The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a
reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an
enjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the
enjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply
injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agnîshomau.
And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not
harm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of
sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not
harming any creature.--For the two injunctions refer to different things.
The injunction to kill the goat for Agnîshomau intimates that the
killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice,
while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has
disastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of
harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat
which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such
actions as spring from natural passion or desire (râga); we remark that
in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural
desire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to
sacrifice', teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons
desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus
learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action
from the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of
the goat also which is offered to Agnîshomau; man learns from Scripture
that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the
result, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in
no way differs from that of harm done in ordinary life--where the agent
always is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the
conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself.
The same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men
learn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties
of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply
themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and
therefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those
who have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of
evil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to
be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things
such as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which
is of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the
result of evil deeds Smriti declares: 'Owing to those defects of work
which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all
this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of
enjoying the fruits of their works.--To this the Sûtra replies--it is
not so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that
the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly
world, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in
the text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine
body goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the
heavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is
not of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it
rather is of beneficial nature.--With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou
dost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men
go, not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.' An act
which has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain,
men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.