'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them
eats the sweet fruit; without eating, the other looks on' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 1). This text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the
other, without enjoying, shining abides within the body. Now this
shining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the
being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and
characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immortality, the Self of all;
it can in no way be the individual Self which, lamenting, experiences
the results of its works. The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the
abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest Self.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'heaven, earth, and so on.'
7. The bhûman (is the highest Self), as the instruction about it is
additional to that about serenity.
The Chandogas read as follows: 'Where one sees nothing else, hears
nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness (bhûman). Where one
sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is
the Little' (Ch. Up. VII, 23, 24).
The term 'bhûman' is derived from _bahu_ (much, many), and primarily
signifies 'muchness.' By 'much' in this connexion, we have however to
understand, not what is numerous, but what is large, for the text uses
the term in contrast with the 'Little' (alpa), i.e. the 'Small.' And the
being qualified as 'large,' we conclude from the context to be the Self;
for this section of the Upanishad at the outset states that he who knows
the Self overcomes grief (VII, 1, 3), then teaches the knowledge of the
bhûman, and concludes by saying that 'the Self is all this' (VII, 25, 2).
The question now arises whether the Self called bhûman is the individual
Self or the highest Self.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view.
For, he says, to Narada who had approached Sanatkumâra with the desire
to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning with
'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated as objects of devout
meditation; Nârada asks each time whether there be anything greater than
name, and so on, and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is
greater than name,' &c.); when, however, the series has advanced as far
as Breath, there is no such question and reply. This shows that the
instruction about the Self terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude
that breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated
with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the clauses 'Breath is
father, breath is mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 1), show that breath here is
something intelligent. And this is further proved by the clause 'Slayer
of thy father, slayer of thy mother,' &c. (VII, 15, 2; 3), which
declares that he who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there
is breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves reproach;
while no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to
them after their breath has departed. For a conscious being only is
capable of being hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a
being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the case of such
living beings as have no vital breath (viz. plants), suffering results,
or does not result, according as injury is inflicted or not, we must for
this reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as
something susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It consequently
would be an error to suppose, on the ground of the comparison of Prâna
to the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set, that Prâna here
denotes the highest Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being
injured. That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, if
we understand by Prâna the individual soul, for the whole aggregate of
non-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation
of object or instrument of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the
individual soul. And this soul, there called Prâna, is what the text
later on calls Bhûman; for as there is no question and reply as to
something greater than Prâna, Prâna continues, without break, to be the
subject-matter up to the mention of bhûman. The paragraphs intervening
between the section on Prâna (VII, 15) and the section on the bhûman
(VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The Prâna section closes
with the remark that he who fully knows Prâna is an ativâdin, i.e. one
who makes a final supreme declaration. In the next sentence then, 'But
this one in truth is an ativâdin who makes a supreme statement by means
of the True,' the clause 'But this one is an ativâdin' refers back to
the previously mentioned person who knows the Prâna, and the relative
clause 'who makes,' &c., enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an
auxiliary element in the meditation on Prâna. The next paragraph, 'When
one understands the truth then one declares the truth,' intimates that
speaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the
cognition of the true nature of the Prâna as described before. For the
accomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin
reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the due
performance of sacred duties. In order that such duties may be
undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the
nature of the individual soul, previously called Prâna, and finally that
the Bhûman, i.e. the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object
of inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is that the
true nature of the individual soul, freed from Nescience, is abundant
bliss--a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement
that he who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore,
which has the attribute of being 'bhûman,' is the individual Self. This
being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when the text
describes the glory and power of the individual Self, it uses the term
'I'; for 'I' denotes just the individual Self: 'I am below, I am above,
&c., I am all this' (VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled,
all remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.
This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. The being characterised
in the text as 'bhûman' is not the individual Self, but the highest Self,
since instruction is given about the bhûman in addition to 'serenity'
(samprasâda). 'Samprasâda' denotes the individual soul, as we know from
the following text, 'Now that "serenity", having risen from out this
body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form'
(Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Now in the text under discussion instruction is
given about a being called 'the True,' and possessing the attribute of
'bhûman,' as being something additional to the individual soul; and this
being called 'the True' is none other than the highest Brahman. Just as
in the series of beings beginning with name and ending with breath, each
successive being is mentioned in addition to the preceding one--
wherefrom we conclude that it is something really different from what
precedes; so that being also which is called 'the True,' and which is
mentioned in addition to the individual Self called Prâna, is something
different from the individual Self, and this being called 'the True' is
the same as the Bhûman; in other words, the text teaches that the Bhûman
is the highest Brahman called 'the True.' This the Vrittikâra also
declares: 'But the Bhûman only. The Bhûman is Brahman, because in the
series beginning with name instruction is given about it subsequently to
the individual Self.'
