The samavâya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to
which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive
at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.
14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse
(takes place); as it is observed.
From the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or
fire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow
that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is
the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms,
viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things
possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed
that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal
nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in
accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any
attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with
actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess
colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then,
in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not
possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the
next Sûtra refers.