DIED OF DYSENTERY

Captain Don Aregita Martin de Avila

Adjutant Oliba

Adjutant Calderon

Alférez Concha

Alférez Alonzo Gonzalez

I shall not name others, as they are not so well known, and it will be

known later. Up to date about two hundred Bisayan Indians have died,

most of them from diseases. Don Pedro Cotoan died while en route from

Jolo to Samboanga, in order to take back the Bisayans, who are a most

cowardly race. Those who have done deeds of valor are the Karagas,

and the Sulus tremble at sight of them. Don Pedro Almonte remains as

governor and lieutenant for the captain-general at Samboangan, with one

hundred and fifty Spaniards, as has been reported. Captain Jines Ros is

to stay as castellan in Jolo with one hundred and eighty men--Captain

Sarria being fortified in the stronghold with eighty men, and Jines

Ros on the beach in a stone tower that is already eight stones high,

with one hundred men. Captain Marquez is going to Buaren with fifty

Spaniards, although no succor had been sent to Don Sebastian from

Manila. All that has been supplied to excess is truly wonderful,

for the winds have brought (and it is incredible) many champanes,

with more than twenty thousand baskets of rice, innumerable fowls,

and pork, veal, beef, and cheeses from Cebu, which have made a very

excellent provision.

They ask for Father Martinez [and] Alexandro at Jolo [and] Father

Carrion at Buiaon, but without an associate. I say that, following

even to the end of the world, I do not know to what to compare these

Moros of Samboangan. They have paid all their tributes. This is a brief

relation. I pray your Reverence to pardon me and commend me to God,

for indeed what I desire is necessary.

Samboangan, April 23, 1638. [263]

APPENDIX VII

OBANDO'S REPORT ON THE PREPARATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN TO RETURN ALIMUD

DIN TO SULU, JULY 15, 1751 [264]

Sire: Your Majesty will find in the enclosed report the resolutions

adopted by the Committees of the War and Treasury Departments for

the purpose of reinstating the king of Sulu, Fernando the First,

whom I found in this capital, baptized and protected by Royal briefs

insuring him the continuation of the same Royal goodwill as long as

he remained a Christian and a friend of the nation, which seems to be

his intention hitherto, with the help of 3 galleys, 3 barges, 1 galiot,

2 large champanes and other craft for war and transportation, under the

orders of the Master-of-camp of your Majesty's infantry here, to whom

I have given the instructions and orders contained in said report,

to the effect that he should make port at Zamboanga, and from there

try to subdue the rebel vassals, blockade the island of Sulu by sea,

cut it off from all communication with its neighbors, prevent food from

being introduced, prevent and punish all depredations, acts of piracy

and insults on the part of that barbarous nation against the town and

vassals of your Majesty of which I receive pitiful complaints every

day, and see that the captives are returned and that due observance

is given the treaties of peace and other agreements which were made

by my predecessor but have not proved to be as satisfactory as might

have been hoped, on account of the inconstancy which characterizes

that nation.

Before undertaking such an important operation, I decided to order

the construction of three average sized galleys, and other small

vessels, of which there were none in these Islands; and to arm them

I ordered to be cast 100 perrier cannon of calibre 2, with three

chambers each, ordering the transfer to the province of Iloilo of

General Francisco Domingo Oscoti, as Lieutenant-Intendant-General,

with instructions to prepare provisions at the smallest cost for the

Treasury, and directing him to issue a proclamation (as he did) calling

for volunteers, who would be rewarded according to their merits on the

ships plying between Manila and Acapulco, and authorizing the natives

to arm boats at their expense, exempting them of all taxes during

the expedition. As I was in possession of a rescript of your Majesty

addressed to his Field Marshal my predecessor Gaspar de la Torre,

ordering him to reconnoiter the island of Balabak, and Ipolote Bay,

and other places of Palawan Island for the purpose of building a fort

for the protection of the inhabitants against the people of Sulu,

Tiron and Borneo, and to build six galleys with which to fight the

Moros, with a report on the same object presented by the Province

of Saint Nicholas of these Islands, [265] both of which have been

communicated to said Committees of the War and Treasury Departments

and to persons who had knowledge by experience of the said province

and regions; also, in view of the poor condition of the Royal treasury

which precluded the possibility of greater expenses it was decided,

in accordance with the opinion of your Majesty's Fiscal [Attorney

General] in regard to the above mentioned instruments, to incorporate

them to said report (or record), [266] as they are of the same nature,

to take, when there was a better opportunity, the proper measures for

reconnoitering the most favorable position for the intended fort,

and to await the result of the expedition for the reinstatement

of the king of Sulu, so as to request him, if the result should be

favorable, to withdraw his vassals from the fort of Ipolote, and,

if not, to secure the safety of the people of the said island by

driving them out; and having already ordered, as I have said, the

construction of the galleys, which were necessary and made more so

by your Royal order, to continue the work until the six were built,

said work being carried on with the utmost care and economy, which

I always bear in mind in my zeal for the service of your Majesty.

I will send your Majesty full reports on the progress of these

different undertakings, so that your Royal orders may let me know

your Royal pleasure, which will always meet with my humble obedience.

God give the Royal and Catholic Person of your Majesty the many years

of life which are required by Christendom for the happiness of your

vast dominions.

Manila, July 15, 1751.

