Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of
mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhâna is destitute of
all power of thought; yet the non-sentient Pradhâna may begin to act
owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel
instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing
to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but
possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence.
And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same
way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakriti
and the soul. As has been said, 'In order that the soul may know the
Pradhâna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like
that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (Sânkhya Kâ.
21). This means--to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhâna,
and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhâna enters on
action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.
To this the Sûtra replies 'thus also.' This means--the inability of the
Pradhâna to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame
man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other
powers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it; and the
blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions
and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the
attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other
hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As,
moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhâna is something
eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the
other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no
bondage and no release.
6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and
subordinate) matter.
You Sânkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a
certain relation between principal and subordinate entities which
depends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas--
'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas'
(Sânkhya Kâ. I, 16).
But, as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise,
none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of
superiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world
cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even
in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow
therefrom that creation is eternal.
7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on
account of (the Pradhâna) being destitute of the power of a knowing
subject.
Even if the Pradhâna were inferred by some reasoning different from the
arguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force
because, anyhow, the Pradhâna is devoid of the power of a cognising
subject. The Pradhâna thus cannot be established by any mode of
inference.