The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhûman suit the
highest Self only. So immortality ('The Bhûman is immortal,' VII, 24, 1);
not being based on something else ('it rests in its own greatness');
being the Self of all ('the bhûman is below,' &c., 'it is all this');
being that which produces all ('from the Self there springs breath,' &c.
). All these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.--
The Pûrvapakshin has pointed to the text which declares the 'I' to be
the Self of all (VII, 25, 1); but what that text really teaches is
meditation on Brahman under the aspect of the 'I.' This appears from the
introductory clause 'Now follows the instruction with regard to the I.'
That of the 'I,' i.e. the individual Self, also the highest Self is the
true Self, scripture declares in several places, so e.g. in the text
about the inward Ruler (Bri. Up. III, 7). As therefore the individual
soul finds its completion in the highest Self only, the word 'I' also
extends in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruction
about the 'I' which is given in the text has thus for its object
meditation on the highest Self in so far as having the individual Self
for its body. As the highest Self has all beings for its body and thus
is the Self of all, it is the Self of the individual soul also; and this
the text declares in the passage beginning 'Now follows the instruction
about the Self,' and ending 'Self is all this.' In order to prove this
the text declares that everything originates from the highest Self which
forms the Self of the individual soul also, viz. in the passage 'From
the Self of him who sees this, perceives this, knows this, there springs
breath,' &c.--that means: breath and all other beings spring from the
highest Self which abides within the Self of the meditating devotee as
its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to intimate, meditation should be
performed on the 'I,' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition
that the highest Self has the 'I,' i.e. the individual soul for its body.
It is thus an established conclusion that the bhûman is the highest Self.
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'fulness.'
9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of its supporting that
which is the end of ether.
The Vâjasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions asked by Gârgî,
read as follows: 'He said, O Gârgî, the Brâhmanas call that the
Imperishable. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, it
is not red, not fluid, it is without a shadow,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8).
A doubt here arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradhâna, or the
individual soul, or the highest Self.--The Pradhâna, it may be
maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages such as
'higher than that which is higher than the Imperishable' the term
'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pradhâna; and moreover the qualities
enumerated, viz. not being either coarse or fine, &c., are
characteristic of the Pradhâna.--But, an objection is raised, in texts
such as 'That knowledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended' (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 5), the word 'Imperishable' is seen to denote the highest
Brahman!--In cases, we reply, where the meaning of a word may be
determined on the basis either of some other means of proof or of
Scripture, the former meaning presents itself to the mind first, and
hence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted.--But
how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary
sense?--From the description, we reply, given of it in the text, 'That
above the heavens,' &c. There it is said that all created things past,
present and future rest on ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore
be taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the
sphere of things created. We therefore must understand by 'ether' matter
in its subtle state, i.e. the Pradhâna; and the Imperishable which
thereupon is declared to be the support of that Pradhâna, hence cannot
itself be the Pradhâna.--Nor is there any force in the argument that a
sense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the
mind more immediately than a sense established by Scripture; for as the
word 'akshara' (i.e. the non-perishable) intimates its sense directly
through the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof
need not be regarded at all.
Moreover Yâjñavalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and
abode of all things past, present and future, and when Gârgî thereupon
asks him in what that ether 'is woven,' i.e. what is the causal
substance and abode of ether, he replies 'the Imperishable.' Now this
also proves that by the 'Imperishable' we have to understand the
Pradhâna which from other sources is known to be the causal substance,
and hence the abode, of all effected things whatsoever.
This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The 'Imperishable' is
the highest Brahman, because the text declares it to support that which
is the end, i. e. that which lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter
(avyâkritam). The ether referred to in Gârgî's question is not ether in
the ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter,
and hence the 'Imperishable' which is said to be the support of that
'unevolved' cannot itself be the 'unevolved,' i.e. cannot be the
Pradhâna. Let us, then, the Pûrvapakshin resumes, understand by the
'Imperishable,' the individual soul; for this may be viewed as the
support of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of the
elements in their subtle condition; and the qualities of non-coarseness,
&c., are characteristic of that soul also. Moreover there are several
texts in which the term 'Imperishable' is actually seen to denote the
individual soul; so e.g. 'the non-evolved' is merged in the
'Imperishable'; 'That of which the non-evolved is the body; that of
which the Imperishable is the body'; 'All the creatures are the
Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperishable' (Bha. GÎ.
XV, 16).
To this alternative primâ facie view the next Sûtra replies.