APPENDIX VIII

OBANDO'S REPORT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE ATTEMPT TO RETURN

ALIMUD DIN TO SULU, JUNE 18, 1752 [267]

Sire: In a letter addressed to your Majesty last year, 1751,

I forwarded a report and vouchers to the effect that I had sent,

with the King of Sulu, Fernando the First, to the fortified station

of Zamboanga, a fleet of 3 galleys, two feluccas, two galiots and two

large champanes, with other craft, under the Master-of-camp [268] of

the Royal troops here, for the purpose of restoring said king to his

throne and forcing his rebel vassals to submit, by means of a blockade

of the island of Sulu, which would cut it off from all communication

with its neighbors and prevent the importation of food to the island,

other provisions being made for the purpose of protecting the Christian

communities against any further harm on the part of the Sulu people

and the Tirons. [269] I have the honor to report now that the said

Master-of-camp arrived at Zamboanga with most of the fleet, ahead of

the Sultan of Sulu, who had been delayed by various accidents, and

sailed at once, in order to avoid the monsoon, for the Bay of Jolo,

where he anchored on the 26th of June of that year, at about one mile

from the forts. He formed a line of battle, and, noticing two Chinese

champanes without flags, that were stationed near the river mouth and

were stretching two lines to go up stream, he ordered two long-boats

to go and remove them from under the artillery of the enemy; the Jolo

forts, four in number, displayed red banners and opened fire with

cannon of calibre 8 to 18 on the boats towing the champanes; our fleet

answered, and the fire was kept up some time on both sides, until the

enemy hoisted the white flag in order to gain time for reënforcing his

trenches; the Master-of-camp sent a letter to Prince Asin, informing

him that his only purpose was to restore the legitimate king of Sulu

to his dominions, and to have the captives delivered; the prince

answered that he had no captives to deliver; that he was waiting for

the return of the king, who would do as he wished with them, that he

was begging the Prophet to send back the king * * *. Finding such an

answer vain and impertinent, our ships opened fire again; a suburb

was stormed and burned, and our men found out that the negotiations

were a pretext to gain time to place artillery behind the palisades;

the Moros accomplished this purpose and again requested a truce in

order to hold a meeting of their leaders and to deliberate as to

what should be done. This was granted, and in a second letter signed

by the Datus Prince Asin insisted that the Master-of-camp should

retire to Zamboanga, promising to bring over the captives; as the

south-west monsoon was blowing hard and he was short of provisions,

the latter decided to go back to Zamboanga; the Datus informed their

king Fernando in a letter addressed to him at Zamboanga of what had

been agreed; Prince Asin also stated verbally that he would bring to

Zamboanga some captives whom he was going to seek in the woods, and

asked the Master to leave the port, while he went after the wives and

children of the followers of King Fernando, who had been frightened and

scattered by the artillery. After a few more answers and objections

which showed an utter lack of sincerity, the Master-of-camp sailed

back to Zamboanga. The King of Sulu had arrived there on June 22,

and as soon as he heard about the truce requested by his brother

Asin, and other affairs of the fleet, he declared that the prince

was his enemy. This statement was believed at the time, but soon

afterwards good-sized boats began to arrive one after the other

with many of his principal people on the pretext of Prince Asin's

visit to the King, until there were 180 persons, including 32 women

between concubines and servants. When the Master-of-camp, Governor

of Zamboanga, remarked that all these boats were full of firearms,

powder, ball, coats of mail, helmets, and other warlike equipment,

that the King of Sulu had secretly sent to his brother Asin, at

Basilan, golden buckles and epaulets, and embroidered stockings to

make a brilliant appearance at landing in Zamboanga, while he feigned

to be his enemy; that Prince Asin had failed to keep his word, since

he said that he had been unable to get hold of the captives he was to

bring to Zamboanga, when it was known that he was keeping the said

captives in a secret place, six of them, including a woman, having

escaped by swimming over to the fleet when the latter was at Jolo,

and reported that the Moros had many captives concealed in the woods;

that Prince Asin had written to the King that all the captives seized

during the latter's stay in Manila were still in their power, not

one having been sold while awaiting the royal commands; and finally,

that the King and his brother were secretly dismissing the concubines

only, telling them that the Master-of-camp was sending them away with

contumely; he inferred that the King was preparing to surprise the

fort. This surmise was strengthened by the face that armed men were

steadily coming in each day, despite the Master-of-camp's friendly

admonition to the King that his followers enter the fort unarmed. The

lying and disingenuousness of the King, which all these indications

were making plainer every moment, were finally betrayed by a letter,

written in Arabic characters, to the King of Mindanao, in which he

stated that he had been compelled, by those in whose power he was,

to write the letter he had previously sent him from Manila,--whereas

he had enjoyed complete freedom in this capital, so complete, in

fact, that he did not perform, during the voyage hence to Zamboanga,

a single rite of the Christian religion, as far as known, while he

was seen to perform various Moro religious acts, and took with him

the Quran in his own language, instead of the numerous Catholic

books which had been given him for his instruction. In view of all

the foregoing evidence of bad faith, the Master-of-camp, Governor of

Zamboanga, and the captains of the fleet decided to arrest at the same

time the King, the datus and their men, to seize their boats, arms,

and concealed ammunition, and to keep the whole under careful guard,

the men being detained in decent quarters, pending the decision of

the Captain-General.

