LETTER I.

By your permission I lay before you, in a series of letters, the

results of my researches upon beauty and art. I am keenly sensible

of the importance as well as of the charm and dignity of this

undertaking. I shall treat a subject which is closely connected with

the better portion of our happiness and not far removed from the

moral nobility of human nature. I shall plead this cause of the

Beautiful before a heart by which her whole power is felt and

exercised, and which will take upon itself the most difficult part

of my task in an investigation where one is compelled to appeal as

frequently to feelings as to principles.

That which I would beg of you as a favour, you generously impose

upon me as a duty; and, when I solely consult my inclination, you

impute to me a service. The liberty of action you prescribe is

rather a necessity for me than a constraint little exercised in

formal rules, I shall scarcely incur the risk of sinning against

good taste by any undue use of them; my ideas, drawn rather from

within than from reading or from an intimate experience with the

world, will not disown their origin; they would rather incur any

reproach than that of a sectarian bias, and would prefer to succumb

by their innate feebleness than sustain themselves by borrowed

authority and foreign support.

In truth, I will not keep back from you that the assertions which

follow rest chiefly upon Kantian principles; but if in the course of

these researches you should be reminded of any special school of

philosophy, ascribe it to my incapacity, not to those principles.

No; your liberty of mind shall be sacred to me; and the facts upon

which I build will be furnished by your own sentiments; your own

unfettered thought will dictate the laws according to which we to

proceed.

With regard to the ideas which predominate in the practical part of

Kant's system, philosophers only disagree, whilst mankind, I am

confident of proving, have never done so. If stripped of their

technical shape, they will appear as the verdict of reason

pronounced from time immemorial by common consent, and as facts of

the moral instinct which nature, in her wisdom, has given to man in

order to serve as guide and teacher until his enlightened

intelligence gives him maturity. But this very technical shape which

renders truth visible to the understanding conceals it from the

feelings; for, unhappily, understanding begins by destroying the

object of the inner sense before it can appropriate the object. Like

the chemist, the philosopher finds synthesis only by analysis, or

the spontaneous work of nature only through the torture of art.

Thus, in order to detain the fleeting apparition, he must enchain it

in the fetters of rule, dissect its fair proportions into abstract

notions, and preserve its living spirit in a fleshless skeleton of

words. Is it surprising that natural feeling should not recognise

itself in such a copy, and if in the report of the analyst the truth

appears as paradox?

Permit me therefore to crave your indulgence if the following

researches should remove their object from the sphere of sense while

endeavouring to draw it towards the understanding. That which I

before said of moral experience can be applied with greater truth to

the manifestation of "the beautiful." It is the mystery which

enchants, and its being is extinguished with the extinction of the

necessary combination of its elements.

Literary and Philosophical Essays: French, German and Italian · 第 51 / 96 题