11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause

must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhâna must be abandoned,

because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved

by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kanâda, Akshapâda,

Jina, Kapila and Patañjali respectively are all mutually contradictory.

12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different

way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is

not got rid of.

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth

by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the

same we may arrive at the Pradhâna theory through other lines of

reasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted.--

But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests

exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other

time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more

skilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the

objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The

conclusion from all this is that, with regard to supersensuous matters,

Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied

only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He

who supports the teaching of the Rishis and the doctrine as to sacred

duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows

sacred duty' (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the Sânkhyas which

conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of

confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.--Here finishes the

section treating of 'difference of nature.'

13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised

(within the Veda) are explained.

Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised

within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sûtra means to say that by the

demolition given above of the Sânkhya doctrine which is not comprised

within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position,

viz. the theories of Kanâda, Akshapâda, Jina, and Buddha, must likewise

be considered as demolished.

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that,

since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the

general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal

substance is ill-founded.--They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that

extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and

they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms

which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or

non-void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence,

being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the

reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those

theories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.--Here

finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within

the Veda).'

14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows

non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul); we reply--it may

be as in ordinary life.

The Sânkhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he

says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an

effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings

in either their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the

difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such

difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes

an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing

a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to

embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.--But we have, under

I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of

pleasure and pain!--By no means! There you have shown only that the

Lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the

object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure

and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like

an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that,

like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we

observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in

the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet

experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal

condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this

Scripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no

escape from pleasure and pain; but when he is free of the body then

neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus,

the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does

not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual

soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely

homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode

of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a

lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing

fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhâna being

the general cause is the more valid one.

To this objection the Sûtra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in

ordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and

the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences

pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due

to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form

of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers

to that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is

onefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He

moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII,

2, 1; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage

of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a

shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which

is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its

gross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected

with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.--'As in

ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either

observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or

pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does

not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he

himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or

transgression of his commands. The author of the Dramida-bhâshya gives

expression to the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although

staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of

discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his

body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort,

rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all

possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of

creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is

not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of

Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy

all possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo

changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts

declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.--Others

give a different explanation of this Sûtra. According to them it refutes

the pûrvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the

distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be

accounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of

the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But

this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that

creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or

a limiting adjunct (upâdhi) no such primâ facie view can arise. For on

their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the

power or Nescience or upâdhi inhering in the causal substance, and the

power or Nescience or upâdhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two

are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view

of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that primâ

facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those

philosophers; for Sûtra II, 1, 35 teaches that the individual souls and

their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the

distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).

But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt

as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not

arise; for the distinction of the two groups will, on that view, be

analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the

one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of

the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a

change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman

(which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to

transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient)

objects of enjoyment.

15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows

from what begins with the word ârambhana.

Under II, 1, 7 and other Sûtras the non-difference of the effect, i.e.

the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this

basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded.

The present Sûtra now raises a primâ facie objection against that very

non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.

On the point in question the school of Kanâda argues as follows. It is

in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the

cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the

ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of

cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the

same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; nobody

applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice versâ. A

third argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched

from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There,

fourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the

effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause

has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly

with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we

say 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical

difference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the

seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing

agent (which would result from cause and effect being identical); for if

the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the

activity of the agent?--Let us then say that, although the effect _exists_

(at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful

towards the effect.--But in that case the activity of the agent would

have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything

would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and

non-eternal things!--Let us then say that the effect, although always

existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the

activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless,

and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!--

This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another

manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a _regressus in

infinitum_. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another

manifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is

eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation

is said to originate, we lapse into the asatkâryavâda (according to

which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if

the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that

the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar

things. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as

lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular

objects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for

showing a jar does _not_ at the same time manifest waterpots and other

things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in

so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which

previously did _not_ exist; and thus the theory of the previous

existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite

causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay

e.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can

become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the

hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the

definite effect which will result from the cause).

But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the

previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the

activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence

before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to

operate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises

without distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's

activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not

only to cloth).--Not so, the Vaiseshika replies. Activity applied to a

certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which

inheres in that cause.

Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is

non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as

an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical

thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the

causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things

such as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the jar or pot, rests

altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars,

waterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz.

clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on

empirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while

the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the

entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i.e. Brahman

which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on

the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while

reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows

that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the

effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our

theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver

erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-

reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while

the non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter of

fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of

jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the reality of everything apart

from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that

reasoning rests, we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous,

permanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non-

permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the

continuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the

imagined snake--is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which

is non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently

enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous

effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is

real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as

e.g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected

thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to

destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that

which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is

false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the

anirvakanîyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see

above, p. 102 ff.).--We further ask, 'Is a causal substance, such as

clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it

passed over into some special modified condition?' The former

alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the

cause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be

rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state

would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different

state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one,

&c., so that a _regressus in infinitum_ would result.--Let it then be

said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed

unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place

(this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).--But this

also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal

substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed

condition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.--

Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk

from clay, gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived; that this

perception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while, on the

other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated--and

that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that

the effect _does_ originate from the cause. For this argumentation does

not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the

mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the

gold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the

gold, as forming the substrate of the coins [FOOTNOTE 434:1]? The mere

gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no

effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could

apply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity

with regard to itself.--But, an objection is raised, the svastika-

ornament is perceived as different from the gold!--It is not, we reply,

different from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other

thing but gold is perceived.--But the existence of another thing is

proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word,

and so on!--By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which

have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no

less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence

have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the

second place, is the _gold coin_ originative of the svastika-ornament;

for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the

threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated

by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold

in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the

svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their

causal substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the

entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal; for

it also is an effect.

In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything

apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption

of things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved

the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal

substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are;

for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.

'In that all this has its Self; it is the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7);

'There is here no plurality; from death to death goes he who sees here

plurality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'For where there is duality

as it were, there one sees another; but when for him the Self only has

become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?' (Bri. Up.

II, 4, 13); 'Indra goes manifold by means of his mâyâs' (Bri. Up. II, 5,

19);--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different

from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated

by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception; for in the way set

forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception

really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if

there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture,

to which no imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final

position among the means of knowledge; and which, although dependent on

Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of

words, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it

follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is

unreal.

Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the

falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-

real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls:

Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all

living bodies; as we know from many texts: 'Having entered into them

with this living Self (Ch. Up. VI, 3); 'The one god hidden within all

beings' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'The one god entered in many places'; 'That

Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth' (Ka. Up. I, 3,12);

'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.--But

if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living

bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect

the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation

affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and

that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released

souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant,

and so on.

Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman

give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the

reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and

so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on

which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the

same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in

mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their

limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another

large, one being bright, another dim, and so on.--But you have said that

scriptural texts such as 'Having entered with this living Self show that

the souls are not different from Brahman!--They are indeed not different

in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an

imagined difference.--To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to

Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no

room for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for

this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul

depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul! Not

so, the advaita-vâdin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the

existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their

relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual

dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the

case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, the very

nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be

established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a

whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of

a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different

from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they

are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same

way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the

dimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may

be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the

reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error;

for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release.

And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the

question as to its cause is not to be raised.

This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the

true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the

admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality.

For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of

Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously

imagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience.

If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is

the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in

it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (jada) is the abode of

Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge

a third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure

intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on

Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the

abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature

being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect; we must

negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous

nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience.

The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience,

and you therefore define nothing.--Moreover, the theory of Nescience

abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of

establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it

really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood

the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains

Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be

released.--But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!--

Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not

destroyed!--But we assume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul

whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience

is not destroyed will remain in Bondage!--You now argue on the

assumption of a special avidyâ for each soul. But what about the

distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to

the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former

alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is

pure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the

assumption of avidyâ to account for the distinction of souls would be

purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives

arise--Does this avidyâ which gives rise to the fictitious distinction

of souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?--If you say 'to

Brahman', your view coincides with mine.--Well then, 'to the souls'!--

But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the

purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?--Let us then view

the matter as follows--those several avidyâs which are assumed for the

purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to

those same avidyâs the distinction of souls is due.--But here you reason

in a manifest circle: the avidyâs are established on the basis of the

distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when

the avidyâs are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and

sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and

plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the

case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing

the several avidyâs on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to

be due to those avidyâs. And if you attempt to give to the argument a

somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyâs abiding

in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we

point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and

moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences

of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The

same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which

effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the

avidyâs abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a

beginningless flow of avidyâs, it follows that there is also a

beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those

avidyâs, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is

supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be

established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something

unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such

defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only; we remark

that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the

highest Brahman itself.--But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has

for its essence pure cognition!--Is Nescience then to be dealt with by

rational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the

arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not

cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question--

When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to

the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or

does it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but

destruction of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the

soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since

it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.--You have further

maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits

of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and

so on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors,

crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point

requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and

other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.)

pass away?--When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass

away!--Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of

those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by

analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from

this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected

image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the

soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.--

Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous

(apurushârtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that

disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman--which

corresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the

imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which

corresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two

former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and

the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on

the other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not

hold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is

conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the

two is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being

conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.

And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other

knowing subject _but_ Brahman and the soul.--It would, moreover, be

necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka)

with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience

itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be

the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved

being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the

existence of the soul is that which _is formed_ by Nescience, just as

shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the

fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is

the abode of Nescience.--If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of

Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of)

the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman

should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares,

is preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names

and forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely

homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience;

and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.

For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Mâya and Nescience

must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Mâyâ, i.e.

illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And

without being conscious of others the lord of Mâyâ is unable to delude

them by his Mâyâ; and Mâyâ herself cannot bring about the consciousness

of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude

others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.--

Perhaps you will say that the Mâyâ of Brahman causes him to be conscious

of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion.

But if Mâyâ causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated

intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements--

to become conscious of other beings, then Mâyâ is nothing but another

name for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of

the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Mâyâ

which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and

thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_

avidyâ.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is

known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be

nothing else but avidyâ. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings

apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none

but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!--

Let us then define avidyâ as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of

unreal things. Mâyâ then, as not being the cause of such a

disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of

avidyâ!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the

moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not

disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidyâ; and if, on

the other hand, Mâyâ which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it

presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of

disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would

be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so,

what harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies

the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts

inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were,

&c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should

he see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real;

Mâyâ on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency

is not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its

essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or

affected with, unreal Mâyâ, without avidyâ. Of what use, we further ask,

should an eternal non-real Mâyâ be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it

deludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be

to Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what

use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then

see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full

happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are

not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind

would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements

unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself,

unreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove

the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul

considered as the abode of avidyâ, apart from Brahman considered as the

abode of Mâyâ.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of

Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with

beginningless avidyâ, and owing to this avidyâ is conscious of plurality

within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of

avidyâ belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the

distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman

affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that

Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true

existence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of

teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such

fiction can be explained by means of the avidyâ of one intelligent being.

The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and

pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are

fictitiously shaped out of the avidyâ of the one dreaming subject. For

the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many

avidyâs. For those also who hold that avidyâ belongs to the individual

souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of

one's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be

accounted for by the avidyâ of one subject. This admits of being stated

in various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own

self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidyâ; for

they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other

bodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this

my body.--Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidyâ; for

they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations,

as this my body is.--The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing

but _me_; for they are of intelligent nature; what is _not me_ is seen

to be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the

distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and

released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by

the avidyâ of one intelligent subject.

The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account

for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an

infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should

attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained

release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be

rationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts

for there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand

by this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted?

This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not

be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord

surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is

not all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's

not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that

he is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely

separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a

number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen

vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it

moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-

intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further

follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we

understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds

that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is

considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said

to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means

nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is

substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and

spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things

which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially

limited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in

point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including

Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space

and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural

texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever

('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and

moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to

origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else

but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so

on.