In reflecting on this important and critical change in the situation,

I bore in mind that the said King of Sulu had been a false friend

and a consummate Machiavellian, who had deceived your Majesty's

Governor Fernando Valdes Tamon with his feigned promises of peace,

which he never kept, and that, instead of releasing the captives and

preventing the cruel outrages of his vassals the Moros and Tirons,

he had used the considerable supply of arms, which he received

from the said Governor and Governor Gaspar de la Torre under the

pretence of suppressing supposed rebellions of his vassals, to keep

our forces busy in Sulu, so that his vassals the Tiron pirates might

ravage the provinces, while our forces were engaged in the Sulu

kingdom. He also deceived your Majesty's Governor and Bishop when

a fleet was sent against the Tirons; he went as an ally and a pilot

for the fleet among the shallows, and the small islands belonging to

the enemy, and prevented the destruction of the principal towns, by

misrepresenting to the commander of the expedition that said towns

belonged to peaceful people who were friends of his, and pledging

himself to have the prisoners returned, so that the fleet retired

after burning only nine villages without importance, thanks to the

cunning of the king. The trouble caused by all these Moros, thanks

to his influence, is really astounding, and has nearly drained the

Royal treasury, as, since the last peace agreement made by Governor

Tamon, 89,744 pesos have been spent from 1736 to 1740, and since then

the war expenses have far exceeded that amount. All these criminal

and astute antecedents fully justify my distrust in giving careful

instructions to the Master-of-camp to avoid a surprise of the fort

under the veil of feigned friendship; I really expected this new act

of treason on account of what I already knew about the said King of

Sulu, and was only held back by the fact that he had been baptized,

and the information about him which my predecessor had given me in

good faith. As it is, all the members of the Government were glad

that the treachery of the King had been foreseen and that he had been

arrested. * * *

In Zamboanga, after his arrest, 12 krises, each in six pieces,

were found hidden in two cushions belonging to him. * * * Urged

by the members of the ministry, I proceeded at once to explain to

the Real Acuerdo [270] and the council of war all the difficulty of

inflicting the condign punishment that was deserved, and, supported by

a majority of votes, I decided to declare war on all the Sulus, Tirons

and Kamukons, with the understanding that no capitulations or treaties

of peace would be considered, but that they would be treated as rebels,

in their persons, their property and their land, and put to the sword

in case of resistance; that all their towns would be destroyed and

burned; and that the mission of our fleet was not to make conquests,

but to punish the rebellion and to blockade the island of Sulu so as

to prevent any attempt to bring in food or any other help. I also

directed that the King of Sulu, who was under arrest at Zamboanga,

should be sent to Manila, there to be kept in confinement until the

pleasure of your Majesty be known. The Datus and other Moros were

declared to be slaves, and I ordered that they should be branded and

marked, not so much for the purpose of guaranteeing the ownership of

their masters or punishing their obstinacy, as for that of avoiding

all confusion between them and the numerous Indians of these Islands,

whom they resemble in color, bearing and language, of crushing their

pride, their daring and their evil spirit, experience having shown

that 8 Sulus suffice to subjugate a whole town, and principally

of preventing the clandestine introduction of the sect of Mohammed,

which would easily spread among the Indians, if the brand did not mark

them as enemies from Sulu, it being known that the sect of Mohammed

is daily extending its darkness over these regions. * * *

The declaration of war against the Moros was published in all the

provinces, which were instructed to be constantly ready for attack

or defense; to organize companies of militia, with their officers,

in all the pueblos, and have them frequently drilled and reviewed, so

as to become skilful in the use of their arms; to send a list of all

the arms and ammunition on hand to the Captain-General, who will thus

be able to supply them with all he may deem necessary. I furthermore

ordered that no boat should leave Manila or any other port without

being well provided with men and arms, and issued proclamations calling

for privateers, several of whom have already been given letters of

marque and have sailed with the hope of doing good service for your

Majesty; I issued new instructions on every subject, to be followed

in their respective parts according to circumstances; I reserved for

my future action the disposal of our prisoners at the best terms,

one fifth of the profits going to the Royal treasury; the right of

plundering was declared to be free for all, all privateers from the

Bisayas were exempted from tribute, and I promised them in the name

of your Majesty 6 pesos for each Moro, as an encouragement to pursue

and exterminate them. As soon as I heard the news from Zamboanga,

I sent there a supply boat with plenty of food, arms and soldiers,

in view of the next campaign; I took on myself the care of relieving

from time to time the officers and soldiers * * * and I can sincerely

assure your Majesty that I have been so provoked and exasperated

by the untamable fierceness and the bad faith of the Moros, that I

am decided to spare neither work nor efforts in order to punish them

thoroughly and to deliver from oppression the Christian communities, so

that the glorious name of your Majesty may be feared and respected all

through my Government, in compensation for the gross deceit practised

by said Moros upon my predecessors. I trust, with the help of God,

to punish them as they deserve, and will report to your Majesty the

progress of the expedition.

God keep the Catholic and Royal Person of your Majesty many years,

as Christendom and the Monarchy have need.

Manila, June 18, 1752.

APPENDIX IX

REPORT ON THE OCCUPATION OF PALAWAN AND BALABAK, APRIL 30, 1753 [271]

Sire: By letter forwarded to your Majesty through confidential channels

under date of * * * I reported that I had despatched an embassador to

the King of Bruney, informing him of the arrest of the King of Sulu for

his inveterate faithlessness, and pressing him to continue our long

standing friendship and to form a new alliance against the said king

as a usurper of part of his dominions, and against all his enemies,

and to cede to your Majesty the Island of Balabak and the territory

of Palawan, for the purpose of better waging war against the Sulus,

Tirons and Kamukons; and that, the desired end having been obtained,

I found it necessary to use the new rights acquired by the cession

referred to. Consequently, with the view of best promoting your

Majesty's interests, I resolved to put into execution the idea of

an armament composed of our galleys, a tender, three feluccas, and

two champanes, supplied with two Spanish companies of one hundred

men each, together with another company of Pampanga Indians, which,

with the crews, the convicts and the military officers, number nearly

a thousand persons, for the glorious object of taking possession of La

Pampanga in the ceded part of Balabak and the other adjacent islands,

forming this new district into a province called Trinidad, with a

separate government from that of the Kalamians; for I have appointed

a governor to take charge of nourishing this new plantation with the

political regulations and Royal ordinances which the prudent zeal of

your Majesty has provided for similar cases, and which, on my part,

have been furnished him in the form of brief and clear instructions

directed towards civilizing those barbarous natives, so as the better

to facilitate the spread of the holy Gospel.

