THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT
I
By forcing France in July to submit the Moroccan question to an
international conference, the German government asserted its power and
restored its country’s prestige; but it had had to employ means which
could not often be repeated with impunity. The future of Germany’s
international position remained uncertain. While the Entente Cordiale
had become firmer, the Triple Alliance was still unsteady and
unreliable. King Edward and his nephew, the Emperor William, were having
one of their numerous quarrels.[865] The German government believed
positively that in case of a Franco-German war Great Britain would
actively support France.[866] Although relations with President
Roosevelt and with Russia remained intimate, these close friendships did
not give Germany the security and power which she had enjoyed before the
conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. Then suddenly, out of a clear sky,
came the possibility of Germany’s becoming master of the situation
again. The Emperor William and Czar Nicholas arranged a meeting at
Björkö, and the Emperor requested that a copy of the projected Russo-
German treaty of the previous autumn be sent to him.
In the latter half of July the Emperor and the Czar were both cruising:
the one in the Baltic Sea, the other in the Finnish Gulf. As it was the
hope of both the Chancellor[867] and the Emperor that a meeting with the
Czar might occur during these cruises, William II suddenly telegraphed
to his cousin on July 18 that he would shortly pass the entrance to the
gulf. “Should it give you any pleasure to see me . . . ., I of course am
always at your disposal.” Nicholas immediately replied: “Delighted with
your proposal. Would it suit you meet at Bjoerkoe-sund . . . .? . . . .
Look forward with intense pleasure to seeing you.” Upon receiving this
answer the Emperor requested Prince Bülow to send him the draft.
The Chancellor, who was at Norderney at the time, forwarded the request
to Herr von Holstein. While he was dubious about the affair, he wrote to
Herr von Holstein that the meeting would at least be a useful means of
keeping in close touch with Russia and finding out something about her
future foreign and internal policy. Germany could not intervene in favor
of Russia during the peace negotiations, he stated, but it would be
advantageous to engage the Czar so far that M. Witte and Count Lamsdorff
would be unable to prepare for a Franco-Russo-British entente
immediately after peace was established.[868]
Herr von Holstein’s long replies to the Chancellor were not very
hopeful. The final draft of the treaty of the previous autumn was
acceptable, he thought, if the clause added by Russia—“Their entente
cordiale will also hold in the case of difficulties which may arise at
the time of the negotiations of peace between Russia and Japan”—were
omitted. In fact, he was willing to accept a change in Article I making
the alliance valid in case of an attack by two Powers instead of by one.
He no longer believed it necessary for Russia and Germany to be in
complete accord before negotiations with France were begun, because M.
Rouvier’s cabinet would not “so absolutely oppose Germany’s joining [the
Dual Alliance] as Delcassé had,” and because, as Russia was more
dependent upon France for loans than she had been six months previously,
she would take no step without the latter’s approval. Herr von Holstein
expected M. Witte, Count Lamsdorff, the mother and wife of the Czar, and
the French government to oppose the project and to favor an Anglo-Russo-
French grouping. In his opinion almost the only reason for Russia to
prefer a German alliance to the other grouping was that it could be
concluded in time to be of value to Russia in the forthcoming
negotiations for peace with Japan. Herr von Holstein therefore advised
that if the treaty were concluded it be published immediately. Fearing
rejection of the German proposal by Count Lamsdorff and an exploitation
of the Russian refusal, he wished the Emperor not to take the initiative
in proposing an alliance, at least until Nicholas II manifested a desire
to pursue a common policy with Germany. Herr von Holstein’s telegrams
formed the basis for the instructions sent to the Emperor on July
22.[869]
The story of Björkö is one of drama and mystery. The two sovereigns
agreed that their meeting should be kept secret until it occurred; and,
although the news immediately leaked out in the Russian press, the
company on the Emperor’s yacht did not know where it was going or for
what purpose. The rulers met, July 23-24, in Björkö Bay, far away from
civilization, with only the sea and the forest-clad shore around them.
The Emperor prepared himself for the interview by lifting up his hands
and asking God to guide and aid him, or at least not to aid the Czar.
When his yacht steamed into the bay, the Czar had already arrived. The
Emperor immediately went on board the “Polar Star.” After a touching
exchange of embraces the two monarchs withdrew for a long conversation.
“Willy” found “Nicky” feeling discouraged, forlorn, and friendless
except for him; and Count Lamsdorff was not there to give him backbone.
The gathering force of the Russian revolution, the defeat by Japan,
anger at Great Britain and France, and deep appreciation for the
friendly attitude of Germany and William II toward him and his country
during their troubles had prepared this weak monarch to throw himself
into the arms of the far stronger, confident, and brilliantly seductive
Emperor. As William II asserted later, the Czar was in a mood to
subscribe to almost anything.
In the first conversation between the two rulers[870] they both relieved
themselves of their anger at Great Britain and King Edward VII. Nicholas
II was particularly enraged at the British, whose unfriendliness toward
Russia during the current war was fresh in his mind. When he described
King Edward as “the greatest mischief-maker and most insincere as well
as the most dangerous intriguer in the world,” the Emperor agreed with
him heartily. King Edward “has a passion to begin something with every
Power, to make ‘a little agreement,’” said William. The Czar replied as
he struck the table with his fist, “Well I can only say, he shall not
get one from me, and never in my life against Germany or you, my word of
honor on it.” When they brought up the Moroccan affair, the Czar,
pleased with the Franco-German agreement, strongly seconded the
Emperor’s hope that out of that agreement a permanent understanding with
France might develop. When the Emperor remarked that “in spite of
English incitements France has absolutely refused to go to war with us
[Germany], and so has shown that she will no longer fight for the sake
of the lost provinces,” Nicholas II replied incisively: “Yes that I saw,
it is quite clear the Alsace-Lorraine question is closed once for all,
thank God.” As they were going on deck again the Czar once more embraced
the Emperor and thanked him for coming.[871]
That night the two groups celebrated together until daybreak. During the
festivities some of the Russian officials in close touch with their
master spoke openly in favor of a Continental alliance. The Emperor
therefore concluded that the ground was prepared for his project. Before
going to breakfast with the Czar and Grand Duke Michael the next
morning, William II opened his _Losungen der Brüdergemeinde für
1905_[872] upon the following text: “Each will receive his reward
according to his work.” So, full of hope, he put a copy of the treaty in
his pocket and set out. He found the Czar in the same mood as before.
They spoke of the Anglo-French fraternization, behind which the Emperor
suspected lay a “little agreement.” The Czar’s head drooped in
dejection. “That is too bad,” he grieved. “What shall I do in this
disagreeable situation.” “I felt that the moment had come,” wrote the
Emperor later to Prince Bülow, in reporting this interview.
Since the ally has preserved the policy of the free hand and of
reinsurance without consulting or informing the Czar [he said to
Nicholas II], it is quite permissible for him . . . . to do the same.
How would it be if we also made a little agreement? We discussed one in
the previous winter, but it failed because of Delcassé and tension with
France. Now that is all past, we shall be good friends with the French.
So does not every obstacle fall? “Oh yes to be sure, I remember well,
but I forgot the contents of it, what a pity I havent got it here.” I
possess a copy which by chance I have in my pocket. The Czar seized me
by the arm, drew me into his father’s cabin, and closed all the doors.
“Show it me please.” The dreamy eyes sparkled. I drew the envelope from
my pocket, unfolded the sheet on the writing desk of Alexander III
before the pictures of the Czar’s mother, between photographs from
Fredensborg and Copenhagen, and laid it before the Czar. He read the
text once, twice, thrice. . . . . I prayed the dear God to be with us
and guide the young ruler. It was deathly still; only the sea murmured
and the sun shone joyfully and clear in the cozy cabin, and directly
before me lay the Hohenzollern and high in the morning air waved the
imperial standard. I was just reading the letters on the black cross,
God with us, when the Czar said, “That is quite excellent. I quite
agree!” My heart beat so loudly that I could hear it. I pulled myself
together and said casually, “Should you like to sign it? It would be a
very nice souvenir of our entrevue.” He read it once more and replied,
“Yes I will.” I opened the ink-well, extending to him the pen, and he
wrote with a firm hand “Nicolas.” Then he passed it to me, I signed it,
and as I arose he, deeply moved, folded me in his arms and said, “I
thank God and I thank you, it will be of most beneficial consequences
for my country and Yours; You are Russia’s only real friend in the whole
world, I have felt that through the whole war and I know it.” Tears of
joy stood in my eyes—to be sure the sweat poured from my brow and
back—and I thought of Frederick William III, Queen Louise, Grandfather
and Nicholas I. Were they near at that moment? At any rate they saw it
all and were overjoyed.
The terms of the treaty were as follows: The Czar and the Emperor, “to
assure the maintenance of peace in Europe, have agreed upon the
following articles of a treaty of defensive alliance.” Article I read:
“In case one of the two Empires is attacked by an European Power, its
ally will aid it in Europe with all its forces on land and sea.”
According to Article II, “The high contracting parties engage not to
conclude a separate peace with a common enemy.” Article III was as
follows: “The present treaty becomes valid as soon as peace is concluded
between Russia and Japan and will remain valid until it is denounced a
year in advance.” By Article IV the Czar agreed “after the coming into
force of the treaty” to take “the steps necessary to initiate France
into the accord and to associate herself in it as ally.”[873]
Thus the act was accomplished. How was it possible? The Emperor’s
explanation was simple and satisfying—God did it.[874] For he was
present, as were various spirits and shades of dead and departed
kinsmen. A humble and depressed Czar and an inspired Emperor with his
_Losungen der Brüdergemeinde_, tears and sighs and embraces, many a
dainty dish and flask of old wine, many a satisfying outburst of anger
at absent enemies—no wonder the Björkö treaty was signed!
The Emperor had visions of illimitable possibilities for the alliance.
On July 27 he wrote to Nicholas II as follows:
In times to come it may not be impossible that even Japan may feel
inclined to join it [the alliance]. This would cool down English self-
assertion and impertinence, as she is her ally too. The 24th of July
1905 is a cornerstone in European Politics and turns over a new leaf in
the history of the world; which will be a chapter of peace and goodwill
among the great Powers of the European Continent, respecting each other
in friendship, confidence and in pursuing the general Policy on the
lines of a community of interests. The moment the news of the new
“groupement” will have become known in the world, the smaller nations,
Holland, Belgium, Danmark, Sweden, Norway will all be attracted to this
new great centre of gravity, by quite natural laws of the attraction of
smaller bodies by the larger and compacter ones. They will revolve in
the orbit of the great block of powers (Russia, Germany, France,
Austria, Italy) and feel confidence in leaning on and revolving around
this mass. The dual Alliance combining with the Triple Alliance gives a
Quintupel Alliance, well able to hold all unruly neighbours in order, to
impose peace even by force, if there should be a power hairbrained
enough to wish to disturb it.[875]
Notwithstanding this optimism, the treaty caused difficulty from the
start. The absence of a countersignature by the Chancellor was not
considered serious.[876] But against the advice of Herr von Tschirschky,
the representative of the foreign office on the cruise, the Emperor had
without consulting the Chancellor introduced very important changes in
the draft of the treaty. In the first article he had added the words “en
Europe,” while he had re-worded the third article so that the alliance
should not become effective before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese
War.[877] Prince Bülow was very dubious about the value of the treaty
after those changes were made, particularly the change in Article I,
“because in Europe,” he wrote to Herr von Holstein, “Russia can be of no
use at all to us against England.” He requested the latter’s advice
before acting.[878]
Herr von Holstein approved decidedly of the treaty even in its changed
form, although he regretted that the Emperor had not obtained more while
the Czar was so pliant. He said that the treaty should be kept
absolutely secret.[879] Otherwise he feared that Great Britain and
perhaps also France would seek to prolong the Russo-Japanese War with
the result that the Czar would be deposed, and that Great Britain, if
she had aggressive plans, might hurriedly attack Germany before the
alliance came into operation. He thought that the suspensive clause was
especially disadvantageous to Germany in that the treaty, if effective
at once, would have a calming effect upon any bellicose spirit on the
part of both France and Great Britain. Moreover, he believed that France
could be brought to join the alliance at the time; whereas if the action
to bring her in were postponed, she would align herself more closely
with Great Britain. The inclusion of the phrase “en Europe” he also
regretted as being advantageous only to Russia.
In case of an Anglo-German war, Russia need not advance against India. .
. . . But even with the best will Russia will not be able to help us in
Europe. . . . . The only positive value from the changed treaty is the
assurance that Russia can no longer enter the Quadruple Alliance.[880]
The circle around Germany can no longer close. That is something. But we
could have obtained more and we must expect that the publication of this
treaty will cause little disquietude in England and will not be
considered as a great success of German diplomacy.[881]
The Chancellor regarded the inclusion of the suspensive clause as an
advantage under the circumstances; but he had grave objections to the
inclusion of the phrase “en Europe.”[882] When he telegraphed these to
the Emperor, the latter replied that he had made the change “after ripe
deliberation” in order to prevent Germany from being obliged to aid
Russia in Asia. He did not believe possible an attack by Russia on
India, nor did anyone else, he stated. The advantage from the treaty
lay, not in the expectation of any active help from Russia in case of a
war with Great Britain but rather in the assurance that Germany would
enjoy full freedom and security on her eastern frontier, that she would
be able to throw all her forces against one front, that is, France,
instead of against two—“naturally provided France mobilizes to help
England, which is not impossible.” He and General Moltke looked upon the
situation in this way:
If England declares or otherwise begins war with us, you [the
Chancellor] must immediately send dispatches to Brussels and Paris with
a demand to state within six hours whether for or against us. We must
immediately march into Belgium no matter what the reply. As to France it
depends upon whether she remains neutral,—which I do not consider
entirely impossible even if the probability is small;—in that case the
Russian _casus foederis_ does not enter into effect. If she [France]
mobilizes, that is a war-threat against us in favor of England, and then
the Russian regiments must march with ours. . . . . It should eventually
be considered whether France could not be offered as an enticement for
good behavior toward us perhaps a part of Belgium as compensation for
the lost provinces.[883]
The Chancellor fully approved the Emperor’s remarks concerning Belgium;
but neither he nor Herr von Holstein thought that it would be possible
to permit French neutrality in case of a British attack on Germany.[884]
Nor was he convinced by the Emperor’s other arguments. He continued to
regard the inclusion of the phrase “en Europe” as “pernicious.” He
declared that he could not uphold the treaty before the German people
unless Russia were bound to give aid in both Asia and Europe, and sought
ways of bringing about a change to that effect.[885] While he had
accepted the treaty at first and had congratulated the Emperor upon
achieving it, and while he had thought that there was plenty of time in
which to eliminate the objectionable phrase,[886] he suddenly reversed
his attitude. On August 3 he stated that he could not accept the
responsibility for the treaty in the present form or for bringing about
the necessary changes. He therefore offered his resignation.[887]
Knowing that he had his master in a quandary, since German public
opinion was already complaining about too much imperial initiative in
foreign affairs, the Chancellor apparently did not expect his
resignation to be accepted. He continued as before to seek means of
altering the treaty without ruining it entirely.[888] And, as a matter
of fact, the Emperor collapsed, agreed to anything, and on August 11
wrote a hysterical letter to his Chancellor.
I thought that I had worked and had accomplished something special for
you. Then you send me a couple of cold lines and your resignation!!!
Please excuse me, dear Bülow, from depicting the condition of my soul to
you. To be so treated by my best, most intimate friend, without giving a
single plausible reason, has been such a fearful blow to me that I have
completely collapsed and fear a grave nervous sickness. You say that the
situation has become so serious because of the treaty with “en Europe”
that you cannot assume responsibility; before whom? And in the same
breath you believe that before God you can assume responsibility of
deserting your Emperor and master to whom you have sworn fidelity, who
has loaded you with love and honors, your fatherland and, as I believed,
your truest friend, in the situation regarded by you as critical and
serious!? No, dear Bülow, that you will not do! We have both been called
by God and created for each other to work for our dear German
fatherland. If in your opinion a graver situation has really been made
by my error—which I do not believe—, it has been done with the best
intentions. You know me well enough to recognize that. Your person is
100,000 times more valuable to me and our country than all the treaties
in the world. I have immediately taken steps with the Czar which shall
weaken or eliminate those words. Do not forget that you sent me to
Tangier against my will in order to achieve a success in your Moroccan
policy. Read my telegrams before the visit to Tangier. You have admitted
to me yourself that you were so anxious that when you received the
announcement of my safe departure you had a nervous fit of weeping. For
your sake because the fatherland needed it I landed, mounted a strange
horse in spite of my crippled left arm, and the horse nearly caused my
death—all of which was your affair! I rode through Spanish anarchists
because you wished it and your policy would profit thereby! and now you
want abruptly to desert me, when I have done everything—and, as I
honestly believe, far more—for you, because my situation appears to you
too serious. Bülow, I have not deserved that of you. No, my friend, you
remain in office and with me and shall continue to work with me _ad
majorem Germaniae gloriam_. You plainly owe me that because of my
service this year. You can and dare not forsake me. Therewith your whole
policy of this year would be disavowed by you yourself and I blamed
forever. That I cannot survive. Grant me a few days to rest and collect
myself before you come, for the nervous excitement caused by your letter
is too great, I am now unable to argue in quiet. . . . . I appeal to
your friendship for me, and let us hear no more of your intention to
resign. Telegraph me “all right” after this letter; then I shall know
that you will remain! For the morning after the arrival of your
resignation will find the emperor no longer alive! Think of my poor wife
and children![889]
How were the mighty fallen! The Chancellor had won, and of course
telegraphed “All right.”
In the meantime various proposals to eliminate the phrase “en
Europe”[890] were being combated by Herr von Holstein, who feared that
the opponents of the treaty in Russia, particularly Count Lamsdorff,
might use such opportunity to propose changes on their side, to annul
the treaty entirely, or at least to undermine its prestige. He wrote:
The treaty even in its present crippled form is still too valuable to
risk in hazardous play. Its value lies in the crushing effect which it
will have upon France and in the indirect reaction through France upon
England. . . . . Through the inclusion of “en Europe” and through the
introduction of the suspensive article, the value of the treaty is
lowered 50 per cent. But this 50 per cent remains to us and should not
be risked.
He urged against proposal for a change until time for the treaty to come
into effect or until the Emperor and the Czar had another meeting.
Prince Bülow acceded to these views.[891]
II
Occurring at a crisis in world-affairs, when the Moroccan difficulty was
still unsettled, when the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace were
about to begin, when the choice of a king by Norway was not yet made,
the news of the unexpected and secret interview at Björkö caused a furor
in the diplomatic world and in the press.[892] Especial alarm was shown
by the British, jealous and mistrustful as they were of Russo-German
intimacy. The English press suspected the German Emperor of seeking the
Norwegian crown for a Hohenzollern and of endeavoring to close the
Baltic Sea to all except the Baltic nations.[893] Sir Francis Bertie,
British ambassador at Paris, was reported to have remarked that Germany
seemed to harbor Napoleonic tendencies, which Great Britain would oppose
as she had the original ones.[894] Mr. Spring Rice, after consulting
Lord Lansdowne, wrote to President Roosevelt as follows:
The most serious aspect of the question is the general balance of power
in Europe. . . . . Two of the great powers have practically disappeared
so far as active intervention in European affairs is concerned, Russia
and Austria. Germany is by far the most powerful of the remaining
powers, and she has an old feud to settle with France. If France is
attacked, there is no Russia to help her and the English Army is at
present practically negligible for a continental campaign. If France is
forced to accept German hegemony, England remains the only independent
great power, and we are in much the same position as during the
Napoleonic wars. We consider it therefore our duty to prepare for
contingencies.
. . . . Of course, nobody here, except the small body of hot-heads who
exist everywhere, desires to attack Germany. Our interest in peace is
supreme and in fact perhaps too dominant. But we all have an
uncomfortable feeling that always and everywhere we encounter the fixed
and determined hostility of Germany, and that, when opportunity offers,
this hostility will take an active form.[895]
Late in July, forthcoming British maneuvers in the Baltic Sea were
suddenly announced in the press without any previous notification to the
various governments. Following so closely after the meeting at Björkö,
that announcement had a sinister significance which the Russian and the
German presses interpreted as a warning to their countries that Great
Britain was still mistress of the seas and that no change should occur
against her will. Germany feared a British attack and, without an
adequate fleet, felt herself defenseless.[896]
The British press denounced these fears as preposterous. In the House of
Commons, Earl Percy, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs,
declared on August 3 that “the situation in Europe presented no special
cause for anxiety” and would present even less cause if certain
“irresponsible persons were not perpetually attributing to this country
Machiavellian motives of which we were quite innocent and who were
always imagining that we could not enter into arrangements with one
country for mutual convenience without having a hostile intent against
some other country.”[897] Lord Lansdowne immediately explained to the
German and Russian governments that the lack of notification had been an
oversight; he denied that the maneuvers were intended as a demonstration
in any way.[898]
As neither side wanted trouble, this explanation cleared up the
difficulty. The press became calmer and the visit of the British fleet
to Swinemünde and Neufahrwasser, August 27-September 1, was used by both
the British and the Germans for demonstrations of good will.[899] Yet
the fact that for the first time in years the British fleet was
practicing in the Baltic was not without significance. Furthermore, King
Edward VII was still at odds with the German Emperor. In August and
September, with the approval of his government, he refused to meet his
nephew until Franco-German relations improved.[900] And at some time in
August the British government learned from a member of the German
Emperor’s party at Björkö that at that meeting William II had seemed
nervous and preoccupied, that he had been seized by sudden fits of
talkativeness and of silence, and that he had advocated his ideas of a
coalition of Germany, Russia, and France to the exclusion of Great
Britain. Lord Lansdowne’s comment to that information was as follows:
“The description of the Kaiser’s language and demeanour fills me with
disquiet. What may not a man in such a frame of mind do next?”[901]
III
When the report reached Paris on July 23 that the interview at Björkö
was to occur, M. Rouvier immediately asked M. Witte, who was in Paris on
his way to Portsmouth, whether it was true. M. Witte, equally in the
dark, replied that he did not believe the rumor.[902] When the authentic
news of the meeting came a few hours later, the French government and
people were alarmed, for the Czar’s meeting with the German Emperor
signified a lack of regard for French feeling and seemed to belie M.
Witte’s assurances of Russia’s devotion to the Dual Alliance.[903]
Moreover, M. Witte’s private advocacy of closer co-operation between the
three great Continental Powers against the great naval Powers, that is,
against France’s friend, Great Britain, no doubt increased the concern
of the French government.[904]
On July 22 M. Bompard, French ambassador in St. Petersburg, demanded an
explanation from Count Lamsdorff of the report of the forthcoming
meeting. The Foreign Minister assured the French government that it was
a strictly private interview, devoid of any political character.[905]
Nevertheless, after the meeting occurred the French government continued
to feel uneasy.[906] Although M. Bompard believed that Count Lamsdorff,
faithful to the Dual Alliance, hoped that the meeting had had no
significance, the Ambassador strongly suspected that the Minister had
again not been consulted beforehand by his master.[907] Believing that
the Emperor William II was trying through his personal relations with
the Czar to destroy the Dual Alliance, he feared the results of an
interview between the two sovereigns. When he learned that some sort of
document had been signed by the two rulers, he surmised that it was a
personal agreement of friendship by which they promised not to
participate in any enterprise directed against the other and to exchange
any information which came to their knowledge.[908]
Faced by the immense possibilities of the meeting at Björkö, M. Rouvier
determined to forestall any Russian initiative looking toward a change
in the Dual Alliance by frankly explaining his foreign policy to the
Russian ambassador, M. Nelidow. On August 9, the Ambassador reported the
Minister’s words as follows:
The Minister assured me that the basis of his policy must remain the
alliance with Russia; France needs no other. “Wherein does my policy
differ from that of my predecessor?” he said to me. “Therein that I wish
to establish good relations with England and Germany; but we do not
intend thereby to make a closer agreement with the latter, just as on
the other hand we do not desire to weaken the understanding already
existing with England.” Upon my remarking that several newspapers have
gone so far as to speak of a German alliance, M. Rouvier replied
emphatically that that would be “absolutely impossible.”[909]
IV
The Czar, who probably felt guilty about not having consulted his
Foreign Minister before signing the Björkö treaty, did not tell Count
Lamsdorff of it until September 12.[910] He probably did so then because
peace with Japan, signed on September 6 and soon to be officially
ratified, would bring the Björkö accord into force.[911] Count Lamsdorff
was horrified at the news. On October 9 he wrote to his friend M.
Nelidow that the German Emperor had endeavored in the previous year to
persuade “our poor monarch” to sign a treaty of defensive alliance with
the obligation for France to join it. He continued:
I succeeded in preventing this crude attempt. But during the fateful
meeting at Björkö, the Emperor William was able with the aid of base
flattery to convince our dear Emperor that he alone was his true friend
and his support, and that the only salvation for Russia and for Europe
lay in a new Triple Alliance which in his opinion France would gladly
join.
After informing M. Nelidow of the treaty signed at Björkö, he went on:
“There you have the new mess into which we have been plunged after so
many unusual adventures during the past two years. You can imagine how
comforting this is.”[912]
From the first Count Lamsdorff was determined to destroy the treaty.
After comparing it with the terms of the Dual Alliance, he concluded
that the one was a flagrant violation of the other.[913] In fact, he
thought that in case of a Franco-German war arising out of the Moroccan
affair, Russia was bound by this treaty to support Germany against her
own ally. He wrote to M. Nelidow:
From long years of experience I have become convinced that the alliance
with France is necessary in order to have really good relations with
Germany. Otherwise we lose our independence; for I know nothing heavier
than the German yoke. Without sacrificing the most intimate relations
with Berlin, we have very tactfully repulsed all attempts to compromise
us.
Not only did he expect France to refuse flatly to enter the new
grouping, but he also considered it bad policy to give up the Dual
Alliance in favor of a doubtful combination _à trois_. He considered the
treaty to be altogether in favor of Germany, for she was bound to aid
Russia only in Europe although Russia had most cause to fear Asiatic
conflicts. Count Lamsdorff held that this alliance might involve Russia
in the Anglo-German rivalry and might draw her into a war in which she
had no interest. Preferring a policy of peace and good will with all
Powers, he believed that Russia should next settle her difficulties with
Great Britain, in spite of the fact that the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance in August had angered him. He was determined to
extricate Russia from this situation with the least possible damage to
Russo-German relations but above all without a breach in the Dual
Alliance.[914]
When the Russian Foreign Minister marshaled these arguments before the
Czar, the latter refused to yield. Without showing much consideration
for French interest in the matter, Nicholas II replied that the alliance
would be of benefit to both Russia and France and maintained that the
latter would join it.[915] Although he was strongly skeptical about this
possibility, the Foreign Minister was forced to inquire of M. Nelidow on
September 14 whether or not France would do so.[916]
Without consulting anyone, M. Nelidow replied decidedly no. The Dual
Alliance, together with the Entente Cordiale, every day becoming more
intimate, he wrote, formed the foundation of the French foreign policy,
whereas Franco-German relations were far from satisfactory. This new
triple alliance, manifestly aimed at Great Britain, might, he continued,
involve France in a war, which she wished above all to avoid, especially
a war against Great Britain for the defense of German interests.
Furthermore, such an alliance would mean the renunciation of all hopes
of revenge for France. In fact, he thought that the slightest hint in
favor of a Continental grouping would only shake France’s trust in her
ally. Nevertheless, he promised to investigate further.[917]
Not convinced by these arguments, the Czar clung to his plan. Just at
this juncture M. Witte arrived in St. Petersburg with a letter from
William II which forced a decision about the alliance.
M. Witte’s ideas on foreign policy were confused. Early in May, 1905, he
spoke of Germany to Mr. Spring Rice in hostile terms. In July,
immediately before he left St. Petersburg for Portsmouth to negotiate
peace with Japan, he was upholding among his friends and to the Czar the
plan that at Portsmouth he should not only make peace but should also
negotiate an “all-round arrangement” with Japan which Great Britain and
France should adhere to or at least recognize.[918] A few days later at
Paris he advocated the formation of a Continental grouping against the
overseas Powers.[919] The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
increased his antagonism to Great Britain.[920] On his return to Paris
in September, he refused an invitation from King Edward to visit England
as well as an offer of British participation in the proposed Russian
loan, and aided in settling the Moroccan difficulty in order to make
possible a Franco-German _rapprochement_.[921]
As M. Witte had to pass through Germany on his trip home, the Emperor
William obtained permission from the Czar for him to stop over and to be
initiated into the secret of Björkö.[922] After a cordial interview with
Prince Bülow at Berlin,[923] M. Witte journeyed to Rominten where he
received an almost royal welcome from the Emperor (September 26). When
William II informed him of the signing of the alliance at Björkö, the
Russian statesman, according to the Emperor, wept tears of joy. M. Witte
proposed that the German and the Russian ambassadors be given
instructions to co-operate on all possible questions as a means of
persuading France to enter the new grouping voluntarily and of preparing
the world for this momentous event. In the meantime, he advised that the
accord be kept closely secret. He promised to do his part in “using this
foundation for the construction of a good house.” Overjoyed at his
success, William II accepted these suggestions. In a letter to the Czar
carried by M. Witte he made this proposal for the co-operation of their
foreign representatives:[924] “This common exposal of a common cause,”
he wrote, “will not fail to impress the world that our relations have
become closer and thus slowly prepare your Allies the French for the new
orientation which their policy must take for the entry into our
treaty.”[925]
In the conversations with M. Witte, who was not shown a copy of the
treaty itself, the Emperor represented the accord as much less binding
upon Franco-Russian relations than was really the case.[926] On his
side, M. Witte, anxious to have the support of William II in regaining
the good graces of the Czar and harboring some vague ideas about the
desirability of a Continental grouping, was easily charmed by the
Emperor into approval of the project. When he reached St. Petersburg,
September 28, he urged upon the French Ambassador the need of a Dual
Alliance-German coalition as a reply to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. M.
Bompard naturally rejected the idea.[927] When Count Witte (he had just
been ennobled) protested to him the Emperor William’s love for France
and his attachment to the Dual Alliance, the Ambassador significantly
asked, “Does not the Emperor’s love for the Dual Alliance extend so far
that he wished to join it?”[928] Count Lamsdorff, even less sympathetic,
showed to Count Witte the actual treaty and wrathfully denounced it. The
latter began to recover from the social intoxication of his visit to
Germany and to perceive that the treaty would have to be annulled.[929]
Count Lamsdorff, Count Witte, M. Nelidow, and the Grand Duke Nicholas,
who was initiated into the secret, all joined forces in persuading the
Czar. By appealing to their master’s sense of honor and loyalty to the
alliance made by his revered father, they succeeded in winning the
unhappy ruler’s consent to a compromise. He acknowledged that the treaty
of Björkö and the terms of the Dual Alliance were in contradiction, and
agreed that before the former became operative either Germany should be
brought to change it in such a way that it would not affect France or
that the French government should be moved to a scrutiny of the terms of
the Dual Alliance “in the sense of a more or less close association with
this defensive Triple Alliance.” Thus, simultaneous attempts were to be
made to persuade either France or Germany to change the terms of her
alliance.[930]
It very soon became apparent that the French government would never
accept the Björkö treaty. When M. Nelidow broached to M. Rouvier on
October 4 the idea of alliance with Germany which his government claimed
President Roosevelt also favored, the Premier repeated his former
assertions on this question. He, in turn, stated his complete approval
of an Anglo-Russian accord.[931] Again on October 18 the Russian
Ambassador reported that during a most intimate conversation with M.
Rouvier he had pressed the arguments in favor of a Continental alliance
against Great Britain only to receive from the Premier the following
emphatic reply:
We have aggressive intentions toward no one. We have given clear proof
of our love of peace. Thirty-five years ago after a war unfortunate for
us two provinces were taken away and we had to pay several billion
francs for peace. Our nation submitted, and since then we have
endeavored to avoid any cause for conflict or misunderstanding. To avoid
difficulties which threatened to come to a head, I recently ventured to
wound the pride of my country a little. But one cannot demand more of
us. The nation would not tolerate a closer _rapprochement_ with Germany.
It cannot forget what it has suffered from her, of which suffering it
has just been reminded in a careless and purposeless way. An alliance
with Germany is impossible. The government is obliged to regard the
feelings of the country.
As M. Nelidow commented in his dispatch, this was M. Rouvier’s final
reaction. It destroyed the possibility of France’s entering a
Continental alliance so completely that even the Czar had to acknowledge
the fact.[932]
In the meantime, the Czar’s letter of October 7 to William II arrived in
Berlin. It read as follows:
The great question is to draw France into our new defensive Alliance. .
. . . But if France were to refuse to join us, then, not only would Art.
IV drop away, but also the meaning of Art. I would change radically,
because its obligations in the _present wording_ point at any European
Power and France too—Russia’s ally. During your stay at Bjorkoe I did
not have with me the documents signed by my Father. . . . . The first
steps taken with the object of trying to find out, whether the French
Government could be induced to join our new treaty, showed us that it is
a difficult task and that it will take a long time to prepare to bring
it over of its free will. . . . . Therefore I think that the coming into
force of the Bjorkoe treaty ought to be _put off until_ we know how
France will look upon it. In case she absolutely refuses to join our two
countries, it will be necessary to change the wordings of articles I and
IV so as to bring them into full accordance with Russia’s obligations
towards France, since the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1890. I
shall do my best to get France to join us.[933]
Without consulting the Chancellor, William II replied on October 12 with
a refusal:
I fully agree with you, that it will cost time, labour and patience to
induce France to join us both, but the reasonable people will in future
make themselves heard and felt! Our Moroccan business is regulated to
entire satisfaction so that the air is free for better understanding
between us. Our treaty is a very good base to build upon. We joined
hands and signed _before God_ who heard our vows! I therefore think that
the treaty can well come into existence. But if you wish any changes in
the wording or clauses or provisions for the future or different
emergencies—as for instance the absolute refusal of France, which is
improbable—I gladly await any proposal you will think fit to lay before
me. Till these have been laid before me and are agreed upon, the Treaty
must be adhered to by us as it is.[934]
The Czar, who had expected an acquiescence,[935] was in an unhappy
plight; no matter which way he turned he would be accused of breaking
his word. Since France had the prior claim and since the pressure upon
him in St. Petersburg was pro-French, he wrote to William II on November
23 that to fulfil with equal loyalty the clauses of the Dual Alliance
and those of the treaty of Björkö he would have to add the following
declaration to the latter:
In view of the difficulties in the way of an immediate adhesion by the
French Government to the treaty of defensive alliance signed at Björkoe
. . . . it is understood that Article I of that act shall not have any
application in the eventuality of a war with France and that the mutual
engagements which unite the latter to Russia will be maintained in full
until the establishment of an accord _à trois_.
To soften his refusal the Czar reported that Great Britain was “trying
hard to get us round for an understanding about Asiatic frontier
questions”; but he assured William II that he had not “the slightest
intention of opening negotiations with her.”[936]
This reply destroyed the entire force of the treaty; it spelled the
failure of Germany’s second effort to ally with Russia. The German
Emperor and his government were bitterly disappointed. In the answer to
the Czar on November 28, based upon a memorandum by Herr von Holstein,
William II did not absolutely say yes or no, but left it to be
understood that Germany still considered the treaty as binding in spite
of the Czar’s declaration.[937] On December 2 the Czar refused to accept
the accord without the proposed declaration.[938] There the matter
rested.
On January 21, 1906, the Czar wrote to William II that in keeping with
“the real sense of our Bjorkoe treaty,” he had accepted a proposal of
President Loubet’s to attach a French general to his person.
I think that this courtesy to France will bring her still closer to
Russia. As long as I can hold her tight she will remain peaceful and
quiet. It seems to me therefore that the continent’s interests and still
more so the interests of Germany can only gain from it. And with God’s
help some day Your right idea of forming a new “triple alliance” will
become a solid reality.
In sending this letter to Prince Bülow on January 23 the Emperor
wrote:[939]
I am sending you herewith another precious, bungling effort from the
youthful idealist on the Russian throne! The latest phase of the Russo-
Gallic Alliance borders on the ridiculous, but show’s how in Paris—at
London’s suggestion?—a counter blow is immediately struck against every
_rapprochement_ between the two Emperors; every time, the little Czar by
reason of the “ancient alliance” immediately falls or is won over by
Lamsdorff. That he speaks on “my” idea of a triple alliance, as if I
were receiving a special favor thereby, is really more than childish or
naïve! . . . . And all that is served to me from behind a tear-drenched
mask of eternal, most intimate friendship! How long will it be until he
will have an “English general” at his side, naturally only in order to
realize “my” ideal of world peace, and then a Japanese general to calm
the oriental peoples, and finally an American general! His Majesty ought
to be ashamed before his and my ancestors and before me to do such
things, to write such letters to me, which Lamsdorff has dictated to
him!
Thus the results of Björkö upon Russo-German relations were entirely
different from those anticipated by the two rulers. By overreaching
himself, by seeking a too-brilliant success without adequate
preparation, the German Emperor alienated the Czar, who felt that he had
played an ignominious rôle.[940] The consequence was that Russia again
drew nearer to France[941] and began to look with more favor upon
British overtures. Germany’s effort to restore her dominant position in
Europe and to prevent the dreaded encirclement by means of a Russian
alliance resulted, therefore, in preparing the ground for the very act
which Germany most feared, the formation of an Anglo-Russo-French
entente.
V
The German bid at Björkö for Russia’s friendship and the rumors of what
had happened there—approaching more and more nearly the truth by
October[942]—inevitably aroused rival efforts by Great Britain. The
British policy of obtaining an understanding with Russia was complex.
Defeat by Japan and revolution within made Russia discouraged and
powerless, and broke the prestige of the chauvinistic, militaristic
groups for the time being.[943] To complete the prophylactic work of
fixing adequate restraints to the Russian expansive energy, Great
Britain renewed prematurely her alliance with Japan in August, 1905,
modifying the terms so that the alliance became effective in case of an
attack by one Power and not only China specifically but also the
“regions of Eastern Asia and of India” were included within its
scope.[944] Then the British government hoped that Russia, with no other
alternative, would make a satisfactory settlement of their Asiatic
differences.[945]
In the previous May, Sir Charles Hardinge, British ambassador at St.
Petersburg, had carried King Edward’s most cordial greetings to the
Russian Foreign Minister. With marked pleasure, Count Lamsdorff had
replied that the maintenance of peace and good relations with Great
Britain was _mon culte et ma religion_. Remarking to the Ambassador that
“interested parties” were trying to stir up discord between their
countries, the Count said that these endeavors must be frustrated. Count
Lamsdorff, wrote the Ambassador to his government,
thoroughly realized the actual difficulties of the situation, but he was
full of confidence that at the end of this miserable war both
Governments would find a means of arriving at a satisfactory arrangement
of all outstanding differences in the same manner as the Anglo-French
arrangement had been made.[946]
Russia and Japan agreed upon terms of peace on September 5. Three days
later, Sir Charles Hardinge notified Count Lamsdorff of the new Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, and assured him most earnestly that it was one of
national insurance, that Great Britain was absolutely sincere in her
desire for peace and friendly relations, and that she had no wish “to
interfere with the legitimate activity of Russia” or “to seek a policy
of aggrandizement at her expense.” Count Lamsdorff replied that he
remained convinced of the value of an agreement and repeated that a
third party was trying to arouse hostility between Great Britain and
Russia. However, when Sir Charles Hardinge alluded to the possibility of
resuming the previous negotiations at a future date, the Foreign
Minister responded “that he was most anxious that they should be brought
to a successful issue but that they should not be unduly hastened.”[947]
This cool reply to the British sounding was caused partly by the
pressing need at that time to annul the Björkö treaty, but primarily by
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whose renewal at that moment Russia had not
expected. Interpreting it as another blow to a state already humiliated
by defeat, Russian public opinion denounced the treaty.[948] Thinking
that the Russian animosity would pass, Lord Lansdowne proposed on
October 3 a way of bringing the two countries closer together.
My own feeling was [he said to the Russian ambassador] that it would be
a mistake to attempt too much, or to allow it to be understood that the
two countries were on the eve of a comprehensive transaction analogous
to that which had taken place between France and Great Britain. My idea
of the procedure to be followed was rather that we should take up in
detail any outstanding points as to which differences of opinion had
manifested themselves and endeavour to dispose of these, and that we
should then pass on to others, if we found that our work proceeded
successfully.
Although the Russian Foreign Minister was gratified at the expression of
British good will, he replied that
he could give no answer of a definite character, but, speaking
privately, he could say that the Treaty had had a very bad effect and
had left an unpleasant impression upon the mind of the Emperor, and he
would recommend our Ambassador, as a friend, not to press for an answer
as it might be a disagreeable one, nor to open negotiations as to a
definite treaty between England and Russia as to their interests in
Asia.
Count Benckendorff even remarked that “any arrangement . . . . should
not be conceived in a spirit of hostility towards Germany”—an
implication which the British Foreign Secretary repudiated with
force.[949]
Greatly alarmed at Russian soundings about a Continental coalition
against Great Britain, the French government in October tried several
times to bring Russia and Great Britain together, even on any minor
question.[950] In view of the Russian reserve, no definite proposals
were made.[951] By October 21, however, the French and British
governments were certain that the danger of a Russo-German combination
was past.[952] Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt, to the content of
those governments, entirely denied that he favored a Continental
grouping against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[953] When King Edward
learned the truth about the Björkö affair in the autumn, he could with
some relief describe his nephew, the Emperor William, as “the most
brilliant failure in history.”[954]
While these conversations were unsuccessful, Sir Charles Hardinge
thought that “the improvement which has already shown itself in the
relations between England and Russia only requires careful fostering to
bear fruit in due season.”[955] To that end it was necessary for the two
governments to find some opportunity for disinterested co-operation—an
opportunity which the Conference of Algeciras was to afford—and for
Russian public opinion to reciprocate the amicable feelings of the
British so that an Anglo-Russian understanding would be built upon a
durable basis, like that of the Entente Cordiale. The British press was
doing its share in bringing about this change of attitude. In fact,
British public opinion felt more relieved than it had in months. The
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, the signing of the Franco-German agreement of September 28—all
cleared the diplomatic atmosphere. The _Matin_ revelations on October 5
concerning the supposed British offer of alliance to France in the
previous summer placed Great Britain in a somewhat embarrassing position
before the world as a disturber of peace. Moreover, it was recognized
that Anglo-German animosity had almost caused a Russo-German alliance,
and that, to make a settlement with Russia, Great Britain should restore
better relations with Germany.[956] So British public opinion was ready
to be friendly with Russia, and, in part, with Germany. During the
autumn, sections of the British people, although not the government,
tried to smooth over the animosities with Germany. A meeting was held in
London early in December for that purpose at which eminent politicians,
business men, representatives of the press, clergymen, and others were
present to further the work.[957] As German public opinion responded to
these efforts, a general _détente_ set in.[958]
[Footnote 865: On these differences see Mühlberg to Metternich, July 18,
1905, _G.P._, XX, 638, No. 6863 and following documents; Lee, _King
Edward VII_, II, 334 ff., 346 ff.]
[Footnote 866: Even Lascelles, British ambassador at Berlin, admitted to
Metternich that “in a Franco-German war in view of the prevailing
opinion here [in England] England would be actively on the French side.”
See Metternich to Bülow, July 19 and 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 639 f., No.
6864; 646 ff., No. 6867; Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905, _ibid._,
641 ff., No. 6866.]
[Footnote 867: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, XXX, 497,
No. 6237.]
[Footnote 868: Bülow to F. O., July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 435 f., No. 6206.
The telegrams between the two rulers were in English.]
[Footnote 869: See the correspondence between Holstein and Bülow, July
21-24, 1905, _ibid._, 436 ff., Nos. 6203-14. It was Holstein who
determined the whole policy of the German foreign office on this
question. Bülow served only as his mouthpiece. Richthofen and
Metternich, and also General Moltke (who in 1906 became chief of staff),
were all opposed to the project of alliance, but their opinions were
either not asked or were disregarded. See Bülow to F. O., Aug. 9, 1905,
_ibid._, 488, No. 6235; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX,
659 ff., No. 6871; Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische
Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167.]
[Footnote 870: They conversed in English. In the Emperor’s account of
the interview he gives the Czar’s statements in that language.]
[Footnote 871: The Czar was also unpleasantly surprised to learn that
King Edward VII was supporting the candidacy of his son-in-law, Prince
Carl of Denmark, for the Norwegian throne. Nicholas II favored Prince
Waldemar, Carl’s younger brother, while the Emperor favored choosing a
member of the House of Bernadotte. It looked to him, said Nicholas, as
if Great Britain were endeavoring thereby to get her fingers on Norway
with the possible purpose of acquiring the port of Christiansund from
which to block the Skaggerrack. See the references given in the
succeeding footnote.]
[Footnote 872: “Watchwords of the Common Brethren for 1905.” It was a
book of proverbs.]
[Footnote 873: There is another account of the meeting written by Bülow
on Aug. 18 immediately after a talk with the Emperor which does not
agree in all details with this one written by the Emperor on the day
after the meeting occurred. The two versions supplement each other. But
the one of July 25 reproduces better the atmosphere in which the affair
took place. The other version is as follows: The Czar declared that he
wished to go hand in hand with the Emperor, his only friend. The latter
asked why the treaty had not been signed in the previous autumn. The
reply was that France had opposed it, that he (the Czar) had had to
maintain the Dual Alliance, and that France and Germany had been
hostile. The Emperor then said that those relations were better, that he
wished France and Germany to become friends, that the Moroccan question
was to be used for that purpose, and that an understanding over it would
certainly be reached. The Czar replied that if that were the case then
nothing stood in the way of a Russo-German treaty. The Emperor then
produced a copy of the treaty and it was signed immediately. See memo.
by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 502 f., No. 6240. The other
accounts of the Björkö interview are as follows: Tschirschky to Bülow,
July 24, 1905, _ibid._, 454 ff., No. 6218; William II to Bülow, July 25,
1905, _ibid._, 458 ff., No. 6220; Bülow to F. O., July 24, 1905,
_ibid._, 452, No. 6215; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 428; Savinsky, _Revue des
deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian
Diplomat_, p. 115; Helmuth von Moltke, _Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente,
1877-1916_ (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 325 ff. The treaty was countersigned
by Grand Duke Michael, Tschirschky, and Admiral Birileff, the last two
apparently without reading it. The Grand Duke was asked to sign it
because William II feared that Nicholas II might be deposed and Michael
made czar. Naturally he did not mention his reason.
The Czar wished to consider an agreement guaranteeing to the King of
Denmark the possession of his territory, so that in case of war Russia
and Germany would be sure of being able to defend the Baltic Sea north
of the Belt. A declaration of Danish neutrality would not suffice,
Nicholas argued to the Emperor, because in case the opponent did not
respect it and seized the territory as a base of operation, Germany and
Russia would be in a difficult situation. But the Emperor, who together
with his government was opposed to touching this important question, put
Nicholas off with a promise to consider the matter with Bülow.
The Emperor also urged the Czar at this interview to grant to the
Russian people a habeas corpus act which would guarantee their civil
liberties, and to call a general council of state to consider the
question of a constitution.]
[Footnote 874: _G.P._, XIX, 459.]
[Footnote 875: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, p.
374.]
[Footnote 876: Bülow to F. O., July 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 453 f., No.
6217; Holstein to Bülow, July 25, 1905, _ibid._, 457 f., No. 6219.]
[Footnote 877: Bülow to F. O., July 27, Aug. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 470 f.,
Nos. 6224 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 878: Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 467 f., No. 6222;
476 f., No. 6228.]
[Footnote 879: The German government was particularly concerned lest
Roosevelt become mistrustful on account of this interview and the
conclusion of an alliance with Russia. It even considered imparting the
terms of the treaty to him, but in view of the need for secrecy decided
not to. Instead, on July 28, the Emperor wrote personally to Roosevelt
making it appear that the interview dealt only with matters pertaining
to the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace (Mühlberg to Bussche-
Haddenhausen, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 614, No. 6319). On this discussion
about whether to notify Roosevelt of the accord see _ibid._, Nos. 6203,
6206-8, 6221, 6223.]
[Footnote 880: He meant the one Germany feared of Russia, France, Great
Britain, and Japan.]
[Footnote 881: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 468 ff., No.
6223; memo. by Holstein, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 474 ff., No. 6227.]
[Footnote 882: Bülow to F. O., July 28, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 476 f.,
No. 6228; 482 f., No. 6231.]
[Footnote 883: Bülow to F. O., July 30, Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 477
ff., No. 6229; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 884: Bülow to William II, July 30, 1905, _ibid._, 477 ff., No.
6229; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., No. 6232.]
[Footnote 885: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 2, 5, 9, 1905, _ibid._, 481 ff.,
Nos. 6230 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 886: Bülow to William II, July 24, 27, 1905, _ibid._, 452, No.
6216; 471 ff., No. 6226; Bülow to F. O., July 27-29, 1905, _ibid._, 471,
No. 6225; 476 ff., Nos. 6228 f.]
[Footnote 887: It is highly probable that Bülow took this step not so
much because of defects in the treaty, but rather because the Emperor
had disregarded his authority by making those important changes without
consulting him. Under the persuasion of Richthofen he took this course
in order to uphold his authority and to teach the Emperor a lesson
(Eckardstein, III, 166; editor’s note in _G.P._, XIX, 481 f., note).]
[Footnote 888: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No.
6231; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 889: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 496 ff., No.
6237.]
[Footnote 890: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No.
6231; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.]
[Footnote 891: Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 6, 14, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f.,
No. 6232; 487 f., No. 6234; 501, No. 6239; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10,
1905, _ibid._, 493 ff., No. 6236; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 12, 1905,
_ibid._, 498 ff., No. 6238; memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 502
f., No. 6240.]
[Footnote 892: Meyer to Roosevelt, Aug. 1, 1905, quoted in Howe, _George
von Lengerke Meyer_, p. 188.]
[Footnote 893: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p.
195.]
[Footnote 894: Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 495, No.
6236.]
[Footnote 895: Memo. by Spring Rice for a letter to Roosevelt, July 10,
1905, Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Aug. 10, 1905, quoted in Gwynn,
_The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 476, 484.]
[Footnote 896: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No.
6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869;
Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 651 ff., No. 6870. The
Emperor did not fear an attack at the time, but certainly at some later
date. He thought that the maneuvers were meant to remind Denmark that
she was an outpost for Great Britain just as Portugal was and that she
must not be too familiar with Germany. And with an English princess
married into the Swedish royal family and King Edward’s son-in-law
seeking the Norwegian throne, he feared that Norway would also become a
British satellite (William II to Bülow, July 30, 1905, quoted in a
dispatch from Bülow to F. O., July 30, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 477 ff., No.
6229). Even so sane a person as General Moltke, who in the next year
became chief of staff, confided to his diary on July 30, 1905: “The
visit of the Channel Fleet in the Baltic announced by England is to be
regarded as a demonstration. . . . . The English are inciting in the
most unbelievable fashion, they are telling the most despicable lies
about us, and are representing Germany as the evil spirit in the whole
world. . . . . The future lies dark before us. May Germany have the
strength to bear difficult times” (Moltke, p. 331).]
[Footnote 897: 4 Hansard, Vol. CLI, cols. 113, 122, 136 ff., 143.]
[Footnote 898: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No.
6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869.
As a matter of fact, the maneuvers had been planned for some time, and
to begin with had no political significance. No direct connection
existed between their inception and the meeting at Björkö, but it is
very probable that the British government was not at all averse to their
occurring at the time (cf. Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 200). Wilson
was in command of the British fleet (see also _G.P._, XIX, 478, editor’s
note).]
[Footnote 899: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 109, 113; Bradford, p. 205.]
[Footnote 900: The German government learned of this fact in August but
not of its approval by the British government. See Metternich to Bülow,
Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 658, No. 6870; Lee, II, 348, 353. On the
quarrels of King Edward and his German nephew see Lee, II, 346 ff.;
_G.P._, 648 ff., Nos. 6868, 6870; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 330.]
[Footnote 901: William II to Nicholas II, Aug. 22, 1905, Goetz, p. 377;
Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 95 f., No. 91 and
editor’s note; Newton, pp. 337 f.]
[Footnote 902: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 477.]
[Footnote 903: _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 65 f.]
[Footnote 904: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, Oct. 15, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 477, 491; Radolin to Bülow, July
25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198; M. Bompard states that Witte
used the word “alli” (Bompard, “Le traité de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue de
Paris_, XXV [May 15, 1918], 438).]
[Footnote 905: Bompard, XXV, 432; Witte, p. 415; _Quest. dipl. et col._,
XX, 174 f.]
[Footnote 906: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 477.]
[Footnote 907: Bompard, XXV, 432 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines
et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 313.]
[Footnote 908: Bompard, XXV, 424 f. Just when Bompard learned this fact
is not evident, but apparently he did so soon after the interview. Cf.
Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 127, No. 168.]
[Footnote 909: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, pp. 477 f.]
[Footnote 910: There are various statements about the date upon which
Lamsdorff learned of the treaty. See Iswolsky, _Recollections of a
Foreign Minister_, pp. 49 f.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII
(1922), 798; A. Nekludow, “Autour de l’entrevue de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue des
deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, p. 139; Nekludow was a secretary in the
Russian embassy in Paris in 1905 (Witte, p. 426; Savinsky, p. 114). The
correct date is given in a dispatch from Lamsdorff to Nelidow on Oct. 9,
where the Foreign Minister stated that he was first told of the treaty
by the Czar just before the latter’s departure for Finland on Aug. 30
(or Sept. 12, according to the new calendar). See _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 487. The Czar excused his delay to Lamsdorff on the
grounds that he had promised William II to preserve secrecy. See
_ibid._, p. 487; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.;
cf. Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.]
[Footnote 911: There is no substantiation in _G.P._ for the assertion by
Savinsky that the Czar told Lamsdorff that William II had asked him then
to make known the accord to the French government (Savinsky, _Revue des
deux mondes_, XII [1922], 799; Savinsky, p. 115).]
[Footnote 912: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 799;
Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct.
9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 486 ff.]
[Footnote 913: This was certainly the case. Even apart from the fact
that the military clauses of the Dual Alliance provided for a war
against Germany, the political clauses as revised in 1899 stated the aim
of the alliance to be “the maintenance of the general peace and of the
European balance of power” (Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria-
Hungary_, II, 206 ff.).]
[Footnote 914: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp. 137
f.; Savinsky, _ibid._, XII (1922), 799 ff.; Witte, p. 425; Savinsky, pp.
115 ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9, Sept. 28, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 480 f., 486 ff.; Nelidow to
Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 1905, _ibid._, p. 483.]
[Footnote 915: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 800 ff.;
Savinsky, pp. 118 ff., 126 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 6 and 9, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 485 ff.; Witte, pp. 415 ff.;
Iswolsky, pp. 44, 49.]
[Footnote 916: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Sept. 14, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 478.]
[Footnote 917: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 479
f.]
[Footnote 918: Hardinge to Lansdowne, July 25, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 93 f.,
No. 89; Spring Rice to G. Balfour, July 29, 1905, and Spring Rice to
Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 481 f., 496.]
[Footnote 919: Radolin to Bülow, July 22, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff.,
No. 6198. On July 26 the German government was about to inaugurate a
press campaign against Witte, thinking that he was pro-British (Bülow to
F. O., July 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 468, No. 6222).]
[Footnote 920: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 205,
No. 195.]
[Footnote 921: Witte, pp. 293 f., 416 f.; Dillon, _The Eclipse of
Russia_, pp. 350 f.; Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503
f., No. 6241; Witte’s interview in _Le Temps_, reprinted in _Quest.
dipl. et col._, XX, 439; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 15, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 491; Lee, II, 307 f.]
