The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose
nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is
differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of
that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we
have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but
light means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of
the Sûtra 'âbhâsâh' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons
set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious.
The 'and' of the Sûtra is meant to point out that that doctrine,
moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be
different from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones,
one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the
sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to
upâdhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the
theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts
connect themselves is one only.
But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being
Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that
view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to
the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the
limiting adjuncts!--To this the next Sûtra replies.