With this in view I am sending two reverend Jesuit priests, persons

distinguished in politics and mathematical learning, and the military

engineer of this place, for the purpose of making an inspection of

the capital of Palawan, as well as of the Island of Balabak, and its

adjacent islands, and of examining their bays, ports, inlets, rivers,

anchorages and depths, in order to construct a fort--which will be

named after Our Lady of the Good End--in the most healthful location,

secure by land as well as by sea, for the garrisoning of which an

adequate force of artillery has been despatched. It will be kept

guarded for the present by a small galley, two feluccas, a company of

Spaniards, and another company of Pampanga Indians, besides the galley

slaves [272] and the suite of the governor, and officials--all rationed

for one year--who will number three hundred, the rest being returned to

this capital when possession is once established. And that the taking

of possession may be unopposed, useful, and lasting, I have planned for

the strengthening of the said fort, with the primary object of having

our troops sally from its walls to pacify the Sulu rebels who have

been dwelling in certain districts of Palawan, or to exterminate them

completely by fire and sword, preventing by means of the new fortress

and the little flying squadron, the Kamukons, Tirons, and others, from

laying waste the province of the Kalamians, and the adjacent islands;

for, there being access to the entire chain of places and all the

islands, facilitating attacks, and our vessels being on a constant

cruise through those regions, their expulsion will be secured. But

the greatest gain of all will lie in becoming acquainted with their

lands, rendezvous and places of refuge, in view of the fact that the

greatest defense which they have had up to the present time has been

our own ignorance and negligence in the premises, they scorning our

arms without fear, in the belief that they are unconquerable because

the places of their abode are unexplored; wherefore the King of Sulu,

pretending to serve us as a pilot among the Tiron Islands laughed at

our expedition under the command of your Majesty's Reverend Bishop of

Nueva Segovia, leading the Spaniards about with a halter wherever he

wished, and wherever he thought they would suffer most fatigue. In

view of all this, and of our present experience of the unbridled

audacity with which they ravage almost all the provinces, I felt

compelled to project this campaign of reconnaissance so as to test,

by the favorable results secured, the surest means of benefiting these

Christian communities, for I am in hopes of establishing, through this

new colony, an impregnable bulwark against the whole Moro power and

a source of reciprocal assistance to the fortress at Zamboanga. And

I likewise propose to introduce into those parts, by reason of their

proximity, commerce with Borneo, Siam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China,

so that, through intercourse, the inhabitants of Palawan may become

pacified and tractable and their towns become opulent; so that with

the families which in due time will be drafted from the outskirts

of this capital, a province of substantial usefulness may be formed,

having greater respect for both Majesties; for, by erecting churches

to God, a new gem will be added to the Royal crown, namely the glory

of giving many souls to the Lord, while the savings of the Royal

treasury will in time be appreciable.

Although I intended to make this journey personally, the noble city

[273] and the majority of the committee on war opposed this course,

and with the sanction of the Audiencia convened in executive session

I decided to delegate my authority for this act, in view of the

necessity of my remaining in the capital for the despatch of the

urgent and arduous affairs which frequently present themselves.

God guard the Royal Catholic Person of your Majesty the many years

that Christendom needs him.

Manila, April 30, 1753.

APPENDIX X

BRIEF REPORT ON THE EXPEDITION TO TAKE POSSESSION OF PALAWAN, JULY 17,

1753 [274]

Sire: When the galleon was on the point of sailing for New Spain,

the Palawan expedition returned to the port of Cavite, from where

the commander of the expedition informs me that he has made a careful

and exact survey of the Islands of Palawan and Balabak, beginning on

the outward coast, from 9 degrees to Labo. On all that coast he has

only found mangrove swamps and reefs, the inhabitants being hostile

to everyone and obeying no king; the land is miserably poor; there is

no drinking water from Balabak to Ipolote; the climate is so bad that

in two months and a half 116 men of the expedition died and 200 were

sick, and he finds that all that has been said about Palawan is false.

I have also been informed by the Alcalde Mayor of the Kalamians of the

arrival there of one galley, and three feluccas, which had left the

fleet since it sailed from Manila, as the Commander also now reports;

after the galley had been careened and food provided, one felucca

sailed on its course convoying the joanga [275] of the father prior

in charge of that district and two small vessels which had been sent

by the Alcalde of Komboy and had suffered the misfortune of being

captured by the Sulu Moros, most of the people, however, escaping,

as explained in the enclosed letter from the Alcalde.

