On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the
Pradhâna or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary
things would attach themselves to the Pradhâna also, since it does not
differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore
is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can
be held to be the general cause.
The Pradhâna, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that
it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,'
and so on?--But there _are_ parts of the Pradhâna, viz. Goodness,
Passion, and Darkness!--This we reply necessitates the following
distinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness
constitute the Pradhâna? or is the Pradhâna the effect of those three?
The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according
to which the Pradhâna is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number
of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three gunas also have
no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former
alternative, the gunas not being composed of parts must be held to
aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of
space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot
result.--The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the
general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of
parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction,
and hence do not possess the power of originating effects.