was now to leave the bench and go into the political branch of the
Government, as a Democratic Senator, elected by the Democrats of the
Illinois legislature, there appeared to him an evident impropriety in
his acting on the Commission as a representative of the unpolitical
branch of the Government, and especially as that member upon whom the
weightiest responsibility would fall, and who would, therefore, be
expected to act with greatest political impartiality, and with an eye
single to public justice. Whether Justice Davis sought this election to
the senatorship at this juncture or not, {288} in order to escape the
great responsibility that was about to fall upon him, we do not know.
He was not a particularly brave man. He was a big, fat man, a good
liver, and loved his ease. Ordinarily men will not exchange the high
and life-long office of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States for a seat in the Senate. Unless he had his eye upon the
Presidency of the United States, it would be very hard to explain his
action in exchanging his high judicial position for the senatorship on
any other ground than his desire to escape the terrible responsibility
of deciding whether Tilden or Hayes should be President. It is even
more difficult to account for the action of the Democrats in the
legislature of Illinois. They certainly did not intend to harm the
chances of Mr. Tilden by this act. The Republicans might have invented
such a scheme for disposing of the Justice, but for Democrats to have
been concerned in any such movement is incredible. It is probable that
it was simply a blunder on their part. They did not appreciate the
incompatibility between the position of a Democratic Senator-elect and
membership on the Electoral Commission as a judicial representative.
They thought that as the Justice would not take his seat in the Senate
until after the 4th of March he would remain a member of the Supreme
Court until then, and as such would be fully qualified for the place on
the Commission. The legislature at Springfield had no such delicate and
discriminating sense of official proprieties as obtained in Washington,
and throughout the more fastidious East.
The Democrats in the House of Representatives learned of the election
of Justice Davis to the Senate on the morning of the day they were to
vote on the passage of the Electoral Commission bill. Even they did not
fully realize that it meant that the Justice {289} would not serve on
the Commission. Moreover, they had gone to such lengths with the bill
that it was too late to turn back. So far as is known the Justice did
not inform them or anybody else of his intention to accept the
senatorship, or of his scruples about being a member of the Commission,
until after the bill became law. When he did do so, the correctness of
his position was so clear that the four Justices named in the Act
immediately selected Justice Joseph P. Bradley as the fifth judicial
member of the Commission. Bradley was a Republican, as were the other
three members of the court, Waite, Hunt and Swayne. That is, after
Justice Davis was disposed of there remained only Republicans to choose
from, and Bradley being regarded as the least partisan, and the most
learned in the law, was selected. He fully realized the vast
responsibility which had been thus unexpectedly thrust upon him, but he
accepted it bravely and without flinching, and discharged it with honor
and success.
[Sidenote: The counting of the electoral vote by Congress.]
The Houses of Congress, and also the Electoral Commission, met on the
1st day of February to count the electoral vote. The Democrats still
felt sure of success, since they would win the election, if successful
upon a single point, while the Republicans, to be successful, must win
upon every point. On the other hand, the hopes of the Republicans had
been raised by gaining the majority of the Commission.
[Sidenote: The double returns from South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana
and Oregon.]
When the returns were opened by the President of the Senate two sets of
returns were found from each of the four "States," Florida, Louisiana,
South Carolina, and Oregon. In the case of Florida the electors voting
for Hayes and Wheeler sent with their votes the certification of the
"State" Canvassing Board and of the Governor to their election. The
case of South Carolina was the same. {290} In the case of Louisiana the
electors voting for Hayes and Wheeler sent with their votes the
certification of Governor Kellogg and of the "State" Canvassing Board
acting with him to their election, and the electors voting for Tilden
and Hendricks sent the certification of John McEnery, claiming to be
Governor, and the Canvassing Board acting with him, to their election.