The commander of the expedition has sent me from Cavite a report of

the councils of war held by him for the purpose of carrying out his

instructions, the most important of which was to take possession

of Palawan and adjacent islands in the name of your Majesty, said

islands having been ceded by the King of Bruney; accordingly, our

fleet took possession of the land with due solemnity, with the express

knowledge and consent of the inhabitants; I also received a log of

the whole route which seems to have been well kept, with maps and

a full explanation of the examination made of the said islands and

the operations in connection therewith. A new map of the islands is

being made, on account of the errors contained in the former one; as

the log and the report of the commander refer to the new map, which

is unfinished, and I cannot delay the departure of the galleon, I

cannot forward a full report to your Majesty; I wish to make a serious

and careful examination of all that has been done, so as to take

such action as may be the best for the benefit of the Royal service,

and to be able to send your Majesty a full report of the expedition,

with my opinion based on a complete knowledge of the facts. This is

all the information I can give your Majesty for the present.

God keep the Catholic Royal Person, of your Majesty many years,

as Christendom has need.

Manila, July 17, 1753.

APPENDIX XI

LETTER OF THE KING OF SPAIN TO SULTAN ISRAEL, DECEMBER 2, 1774 [276]

To the Captain-General of the Philippine Islands.

Most illustrious Sir: In letters Nos. 322 and 325, your Excellency sets

forth the ideas of the English settled in the island of Balambangan,

who are displeased with the unhealthfulness of the country and petition

that the Sultan of Sulu allow them to settle within his dominions.

With No. 325, the letter of the Sultan was received, and the King, thus

informed of the attempts of the Englishmen, and also of the favorable

inclination of the Sulu Sultan to establish with our nation friendship

and alliance, commands me to direct you to listen to his proposals,

to accede to them whenever they are reasonable, and to grant him aid

and favor as far as possible, assuring him of Royal protection, and

delivering to him the enclosed communication in answer to his own, in

which his Catholic Majesty declares his entire satisfaction with his

reasonable conduct and promises to reciprocate his friendship as you

may understand through the copy of that letter which I enclose. God

preserve your Excellency many years.

Madrid, December 5, 1774.

Dr. Julian de Biriaga.

[Copy of the communication referred to in the foregoing letter.]

Most illustrious and excellent prince Mohammed Israel, Sultan

of Sulu. Most gratifying has been to me the announcement, which

you conveyed to me in your letter of January 20th, of your happy

accession to the sovereignty of Sulu, on account of which I offer

you many congratulations, wishing you happiness in all things.

The disposition which inclines you to seek my friendship and

assistance, as also the friendly relations which you maintain with

my Governor of the Philippines, which you desire to establish and

perpetuate by means of a mutual agreement, which may secure for the

future firm peace and a perpetual alliance between your states and

mine, increase my just gratification, especially as my Governor has

informed me of the sublime natural gifts which are united in your

person, with many and most expressive eulogies thereof.

In view of this, and of the constant fidelity which you promise in

your letter, I command my good vassal, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar, to

listen to your proposals, to accede to them whenever reasonable, and to

grant you all the favor and assistance which the forces and facilities

to be found there may allow assuring you of my Royal protection, which

I extend to you from now on, confiding in your reciprocal friendship,

and noble conduct, and desirous of opportunities of favoring you and

of proving the interest which I feel in your good fortunes and the

earnestness with which I pray God to preserve you many years.

Madrid, December 2, 1774.

I, the King.

APPENDIX XII

LETTER FROM THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES FORWARDING A COPY

OF THE TREATY OF PEACE, PROTECTION, AND COMMERCE WITH SULU, DECEMBER

25, 1836 [277]

Superior Government of the Philippines

Most Excellent Sir: After having reported to your Excellency in my

three former communications, the opinion which I have formed with

regard to the countries in the vicinity of our possessions in the

southern part of the Philippines, of the relations which we ought

to sustain with their governments and the policy we should follow

until we shall obtain the immense advantages which our position

offers us, I have the honor to deliver to your Excellency a copy of

the Capitulations of the Treaty of Peace, Protection, and Commerce,

which I have concluded through the captain of frigate, Don José María

Halcon, with the Sultan and Datus of Sulu.

The articles which need some explanation, are the 1st, 3rd and

4th. With reference to the 3rd and 4th, I mention them in my former

communication and indicate their intent; and with respect to the 1st,

I copy herewith what has been reported to me by the commissioner,

D. José María Halcon, which is as follows:

I must make clear an important point relating to the text of the

Capitulations, in the wording of which your Excellency has noted

perhaps some ambiguities and omissions in Article I, which while

intended to make the Datus and Sultan of Sulu acknowledge and

declare the extent of our rights, seems indefinite on certain

points which many irresponsible writers have asserted with

confidence.

While considering the protection granted the Sultan, I recognized

the inexpediency of making the same include the lands which he has

lately acquired in Borneo, and of determining definitely the line

of the boundary in Palawan, the title to which island, as also that

to Balabak and Balambangan, is very disputable, though at present,

the lands where we have not established our settlements of the

province of Kalamians are included de facto in his possessions.

Palawan was ceded to the Crown of Spain by the King of Bruney,

and Balabak is likewise ceded by an instrument brought back by

D. Antonio Fabean when he went there as Embassador under the

administration of the Marquis of Obando, which should be in the

archives of the Philippine Government; but since these cessions

were made on an occasion when the Sultan of Sulu found himself

in possession of the lands by virtue of a former cession made in

his favor by another King of Bruney, such documentary testimony

cannot serve as the basis of our arguments, especially since we

did not proceed to found any settlements.

This matter of the cession of Balabak occurred upon the occasion

of a visit to Manila, of Sultan Mohammed Alimud Din (Fernando I)

who, asserting his right to the island, executed and ratified upon

his part the gift, at least in word, through D. Manuel Fernandez

Toribio, afterward Governor of Zamboanga, and the Secretary of

the Government.

