We have shown that the theory of the Pradhâna being the universal cause
is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from
inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms
constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same
way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable'
must be supplied from the preceding Sûtra; 'or' has to be taken in the
sense of 'and.' The sense of the Sûtra is--in the same way as the big
and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the
short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is
untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas) maintain is
untenable; or, in other words--as the theory of the world originating
from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is
likewise untenable.--Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of
cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means
of the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms
also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining
by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction
of parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms
would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different
kinds of extension--minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.--would
never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also
have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and
those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.--
But, the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard seed
and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one
hand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the
atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the
mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their
inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there
is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not
themselves consist of parts).--Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not
possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than
the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard
seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.--But what, then, are we
to do to get out of this dilemma?--You have only to accept the Vedic
doctrine of the origination of the world.
Others explain the above Sûtra as meant to refute an objection against
the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit
the arrangement of the Sûtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration.
The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been
disposed of in the preceding pâda, and the present pâda is devoted to
the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being
viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was
shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sûtra, therefore, is
none other than what we stated above.--But what are those other
untenable views to which the Sûtra refers?--To this question the next
Sûtra replies.
11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being
(of the origination of the world).
The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive
formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the
aggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the
atoms. The primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the
origination of the entire world--is assumed to be brought about by the
unseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway
motion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas
are caused by the unseen principle.'--Is then, we ask, this primary
motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an
adrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the
unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the
individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could,
the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the
world. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of
motion originating in the atoms.--Let it then be assumed that motion
originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls
in which the adrishta abides!--If this were so, we reply, it would
follow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of
the souls forms an eternal stream.-But the adrishta requires to be
matured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to
maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were
performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only;
and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It
is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the
origination of the world does not take place at all times.--But this
reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to
establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring
from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any
previous agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should
reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time
(so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours
account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same
time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a
dviparârdha.--Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to
their conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific
qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere
inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown
under I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any
action on the part of the atoms.
12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavâya, there results a
_regressus in infinitum_ from equality.
The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the
acknowledgment of samavâya.--Why so?--Because the samavâya also, like
part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to
establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing
to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain.
The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavâya relation, defining it as
'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the
case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to
each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now,
if such a samavâya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact
that things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., class
characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which
they belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to
be searched for why the samavâya, which is of the same nature as those
things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the
things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further
reason has to be postulated, and so on, _in infinitum_. Nor can it be
said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the
essential nature of samavâya (so that no further reason need be demanded
for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to
assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities,
and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavâya needless for
them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen
entity such as the samavâya is, and then to assume for it such and such
an essential nature.--These objections apply to the samavâya whether it
be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sûtra urges a further
objection against it if viewed as eternal.