THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
I. GERMAN PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
After the Björkö treaty had been annulled by the Russian government, the
Moroccan affair once more held the chief attention of the German foreign
office. Already important, it became more so; for there was no longer
any reason for the German government to use the Moroccan affair as a
means of conciliating France and there was added need for it to justify
to the German people and to the world the long diplomatic campaign over
Morocco by checkmating France at the Conference.
Our chief object [wrote Prince Bülow on November 23] must be to avoid
isolation at the conference. If we have the majority or all the other
Powers against us on a question upon which we have engaged ourselves,
boldness and threats will be of no use since after all that has
occurred, our situation would be almost ludicrous.[959]
At almost the same moment the French Premier sounded the German
government as to whether it would agree for France and Spain together to
receive a police mandate from the Conference.[960] The inclusion of
Spain, he said, would prevent the concession from appearing one-sided in
favor of France and would enable the latter to keep her promise not to
seek a general mandate. He added that Germany might be forced to agree
to that solution. Replying doubtfully to these overtures, Herr von
Flotow advised the French government to make the proposal directly in
Berlin in accordance with diplomatic form. A few days later (November
30) Herr von Kühlmann reported that M. Vaffier-Pollet, representative of
the Comité du Maroc in Tangier, and Count de Chérisey, former secretary
of the French legation in Tangier, had proposed to him in Paris that the
German and French governments make a secret agreement before the
Conference to the following effect: The _status quo_ in Morocco should
be maintained for three or four years, after which, if conditions had
not improved, Germany should not oppose the bestowal upon France of the
police mandate for all of Morocco; in return, Germany should be assured
of the open door and of the right for German capital to participate to
the extent of 45 per cent in all governmental enterprises in Morocco, of
territorial compensation in the French Congo region, and of the cession
of the French right of preference to acquire the Belgian Congo.[961]
Although M. Rouvier stood behind this offer, the German government did
not know it and did not reply. It was much disposed to consider the
overture made through Herr von Flotow; but this fact the French Premier
could not know, and, misled by the German silence, he never returned to
the subject.[962]
The German Chancellor’s willingness to negotiate directly with France
showed that he was beginning to appreciate Germany’s increasingly
unfavorable position in international relations. He knew that the German
government faced a hard campaign and that its public opinion, which had
no particular interest in Morocco and was averse to war, must be
convinced of the justice of the German cause and aroused to the
seriousness of the international situation. In the Reichstag on December
6 the Chancellor therefore warned the nation that while animosities had
been overcome, new ones were possible, and that the British were
particularly anti-German. Repeating all the German accusations against
the French Moroccan policy, he justified at length Germany’s defense of
her interests. He avowed his strong desire for the maintenance of
friendly relations with all nations. He assured his hearers that Italy
remained loyal to the Triple Alliance. But he urged his country to be
prepared for any emergency.[963] The speech was widely approved.[964]
The Chancellor’s utterances were soon answered by M. Rouvier through the
publication of a French _Livre jaune_ of over three hundred pages, which
was supplemented by a speech in the Chamber on December 16.[965]
Therein, to the satisfaction of the French, the German accusations were
denied and the national policy of France toward Morocco was
exonerated.[966] According to the reports of the German representatives
in Paris in December and January, France was firmly resolved not to
recede further, and the French government was making military
preparations.[967]
These manifestations did not augur well for the German government. Nor
did the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of September 1, 1905,
which it learned of at some time before the Conference opened.[968] The
knowledge of the terms gave a concrete basis to the mistrust of France’s
intentions toward Morocco, and stiffened German resistance. On December
25 the German government envisaged three ways in which the Conference
might end: first, a provisorium of about three years might be agreed
upon, at the end of which each Power would recover its freedom of
action; second, a separate agreement with France might be made, but only
in case the latter offered suitable terms; third, a general police
mandate for Western Morocco might be given to France. This last result,
equivalent to a French victory, the German government was determined not
to permit, holding a conflict as preferable.[969] In fact, none of these
solutions was very palatable to the government. But it was determined to
hold firm,[970] and the instructions to Herr von Radowitz and Count
Tattenbach, the German delegates at the Conference, were optimistic.
The delegates were to uphold the open door and economic equality for
all. They should combat the monopoly for making loans to Morocco claimed
by the French banks. As Germany had already recognized the legitimate
interests of France by permitting her to regulate the frontier, the
mandate for police reforms in the west should be given to a number of
Powers and should be internationally organized for a limited number of
years. If a division of mandated areas were made, Germany should receive
her share—one with a port advantageously located for later expansion
into the interior; however, Germany was ready to agree with the others
not to draw any advantage for herself from this mandate. All the
signatory Powers should participate equally in establishing and
directing the proposed state bank, for which adequate international
organization and control should be provided. Above all, the delegates
should not permit themselves to be isolated or to stand alone with
Morocco. Thus, in general, they were to work for the
internationalization of Morocco.[971]
Prince Bülow became more and more optimistic as the Conference
approached.[972] At his urging, the Sultan promised to select carefully
his delegates to the assembly and to co-operate with the Powers
there.[973] The Chancellor expected the neutral Powers to support
Germany against the monopolistic desires of France. He particularly
courted President Roosevelt; for, although he knew that Mr. White, the
American delegate, would not be permitted to take the initiative at the
Conference, the Chancellor thought that the President and his delegate
would be able, behind the scenes, to exert a powerful influence.[974]
From Russia, Prince Bülow anticipated no interference. The Austrian
Foreign Minister stated his government’s readiness to go hand in hand
with Germany at the Conference.[975] Spanish mistrust and jealousy of
France with reference to Morocco might be aroused and used.[976] To that
end the German government prevented the selection of the anti-German M.
Villa-Urrutia as delegate.[977]
Toward Italy, embarrassed by her situation as Germany’s ally and
France’s friend through an agreement over Morocco, the Chancellor
modified his former tactics. He offered to support her as a candidate
for the general police mandate at the Conference.[978] But the Italian
government refused. Sending the aged and experienced Marquis Visconti
Venosta as delegate, it gave him permission to act as he saw fit in
order to keep his head out of the noose.[979] The German Chancellor
approved this choice and welcomed the Marquis’ statement that he would
endeavor to mediate between France and Germany and to bring the
Conference to a successful conclusion.[980] Prince Bülow planned to
exploit Italy’s position by laying down a flat _non possumus_ on the
question of permitting France to receive the mandate for the police,
with the expectation that the Italian government would then press France
to accept the German terms in order to prevent a conflict wherein it
would be forced to choose sides.[981]
The Chancellor instructed Prince Radolin to impress French official
circles with the fact that Germany would never permit France to obtain a
general police mandate or a special position in the state bank, that if
France persisted in refusing to agree to the open door in Morocco, a
“very critical situation would arise” which “would lead inevitably to a
grave conflict” between the two states.[982] Prince Bülow was pleased to
learn that the French people were growing nervous and that M. Rouvier,
M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador in Madrid, and others were asserting
France’s wish for a peaceful and satisfactory solution.[983]
The main reason for the Chancellor’s growing optimism was the fact that
in December a Liberal government had come to power in England and that
British public opinion was more friendly to Germany. Prince Bülow and
the Emperor both expected an improvement in Anglo-German relations, and
exerted their influence in achieving it.[984] The Chancellor did not
believe that the new Liberal government would stiffen the French
resistance by holding out the prospect of active aid in case of war as
the Unionist cabinet had done. He interpreted the overwhelming Liberal
victory at the elections in January as a clear rejection of chauvinism
and an equally clear expression by the nation of an earnest desire for
peace and for further improvement in Anglo-German relations. He learned
that Edward VII had spoken in favor of a peaceful settlement.[985] Then,
just after the Conference opened, the King and the Emperor entered into
personal correspondence once more.[986] The Chancellor therefore
expected the British government to play the rôle of mediator instead of
active French partisan, and he endeavored to impress this duty upon
it.[987] In view of this situation he believed that France would accept
the German solution of the Moroccan problem.[988]
Although the Chancellor knew that France was improving her defenses, he
did not anticipate a war.[989] He notified General Moltke, the new chief
of staff, that he need take no precautionary measures.[990] The Emperor
also regarded the French fears of war as “ludicrous, bordering on
insanity.” Late in December he roundly declared to Mr. Werner Beit, a
friend of Edward VII, and to the Marquis de Laguiche, French military
attaché in Berlin, that “there is absolutely no cause for any war or for
any concern about an attack from us,” adding, however, these more
ominous words:
Even if we had the best intentions and were loyal and wished to remain
peaceful, there would be danger that in case of continued inciting of
France by London, she [France] might, relying on certain aid from
England, conduct herself toward us so ill-manneredly and provocatively
that finally our national honor would come into question, for the sake
of which we should have to resort to arms; then we would have to strike
and therewith, through our “illegal attack” on France, give the occasion
for England’s aid. And it is monstrous perfidy [for England] to work
toward such.[991]
Thus, hopeful for peace but not entirely averse to war, the German
leaders saw the Conference begin.