But how do we know that the instruction as to 'the True' is in addition
to, and refers to something different from, the being called Prâna?--The
text, after having declared that he who knows the Prâna is an ativâdin,
goes on, 'But really that one is an ativâdin who makes a supreme
declaration by means of the True.' The 'but' here clearly separates him
who is an ativâdin by means of the True from the previous ativâdin, and
the clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is ativâdin by
means of Prâna; hence 'the True' which is the cause of the latter
ativâdin being what he is must be something different from the Prâna
which is the cause of the former ativâdin's quality.--But we have
maintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the True' merely
as an auxiliary duty for him who knows Prâna; and that hence the Prâna
continues to be the general subject-matter!--This contention is
untenable, we reply. The conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives
instruction about a new ativâdin, and does not merely declare that the
ativâdin previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is different
with texts such as 'But that one indeed is an Agnihotrin who speaks the
truth'; there we have no knowledge of any further Agnihotrin, and
therefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an
obligation incumbent on the ordinary Agnihotrin. In the text under
discussion, on the other hand, we have the term 'the True', which makes
us apprehend that there is a further ativâdin different from the
preceding one; and we know that that term is used to denote the highest
Brahman, as e.g. in the text, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is
Brahman.' The ativâdin who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore,
must be viewed as different from the preceding ativâdin; and a
difference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of
the different sentences cannot be set aside. An ativâdin ('one who in
his declaration goes beyond') is one who maintains, as object of his
devotion, something which, as being more beneficial to man, surpasses
other objects of devotion. The text at first declares that he who knows
Prâna, i.e. the individual soul, is an ativâdin, in so far as the object
of his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope; and
then goes on to say that, as that object also is not of _supreme_
benefit to man, an ativâdin in the full sense of the term is he only who
proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest Brahman, which alone
is of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man. 'He who is an ativâdin by
the True,' i.e. he who is an ativâdin characterised by the highest
Brahman as the object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil
entreats, 'Sir, may I be an ativâdin with the True!' and the teacher
replies, 'But we must desire to know the True!'--Moreover, the text, VII,
26, I, 'Prâna springs from the Self,' declares the origination from the
Self of the being called Prâna; and from this we infer that the Self
which is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, in the
clause 'He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' is different from
the being called Prâna.--The contention that, because there is no
question and answer as to something greater than Prâna, the instruction
about the Self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction
about Prâna, is by no means legitimate. For that a new subject is
introduced is proved, not only by those questions and answers; it may be
proved by other means also, and we have already explained such means.
The following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question
whether there is anything greater than Prâna. With regard to the non-
sentient objects extending from name to hope--each of which surpasses
the preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man--the teacher
does not declare that he who knows them is an ativâdin; when, however,
he comes to the individual soul, there called Prâna, the knowledge of
whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he expressly says that
'he who sees this, notes this, understands this is an ativâdin' (VII, 15,
4). The pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the Self is
now completed, and hence asks no further question. The teacher on the
other hand, holding that even that knowledge is not the highest,
spontaneously continues his teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he
only is an ativâdin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely
beneficial being which is called 'the True,' i.e. the highest Brahman.
On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the pupil, desirous to learn
its true nature and true worship, entreats the teacher, 'Sir, may I
become an ativâdin by the True!' Thereupon the teacher--in order to help
the pupil to become an ativâdin,--a position which requires previous
intuition of Brahman--enjoins on him meditation on Brahman which is the
means to attain intuition ('You must desire to know the True!'); next
recommends to him reflection (manana) which is the means towards
meditation ('You must desire to understand reflection'); then--taking it
for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of
'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting--
advises him to cherish faith in Brahman which is the preliminary means
towards hearing ('You must desire to understand faith'); after that
tells him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on
Brahman ('You must desire to understand reliance'); next admonishes him,
to apply himself to 'action,' i.e. to make the effort which is a
preliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated ('You must
desire to understand action'). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil
to enter on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss
constitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of all his
effort ('You must desire to understand bliss'); and bids him to realise
that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is supremely large and
full ('You must endeavour to understand the "bhûman," i.e. the supreme
fulness of bliss'). And of this Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss,
a definition is then given as follows,' Where one sees nothing else,
hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is bhûman.' This means--
when the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman,
which consists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from it,
since the whole aggregate of things is contained within the essence and
outward manifestation (vibhûti) of Brahman. He, therefore, who has an
intuitive knowledge of Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its
vibhûti--which also is called aisvarya, i.e. lordly power--and
consisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there _is_ nothing
apart from Brahman; and sees, i.e. feels no pain since all possible
objects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure;
for pleasure is just that which, being experienced, is agreeable to
man's nature.--But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that
this very world is perceived as something different from Brahman, and as
being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited pleasure; how then
can it be perceived as being a manifestation of Brahman, as having
Brahman for its Self, and hence consisting of bliss?--The individual
souls, we reply, which are under the influence of karman, are conscious
of this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their
individual karman, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as
this view depends altogether on karman, to him who has freed himself
from Nescience in the form of karman, this same world presents itself as
lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and
vibhûti, and hence as essentially blissful. To a man troubled with
excess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright
unpleasant or moderately pleasant, according to the degree to which his
health is affected; while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste
for a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that some
plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care for it; when on the
other hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight, the thing
becomes very dear to him. In the same way the world becomes an object of
supreme love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its Self,
and being a mere plaything of Brahman--of Brahman, whose essential
nature is supreme bliss, and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of
numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. He who has
reached such intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels
no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set forth in detail,
'He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights
in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self
ruler, he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But
those who have a different knowledge from this, they are ruled by others,
they live in perishable worlds, they do not move in all the worlds
according to their liking.' 'They are ruled by others,' means 'they are
in the power of karman.' And further on, 'He who sees this does not see
death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees everything and
obtains everything everywhere.'
That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail
under I, 1, 12 ff.--The conclusion from all this is that, as the text
applies the term 'bhûman' to what was previously called the Real or True,
and which is different from the individual soul there called Prâna, the
bhûman is the highest Brahman.