The Oregon case was more complicated. The three Republican electors
received the highest number of votes, as reported by the Secretary of
State, who by the laws of Oregon was the "State" canvassing officer, to
the Governor. But one of them, Watts, held the office of postmaster in
a small place at the time of his election, and the Constitution of the
United States provides that "no Senator or Representative, or person
holding any office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an elector." The Democratic Governor of Oregon decided in his
own mind that Watts was not eligible, and made out his certification to
include, beside the two Republican electors who were eligible, one
Cronin, the Democrat receiving the highest number of votes for elector,
although the number received by him was a minority of all the votes
cast for the electoral tickets. This certificate was attested by the
Secretary of State, and was given to Cronin. When the day for the
meeting of the electors came around Cronin presented himself holding
the Governor's certificate, the only certificate which had been issued
to the electors by Governor Grover. But in spite of the fact that he
had this technical advantage, the two Republican electors, whose names
were included in the Governor's certificate, refused to act with him,
and he refused to let them have the certificate to attach to their
return of the electoral vote to the President of the Senate of the
United States unless they should so act. Both parties persisted {291}
in their refusals. Whereupon Cronin selected one J. N. Y. Miller and
one John Parker to fill up the electoral college of Oregon and these
three cast two electoral votes for Hayes and Wheeler and one for Tilden
and Hendricks, and, after attaching the Governor's certification to the
record of their vote in due form, sent this return to the President of
the Senate of the United States, as required by the Constitution. At
the same time the two Republican electors, Odell and Cartwright, met to
cast the electoral vote of the Commonwealth. Watts was also present. He
had resigned his office of postmaster, and now he resigned his position
as elector. The other two accepted his resignation, and immediately
chose him an elector. The three then cast the electoral vote of the
Commonwealth for Hayes and Wheeler. As we have seen, they did not have
the certification of their election by the Governor to attach to their
votes, as required by the law of the United States, but they procured
from the Secretary of State a certified copy of the canvass of the
votes for the electors, which showed the election of the three
Republican candidates, and sent this, and also a copy of their
proceedings in accepting the resignation of Watts, and then electing
him an elector, along with their report of the vote of the electors for
President and Vice-President, to the President of the Senate.
[Sidenote: The counsel before the Commission.]
Both the Republicans and the Democrats were represented by most able
counsel before the Electoral Commission. William M. Evarts, Stanley
Matthews, E. W. Stoughton, and Samuel Shellabarger were pitted against
a formidable array both as to ability and numbers on the other side,
Judge J. S. Black, Matthew H. Carpenter, Charles O'Conor, J. A.
Campbell, Lyman Trumbull, Ashbel Green, Montgomery Blair, George
Hoadly, William C. Whitney, R. T. Merrick and A. P. Morse.
{292} [Sidenote: The Republican position.]
The Republicans took their stand at the outset upon the principle that
Congress could not go behind the returns of the "State" Canvassing
Board or officer, in counting the electoral vote from any "State." They
contended that in the election of the President and Vice-President, the
Constitution had separated the procedure into two distinct parts, and
had assigned the first part to the control of the several "States"
exclusively, and the second part to the control of Congress
exclusively; that up to the completion of the election of the electors
the exclusive control of the "States" respectively extended, but that
all control after that point had been reached was in Congress, and that
Congress had no power whatever, under the Constitution, to revise,
interfere with, or examine into, that part assigned by the Constitution
to the "States" respectively, and, on the other hand, that Congress was
bound to disregard any act of the "States," or of any of the officers
or agents of the "States," in that part assigned exclusively by the
Constitution to its own control. There is no question that this was all
sound constitutional law and that the Democrats would have to abandon
entirely their old "States'" rights doctrine and go over to the most
extreme nationalism in order to combat it.
[Sidenote: The Democratic position.]