II. FRENCH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
In spite of the failure of his overtures to the German government in
November, the French Premier assured the _Wilhelmstrasse_ on the eve of
the Conference that he wished to reach an understanding at that assembly
on the basis of “no victor, no vanquished.” Nevertheless, both he and
the French nation were determined to uphold France’s ambitions and
claims toward Morocco. On January 8, 1906, Prince Radolin wrote that
there prevailed in France “grave anxiety over the possibility of warlike
complications. . . . . In press and public it is said that Germany
wishes war, that France has receded . . . . on all points, but without
satisfying Germany.” At the Conference, thus Prince Radolin interpreted
French opinion, “proposals would be made which would be contrary to her
honor and her traditional policy in Morocco. France must defend herself
and be prepared for any eventuality. . . . . Germany makes no secret of
her armaments, and therefore it is imperative for France also to keep
her powder dry.”[992]
In this state of mind the French Parliament during the latter half of
1905 investigated French defences and put 200,000,000 francs at the
disposal of the war Minister for repairing them, particularly on the
eastern frontier. That work was actively begun; food and munitions were
brought in; the frontier forces were increased by reserves; drilling and
trial mobilizations were held.[993] As M. Delcassé had prophesied, M.
Rouvier returned completely to the international policy of the fallen
Minister in order to achieve victory at the Conference. The French
government realized that the opposition of the French and German
policies was so complete as to make retreat difficult for either party.
Preparing for the worst, M. Rouvier yet hoped to exert sufficient moral
pressure on Germany at the Conference to gain a French victory without
precipitating a war.[994] To that end he supplemented the military
measures by diplomatic work. He was certain of Russia’s support because,
aside from the alliance, Russia had urgent need of a French loan, which
M. Rouvier would not permit until after a satisfactory conclusion of the
Moroccan affair.[995] Russia’s influence was restricted by the
revolution and by a lack of interest in Morocco. But a promise from the
Czar to exercise his personal power with Emperor William II in favor of
conciliation would be of eminent value, and M. Rouvier sought to obtain
it.[996] He also wished to have President Roosevelt act similarly at the
proper moment. This plan was to bear fruit later; but at the time the
American government replied that it had small concern in the Moroccan
conference and that, while standing for the open door and exerting its
influence for peace, it would interfere as little as possible in the
deliberations. Mr. Root, the secretary of state, told the British
Ambassador that the American delegate would “avoid any action which
could tend to weaken Anglo-French entente.”[997] M. Rouvier also
received “satisfactory assurances” from the Austro-Hungarian government;
he did not expect opposition from it or from Belgium.[998] Far more
important was the continuation of British aid, both for its own sake and
for holding Italy and Spain in line.[999] From the new Liberal
government that came in early in December, the French Premier was
immediately assured of diplomatic aid by word and act.
III. BRITISH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS
When internal disputes over the question of tariff reform finally forced
the resignation of the Unionist government on December 4, the Liberals,
with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister, entered office. In
response to the popular demand they were pledged to continue the foreign
policy of their predecessor, and the presence at the foreign office of
Sir Edward Grey assured the fulfilment of that pledge. The Foreign
Secretary was a Liberal Imperialist, a follower of Lord Rosebery. He had
been one of the rebels against the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, a Gladstonian Liberal, because of the latter’s denunciation
of the Boer War. Regretting that Lord Rosebery would not enter the
cabinet, Sir Edward Grey at first refused office unless the Premier
would accept a peerage and leave the leadership in the House of Commons
to Mr. Asquith, another Liberal Imperialist. After much persuasion from
his friends and after the influence of the Liberal Imperialists had been
increased by the appointment of Mr. Haldane as secretary of war, Sir
Edward receded from his demand.[1000]
The new Foreign Secretary found the “mud of foreign politics” deeper
than any he had ever been in; but he was soon steering himself through
it as nimbly as his predecessors. Although an idealist who hated war, he
was not afraid of it, for, he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie, January 15,
1906, “We can protect ourselves . . . . for we are more supreme at sea
than we have ever been.”[1001] He followed the ways of _Realpolitik_,
playing the “grand game” of prestige politics in the ordinary way with
national interest as his ultimate guide. He impressed other men with
whom he had personal contact as trying to be entirely frank and honest
and sympathetic. Yet his insularity, his lack of knowledge of the
Continent, really prevented him from appreciating any other state’s
point of view. Combining the limitations of a “downright Britisher” with
high moral and political rectitude, he usually believed that Great
Britain was in the right and acted accordingly. Then he was unable to
comprehend why other Powers misinterpreted her policy.[1002]
With regard to Russia, Sir Edward Grey immediately stated to the
Ambassador his hope for a settlement of the outstanding questions. Count
Benckendorff thought that negotiations were impossible “while things in
Russia were in their present condition.” Appreciating this fact, Sir
Edward Grey answered that “during this inevitable delay, it would be the
policy of our Government not to do anything which would make the
resumption of negotiations or a settlement more difficult later
on.”[1003] In January of the next year, Count Witte, Russian premier,
proposed to the British government that Czar Nicholas and King
Edward—diplomats he distrusted as being too slow—should at a personal
meeting conclude a general agreement in return for which Great Britain
should make a loan to Russia. The British Ambassador soon showed him the
impracticability of the idea.[1004] In the same month Count Benckendorff
talked vaguely and informally with Mr. Spring Rice of the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles and of Persia—all to no object, for, as the British
government perceived, Russia was indifferent to an agreement.[1005] But
some progress was made toward a _rapprochement_. The two governments co-
operated on the Cretan and Macedonian questions.[1006] Treating each
other more frankly,[1007] each refused to take advantage of the other
early in 1906 by making a loan to Persia.[1008] The British government
renewed its assurances about Tibet in January.[1009] British bankers
agreed to participate in a forthcoming loan to Russia.[1010] The Czar
and King Edward were on cordial terms, the former late in January even
intimated to his uncle that he would be pleased with a visit from
him.[1011] And the two governments were in harmony in their policy of
helping France at Algeciras. So while the work of achieving the entente
was slow, the British government did not let it cease.
The British Foreign Secretary also continued the previous policy toward
Germany. He knew very little of that Power, did not understand it,[1012]
and nursed a deep suspicion of it from his experiences as undersecretary
of state for foreign affairs from 1892 to 1895. He was determined not to
let Great Britain fall again into that state of trouble with other
Powers, which he thought had enabled Germany to treat her so high-
handedly at that time and to make demands upon her inimical to her
interests.[1013] His advisers in the foreign office, Sir Charles
Hardinge and Mr. Eyre Crowe, were of a similar mind, lacking the
balanced and comprehensive judgment characteristic of Lord Sanderson,
who after years of service retired from his position as permanent
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs in January, 1906.[1014]
Sir Edward Grey was now confronted with the same kind of action on the
part of Germany which had previously angered him. He saw a conference
approaching at which the new friendship with France would be tested, at
which it would be either broken or confirmed. He was resolved that if
possible it should not be broken, though he did not necessarily intend
that it should become stronger. “It was a matter of interest,” he said
on August 3, 1914, with reference to this crisis, “to preserve it [the
Entente] as well as a point of honour to act up to the diplomatic
obligations contained in it.”[1015] At the time (December 21, 1905) he
expressed himself more concretely to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows:
The Morocco Conference is going to be difficult if not critical. As far
as I can discover the Germans will refuse altogether to concede to
France the special position in Morocco, which we have promised France
not only to concede to her but to help her by diplomatic methods to
obtain.
If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a great
success for the Anglo-French _Entente_; if she fails the prestige of the
_Entente_ will suffer and its vitality will be diminished.
Our main object therefore must be to help France to carry her point at
the Conference.[1016]
Thus for the sake of interest and honor, that invincible pair, Sir
Edward Grey based British policy upon the matter of prestige. Whereas
Lord Lansdowne had admitted that the Anglo-French declaration over
Morocco did not bind Germany, the new British Foreign Secretary was
determined that Germany should formally recognize France’s preponderant
position in Morocco. It is to be inferred from his statement that
Germany had the alternative of accepting France’s monopolization of the
Sherifian Empire passively or of challenging it and then being forced to
accept it.
