24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of
employment; we say, not so; for as in the case of milk.
We have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that
the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its
purposes, &c., has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body,
and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from
everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to
hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its
mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe.--But,
it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents
of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies
in order to effect their purposes; but how should it follow therefrom
that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without
such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational?--As, we reply, it
is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the
capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain
instruments, some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman,
being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the
world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters,
weavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of
actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although
they may fully possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of
such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of
implements; those having the capacity produce by means of the
instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also,
although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating
the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But
before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as
we know from texts such as 'Being only this was in the beginning';
'there was Nârayana alone.' Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be
rendered plausible; and hence the primâ facie view set forth in the
earlier part of the Sûtra, 'Should it be said that (it is) not; on
account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'
This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sûtra, 'not so; for as
in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable
of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g.
and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour
milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analogously
Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may
actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sûtra
is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally
known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and
similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the
end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the
process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour.