In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating
subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of
meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises
whether the meditating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and
enjoying Self, subject to transmigration; or as that Self which
Prajâpati describes (Ch. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self free from all sin and
imperfection.--Some hold the former view, on the ground that the
meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within
a body, it _is_ a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring
about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A
person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters
on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result,
possess characteristics different from those of a knowing, doing, and
enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him
as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of
accomplishing those ends; in the latter state he must be viewed as an
ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something
different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person
engaged in meditation.--But, an objection is raised, the text 'as the
thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed
this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) _does_ declare a difference (between the
agent engaged in sacrificial action, and the meditating subject), and
from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as
having a nature free from all evil, and so on.--Not so, the Pûrvapakshin
replies; for the clause, 'howsoever they meditate on him,' proves that
that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of
the meditating subject).--To this the next Sûtra replies.
52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the
being of that; as in the case of intuition.
It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having
the ordinary characteristics of knowing, acting, &c.; it rather
possesses those characteristic properties--freedom from evil, and so on--
which distinguish the state of Release from the Samsâra state. At the
time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature
as the released Self. 'For it is of the being of that,' i.e. it attains
the nature of that--as proved by the texts, 'as the thought of a man is
in this world, so he will be when he has departed,' and 'howsoever he
meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that
these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without
declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee); for the
personal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of
meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of
meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a
meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual
Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities
mentioned in the teaching of Prajâpati. And hence the individual Self is,
in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but)
under that form which it has to attain (i.e. the pure form which belongs
to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition'--i.e. as
in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intuition of Brahman has for
its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the
individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature.
In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of
the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as 'Let him who
is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,' enjoins the performance of
the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached; while the
conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a
knowing subject, and so on--which are separate from the body--has the
function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results
which will come about at some future time. So much only (i.e. the mere
cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required
for works (as distinguished from meditations).--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'being in the body.'
53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of
sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sâkhâs, but rather
(belong) to all sâkhâs.
There are certain meditations connected with certain constituent
elements of sacrifices-as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
(as) the Udgîtha '(Ch. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold
Saman as the five worlds' (Ch. Up. II, 2, 1), &c. The question here
arises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those
sâkhâs in whose texts they are mentioned; or to be connected with the
Udgîtha, and so on, in all sâkhâs. There is here a legitimate ground for
doubt, in so far as, although the general agreement of all Vedânta-texts
is established, the Udgîtha, and so on, are different in each Veda since
the accents differ in the different Vedas--The Pûrvapakshin declares
that those meditations are limited each to its particular sâkhâ; for, he
says, the injunction 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha' does indeed,
verbally, refer to the Udgîtha in general; but as what stands nearest to
this injunction is the special Udgîtha of the sâkhâ, in whose text this
injunction occurs, and which shares the peculiarities of accent
characteristic of that sâkhâ, we decide that the meditation is enjoined
on members of that sâkhâ only.--The Sûtra sets this opinion aside. The
injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all sâkhâs, since
the text expressly connects them with the Udgîtha in general. They
therefore hold good wherever there is an Udgîtha. The individual
Udgîthas of the several sâkhâs are indeed distinguished by different
accentuation; but the general statement, 'Let him meditate on the
Udgîtha.' suggests to the mind not any particular Udgîtha, but _the_
Udgîtha in general, and hence there is no reason to restrict the
meditation to a particular sâkhâ. From the principle moreover that all
sâkhâs teach the same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined
in the different sâkhâs is one only; and hence there is no reason to
hold that the Udgîtha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a
particular one. For the Udgîtha is only an element in the sacrifice, and
the sacrifice is one and the same. The meditations are not therefore
limited to particular sâkhâs.