That this ominous feeling was not peculiar to Sir Edward Grey was shown
early in January by a letter which Lord Ripon, one of the older members
of the cabinet, wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, parliamentary undersecretary
of state for foreign affairs. It read in part as follows:
One cannot help being anxious about this Morocco business. I am sorry
though not surprised to hear that you think the Germans intend to make
the Conference a failure. That a European war should arise out of the
matter seems almost impossible, but when one has to deal with a
potentate like the German Emperor one can feel no real security.[1017]
On December 19 Count Metternich gave to Sir Edward Grey a general
explanation of Germany’s policy on the Moroccan question, expressing the
hope that the British government would play the part of conciliator at
the Conference.[1018] The British Minister replied on January 3. The
Conference filled him with concern, he said. After having studied the
documents more thoroughly, he had found that Lord Lansdowne had stated
to Count Metternich “that, in the event of war between Germany and
France, public feeling in England would be such that, in his opinion, it
would be impossible for England to remain neutral.” This statement, he
went on, he made his own; for, while the British government “wanted to
avoid trouble between Germany and France,” and would not “egg” France on
at the Conference, yet since the entente was very popular in England he
“really thought that if there was trouble, we [Great Britain] should be
involved in it. . . . . It was not a question of the policy of the
Government,” he told the Ambassador; “what made a nation most likely to
take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the
circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that
it would be impossible to be neutral.” British opinion, he declared,
would be moved not by hostility to Germany but by the wish to preserve
friendship with France. He made an Anglo-German _rapprochement_
contingent upon a happy outcome of the Conference, an improvement in
Franco-German relations and the assurance thereby that the Entente
Cordiale would not be endangered. He spoke frankly, he said, because the
situation might later become such as to make openness more difficult.
When Count Metternich reminded him that Lord Lansdowne had qualified his
statement concerning the possibility of active British aid by the
further assertion, “in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany upon
France,” Sir Edward Grey made no reply. But the meaning of his statement
was clear to the Ambassador, who accepted it as an honest rendition of
the British position.[1019]
The bluntness of these remarks seemed justified immediately by the
varying reports about Germany’s intentions which came to the British
foreign office. The German Emperor was in a friendlier mood although
angry at the tone of the British press. Baron Richthofen and Herr von
Radowitz both spoke of a desire for conciliation.[1020] The British
Consul in Hamburg, however, learned from Herr von Tschirschky of the
German foreign office on New Year’s Day that “Germany’s policy always
had been and would be to try to frustrate any coalition between two
States which might result in damaging Germany’s interests and prestige,
and Germany would, if she thought that such a coalition was being
formed, even if its actual results had not been carried into practical
effect, not hesitate to take such steps as she thought proper to break
the combination.”[1021] And Prince Bülow’s brother, minister at Berne,
remarked to his British colleague on December 31:
No doubt the sudden intervention of Germany [in Morocco] had not been
dictated by the desire to safeguard German interests in that region. The
object had been a higher one. Germany was bound in self-defense to
emancipate herself from the isolation with which she was threatened.
First Russia, then Italy, and lastly England had been won over by
France. The cordon must be broken, and the penultimate defeat of Russia
had furnished the propitious moment. . . . . He thought that a _détente_
would make itself felt when once the Conference was over.[1022]
It was becoming more and more apparent that Anglo-German antagonism
would accentuate the difficulties of the Conference. Prince Bülow
informed the British government on January 11 that he advocated reforms
on an international basis. Stating that M. Rouvier had promised not to
seek a general police mandate for France,[1023] the Chancellor made it
understood that Germany could not accept that solution. In talking to
the British Ambassador on the next day Herr von Holstein foresaw danger
since France, relying upon British aid, might, if dissatisfied with the
results of the Conference, “seek to create a _fait accompli_ by invading
Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor, and war would be the
result.” Asseverating that France was preparing for war, Herr von
Holstein said that the danger could be averted if the British government
would hint to the French that in the event of their invading Morocco it
was doubtful whether British opinion would approve of supporting France
by force of arms.
Upon being consulted, Sir Francis Bertie denied that France had any such
intention, and asserted that
any communication to the French Gov[ernmen]t such as the Baron
[Holstein] suggests would shake the confidence of the French
Gov[ernmen]t in H[is] M[ajesty’s] present Gov[ernmen]t resulting from
their assurances as to policy of England (and) might lead France either
to make concessions to Germany in Morocco injurious to us or bring her
out of Morocco by concessions elsewhere detrimental to our interests but
not greatly to those of France.
After this Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Frank Lascelles, January
15, the following curt response to Herr von Holstein’s suggestion:
I hope the result of Morocco conference will prevent the contingency,
which Herr von Holstein contemplates, from arising. Should it however be
otherwise we cannot deprecate any action on the part of France which
comes within the terms of the Anglo-French declarations of April 1904.
Herr von Holstein should know this.[1024]
In these negotiations the British Foreign Secretary tried to impress the
German government with the fact that Great Britain placed herself
squarely on the French side. This was one facet of his policy. The other
had to do with France.
The British government was as eager for France to win at the conference
as was the French government. To that end Sir Francis Bertie informed M.
Rouvier on December 22 that his government
would loyally act up to the engagements taken by their predecessors and
. . . . would give to France their unreserved support in the Conference
on Morocco within the four corners of the Anglo-French Agreement and the
programme arranged between the French and German Governments; but in
order to enable them to do so effectively, and to put them in a position
to act in concert with France, it would be desirable that His Majesty’s
Government should be made acquainted with the views of the French
Government on the matters to be discussed, and as to the concessions, if
any, which might be made for the satisfaction of Germany.
The British government, he said, wished to avoid the accusation of being
more French than the French. Going farther still, the Ambassador assured
M. Rouvier that his government was in no way associated with the
friendly manifestations toward Germany then being made in England. While
the British government wanted friendly relations with Germany, he
stated, an improvement in those relations “would depend on the attitude
of the German Government in regard to Morocco and other questions in
which England was interested.” The cordiality with which M. Rouvier
agreed to respect this wish showed how conscious both governments were
of the mutual advantages in loyal co-operation.[1025]
The need therefor was manifested at once in the case of Spain. While
King Alfonso was regarded as entirely loyal,[1026] M. Moret, the Spanish
premier who supplanted M. Montero Rios in December, was mistrusted by
the British and French governments as being too friendly toward Germany
and uncertain in his attitude toward the Moroccan agreements. Both
governments knew of German efforts to win Spain, both learned of the
German Emperor’s offer in November of a military convention to the King
of Spain, and both learned that at Germany’s request the Spanish
government had not appointed M. Villa-Urrutia as delegate to the
Conference.[1027] At the French initiative the two governments late in
December pressed M. Moret to remain loyal to them. These efforts won
over the Spanish Premier. He frankly admitted that the Emperor had made
the offer, but denied that he had ever considered it. He stated that
Spain would support the French policy during the Conference, and hoped
that the three Powers would work harmoniously together. And he told the
French that “it will facilitate his support of them at the Conference if
they will provide money to quiet the Spanish Opposition.”[1028]
Nevertheless, the British government suspected that the Duke of
Almodovar, the Spanish delegate and proposed president of the
Conference, would be “in the hands of the German Ambassador [Herr von
Radowitz].” Sir Edward Grey also feared that Spain might, to the
detriment of British interests, be induced to cede a part of her
possessions along the north coast of Morocco or elsewhere to
Germany.[1029] So Spain remained under constant observation and pressure
by the Entente Cordiale.[1030] The British government put similar
pressure upon Italy. In informing the Italian Ambassador on December 27
of the British policy, Sir Edward Grey remarked that the four Powers
most interested in the Mediterranean were all good friends now and that
he “hoped we should all come out of the Conference as good friends as we
went in.” The Italian government protested that it had “not only
friendship but also an alliance to be considered.” This item Sir Edward
Grey ignored, and in Rome Sir Edwin Egerton repeatedly asserted that “a
European political combination did not appear to regard special
agreements respecting a local question, such as that of Morocco.” This
veiled threat and curious interpretation of the Triple Alliance were
valuable aids to M. Barrère in urging Italy to the Anglo-French side.
The selection as delegates of the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who had made
the agreement with France in 1900, was regarded as insuring a pro-French
policy. But the Italian government could make no promises of support,
and Sir Edward Grey feared that the Marquis might, by trying to play the
“fine” but “dangerous” rôle of mediator at the Conference, suggest some
solution which would be altogether unacceptable.[1031]
The Anglo-French co-operation extended to planning the procedure at the
Conference and to drawing up instructions for the French delegates.
Every precaution was taken for victory. The British were as sensitive to
alarms as were the French. About the middle of December both governments
heard that the proposed Austrian delegate thought it possible to bring
matters before the Conference not mentioned in the program. M. Rouvier
took immediate steps in Vienna to prevent that danger.[1032]
Furthermore, the two governments planned that the less difficult
problems should be considered first and the police question last. M.
Rouvier proposed that the published Anglo-French, Anglo-Spanish, and
Franco-German agreements over Morocco should be laid before the
Conference, but Sir Edward Grey objected that they might then be
discussed and questioned by the Powers. The British Foreign Secretary
thought that “it should appear that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish
Agreements of 1904 were rather intended to give a formal sanction to a
_de facto_ state of affairs than to create a new situation.” M. Rouvier
accepted this suggestion. It was also in accordance with a British
proposal that the French delegate was instructed to refuse to argue the
matter of France’s right in the Algero-Moroccan frontier region, since
it might lead to an “embarrassing discussion.”[1033]
The main problem which the British and French governments had to solve
was that of the police. For, as they learned from Prince Bülow,[1034]
Germany would propose either that Morocco be divided into sectors, each
one under the police power of a different state, or that the policing be
done by a lesser Power disinterested in Morocco. While the first
solution could be easily rejected, the second one would be more
difficult for France to combat without exposing herself to the
accusation of selfishness. If the Conference broke up because of a
refusal, France would be blamed. At this point the two governments
received a suggestion from M. Bacheracht, Russian minister at Tangier
and a delegate at the Conference, to the following effect: “All
considerations of a political character and all references to ‘special
interests,’ etc., should not be touched upon in discussion” of the
police question. The problem should be considered solely from a
practical point of view, of how to assure protection and safety to the
foreigners. Clearly that work could be done best by France and Spain,
who had had experience in handling Mohammedans, who were already
policing portions of Moroccan soil, and who could employ Mohammedans
from their North African territories to aid them. The policing might be
regarded as experimental and temporary so as to mollify German
opposition. If Germany rejected the plan, she would receive the
discredit for breaking up the Conference. The British and French
authorities accepted this proposal at once, for, as MM. Paul and Jules
Cambon said, it would be “difficult to combat.”[1035]
After this thorough preparatory discussion, M. Rouvier sent the
following instructions to M. Révoil, a copy of which he also gave to the
British government: The repression of contraband trade should be
committed to France and Spain alone. A state bank should be established
in which French participation in capital and in personnel should be in
harmony with France’s superior rights in Morocco resulting from the loan
contract of June, 1904, and from the high percentage of trade
(approximately 80 per cent) which France together with Great Britain and
Spain had with that country as compared with that (approximately 10 per
cent) of Germany. The bank should be under the French legal system and
its president a Frenchman. Moroccan revenues should be augmented, but
not merely by an increase in customs duties. The thirty-year limitation
to commercial freedom might be extended. “In a general manner it is in
the economic program that we are disposed to accord the most complete
satisfaction. But you will avoid a definitive acquiescence in those
solutions until you are certain that the delegates do not aim to adopt
unacceptable solutions relative to the organization of the police.” This
question should refer solely to the policing of the coastal towns and
should not concern the Moroccan army. Any internationalization of the
police should be refused. The plan of dividing Morocco into sectors
among the Powers, that of selecting a minor Power to accomplish the
task, and that of selecting officers from neutral Powers should be
absolutely refused. The policing should be conferred upon France and
Spain alone.
In case the proposals conforming to our desires on that matter meet with
insurmountable opposition . . . ., we would consider that, the economic
questions being regulated according to our views, an accord for the
maintenance of the _status quo_ in that which concerns the police would
be an acceptable solution, if that accord respects our rights and
implies the renunciation by the other contracting parties to all action
tending to reopen the question with the Sultan without previous
agreement with us. . . . . In résumé . . . . no one will expect of us an
adhesion to any solution of a nature to compromise the future of our
national interests. Under that condition, you will show on all occasions
our sincere desire to respect the rights of other countries, to open
Morocco to the free competition of commercial interests, and you will
affirm at the same time our desire to maintain our rights and interests
only with the most formal guarantees of the sovereign rights of the
Sultan, the independence and the established traditions of his
Empire.[1036]
A few days later, with the approval of Spain, M. Rouvier advised the
French delegate to reject as “absolutely inacceptable” any plan to
neutralize Morocco.[1037]
These instructions denoted a determination to defeat
internationalization, by all means to exclude Germany from Morocco, and
to divide Morocco between France and Spain.
While these negotiations were in progress, the French government was
sounding Great Britain as to a defensive agreement against Germany.
Toward the middle of December Major Huguet, French military attaché in
London, spoke to General Grierson, director of military operations in
the British war office, about the French fears of a German attack, and
questioned him about the British organization for war. When he asked
whether the British general staff had ever considered operations in
Belgium, General Grierson replied that “as a strategical exercise” he
had worked out a plan for them last spring.[1038]
On December 28 Major Huguet dined with Colonel Repington, a retired
officer serving as military correspondent on the _London Times_. The
conversation turned immediately to the Colonel’s article of the previous
day, in which he had denounced the attempts being made toward an Anglo-
German _rapprochement_, expressed anxiety over the international
situation, and advised full loyalty to France. The two men found
themselves in entire agreement over the possibility of complications and
over the need for France and Great Britain to be prepared for co-
operation in case of a German aggression. Major Huguet said that the
French embassy was worried because Sir Edward Grey, the new British
foreign minister, had not renewed the assurances given by his
predecessor.[1039] Time was pressing, he said, for the Conference of
Algeciras would open on January 16. He wished that Sir Edward Grey would
broach the subject at the next diplomatic reception. The French “knew
that our sympathies were with them,” so Colonel Repington has recorded
the military attaché’s words, “but they wanted to know what we should do
in case Germany confronted them with a crisis.”
Colonel Repington immediately communicated the conversation to the
British Foreign Secretary, who was then electioneering in
Northumberland. The latter replied on December 30 as follows: “I can
only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said
to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it.” The Colonel also
reported Major Huguet’s words to Sir George Clarke, secretary of the
Defence Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They
agreed that in view of the German menace, active steps toward co-
operation should be taken. As Colonel Repington was a free-lance, they
suggested that he open unofficial conversations with Major Huguet and
communicate the results to the British officials. The Colonel prepared a
set of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These
questions were considered by M. Rouvier, M. Etienne, minister of war, M.
Thomson, minister of marine, his naval staff, General Brun, and General
Brugère. On January 12 a cordial reply was returned to Colonel Repington
who then imparted it to the Defence Committee.[1040]
When Major Huguet related these incidents to his ambassador, M. Cambon
was so struck by the fact that British as well as French authorities
were studying the problem of how quickly the British forces could be
mobilized for action on the Continent that he went immediately to Paris
to consult M. Rouvier.[1041] The latter approved of the plan to broach
Sir Edward Grey for a closer and more definite understanding.
Before returning to London, M. Cambon visited his brother in Madrid.
There the two prepared the ground for later discussion by a conversation
with Sir Arthur Nicolson which the latter reported (January 2) as
follows:
They [MM. Cambon] asked me, supposing, as they considered probable, that
the Conference failed, what did I think would be the consequences? I
replied that in my opinion it was quite possible that the Sultan would
then apply to Germany to take in hand the military, financial and police
administration. They remarked that that would mean war. I said that I
did not consider that this would necessarily follow; but I did think
that they would have to take up a very firm attitude at Fez, and prevent
the Sultan from handing himself over to the Germans.[1042]
This alarming forecast, together with the staunch diplomatic support
which the British government was rendering France, strengthened the
French authorities in their resolve. When M. Cambon reached London, he
had a long conversation with Sir Edward Grey on January 10 which the
latter recorded as follows:
M. Cambon said that he did not believe that the German Emperor desired
war, but that His Majesty was pursuing a very dangerous policy. He had
succeeded in inciting public opinion and military opinion in Germany,
and there was a risk that matters might be brought to a point in which a
pacific issue would be difficult. During the previous discussions on the
subject of Morocco, Lord Lansdowne had expressed his opinion that the
British and French Governments should frankly discuss any eventualities
that might seem possible, and by his instructions your Excellency [Sir
Francis Bertie, ambassador in Paris] had communicated a Memorandum to M.
Delcassé to the same effect. It had not been considered necessary at the
time to discuss the eventuality of war, but it now seemed desirable that
this eventuality should also be considered.
M. Cambon said that he had spoken to this effect to M. Rouvier, who
agreed in his view. It was not necessary, nor, indeed, expedient, that
there should be any formal alliance, but it was of great importance that
the French Government should know beforehand whether, in the event of
aggression against France by Germany, Great Britain would be prepared to
render to France armed assistance.[1043]
The British statesman, embarrassed by the question, replied that he
personally could give the French government no promise of active aid. He
put the Ambassador off by pointing out that the Prime Minister was away,
that the members of the cabinet were all electioneering, and that the
verdict of the elections was doubtful. He said that he could only state
as his personal opinion that “if France were to be attacked by Germany
in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement [of April 8,
1904] . . . . public opinion in England would be strongly moved in
favour of France.” When he added that Great Britain earnestly desired
“that the conference should have a pacific issue favourable to France,”
M. Cambon replied that “nothing would have a more pacific influence on
the Emperor of Germany than the conviction that, if Germany attacked
France, she would find England allied against her.” Sir Edward Grey
answered that he thought that “the German Emperor did believe this, but
that it was one thing that this opinion should be held in Germany and
another that we should give a positive assurance to France on the
subject.” He could give no assurance, he said, of which he was
uncertain. He “did not believe that any Minister could, in present
circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the
sympathy of Great Britain might be with France in the case of a rupture
with Germany, the expression which might be given to it and the action
which might follow must depend largely upon the circumstances in which
the rupture took place.”[1044]
As Sir Edward Grey thus postponed a definitive answer until after the
elections, M. Cambon replied that he would repeat his request at that
time. But he asked that in the meantime the “unofficial communications”
between the British admiralty and war office and the French naval and
military attachés “as to what action might advantageously be taken in
case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war” might
be permitted to continue. “They did not pledge either Government,” he
said.[1045]
Sir Edward Grey immediately sent a report of this conversation to the
Prime Minister and to Lord Ripon, and he met his friend, Mr. Haldane, at
Berwick on January 12 to discuss the matter, particularly the French
request concerning the military conversations.[1046] He had learned that
under the Unionist cabinet in the previous year such military and naval
conversations had taken place, and that at the present time official
conversations were going on between Admiral Sir John Fisher and the
French naval attaché while the military conversations were being held
unofficially between the French military attaché and Colonel Repington.
When consulted on January 11, General Grierson replied that “if there is
even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France
or to take the field on her side in Belgium in consequence of a
violation of Belgian territory by the Germans, we should have as soon as
possible informal communication between the military authorities of
France and/or Belgium and the General Staff.”[1047] Neither Sir Edward
Grey nor Mr. Haldane saw any reason why these conversations should not
be carried on officially also. As the former argued:
It was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obligation to go
to war, but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular in Britain. It was
certain that if Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter
of that Agreement, the pro-French feeling in Britain would be very
strong, so strong probably as to justify a British Government in
intervening on the side of France or even to insist on its doing so. We
must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to
stand aside. But modern war may be an affair of days. If there were no
military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the
assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain
might desire it. We should in effect not have preserved our freedom to
help France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing
so, unless we had allowed the British and French staffs to concert plans
for common action.[1048]
The Prime Minister feared the interpretation that would be put upon
these conversations. “I do not like the stress laid upon joint
preparations,” he wrote to Lord Ripon on February 2. “It comes very
close to an honourable undertaking; and it will be known on both sides
of the Rhine.” However, he considered them to be merely “provisional and
precautionary measures” not binding the government, “raising no new
question of policy and therefore within the competence of the War
Office.” So he agreed to them.[1049] It was definitely understood that
these military conversations did not bind the governments.[1050] On
January 17 they were begun between the French military attaché and
General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the French and
British general staffs until the outbreak of the World War.[1051]
The same reasoning applied to Belgium, for both the French and the
British authorities expected Germany to violate Belgian neutrality in
order to strike France suddenly from the northeast.[1052] On January 15
Sir Edward Grey therefore instructed General Grierson to open
conversations with the Belgian military authorities “as to the manner in
which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually
afforded to Belgium for the defence of her neutrality. Such
communications,” he continued, “must be solely provisional and
noncommittal.”[1053] Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché
in Brussels, broached the subject on January 18 to General Ducarne,
Belgian chief of staff, remarking that the British Minister would bring
up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister.[1054] After consulting
the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed to the conversations.[1055]
This decision was anticipated by Colonel Barnardiston, who had learned
that the Belgian military authorities were quietly making preparations
for instant mobilization.[1056] The Anglo-Belgian negotiations continued
at least until the end of April.[1057]
These conversations, both military and naval, were kept secret. The
Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only half-a-dozen persons; the
ones with France were not known to all the members of the British
cabinet although reports of them leaked out in the press about the
middle of 1906.[1058] Sir Edward Grey wanted to prevent either these
conversations or any military or naval action from being regarded as
provocations. In informing Lord Tweedmouth, first lord of the admiralty,
of the Anglo-French conversations, he wrote, January 16:
Meanwhile the mood of the German Emperor is said to be pacific; the tone
of German diplomacy is quiet and not aggressive. Any movement of our
ships which could be interpreted as a threat to Germany would be very
undesirable at this moment and most unfortunate so long as there is a
prospect or even a chance that things may go smoothly at the Morocco
Conference which meets today. I hope therefore that the Admiralty won’t
plan any special cruises or visits to Foreign ports or unusual movements
of squadrons without consulting the F[oreign] O[ffice] as to the
possible political effect.
I assume that the present disposition of the Fleet is satisfactory as
regards possibilities between Germany and France; if so the quieter we
keep for the present the better.[1059]
With the opening of these conversations a new military problem
confronted the British which Mr. Haldane, then minister of war, has
described as follows:
It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly to be
opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate (with the
assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the
inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the
entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even further
south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.[1060]
At the time, in January, the Committee of Imperial Defence, although not
all of its members knew of the military conversations then beginning,
studied the question. It decided that “four Divisions and a Cavalry
Division” could be landed at the nearest French port in case of a sudden
outbreak of hostilities.[1061] The admiralty was prepared “to bar the
Channel against the German squadrons.”[1062] The Minister of War began a
thorough reorganization of the army in order to make British aid
effective at the desired moment in the future.[1063]
Having settled this matter, Sir Edward Grey had the difficult problem of
how to answer M. Cambon’s question about a formal agreement.[1064] As it
was inconvenient then to hold a cabinet meeting, Sir Edward Grey talked
over the reply to be given with the Premier and Mr. Haldane, who were
both in London after January 26, and asked Sir Francis Bertie to write
his opinion.[1065]
The Ambassador wrote that France did not desire war at all, but that if
a conflict did arise over Morocco either then or later she expected
active British support. He warned his chief that if his answer did not
assure to France
more than a continuance of diplomatic support, or of neutrality in the
event of a war provoked by Germany, there is serious danger of a
complete revulsion of feeling on the part of the French Government and
of public opinion in France. The Government would consider that they had
been deserted and might, in order to avoid the risks of a war without
ally, deem it advisable to make great concessions to Germany outside
Morocco in order to obtain liberty of action in that country.
Such concessions might not be very great sacrifices for France but they
might well be very detrimental to the interests of the British Empire,
for, in the temper in which France would then be, it could not be
expected that she would give them much consideration.[1066]
Sir Edward Grey’s personal opinion was that “if France is let in for a
war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about Morocco, we
cannot stand aside, but must take part with France.” While pondering the
question of an alliance, he saw the great difficulties in making
one.[1067] He decided to adapt the policy of his predecessor in office
to the new situation created by M. Cambon’s request. This policy is best
explained in the long dispatch which Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir
Francis Bertie about his interview with the French Ambassador on January
31:
The French Ambassador asked me again to-day whether France would be able
to count upon the assistance of England in the event of an attack upon
her by Germany.
I said that I had spoken on the subject to the Prime Minister and
discussed it with him, and that I had three observations to submit.
In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good deal of
progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities had been in
communication with the French, and I assumed that all preparations were
ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want
of a formal engagement.
In the second place, a week or more before Monsieur Cambon had spoken to
me, I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my
personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne had also expressed
to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event of an attack upon
France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan Agreement, public feeling
in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain
neutral. I urged upon Monsieur Cambon that this, which I had reason to
know had been correctly reported at Berlin, had produced there the moral
effect which Monsieur Cambon had urged upon me as being one of the great
securities of peace and the main reason for a formal engagement between
England and France with regard to armed co-operation.
In the third place, I pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at present
French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the Declaration
exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did not question it,
that we suggested no concessions and no alterations in it, that we left
France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which
she could count; but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic
support, and should we take an engagement which might involve us in a
war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be
consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be
free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of
their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid a war.
I asked Monsieur Cambon to weigh these considerations in his mind, and
to consider whether the present situation as regards ourselves and
France was not so satisfactory that it was unnecessary to alter it by a
formal declaration as he desired.
M. Cambon replied that a war might break out over some Moroccan incident
so quickly that if it were necessary for the British government “to
consult, and to wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it
might be too late to be of use.” He repeated his request for some form
of verbal assurance. Sir Edward Grey pointed out the difficulties of
giving this assurance—that it would be a “solemn undertaking,” that it
would have to be put in writing and submitted to the cabinet and also to
Parliament. He said that it would constitute the transformation of the
entente into a defensive alliance, that it could not be given
unconditionally, and that the conditions “would be difficult to
describe.” He again asked M. Cambon “whether the force of circumstances
bringing England and France together was not stronger than any assurance
in words which could be given at this moment.” He added that German
pressure “might eventually transform the ‘Entente’ into a defensive
alliance,” yet at the time he did not think that the change was needed.
When M. Cambon emphasized the fact that Sir Edward Grey had expressed
his personal opinion that in case of a German attack upon France, no
British government could remain neutral, the latter replied that he had
said this first to Count Metternich and not to him,
because, supposing it appeared that I had overestimated the strength of
feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany;
but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France,
because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a
matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must
keep well within the mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the
war broke out between Germany and France.
Sir Edward Grey believed that the British people would be unwilling to
fight in order to put France into possession of Morocco. But if “it
appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the
Anglo-French ‘Entente,’ public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong
on the side of France.” He said, however, that British sentiment was
much averse to war, and that it was not certain whether this aversion
would be overcome by the desire to aid France. While he was ready to
reopen the conversation at any time in the future, he did not think that
the situation justified such a radical change at that time.[1068] M.
Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that answer.[1069]
Thus, Sir Edward Grey laid down the policy which he followed until the
outbreak of the World War. He was open and frank with both France and
Germany. To the German government he emphasized the probability of
British intervention in favor of France in case of war. To the French
government he gave the promise of full diplomatic support; while
permitting preparations for any emergency, he refused to give to the
French assurance of active aid in case of war or even to speak as firmly
on that score as he did to the German government. Instead of binding
Great Britain and France in an alliance—an act which would have forced
him to keep a hand on France’s policy toward Morocco and Germany—Sir
Edward Grey kept British hands free. In giving France sufficient
assurance to maintain Anglo-French intimacy and co-operation, he
depended upon the uncertainty of British support in a crisis to hold
France back. He relied upon the same uncertainty—this time, however,
that Great Britain might enter a Franco-German conflict—to restrain
Germany. By this apparently simple but really intricate policy he sought
to satisfy the needs of British foreign relations.
[Footnote 959: Memo. by Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 14 f., No.
6900.]
[Footnote 960: Rouvier was apparently led astray by William II’s
instructions to the Prince of Monaco in October to tell Rouvier that “he
would lay no hindrances whatever in the way of the French policy”
(Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 596 f. and note, No.
6836). Rouvier sounded the German embassy first through a third person
and then unofficially through M. Louis of the foreign office.]
[Footnote 961: Memo. by Mühlberg, Nov. 30, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 20 ff.,
No. 6906.]
[Footnote 962: On this episode see _ibid._, Nos. 6901, 6903 ff. The
editors of _G.P._ assure us that there is no indication in the documents
that Rouvier followed up the subject (_ibid._, p. 23). Joseph Caillaux
states that Rouvier was back of the overture made through Vaffier-
Pollet. He also asserts that in Nov., 1905, Rouvier offered the port of
Mogador and its hinterland to Germany, but that the latter refused
(_Agadir, ma politique extérieure_ [Paris, 1919], p. 25). There is no
reference to this proposal in _G.P._ Caillaux is probably referring to
the offer made through Eckardstein in May, 1905.]
[Footnote 963: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 250 ff., 272 ff.; see also Hammann,
_Bilder_, pp. 43 f. At the opening of the Reichstag on Nov. 28 the
Emperor declared that Germany stood with all Powers in “correct
relations” and with the most of them in “good and friendly relations”
(Schulthess _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 132 f.).]
[Footnote 964: Report from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Dec. 2 and
11, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 92 ff.]
[Footnote 965: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre), pp. 4034
ff. Rouvier received a vote of confidence of 501 to 51 (_ibid._, p.
4050).]
[Footnote 966: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 662 ff.]
[Footnote 967: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 693, No.
6887; Flotow to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 15 ff., No. 6901;
Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 52, No. 6924.]
[Footnote 968: So Ojeda, Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign
affairs, declared to Cartwright on Jan. 22, 1906 (Cartwright to Grey,
Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252). There is no indication in
_G.P._ that those terms were known.]
[Footnote 969: Memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 28 f., No.
6914. It contained the conclusions of a conference by Bülow with
Richthofen, Mühlberg, and Klehmet.]
[Footnote 970: On Jan. 8 the government published a _Weissbuch_ on
Morocco of thirty-nine pages substantiating the German accusations
against the French policy. According to Bülow it was intended to
supplement the French _Livre jaune_ (_G.P._, XXI, 24 n.). Its appearance
made a painful impression in France. Rouvier found it “scarcely
courteous” and hardly indicative of the conciliatory spirit which
Germany professed to have (report from Paris, Jan. 11, 1906, _Zur europ.
Politik_, II, 99 f.). It was well received by the German press
(Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 215 f., No. 235.).]
[Footnote 971: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 38 ff., No.
6922 and Anlage.]
[Footnote 972: Metternich was very pessimistic about the outcome. See
Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; Bülow
to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 673, No. 6364.]
[Footnote 973: Tattenbach to Bülow, Nov. 4, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 12, No.
6898.]
[Footnote 974: Bülow to Sternburg, Oct. 29, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 641 f.,
No. 6341 and note; Sternburg to F. O., Nov. 3, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 9 f.,
No. 6896; Bülow to Sternburg, Nov. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 11 f., No. 6897;
memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 23 f., No. 6909; Dennis,
_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 398 f., 499. Mr. Choate,
ambassador in London, had been selected as American delegate in August
(_Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence_, II, 172 ff.); but the final choice
rested on Mr. White, ambassador at Rome.]
[Footnote 975: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 22, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 27 n.; cf.
Steed, _Through Thirty Years_, I, 234.]
[Footnote 976: According to a minute by the Emperor William to a
dispatch from Stumm on Feb. 20, 1906 (the only reference to this
incident which _G.P._ contains), during the visit of the King of Spain
to Germany in the previous November the Emperor had “proposed to the
Spanish King to renew the agreement with his father and a convention
regarding the common action of our armies! Whereupon the King said that
he knew nothing of that matter, but would look into it upon his return.”
Nothing came of the matter. See _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024. See also
Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160, No. 197; Nicolson to
Grey, Dec. 26 and 27, 1905, _ibid._, 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208.]
[Footnote 977: Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No.
192.]
[Footnote 978: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54, No. 6925.]
[Footnote 979: So expressed by San Giuliano, Italian foreign minister.
(Monts to Bülow, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 34 ff., No. 6921).]
[Footnote 980: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 53 f., No. 6925;
Monts to Bülow, Jan 6, 1906, _ibid._, 56 ff., No. 6928.]
[Footnote 981: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 59, No. 6929.]
[Footnote 982: Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 30 f., No.
6916; memo. by Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 31, No. 6917; memo. by
Bülow, Dec. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 32, No. 6918.]
[Footnote 983: Flotow to F. O., Dec. 20, 1905; _ibid._, 25 f., No. 6911;
Radolin to F. O., Jan. 8 and 10, 1906, _ibid._, 60 f., No. 6931; 64 f.,
No. 6934; Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 697 f., 6888;
Radowitz to Bülow, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 32 f., No. 6919 f.;
Bülow also remained willing to negotiate directly with the French
government over the Moroccan affair (Bülow to Radolin, Jan. 16, 1906,
_ibid._, 67, No. 6936).]
[Footnote 984: Report from Berlin, Dec. 24, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_,
II, 97 f.; report from Berlin, Dec. 31, 1905, _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_,
No. 14; Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 672 ff.,
No. 6881; 685 ff., No. 6886; Bülow, II, 434; Schulthess, _1905_, p. 154.
The Emperor refused twice to help before Bülow won him over. See Bülow
to William II, Dec. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 679 ff., No. 6882, and the
Emperor’s minutes.]
[Footnote 985: So D. M. Wallace, special representative of the _London
Times_ at the conference, asserted to Radowitz (Radowitz to F. O., Jan.
21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 95 n.).]
[Footnote 986: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 524 ff.; Edward VII to
William II, Jan. 23, Feb. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 108 f., No. 6961; 111
f., No. 6963; William II to Edward VII, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 110 f.,
No. 6962.]
[Footnote 987: “If England restricts herself to the diplomatic support
of the French claims, peace and the permanent open door are assured. But
as soon as France has reason to count on the armed help of England for
the conquest of Morocco and for any results therefrom, then both peace
and the open door will be endangered” (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 17, 1906,
_ibid._, 94, No. 6950). A similar thought was expressed by Bülow to
Lascelles, Jan. 24, to Sir Edgar Speyer, London banker and friend of
Grey’s, on Jan. 18, by Metternich to Grey, Dec. 20, Jan. 23, and was
given out to the press. See _ibid._, 96 ff., Nos. 6953 f.; 106 ff., No.
6960; 103 ff., No. 6959; _ibid._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]
[Footnote 988: For Bülow’s reasoning see his dispatch to Moltke, Jan.
24, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 77 ff., No. 6943.]
[Footnote 989: A report of a partial French mobilization on the eastern
frontier did alarm Bülow, but it was immediately proved to be untrue
(_ibid._, 71 ff., Nos. 6937 ff.).]
[Footnote 990: The German government had announced a new navy bill,
which would have been proposed anyway, and was only hastened because the
visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and the revelations in _Le
Matin_ insured it a favorable reception by the German public. Aside from
that Germany took special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she
was preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed
his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff until
after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See Moltke to
Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 79 and note, No. 6944. See also Philip
Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, _Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher,
und Briefe_ (ed. Johannes Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke,
however, did not expect the French to recede, writing to Bülow on
January 23 as follows: “In my opinion the French now consider further
concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of
their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcassé
fall.
“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference
may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They
themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to
be armed against an attack from Germany” (_G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).]
[Footnote 991: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 690 ff.,
No. 6887. The account of the Emperor’s conversation with Laguiche was
published in _Le Temps_ on Dec. 28. Richthofen spoke to a similar effect
to the Belgian minister (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14).]
[Footnote 992: Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 60 f., No.
6931; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 51 f., No. 6924; _Zur
europ. Politik_, II, 95 f., 99; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 92 ff.
See also Bompard’s analysis of the German policy toward France (Spring
Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir
Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 58 f.).]
[Footnote 993: According to Moltke, France was making military and
financial preparations for defensive purposes. “The fortifications on
the eastern frontier are being strengthened and put in a more defensive
condition. Their provisions in munitions and food are being replenished.
The forces of the frontier defence troops are apparently being brought
approximately to the legal number for peace time by the addition of
troops from the interior. Moreover, reserves are here and there being
called up to undergo their legal drilling.
“The training of the troops on the frontier is being furthered in every
way. Numerous trial mobilizations by the various garrisons and drilling
of the border troops by day and night are occurring.
“But all these preparations are not to be regarded as preparations for
an intended mobilization but only as precautionary measures, which are
easily explained” (Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 75, No.
6942).
According to the Belgian Minister at Paris, Jan. 16, 1906, the sum of
270,000,000 francs was being devoted to the defenses (_Zur europ.
Politik_, II, 103).]
[Footnote 994: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, _Adventures in
American Diplomacy_, p. 498; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.]
[Footnote 995: The Russian delegate, Count Cassini, declared that in
forty years he had never received such positive instructions (Tardieu,
p. 88; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 298; Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906,
_B.D._, III, 204, No. 223). Rouvier repeated the refusal of that loan
just before the conference (Witte, pp. 295 ff., 429 f.; Nicholas II to
William II, Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 125 f., and note). Concerning
that loan Sir Edward Grey wrote to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, as follows: “.
. . . Russia has demanded a loan on improper terms as the price of her
support [at the conference]” (_B.D._, III, 178, No. 216).]
[Footnote 996: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, p. 498. Witte
apparently offered to obtain this promise in return for an immediate
French loan, but the Czar refused to give it—at least, that was Spring
Rice’s inference (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 57
f.).]
[Footnote 997: Dennis, pp. 498 f.; Durand to Grey, Jan. 11, 1905,
_B.D._, III, 217, No. 236.]
[Footnote 998: Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905; _B.D._, III, 165, No.
204.]
[Footnote 999: See Rouvier’s assertion to Hardinge on Jan. 15, 1906,
_ibid._, 227 and inclosure, No. 245.]
[Footnote 1000: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 193 ff.;
Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 60 ff., Richard Burdon Haldane, _An
Autobiography_ (London, 1929), pp. 157 ff., 168 ff.]
[Footnote 1001: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 178, No.
216.]
[Footnote 1002: Cf. Spender, _The Public Life_ (1925), I, 112 ff.;
Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 215 f.; cf. Hermann Lutz, _Lord Grey
und der Weltkrieg_ (Berlin, 1927).]
[Footnote 1003: Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 218, No.
204; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]
[Footnote 1004: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _B.D._, IV,
219 f., No. 205; 221, No. 207; and Gwynn, II, 54 f., 57; Spring Rice to
Knollys, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 22, 26.]
[Footnote 1005: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, Gwynn, II, 55 f.]
[Footnote 1006: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 222 ff.,
No. 208; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]
[Footnote 1007: See Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 20, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
213 f., No. 200; Hardinge to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 622 f.]
[Footnote 1008: _Ibid._, chap. xxvii, Part III. Nicolson suspected that
Russia acted so loyally because she had no money with which to make the
loan (Nicolson to Grey, Sept. 12, 1906, _ibid._, 242, No. 228).]
[Footnote 1009: Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 323, No.
304.]
[Footnote 1010: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 220, No.
205.]
[Footnote 1011: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 223, No.
208; Lee, II, 564; Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61
f.]
[Footnote 1012: Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.]
[Footnote 1013: Grey, I, 100 f.]
[Footnote 1014: Cf. memo. by Crowe, Jan. 1, 1907, _B.D._, III, 397 ff.;
memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, pp. 420 ff.; Haldane, _An
Autobiography_, p. 215.]
[Footnote 1015: Grey, I, 100 f.]
[Footnote 1016: _B.D._, III, 162, No. 200.]
[Footnote 1017: Lucien Wolf, _Life of the First Marquess of Ripon_
(London, 1921), II, 292 f.; see also Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31,
1906, Gwynn, II, 61.]
[Footnote 1018: Metternich gives the date of the conversation as Dec.
18. See Grey to Whitehead, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160 f., No. 198;
Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]
[Footnote 1019: On this conversation between Grey and Metternich see the
following: Grey to Lascelles Jan. 9, 1906, Grey to Campbell-Bannerman,
Jan. 9, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 80 ff., 114, and in _B.D._, III, 209
ff., No. 229; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 3 and 4, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 45
ff., Nos. 6923 f. Grey repeated his statement to Metternich on Jan. 10,
1906. See Metternich to F. O., Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 64, No. 6933. See
also Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 24, 1906, quoting a dispatch from
Metternich, _ibid._, 103 ff., No. 6959. However, Van Grooten, secretary
of the Belgian ministry in London, reported to his government on Jan. 14
as follows: “Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeated at
various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited in London that
Great Britain has engaged herself towards France in the Moroccan
question and that she will meet her obligations fully even in case of a
Franco-German war and at all costs. The press and public opinion give
proof of the same sentiments” (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, p. 19). The
report is exaggerated, but it is significant that it was current.]
[Footnote 1020: Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206 ff.,
Nos. 225 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163, No. 203.]
[Footnote 1021: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257 f.]
[Footnote 1022: Acton to Grey, Dec. 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 167 f., No.
209.]
[Footnote 1023: Rouvier denied that he had done so. Notes by Hardinge,
Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 and inclosure, No. 245 (see above).]
[Footnote 1024: On this episode see Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 3, R.
Jan. 6, 1905, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15; dated Jan. 12, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan.
15, 1906, _ibid._, 207 f., No. 226; 217 ff., Nos. 237 f.; 222 f., Nos.
240 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Jan. 9 and 15, 1906, _ibid._, 211 f., No.
230; 225, No. 243; Bertie to Grey, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 224, No. 242;
memo. by Holstein, Jan. 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96 f., No. 6953.]
[Footnote 1025: Bertie to Grey, D. Dec. 22, R. Dec. 27, 1905, _B.D._,
III, 163 ff., No. 204; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 162,
No. 200. “Nous serons biens sûrement avec vous,” Grey stated to Cambon
(Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197).]
[Footnote 1026: Tardieu, pp. 81 f.]
[Footnote 1027: Nicolson thought that he would have been “an admirable
selection.” King Edward’s comment to the report of Germany’s veto was,
“a case of bullying as usual!” See Nicolson to Grey, D. Dec. 14, R. Dec.
23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.]
[Footnote 1028: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 178, No. 216.]
[Footnote 1029: Minutes to dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, D. Jan. 5, R.
Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 209, No. 227.]