The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to

our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahmâ down to a blade of

grass, springs from the avidyâ attached to Brahman which in itself is

absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of

pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from

the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the

distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman,

whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous

elements, owing to the influence of avidyâ illusorily manifests itself

(vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there

exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world

is 'non-different' from Brahman.

To this the Dvaitavâdin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The

doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-

illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidyâ and hence sees

plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of

right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e.

cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of

Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded.

This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the

hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin.

Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their

causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the

effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no

valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real

because it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and

waterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that

the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not

sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any

soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing

to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined

either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being

perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-

permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it

is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with

reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is

perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and

time _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves

only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time,

but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form,

viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not

sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self

is.--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot

originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect

may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring

conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the

assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter

into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the

cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.--

But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously

connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally

unmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions

of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other

cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault

then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a

special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c.,

producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause

possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency

is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further

there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot

belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined

gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the

like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected

with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess

originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect

different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the

svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence

of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different

things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of

shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is

perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination

and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that

time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that

perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived

svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to

the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and

hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the

reality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the

world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a

previous part of this work.

We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on

all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this

it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and

pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and

others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is

conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again

must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of

all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos,

which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs;

for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego.

The organ of egoity (ahamkâra), on the other hand, which is the same as

the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it

is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body

and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there

any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from

the avidyâ of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent,

effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of

avidyâ is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of

proof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the assertion

that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we

observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-

intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of

intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among

them, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me

only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious

creations of _my_ avidyâ; _I_ alone constitute the whole aggregate of

intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have

attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but

the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of

his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure

intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is

altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different

from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all

effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless,

for the Veda also is the effect of avidyâ, and the effort spent on it

therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver

wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of

view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the

effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence.

Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end

to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious

product of avidyâ; or because it is itself of the nature of avidyâ; or

because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of

avidyâ; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends

on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidyâ; it is thus no better

than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end

to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again

from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-

differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by

knowledge, which is the effect of avidyâ; or since it is to be attained

by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidyâ;

or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of

avidyâ. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false;

as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata

Morgana).

Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence,

shine forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means

of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to

be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of

particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular

cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the

different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-

differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just

now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidyâ.

Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-

differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidyâ, and implicates itself in

the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide

only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general.

Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess

illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light

(enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established

knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to

some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove

the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non-

differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and

object such 'svayamprakâsatâ' could not possibly belong. With regard

again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real

effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that

although you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a

kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vyâvahârika),

you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but

products of avidyâ; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on

the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving

that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may

you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by

Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and

hence of the essence of avidyâ, it is in no better case than the

instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to

be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when

once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this

reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that

some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis,

the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that

principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a

universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning

leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we

are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover,

for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge,

bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the

ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from

mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts

(which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise

and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the

principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus

sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than

the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the

Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation;

for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting

on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between

Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general

unreality, founded on the Vedânta. The proper conclusion therefore is

that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and

are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to

special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which

themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real

and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able

to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and

things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought,

whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light

(illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular

object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced

Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing

subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether

referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis

of empirical thought.

Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real

substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyâsa), for the reason

that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may

take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an

error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the

abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself

are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now

argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is

unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for

error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a

fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the

defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if

we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all

these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two

cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.

You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs,

it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must

have been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage;

and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and

released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the

fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if

the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite

number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these

instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also

infinite in number.--But do we not actually see that all these things

have definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.?--True,

but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so

on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other

limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this

sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls

should be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).--

Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual

souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-

intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the

circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each

other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of

things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars

does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.--You

further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls

it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of

this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its

infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things

substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time

and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of

their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in

dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with _all_

space and _all_ time results from such other means of proof, and hence

there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to

space and time, and its limitation in point of substance--which is due

to the existence of other souls).--But mere substantial limitation, as

meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that

Brahman is not infinite!--Well, then you yourself are in no better case;

for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidyâ. From this

admission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and

thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling

to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed

that Brahman differs in nature from avidyâ, then Brahman's nature itself

is constituted by avidyâ, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True,

knowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.--If the reality of

'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction

between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates

of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof

of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of

limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation;

absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a

hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other

hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and

Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.--

We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as

different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world,

is different from Brahman.

