If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed
to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-
sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the
intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But
that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of
the essential nature of things. This the Sûtra expresses in 'for (there
are) manifold (powers).' We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which
are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on:
there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest
Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life
should possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus
Parâsara also--in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation--
viz. 'How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of
qualities, pure, &c.?'--declares 'Numberless powers, lying beyond the
sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for
creation, and so on; just as heat belongs to fire.' Similarly, Scripture
says, 'what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built
heaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 81); and 'Brahman was that wood,
Brahman was that tree', and so on.--Objections founded on ordinary
generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature
from all other things.