Our writers have misrepresented the subsequent conduct of the

said Sultan, and concealed very important facts, but at any rate,

the very concealment of the reasons for his fleeing from Manila

betokens the lack of liberty in all of the instruments he granted

during his stay in that place; moreover the facts in the case

justify his later actions, which gave occasion for casting a doubt

over the legitimacy of our title to the lands under consideration.

The true reason for the actions of Mohammed Alimud Din, beginning

with his flight from Manila, was the fact that he had purchased

the secret in a copy of the confidential letter which the First

Minister of the Monarchy, Marquis de la Ensenada, wrote to the

Captain-General of the Philippines on August 28, 1751, discussing

the states of Sulu; which document, when brought to his knowledge,

could not fail to ruin all of our political moves, and to dispose

him to take every defensive measure against our power, for Mohammed

Alimud Din was a man of no mean understanding.

This was the origin of the letters which, on September 17, 1763,

the said Sultan wrote from Sulu to the King of England and to

the English company, [278] ratifying in favor of the latter

the concession of the lands which form the strait of Balabak,

in which is comprised the southern part of Palawan from Point

Kanipaan to Point Bulilaruan, and this was the origin of their

settlements in Balabak and Balambangan which have been abandoned

since later events.

Such are the antecedents which induced me to draw up the said

article with such ambiguity that it may be construed to the

advantage of the Crown without giving occasion to embarrassing

objections.

My aim throughout, most illustrious Sir, has been to promote

the national welfare by carrying out the high designs of your

Excellency, who by promoting this enterprise has attempted to open

up one of the most abundant sources of wealth in the Philippines.

I also deliver to your Excellency a copy of the Capitulations, in

which, in consequence of Article 2nd, it has been agreed to determine

the duties to be paid by the Sulu vessels in Zamboanga and Manila,

and ours in Sulu. For the better understanding of these stipulations,

I have thought it expedient to inclose a copy of the explanation with

which the said commissioner forwarded them to me.

The present tariff rates have served as a basis for the duties

imposed upon the Sulu vessels, it being beyond my authority to

alter them. With reference to those which shall be paid by our

vessels in Joló, although they may appear to be excessive, it will

be sufficient to inform your Excellency that all of the ship-owners

who are accustomed to make voyages to Joló, have been satisfied with

the very favorable terms we have secured in the agreement, not only

because of the high valuation set on the articles in which payment

will be made, but because of the regulation and reduction to fixed

rules of the charges, that until now have been arbitrary and never

less than the stipulated rates. It is true that they have desired not

only a greater reduction but still more their complete abolition,

as is natural, but it was necessary to conciliate the two parties,

as the commissioner says.

Above all, one of the advantages of importance which our merchants

recognize in the relations now established, the benefits of which

they have begun already to experience, is that the Sultan and Datus

together guarantee the credits left in Sulu as a result of commercial

operations, which advantage they have not heretofore enjoyed,

but waited on the will and good faith of the debtor, who paid if he

pleased and when he pleased, or perhaps never, and there existed no

means of compelling him as there now is by recourse to the Government.

Likewise through the preference they are now accorded, our merchants

have gained greatly, as your Excellency will comprehend. In short,

there is not one of them who is not well satisfied with the results

of the negotiations, and all appreciate the skill and prudence with

which Halcon has conducted himself upon a mission all the more delicate

and difficult since he has had to treat with a Government whose lack

of enlightenment and poorness of organization equal the barbarism of

its people.

Finally, in the answer given by the Chamber of Commerce of which I

inclose a copy, your Excellency will perceive the appreciation which

the Capitulations have brought him, by having settled the duties to be

paid by our vessels in Sulu, as also by having established relations

with the Government of that island.

I trust that your Excellency will condescend to bring all this to

the notice of her Majesty that she may grant her Royal approval.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

Manila, December 25, 1836.

Most excellent Sir,

(Sgd.) Pedro Antonio Salazar.--Rubricated.

The most excellent the Secretary of State and of the Office of

"Gobernación" of the Kingdom.

APPENDIX XIII

ROYAL DIRECTIONS RELATIVE TO A GENERAL POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF

COMMERCE WITH SULU, AND THE ADVISABILITY OF MAKING ZAMBOANGA A FREE

PORT, JUNE 23, 1837 [279]

Ministry of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonial Administration

Most Excellent Sir: Your Excellency's predecessor, Don Pedro Antonio

Salazar, when he reported in detail, in letters of last December,

all that he had done in the treaty of friendship and commerce

entered into with the Sultan of Sulu, of the mercantile relations

which it behooves us to maintain with the Mohammedan possessions to

the south of the Philippines, of the opinion which he had formed

concerning the war of enslavement, and other matters upon which

your Excellency will receive due instructions under Royal order

of this date, forwarded separately and privately, in a very secret

manner, a communication dated the 17th of the same month, in which

he set forth the policy, which, according to his belief, should be

adopted toward the said Kingdom of Sulu in consequence of the said

treaty. Her Majesty the Queen Regent, having been informed of all

this, and having in mind the remark made in the said communication,

that the Spanish possessions in the southern region are frequently

oppressed by the alcaldes, on account of the present defective system

of administration, has decided to direct your Excellency to suppress,

with strong hand, these excesses of the alcaldes, that they may not

disturb the peace happily established with Sulu; exhorting them to

moderation and peaceableness, in order that the odium which the Moro

race feels toward us may vanish. Noting also among his remarks, his

conclusion that while the war of enslavement is undoubtedly an evil,

it produces nevertheless the advantage that those provinces are united

more closely to the Government because of their greater need of the

same against their enemies; and that by becoming used to a life of

freedom and license, those people become also inured to captivity,

from which they could sometimes escape but do not, many preferring to

turn to piracy, Her Majesty holds these views erroneous and harmful,

since no just and paternal government should promote misfortunes among

its subjects in order to make itself more necessary, and thus keep

them dependent; and because, though there may be some who are content

with slavery in Sulu because it affords them a life of unrestraint,

it can not be ignored that their families and the Government suffer

a great injury from their situation, nor that morality would be

greatly outraged, if, for these reasons, countenance were given to

slavery, which should be attacked and exterminated at all costs. The

idea is advanced in the same communication, that in the countries

of the southern part of the Philippines, the system of protection,

carried to the point of establishing trading houses, will be almost

equivalent to possession and control, when once commercial interests

are held to be the chief interests, and there is set forth a plan to

diminish or even cut off the trade [280] with Mindanao, in order to

confine the commerce to our channels. Her Majesty, on being informed

of this policy of a protectorate, approves of the same, but desires

that it be carried out frankly and faithfully with the Sultan of Sulu,

in order that he be convinced, through experience, that the Spaniards

are his loyal friends, our authorities keeping it in mind that the

conquest of those countries is not to the interest of the nation, but

rather the acquisition of isolated military and mercantile stations,

which may control indirectly without the disadvantages of great expense

and of arousing the hatred of the natives. This alliance or friendship

with the Sultan should be such, that in whatever war he may be engaged

with his rebellious subjects, he shall be aided in good faith, unless

his adversary should be of such strength as to insure his triumph,

for then the useless defense of the vanquished would subject us

to the contempt of the conqueror and we should lose the benefits

already acquired. In such cases we should remain neutral, under some

plausible pretext of impracticableness or other honorable reason. In

other wars, waged by the Sultan with other princes, we should attempt

to mediate, with the purpose that, by settling new discords, we may

obtain advantages from the two or more belligerents, as rewards for

the services rendered them; but in the event of having to oppose some

one of them, it should be that one who offers us the least advantages,

and has the best chances of triumph, because with our ally victorious,

the latter may in the treaty of peace execute articles favorable to our

commerce,--trying always, above all things, so to act that the victor

shall not become too strong nor the vanquished brought too low. With

regard to the policy which it is best to adopt as a general rule in

regard to commerce, your Excellency should remember that the best

system consists in the greatest possible liberty for our merchandise,

and in securing, directly or indirectly, for our own merchandise,

or foreign goods carried by the national vessels, the enjoyment of

greater privileges than those of any other country, in order that

they may be preferred and produce greater profits on the markets.

In the same letter he submits the opinion that the lack of

communication of the countries to the south with the Philippines, is a

most favorable political measure for Spanish commerce, and recommends

that our relations with the Government of Sulu should be strengthened

in order to include the same under our dependence at some future

time, it being necessary to act with cunning in order to separate

it completely from the piratical warfare. Her Majesty commands me

to state to you concerning these matters, that the communication

of Sulu with the Philippines being purely commercial, should not

be restricted, but on the contrary, should be increased in every

way possible, encouragement should be given to the establishment of

traders and Spanish trading houses in Sulu, where our good conduct and

benevolence toward the natives may bring us profit. But it is always

to be borne in mind that the Government of Her Majesty does not desire

the subjection of other states to itself, but a sincere friendship

and a close and useful alliance, and that a just and discreet policy,

not crafty nor artful, will accomplish most in withdrawing the Sultan

from the interests of the leaders of the pirates.

Your Excellency will note in the draft of the communication from

your predecessor, to which I make answer, the proposal of various

schemes for establishing ourselves securely in Sulu. Such would be

the establishment of a trading house there, already agreed upon in

the treaty, and posting there a garrison, under the pretext that it

is for the safety and greater state of the person of the Sultan. Her

Majesty deems indispensable the establishment of the trading house,

but it should be done in such a manner as not to cause distrust,

and fortified and protected from any sudden attack, using in this the

greatest prudence, and remembering that a garrison there, though it

might be acceptable to the Sultan, might wound the self-love of the

people of the country, and so render odious both the Sultan and his

protectors. The most essential thing for the Spaniards, in order to

become firmly established, is to make themselves popular, to respect

the customs of the people, even with veneration, not offending any

one for any reason, treating all with courtesy and decorum; not

showing themselves domineering nor covetous, not insulting any one,

but being very respectful to women, the old and children, not scoffing

at anything in their public amusements, nor religious affairs, nor

in their meetings. It seems to her Majesty that through these means

would be secured a consistent friendship between both countries,

and that the most adequate plan for the support and defense of the

trading house would be to maintain in the safest harbor a permanent

maritime force, in which should be stored all arms and munitions,

and sufficient soldiers, in case it should be necessary to defend

the building, without arousing the suspicions that would be caused

by placing these preparations, concealed or openly, in the house

itself; and since for this purpose, for the defense of the country

against the pirates, and for maintaining the respect of the people

and Government of the protectorate, it is indispensable to keep a

well organized sea force, her Majesty had determined that you decide

the manner of organizing this maritime force, without losing sight

of the great economy which it is necessary to observe on account of

the embarrassed condition of the Peninsula, which needs now more than

ever before the assistance of her colonial provinces.

Finally, the predecessor of your Excellency further stated that

he was attempting to extend his efforts to the establishing of the

protectorate over the countries subject to the Sultan of Mindanao:

her Majesty approves this policy on condition that in its execution the

purposes and measures, which are mentioned above for Sulu, be adopted.