[Footnote 922: William II to Bülow, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505,
No. 6242.]
[Footnote 923: At the Emperor’s request Bülow said nothing to him about
the Björkö treaty. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 505
ff., No. 6243.]
[Footnote 924: On the meeting at Rominten see the following: Witte, pp.
416 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 50 ff.; Dillon, pp. 396 f.; Goetz, pp. 379 ff.;
Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 507 f., Nos. 6244 f.;
William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246.]
[Footnote 925: William II to Nicholas II, Sept. 26, 1905, Goetz, pp. 379
ff.]
[Footnote 926: Bülow instructed the Emperor to that effect. See Bülow to
William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 506, No. 6243. See the dispatch
from the Emperor to Bülow on Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No.
6246.]
[Footnote 927: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
202 f., No. 193; 205 f., No. 195.]
[Footnote 928: Bompard, XXV, 441 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, pp. 318 f.]
[Footnote 929: In his memoirs Witte represented himself the dupe of the
two rulers; when he read the document itself, he wrote, he was
horrified. He claimed that he was largely responsible for the annulment
of the treaty (Witte, pp. 425 ff.; Dillon, pp. 358 ff., 354, 413 f.; cf.
Savinsky, p. 125). These accounts by him were both of a much later date,
when he had been out of favor for several years and held a deep grudge
against his master. Consequently he wanted to paint the latter’s perfidy
toward France as black as possible. That Witte thought the treaty so
harmful at the time is difficult to believe. See his letter to
Eulenburg, Oct. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 519 f., No. 6250, Anlage; Witte,
p. 424; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 202 f.,
No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905,
Gwynn, I, 496 f.]
[Footnote 930: See the following: Witte, pp. 427 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 54
ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 801; Dillon, pp. 361
ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9 and 27, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, pp. 487, 495; Bompard, XXV, 422 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 120 ff.]
[Footnote 931: Lamsdorff met with a similar response from Bompard.
According to the latter, Lamsdorff suggested a combination of Russia,
France, Germany, and the United States as a counterpoise to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, “in the same manner that the political equilibrium of
Europe was maintained by the Dual and Triple Alliances.” See Hardinge to
Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 211 f., No. 198; Spring Rice to
Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5 and 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 497, 501 f.]
[Footnote 932: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 15, 18, 1905,
_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 481 f., 489 f.]
[Footnote 933: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 7, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 512
f., No. 6247.]
[Footnote 934: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 514,
No. 6248; William II to Bülow, Oct. 12 and 17, 1905, _ibid._, 515 ff.,
Nos. 6249 f. The reply to Witte was made by Eulenburg at the same time.
See Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 520 f., No. 6251;
Eulenburg to Witte, Oct., 1905, _ibid._, 521, No. 6252. Cf. Bompard,
XXV, 443 ff. Bülow approved of the line taken by his master, for he
earnestly desired to continue the negotiations (Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct.
18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 520, No. 6251).]
[Footnote 935: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 12, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_,
Nov., 1924, p. 488.]
[Footnote 936: The letter was delivered by Osten-Sacken, Russian
ambassador at Berlin, to give it full official character. See _G.P._,
XIX, 522 ff., No. 6254 and Anlage. The Czar approved this reply as early
as Nov. 10. Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, undated though bearing the date
of approval by Nicholas II of Nov. 10. See _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov.,
1924, pp. 495 f.; Iswolsky, pp. 55 f.; Bompard, XXV, 443 ff.; Witte, p.
429; Savinsky, pp. 123 f.]
[Footnote 937: William II to Bülow, Nov. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 524 f.,
No. 6255. The Emperor thought that Russia had shown little appreciation
of German friendship during the recent war, and he declared to Bülow
that the coalition of Russia, France, and Great Britain was _de facto_
already existent. In the same letter he stated that Germany alone, since
Russia refused her aid, must win France to the new project. For the
reply to the Czar see William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26 and 28, 1905,
_ibid._, 526 f., Nos. 6256 f. That the German government continued to
hold the alliance as valid is seen from a memorandum composed by the
foreign office for the Emperor just before the latter’s meeting with the
Czar at Swinemünde, July, 1907 (_ibid._, p. 528 n.).]
[Footnote 938: _Ibid._, 527 f., No. 6528. See also Bompard, XXV, 447;
Witte, p. 429; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 313.]
[Footnote 939: Both letters are quoted in _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.]
[Footnote 940: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp.
142, 144. See also the correspondence between the two rulers, Jan. 21
and 29, 1906, _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.; Goetz, p. 386.]
[Footnote 941: Iswolsky, p. 56.]
[Footnote 942: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1, 4, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; 211 f., No. 198; Lansdowne to Bertie,
Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 203.]
[Footnote 943: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 198 f.,
No. 191.]
[Footnote 944: _Ibid._, chap. xxiv.]
[Footnote 945: Cf. Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 177, No.
172_a_; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 498.]
[Footnote 946: Hardinge to Knollys, May, 1905, Lee, II, 306; Hardinge to
Lansdowne, May 30, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 195 f., No. 189.]
[Footnote 947: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 178 f.,
No. 172 (_b_); Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 4, 1905, Newton, pp. 327 f.]
[Footnote 948: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 2, 9, 26, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
170 f., No. 159; 178 f., No. 172 (_b_); 199 ff., No. 192 and following
documents.]
[Footnote 949: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 3 and 5, 1905, _ibid._, 204
f., No. 194; 207 f., No. 196; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 15,
1905, Gwynn, I, 501.]
[Footnote 950: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 8, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV,
205 ff., No. 195; 208 ff., Nos. 197 f.; Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 17 and
25, 1905, _ibid._, 212 f., No. 199; 217 f., No. 203.]
[Footnote 951: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 211
f., No. 198, Lansdowne’s minute; _ibid._, pp. 521 f.; report from
London, Oct. 30, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, No. 22; report from St.
Petersburg, Nov. 8, 1905, _ibid._, No. 23; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 22,
1905, _G.P._, XIX, 663 ff., No. 6360; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15,
1905, _ibid._, XXV, No. 8501; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905,
_ibid._, XIX, 665, No. 6361; Schoen to Bülow, Jan. 28, 1906, _ibid._,
XXV, 5 f., No. 8502; Miquel to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 666
ff., No. 6362; Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, 523,
No. 6254. On Oct. 21, 1905, King Edward instructed Hardinge to express
to the Czar “my earnest desire that the best and most durable relations
should be established between the two countries, and that all important
points should be discussed in the most amicable spirit and arranged as
soon as possible” (Edward VII to Hardinge, quoted in Lee, II, 310). On
Oct. 12 Lord Sydenham received a letter from Balfour stating that “the
time is propitious for an understanding with Russia.” Lord Sydenham, a
member of the Defence Committee, wrote a draft of an agreement with
Russia and sent it to the Premier, Oct. 20. On Nov. 1 he discussed
Persian railways with Balfour and Sir Charles Hardinge, and, after
Balfour had left, he (Sydenham) and Hardinge talked over the draft
agreement. Hardinge believed that the Russians would accept it (Colonel
Lord Sydenham, _My Working Life_ [London, 1927], p. 182).]
[Footnote 952: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 21, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 214,
No. 201; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f., No.
6253.]
[Footnote 953: Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Gwynn, II, 8; G.
Balfour to Spring Rice, Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, I, 503.]
[Footnote 954: Eckardstein, I, 218 f.]
[Footnote 955: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 216,
No. 202.]
[Footnote 956: Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f.,
No. 6253; Howe, p. 209.]
[Footnote 957: Report from London, Oct. 23, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_,
II, 80 f.; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 636 ff., No.
6340. Party leaders, magazines, newspapers, and various societies in
England took up the work. The _Times_, however, continued its anti-
German campaign. In December, Colonel Repington published an article
therein, warning the public against friendliness with Germany
(Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington, _Vestigia_ [London,
1919], pp. 262 f.). See also E. T. Raymond, _The Life of Lord Rosebery_
(New York, 1923), p. 211; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II,
208; Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 198 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 18 and
22, Nov. 2, Dec. 3 and 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 669 ff., Nos. 6879 ff.;
Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 191 f.]
[Footnote 958: See Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 690,
No. 6886.]