Against this view the Sûtra now declares itself as follows.--The non-

difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from

'what begins with the word ârambhana'--which proves such non-difference;

'what begins with the word ârambhana' means those clauses at the head of

which that word is met with, viz. 'vâkârambhanam vikâro nâmadheyam

mrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only,

without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent

forth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son,

all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True

they rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is

the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)--it is these

clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other

chapters, that the Sûtra refers to. For these texts prove the non-

difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and

sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind

the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and

of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil,

'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is

heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein

there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the

general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The

pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe,

raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through

another,'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon,

in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause,

quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from

the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay

there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as

jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay,

are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is

not different from it.'In order to meet the objection that according to

Kanâda's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the

cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the

effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience,

'vâkârambhanam vikâro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'. Ârambhanam must

here be explained as that which is taken or touched (â-rabh = â-labh;

and 'âlambhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare Pânini III, 3, 113, as to the

form and meaning of the word. 'Vâkâ,' 'on account of speech,' we take to

mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as

the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech,'Fetch water

in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the

material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters

into contact with) an effect (vikâra), i.e. a particular make or

configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the

shape of a belly, and a special name (nâmadheya), viz. _pitcher_, and so

on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the

end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay

receives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars

and other things of clay are clay (mrittikâ), i.e. are of the substance

of clay, only; this _only_ is true (satyam), i.e. known through

authoritative means of proof; _only_ (eva), because the effects are not

known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore,

such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only

as it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and

the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and

gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of

life--youth, old age, &c.--which he has reached.--The fact of our saying

'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by

the Pûrvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from

the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that

origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one

and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance

is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and

different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed

as depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are

connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not

acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the

admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the

effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.--But it is a

contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is

originated!--This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows

nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A

substance enters into different states in succession; what passes away

is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the

substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its

states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkârya theory.--

But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in

the asatkârya theory!--If he, we retort, who holds the asatkârya theory

is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself

originate, he is similarly landed in the satkârya theory; and if he

holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a

_regressus in infinitum_. According to us, on the other hand, who hold

that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from

that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on,

belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this

theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being

a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two

halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance

giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of

plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.

We now consider the whole Chândogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam

agra âsîd ekam evâdvitîyam.' This means--That which is Being, i.e. this

world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a

manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of

the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being

endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the

question, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non-

difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause

also,' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the

creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to

differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable

and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the

effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e.

the highest Brahman.

And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with

all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the

world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on

another guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on

the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold

world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible;

the text continues,'That deity thought--Let me now enter those three

beings with this living Self (jîva âtman) and distinguish names and

forms'--which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things

(for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and

forms, by entering into them by means of the gîva, which is of the

nature of my Self.'The possession of names and forms must thus be

understood to be effected by the jîva entering into matter as its Self.

There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the

highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together

with the jîvas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having

entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient

beings).'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient

beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state,

constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand

the highest Brahman constitutes their Self--this is proved by the

antaryâmin-brâhmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised

above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter

together with the jîvas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so

far only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for

its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in

the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and

all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body,

and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a

treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be

further elucidated under II, 1, 22.--The Chândogya-text then further

teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in

Brahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this

truth in 'Thou art that.'

Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of

the general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Ch. Up.

III, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,

then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this'

(Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); 'The

Self only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative

difference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere

than in the Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here'

(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any

plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage 'For

where there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him

the Self has become all, whereby then should he sec and whom?'(Bri. Up.

11,4, 13)--in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who

does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates

that non-difference only is real.

It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with

ârambhana, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e.

the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and

non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakâra), is

denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes

constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state,

when--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being

(conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form:

Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the

body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings

in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being

thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then

is in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to

be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in

the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as

constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied

therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the

difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved

by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.

Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and

effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are

unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False

cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either

that Brahman is false or that the world is real.--Those again who (like

Bhâskara) hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul

and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference

is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of

Brahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those

texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as

the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all

evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter

undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them,

nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman--as being

indivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the

upâdhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if

they say that it is only the power (sakti), not Brahman itself, which

undergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power

are non-different.

Others again (Yâdavaprakâsa) hold that the general cause, i.e. Brahman,

is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an

enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed

with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance

abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of

pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by

dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient

matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the

substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or

as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so

on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of

constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a

ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an

enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on

those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the

attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different

effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the

substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and

the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is'

constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one

in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one

substance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different

conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from

Brahman.--But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture,

Smriti, Itihâsa, Purâna and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itihâsa

and Purâna alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman--a

being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful,

instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not

limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss.

Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which

the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the

beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I

grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was

Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the

most excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas--Indra,

Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, îsâna' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11);

'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing

whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait.

Ár. II, 4, 1, 1, 2); 'There was in truth Nârâyana only, not Brahmâ, not

Îsâna, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor

Agni, nor Soma, nor Sûrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged

in meditation' &c. (Mahânâ. Up. I, 1)--these and other texts prove that

the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Nârâyana. For as the terms

'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of

the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by

the term 'Nârâyana,' it follows that they all mean Nârâyana. That the

Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also,

'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities--he is

the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him

neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti,

'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahmâ)--desirous to produce from his

own body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters

and placed his seed in them' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihâsas and Purânas also

declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Nârâyana, of

whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous

to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two

divisions.' 'From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.'

Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such

'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all

'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's

connexion with all his auspicious qualities--knowledge, bliss, and so

on--is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and

hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts--viz. 'His

high power (sakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his

knowledge, strength and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-

knowing, all-cognising' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others--to the end of

proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the

_potentialities_ (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the

Svetâsvatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies

'knowledge, strength, and action' no less than 'sakti'; and your

explanation would necessitate so-called implication (lakshanâ). Nor

again can it be said that in words such as sarvjña (all-knowing), the

formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in

other words such as pâkaka (cook); for grammar does not teach that all

these (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only.

It rather teaches (cp. Pânini III, 2, 54) that a few krit-affixes only

have this limited meaning; and in the case of pâkaka and similar words

we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other

explanation open to us.--If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a

part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be

superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this

would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make

statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. 'Him the highest great lord of

lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior' (Svet. Up. VI, 7,

8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the

general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would

imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be

the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts; for jars

and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their

being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of

clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is

fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the

Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in and being

parts of, him.--But from your principles we might with equal right draw

the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the

Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations

such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an

attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By

the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable

for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its

suitability for an effect of an opposite nature.--Should it on the other

hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable)

consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if

(to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and

so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult

to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and

the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as

'being,' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of

everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all

good and evil (i.e. every one would have conscious experience of

everything) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons

non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.--Here the

following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on,

we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to

different states of one and the same being; in the case of clay, wood,

gold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different ideas and terms

are applied to different things. On what ground then do you determine

that in the case of causes and effects, such as e.g. clay and jars, it

is mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms

is based?--To this question the next Sûtra gives a reply.

[FOOTNOTE 434:1. In other words--is the golden ornament originated by

the mere formless substance, gold; or by the form belonging to that

special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the ornament is

fashioned; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that

special form? The rukaka of the text has to be taken in the sense of

nishka.]

[FOOTNOTE 455:1. The meaning of the four words constituting the clause

therefore would be, 'On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the

accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water,

which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously

mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i.e. for the sake of, &c.,

clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.'The

Commentary remarks that' ârambhanam 'cannot be taken in the sense of

upâdâna; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is

originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the

parinâma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by

Brahman.]