It did not appear to them necessary to do this in order to win their
case. One single electoral vote from any one of the four "States," from
which double returns had been received, would elect Tilden and
Hendricks. It did not seem to them that the line between the powers of
the "States" and those of Congress over the election of the President
and Vice-President could under the existing facts be drawn anywhere
without giving them at least this one vote. If the returns as certified
to by the Governors and the "State" canvassing officer, officers, or
boards, of these four {293} "States" should be received and counted
they would have this one vote from Oregon. If, on the other hand, the
popular vote for the electors as it came into the hands of the "State"
canvassing officers or boards was to be received and counted, then they
would have the electoral votes of at least Louisiana, Florida, or South
Carolina, and perhaps of all of them. But the Republicans contended
that the line between "State" control and Congressional control was to
be drawn between the Governor's certification and the report of the
"State" canvassing officer, officers, or board to the Governor of the
result of the vote for the electors. The certification issued by the
Governor, they held, was ordered by Congressional law and was under
Congressional control, even when the "State" canvassing officer,
officers, or board should join with the Governor in the certification
of the persons chosen electors. The report of the vote for the electors
by the "State" canvassing officer, officers, or board to the Governor
was thus the final act under "State" control, was the final act in the
election of the electors. This was unquestionably sound constitutional
law. But it would give all the electoral votes from all four of the
"States," from which double returns had been received, to Hayes and
Wheeler, and would elect them by one vote.
[Sidenote: The decisions of the Commission.]
The view of the counsel for the Republican candidates prevailed with a
majority of the Commission. By a majority of a single vote the
Commission gave all the electoral votes of the four "States" from which
double returns had been received to Hayes and Wheeler, and since the
decisions of the Commission were final unless negatived by both Houses
of Congress, and the Republican Senate, of course, sustained the
decisions of the Commission, there was nothing for the Democrats to do
but submit or have recourse to violence. Threats were freely expressed
of having {294} Mr. Tilden take the oath of office, and then conducting
him, under the support of a large armed body, to the White House and
installing him there. But it was observed that the Southern Democrats
did not participate in these menacing declarations, and it was soon
learned that Mr. Tilden himself would not lend himself to any such
desperate movement. Moreover, the existing President had, with his
usual promptness and decision, prepared himself to meet all exigencies,
and had let it be known that he would uphold the decisions to which
Congress and its Commission might come by any power necessary to
accomplish the result.
[Sidenote: Mr. Hayes declared President.]
In the early morning of March 2d, the count was completed, and Hayes
and Wheeler were proclaimed by the presiding officer of the Senate, Mr.
Ferry, elected President and Vice-President of the United States by a
majority of one electoral vote. The popular vote for the electors was
about eight millions three hundred thousand. Of this vast number the
Tilden electors had received the majority by about two hundred and
fifty thousand, according to the Republican count, and by about three
hundred thousand, according to the Democratic count. It must be
remembered, however, that it is quite possible for the candidate of one
party to receive a popular majority throughout the whole country, and
the candidate of the other to receive a majority of the electoral
votes, simply because the popular vote is counted, in electing the
electors, by "States" and not in the aggregate.
[Sidenote: The truth in regard to the election.]
The truth in regard to the whole transaction of the election probably
is that the Democrats did in some places in the South intimidate
voters; that the Republican "State" canvassing officers, making this a
justification, or an excuse, did throw out votes that ought to have
been counted; and that the existing law of {295} elections,
administered by Republicans, was capable of being so interpreted as to
give legal warrant to all that was done by them. A perfectly fair
election in the "States" of Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina,
with the law of suffrage then obtaining, would probably have resulted
in a popular majority for the Republican candidates for electors.
Accepting the law of suffrage as then existing for the basis of our
reasoning, it will have to be conceded that the Republicans were in the
right both morally and legally, and that the title of Hayes and Wheeler
to the offices of President and Vice-President was entirely sound and
unimpeachable. They were inaugurated on the 5th day of March, 1877,
without any attempt at resistance or disturbance from any quarter.
[Sidenote: Mr. Hayes's Southern policy.]
