The 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises
generic characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of
succession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to
reason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one
sâkhâ only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct
statement, and so on, their application in all sâkhâs, since the
sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all sâkhâs; so
there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion
being undertaken by members of all sâkhâs.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the
sacrifice.'
55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the case of the sacrifice;
for thus Scripture shows.
The sacred text (Ch. Up. V, 12 ff.) enjoins a meditation on Vaisvânara,
the object of which is the highest Self, as having for its body the
entire threefold world, and for its limbs the heavenly world, the sun,
the wind, and so on. The doubt here arises whether separate meditations
have to be performed on the highest Being in its separate aspects, or in
its aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect, or in its aggregate
aspect only.--In its separate aspects, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; since
at the outset a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the Rishis
in succession telling Asvapati the objects of their meditation, viz. the
sky, the sun, and so on, Asvapati explains to them that these
meditations refer to the head, eye, and so on, of the highest Being, and
mentions for each of these meditations a special fruit. And the
concluding explanation 'he who worships Vaisvânara as a span long, &c.,'
is merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the preceding
meditations on the parts of Vaisvânara.--Another Pûrvapakshin holds that
this very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on Vaisvânara
in his collective aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined
meditations on his limbs; for that passage states a separate result, 'he
eats food in all worlds,' &c. Nor does this destroy the unity of the
whole section. The case is analogous to that of the meditation on
'plenitude' (bhûman; Ch. Up. VII, 23). There, in the beginning,
separate meditations are enjoined on name, and so on, with special
results of their own; and after that a meditation is enjoined on bhûman,
with a result of its own, 'He becomes a Self-ruler,' &c. The entire
section really refers to the meditation on bhûman; but all the same
there are admitted subordinate meditations on name, and so on, and a
special result for each.--These views are set aside by the Sûtra, 'There
is pre-eminence of plenitude,' i.e. there is reason to assume that
Vaisvânara in his fulness, i.e. in his collective aspect, is meant;
since we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the beginning of
the section it is manifest that what the Rishis desire to know is the
Vaisânara Self; it is that Self which Asvapati expounds to them as
having the Universe for his body, and in agreement therewith the last
clause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which is
none other than the Vaisvânara Self)--which is there characterised as
the food of all worlds, all beings, all Selfs--is the fruit of the
meditation on Vaisvânara. This summing up proves the whole section to
deal with the same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we
determine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate
members of the Vaisânara Self and their special results is merely of the
nature of explanatory comment (anuvâda) on parts of the meditation on
the collective Self.--This decision is arrived at as in the case of the
sacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices--such as 'Let a
man, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve potsherds to
Vaisvânara'--the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation,
'there is an oblation on eight potsherds,' and so on.--The meditation
therefore has to be performed on the entire Vaisvânara Self only, not on
its parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so far, namely,
as declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the Self
only, 'your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me'; 'you
would have become blind,' and so on. This also shows that the reference
to the text enjoining meditations on name, &c., proves nothing as to our
passage. For there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected
with those special meditations; it only says that the meditation on
plenitude (bhûman) has a more excellent result. The section, therefore,
although really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bhûman,
at the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are
fruitful; otherwise the meditation on the bhûman could not be
recommended, for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the
preceding meditations.--The conclusion, therefore, is that the text
enjoins a meditation on the collective Vaisvânara Self only.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude.'
56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of the difference of
words, and so on.
The instances coming under this head of discussion are all those
meditations on Brahman which have for their only result final Release,
which consists in attaining to Brahman--such as the meditation on that
which is, the meditation on the bhûman, the meditation on the small
space within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the Sândilya
meditation, the meditation on Vaisvânara, the meditation on the Self of
bliss, the meditation on the Imperishable, and others--whether they be
recorded in one sâkhâ only or in several sâkhâs. To a different category
belong those meditations which have a special object such as Prâna, and
a special result.--The doubt here arises whether the meditations of the
former class are all to be considered as identical, or as separate--The
Pûrvapakshin holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have
one and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the nature of
all cognition depends on the object cognised; and the nature of the
meditations thus being one, the meditations themselves are one.--This
view the Sûtra controverts. The meditations are different, on account of
the difference of terms and the rest. The 'and the rest' comprises
repetition (abhyâsa), number (samkhyâ), quality (guna), subject-matter
(prakriyâ), and name (nâmadheya; cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet
in those meditations with difference of connexion, expressing itself in
difference of words, and so on; which causes difference on the part of
the meditations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, 'he knows,'
'he is to meditate' (veda; upâsîta), and so on, do indeed all of them
denote a certain continuity of cognition, and all these cognitions have
for their object Brahman only, but all the same those cognitions differ
in so far as they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified
by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation; in one
meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world, in another as
free from all evil, and so on. We therefore arrive at the decision that
clauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their
result the attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves, convey
the idea of separate independent meditations, and thus effect separation
of the vidyâs. This entire question was indeed already decided in the
Pûrva Mimâmsa-sûtras (II, 2, 1), but it is here argued again to the end
of dispelling the mistaken notion that the Vedânta-texts aim at
knowledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as
meditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'difference of words and the rest.'