[Footnote 1030: Grey stated to the Spanish Ambassador, Jan. 3, 1906, as
follows: “All the four Powers most directly interested in the
Mediterranean had made arrangements with each other which were
satisfactory to themselves and it was most undesirable that they should
allow these arrangements to be disturbed” (Grey to Nicolson, Jan. 10,
1906, _ibid._, 215, No. 234). On this Spanish affair see also Grey to
Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14,
20, 21, 1905, _ibid._, 151, No. 193; 161 f., Nos. 199 ff.; Nicolson to
Grey, Dec. 22, 25, 27, 1905, Jan. 5 and 9, 1906, _ibid._, 163, No. 202;
165, No. 205; 167, No. 208; 208 f., No. 227; 212, No. 231; Bertie to
Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163 ff., No. 204.]
[Footnote 1031: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 244;
Grey to Egerton, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 166, No. 206; Egerton to Grey,
Dec. 27, 1905, Jan. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 166 f., No. 207; 212 f., No. 232.]
[Footnote 1032: Gorst to Bertie, Dec. 13, 1905, _ibid._, 149 f. and
inclosure, No. 191; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 158 f., No.
195.]
[Footnote 1033: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 244
and inclosure; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 228 f., No.
247.]
[Footnote 1034: Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15, 1906,
_ibid._, 217 ff., No. 237.]
[Footnote 1035: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 205 f., No.
224; Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 213 ff., No. 233. See also
Bompard’s conversation with Spring Rice as reported by the latter to
Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 59 f.]
[Footnote 1036: Rouvier to Révoil, Jan. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 220 ff.,
No. 239; Tardieu, pp. 101 ff., 244; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905,
_B.D._, III, 164, No. 204. In talking to Sir Charles Hardinge on Jan. 15
Rouvier added a third alternative—“a mandate to France, Spain and a
third Power to study and elaborate a scheme for submission to the
Powers” (notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 f., No. 245 and
inclosure).]
[Footnote 1037: Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 233 f., No.
253.]
[Footnote 1038: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906; _ibid._, 172, No.
211.]
[Footnote 1039: This display of doubt about Great Britain’s loyalty was
one of France’s best means of gaining that Power’s support. See
Bompard’s assertions as reported by Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31,
1906, Gwynn, II, 62; also see below.]
[Footnote 1040: The story is given in Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court
Repington, _The First World War, 1914-1918: Personal Experiences_
(London, 1920), I, 2 ff.]
[Footnote 1041: Général Huguet, _L’intervention militaire britannique en
1914_ (Paris, 1928), p. 15.]
[Footnote 1042: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206, No.
224.]
[Footnote 1043: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Spender, _Life
of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff.; Grey, I, 70 f.; _B.D._, III, 170
f., No. 210_a_.]
[Footnote 1044: This document is sufficient proof against the accusation
of the editors of _G.P._ that Grey went further in his assertions to the
French Ambassador in his first conversation with the latter, and that
afterward, apparently restrained by the more pacific Premier, he
qualified his position in the interview of Jan. 31. It is apparent that
Grey’s statements of Jan. 10 and 31 do not differ in kind or degree,
except that in the latter the Foreign Secretary expanded the conditions
which he had already formulated in the earlier interview (see _G.P._,
XXI, 48 f. note; see also below).]
[Footnote 1045: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 70
ff., in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff., and in
_B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210. Cambon’s account to Rouvier of the
conversation is given in _ibid._, 173 f., No. 212. Sanderson was present
at that interview.]
[Footnote 1046: Grey, I, 72, 114; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_,
II, 251 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.]
[Footnote 1047: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 172,
No. 211.]
[Footnote 1048: Grey, I, 72 f.]
[Footnote 1049: “C-B was a fine old Tory in Army matter” (Repington, I,
13). On this affair see Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253,
256 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.; Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London,
1920), p. 184; Grey, I, 70 ff., 83; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 189
f.]
[Footnote 1050: Grey, I, 70 ff.]
[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, pp. 73 f.; Repington, I, 13; _B.D._, III, 169,
editor’s note, 438 ff. In 1911 Grey wrote to Asquith that he never knew
anything more of the course of those conversations (Grey, I, 92).]
[Footnote 1052: Sydenham, _My Working Life_, pp. 186 f., 190; Haldane,
_Before the War_, p. 45; Repington, I, 3. The British based their belief
on the German construction of obviously unnecessary railroads to the
Belgian frontier (_Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the
Outbreak of the European War_ [1915], pp. 365 f.).]
[Footnote 1053: Sanderson to Grierson, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 176
f., No. 214; Grierson to Barnardiston, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 179, No.
217_b_.]
[Footnote 1054: In a dispatch to Grierson on Jan. 19 Barnardiston wrote
that he had told Ducarne at their first meeting that Sir C. Phipps, the
British minister in Brussels, had already mentioned the matter to the
Belgian Foreign Minister (_ibid._, III, 188). In some notes by
Barnardiston deposited in the war office, he stated that Phipps would
speak to the Belgian Foreign Minister. The Belgian government asserts
that there is no record of such a communication; rather, that the
Foreign Minister learned of the military conversations from the Belgian
Minister of War. There is no report of any conversation on this subject
between Phipps and the Belgian Minister in the papers in the British
foreign office, nor is there any record of instructions on it being sent
to Phipps. On March 17 Barnardiston wrote to Grierson that both the
Belgian Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs knew of the
conversation (editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 203; _Collected Diplomatic
Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, p. 355;
Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 f.). There is no doubt but that the
conversations were approved by both foreign ministers.]
[Footnote 1055: Barnardiston to Grierson, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III,
187 f.]
[Footnote 1056: Barnardiston to Phipps, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 179
f.]
[Footnote 1057: On these negotiations see the correspondence between
Grierson and Barnardiston in _ibid._, pp. 187 ff.; _Collected Diplomatic
Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, pp. 350 ff.;
Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 ff.]
[Footnote 1058: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193;
Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191.]
[Footnote 1059: _B.D._, III, 203.]
[Footnote 1060: Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 45 f.]
[Footnote 1061: Statement written by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927,
_B.D._, III, 185, No. 221_a_; memo. by Brigadier General Nicholson, Nov.
6, 1911, _ibid._, pp. 186 f.; Admiral Ottley to First Sea Lord, Jan. 13,
1906, _ibid._, p. 186; Sydenham, p. 186.]
[Footnote 1062: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906; _B.D._, III, 193, No.
220_a_.]
[Footnote 1063: Haldane, _Before the War_, chap. iv.]
[Footnote 1064: Grey informed Cambon of the approval of the naval and
military conversations on Jan. 15, but postponed answering the larger
question (Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 177, No. 215; 225,
No. 244.)]
[Footnote 1065: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 ff.;
Grey, I, 84. Grey’s omission to consult the entire cabinet has been
severely criticized. He has admitted in his memoirs that he did wrong.
See especially Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191; Earl Loreburn, _How
the War Came_ (London, 1919), pp. 80 f.; cf. Spender, _Life, Journalism
and Politics_, I, 193.]
[Footnote 1066: Bertie to Grey, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._,
III, 174 ff., No. 213.]
[Footnote 1067: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 216;
Grey, I, 75.]
[Footnote 1068: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253 ff.;
Grey, II, 76 ff.; _B.D._, III, 180 ff., No. 219. Cambon and Grey
exchanged memoranda of that conversation. According to Mr. Eyre Crowe,
senior clerk in the British foreign office, Cambon’s account differed
from Grey’s on the following points: “(A) The French note alludes to the
intention of the British Admiralty in case of a conflict with Germany,
to bar the Channel against the German squadrons. This passage does not
occur in Sir E. Grey’s draft. . . . . (B) The French note contains no
allusion to the argument given in the following passage of Sir E. Grey’s
draft: ‘I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in
order to put France in possession of Morocco. They would say that France
should wait for opportunities and be content to take time, and that it
was unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war’” (Crowe’s minute
to the memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 183 f., No. 220_a_). On
Feb. 1 Sanderson talked over the two drafts with Cambon, who made some
changes in his. Sanderson again emphasized the reasons why the British
government could not give the desired assurance, speaking in part as
follows: “I told him [Cambon] that I thought that if the Cabinet were to
give a pledge which would morally bind the country to go to war in
certain circumstances, and were not to mention this pledge to
Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country suddenly
found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case
would be one which would justify impeachment, and which might even
result in that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were
very strongly in favour of the course to which the Government was
pledged” (memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 184 f., No.
220_b_).]
[Footnote 1069: So thought Sanderson, and Grey’s secretary (Grey, I, 85;
Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257; memo. by Sanderson, Feb.
2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 220_b_). Grey was absent from the foreign
office for some time owing to the sudden death of his wife, Feb. 1.]