During the counting of the electoral vote it was suspected that the
friends of Mr. Hayes were giving some assurances to the Southerners in
Congress in regard to what the policy of his Administration would be
concerning the "State" governments in the South. The unwillingness of
the Southern Democrats to join with their party associates of the North
in any revolutionary projects was attributed partly to this. While
there is no evidence that Mr. Hayes ever pledged himself to the
Southerners in regard to anything, still it is probably true that his
views concerning the unwisdom of the employment of the military power
of the United States in upholding the negro-Republican "State"
governments in the South were imparted to them by his friends. At any
rate, he announced in his inaugural address that he considered the
re-establishment of local self-government in these "States" to be one
of the prime objects of his Administration, and he speedily withdrew
the support of the military power of the United States from the three
{296} negro-Republican "State" governments, and left them to their own
resources.
[Sidenote: The result of his policy.]
The result was that, although the Republican candidates for Governor
and for the members of the legislature in these three "States" received
about the same vote as the Republican presidential electors, and in
January of 1877 actually assumed power, the Democratic candidates
ousted them from the offices, and in sufficient number from the
legislative seats, and established at last Democratic white rule in all
the "States" of the South. In Florida the Republican, M. L. Stearns,
gave way to the Democrat, George F. Drew, in the gubernatorial office;
in South Carolina D. H. Chamberlain gave way to Wade Hampton, and in
Louisiana, S. B. Packard gave way to Francis T. Nicholls.
Order and peace were quickly established everywhere, and the plundered
and impoverished South could at last take hope and feel courage to make
a new effort to recover some degree of prosperity and some measure of
domestic content. For ten years the dark night of domination by the
negro and adventurer had rested upon the unhappy section, until it had
been reduced to the very abomination of desolation. Broken in health
and fortune, sick at heart, conscious of the terrible degradation which
had been imposed upon them, and politically ostracized, the better part
of the white population of the South had staggered and groped through
the hideous experiences of this period, and such of them as had not
perished during the awful passage had now at last been relieved of the
frightful scourge, and half dazed, as if just recovering from a
terrible nightmare, found themselves again in the places of power and
responsibility. But they brought with them, as their dominant passion,
undying hatred of the Republican party as the author of all their woes,
and as their {297} dominant policy, the stern and unbending resolve to
stand together as one man against every movement which had even the
slightest tendency toward a restoration of the hated conditions from
which they had escaped. No sane mind can wonder at "the solid South,"
or at the Democratic South. Life, property, happiness, honor,
civilization, everything which makes existence endurable demanded that
the decent white men of the South should stand shoulder to shoulder in
defending their families, their homes and their communities from any
return of the vile plague under which they had suffered so long and so
cruelly; and human instinct determined that this should be done in
connection with that party which was hostile to the Republican party.
The differences which lead to a fair fight and the wounds which are
received in it are easily healed, but indignities heaped upon a fallen
foe create a bitterness of heart that lasts so long as life endures.
[Sidenote: Reconciliation between the North and the South.]
Slavery was a great wrong, and secession was an error and a terrible
blunder, but Reconstruction was a punishment so far in excess of the
crime that it extinguished every sense of culpability upon the part of
those whom it was sought to convict and convert. More than a quarter of
a century has now passed since the blunder-crime of Reconstruction
played its baleful part in alienating the two sections of the country.
Until four years ago little progress had been made in reconciling them.
It is said now that the recent war with Spain, in which men from the
North and men from the South marched under the same banner to battle
and to victory, has buried the hatchet forever between them. But they
had done this many times before, and yet it did not prevent the attempt
to destroy the Union. It cannot be in this alone that the South feels
increased security against the doctrines and the {298} policies and
interferences of the Republican party with regard to the negro
question, the great question which has made and kept the South solidly
Democratic. It is something far more significant and substantial than
this. It is to some the pleasing, though to others startling, fact,
that the Republican party, in its work of imposing the sovereignty of
the United States upon eight millions of Asiatics, has changed its
views in regard to the political relation of races and has at last
virtually accepted the ideas of the South upon that subject. The white
men of the South need now have no further fear that the Republican
party, or Republican Administrations, will ever again give themselves
over to the vain imagination of the political equality of man. It is
this change of mind and heart on the part of the North in regard to
this vital question of Southern "State" polity which has caused the now
much-talked-of reconciliation.
{299}