As the one air, according as it undergoes in the body different
modifications, acquires a new name, new characteristics, and new
functions, being then called prâna, apâna, and so on; thus the one
Brahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non-moving
beings.--The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause,
is thus fully established.
Here terminates the 'ârambhana' adhikarana.
21. From the designation of the 'other' (as non-different from Brahman)
there result (Brahman's) not creating what is beneficial, and other
imperfections.
'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman'--these and similar texts which
declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been
said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the
individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these
texts really imply that the 'other one,' i.e. the soul, is Brahman,
there will follow certain imperfections on Brahman's part, viz. that
Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its
purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to
itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the
like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either
originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other
natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational
independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial
to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world
from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare
Brahman to be different from the soul; for were there such difference,
the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should
it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference
due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean
essential non-difference, we must ask the following question--does the
non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is
essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's
omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it,
then Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul--which is non-
different from Brahman--as its own pains; and from this there
necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brahman does not create
what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If,
again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to
Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference
refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging
to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their
respective results. Should the ajñana, on the other hand, belong to
Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-
illuminedness, cannot possibly be conscious of ajñana and the creation
of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman
is obscured by ajñana, we point to all the difficulties, previously set
forth, which follow from this hypothesis--to obscure light means to make
it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the
essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view
of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be
untenable.--This primâ facie view the next Sûtra refutes.
22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of
difference.
The word 'but' sets aside the primâ facie view. To the individual soul
capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional,
i.e. from it there is different, Brahman.--On what ground?--'Owing to
the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different
from the soul in the following texts:--'He who dwells in the Self and
within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the
body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowing as separate the Self and the
Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'He is the
cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls)
(Svet Up. VI, 9); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the
other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'There are two, the one knowing, the
other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler'
(Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the prâjña. Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21);
'Mounted by the prâjña. Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35); 'From that the ruler
of mâyâ sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through mâyâ
(Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'the Master of the Pradhâna and the souls, the lord
of the gunas' (Svet. Up. VI, 16);'the eternal among eternals, the
intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of
many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the
Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves
within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the
Imperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the
body, whom Death does not know; he is the inner Self of all beings, free
from evil, the divine one, the one God, Nârâyana'; and other similar
texts.
23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is
impossibility of that.
In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient
things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c., which are of an extremely
low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature
with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic
to all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the
individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere
wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know
from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious
qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in
coordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on
passages such as 'of whom the Self is the body,' that as the jîva
constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the jîva as its
Self, Brahman has the jîva for its mode; and with this doctrine the co-
ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it--
as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Sû. I, 4, 22. Brahman in all its
states has the souls and matter for its body; when the souls and matter
are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition; when, on
the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross
state, it is 'effected' and then called world. In this way the co-
ordination above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-
different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no
confusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to
change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient
souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman: hence
the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in
the state of non-separation-described in texts such as, 'Being only this
was in the beginning'--the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist
in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must
necessarily be admitted; for that the souls at that time also persist in
a subtle form is shown under Sûtras II, I, 34; 35. Non-division, at that
time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and
forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary
to reason.
Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in
Sûtra 22, as the difference between the jîva in its state of bondage and
the jîva in so far as free from avidyâ, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman,
implicate themselves in contradictions. For the jiva., in so far as free
from avidyâ, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause
of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all--it in fact possesses
none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the
difference of the released soul; for according to the view in question
all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can
the Sûtra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the
individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidyâ--a distinction
analogous to that which a man in the state of avidyâ makes between the
shell and the silver; for it is the task of the Vedânta to convey a
knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of
enquiry in the first Sûtra ('Now then the enquiry into Brahman') and
which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what
they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised
against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and
Reasoning.--The two Sûtras II, 1, 8; 9 really form a complementary
statement to what is proved in the present adhikarana; for their purport
is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other
in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sûtra II, 1, 7 has
reference to what is contained in the previous adhikarana.