Her Majesty, by whose Royal order I communicate to your Excellency

the foregoing, trusts in your zeal to realize the importance of this

matter, and, regarding the principles of justice and right which

direct the resolutions of her Majesty, to direct all your efforts

to the accomplishment of the results desired; carefully reporting

your progress in the affair, for the information of her Majesty and

further action. God preserve your Excellency many years.

Madrid, June 23, 1837.

Mendizabal.--Rubricated.

The Governor Captain-General of the Philippines.

Ministry of the Navy, Commerce, and Colonial Administration

Most Excellent Sir: The predecessor of your Excellency, convinced of

the important advantages to be derived by the Philippines, in making

more intimate and more secure our few and doubtful relations with

the island of Sulu, determined immediately upon assuming command,

to negotiate with the Sultan of the said place, a treaty of peace

and commerce which he considered, in every respect, not only useful

but indispensable to the prosperity of the country. After having

announced this project in various of his communications, he reported

in December of last year, having accomplished the same, and furnished

in several communications, an exact and detailed account of the

history of his labors in the affair, the reasons which he had for

undertaking the same, the benefits which he expects as results, and

the measures whose adoption he deems necessary in order that these

results may be more certain, and at the same time profitable. There

were received from him seven letters, all marked with the letter "A,"

numbered from 14 to 23, and dated from the 15th to the 29th of the

said month; with so many points of analogy and similarity between

them, that they should be considered as one only. The first, number

14, is intended to furnish information and data relative to Sulu,

and the other Mohammedan islands of the south (without which it would

be impossible to know their importance) and to detail the relations

which we should have with them, considering them both in relation to

commerce and with respect to the war of enslavement. In the second, of

a confidential nature, he outlines the policy, which, in his opinion,

should be adopted in order to obtain all the advantages which our

position affords. In the third, number 16, he states the measures

which should be adopted for the benefit of the national commerce

in those countries. In the fourth, number 20, he transmits a copy

of the treaty of peace, protection and commerce concluded with the

Sultan of Sulu, and of the stipulations made for the determination

of the duties which our vessels should pay in Sulu, and the Sulus

in Manila and Zamboanga. In the fifth, number 21, he relates the

motives which have led him to direct these matters as he has done,

transmitting to her Majesty all the plans referring to it, through this

Ministry only. In the sixth, number 22, he gives account of some of

the advantages which have been derived from our expedition to Sulu,

and amongst others, a treaty of peace concluded between the pueblo

of Malusu and the Governor of Zamboanga. And finally, in the seventh,

number 23, he sets forth the necessity of retaining at that station,

the frigate-captain, Don José María Halcon, who performed the duty

of commissioner for the negotiation of the treaty.

I have informed her Majesty, the Queen Regent, of the contents of

all these communications, and in this knowledge she has seen fit

to approve, in a general manner, all the measures adopted by the

aforementioned predecessor of your Excellency, giving suitable orders,

that the proper Ministry provide the special approval which some of

them deserve, on account of their weight and importance, concerning

which your Excellency will soon be informed, and deigning to command

me to submit in a separate and particular communication the following

advice on the special subject of the letters referred to above.

Her Majesty, feeling assured that conquests in themselves, and later

their maintenance, absorb the profits which accrue from the countries

already acquired, prefers to any conquest advantageous trade and

commerce. Convinced, therefore, that the most profitable and lucrative

policy is to conquer or secure such places as on account of their

fortunate location may prove to be at the same time strong military and

mercantile posts and so both promote and protect commerce, she cannot

but approve the ideas your Excellency's predecessor expresses in his

communication numbered 14, and desires, that upon adopting the system

in accordance with those ideas, you confine yourself solely, in all

enterprises of conquest, to occupation of territory either abandoned

or uninhabited, or to that which, notwithstanding its being settled,

would cost little and would not give occasion for a costly war. In

order to increase our commercial advantages in Sulu, and to raise up

rivals to the Portuguese, it would be well to grant protection and

reduction in duties to the Chinese junks [281] under the specific

condition that they do not sail under the flag of any other nation

(without mentioning the Portuguese by name in order not to occasion

the resentment of this power) and to secure in Sulu for those who

adopt the Spanish flag, a reduction of duties although not as much

as that which should be granted to Spanish vessels. Thus it is the

will of her Majesty that you be directed, commanding, with the same

purpose in view, that your predecessor state to you explicitly, which

are the measures that he would have adopted, had he been authorized

to do so, in order to avoid the blow to our commerce threatened by

the Portuguese, depriving us with the double expedition from Macao and

Singapore to Sulu, of the advantage over all other nations which still

remained to us in this traffic; and that your Excellency obstruct,

by all the means in your power, the association of interests between

the commercial houses of Manila with those of Macao and Singapore,

if the same were intended to secure special privileges in the island

of Sulu to the products of the Philippines to the injury of the

national commerce.

With respect to the matter of the war against piracy, referred to also

in letter number 14, her Majesty approves all the purposes expressed

therein by the predecessor of your Excellency, and commands me to

direct your Excellency that, without ever recurring to war or the

interruption of traffic with Sulu as means of destroying or diminishing

piracy and traffic in slaves, you exert yourself to suppress the same

and remedy the evil which it inflicts on the Philippines, by the

various means at hand, to-wit; 1st, through negotiations with the

Sultan of Sulu; in which measures suitable for the accomplishment

of the purpose may be concerted; 2d, securing the increase, by the

Sultan, of import duties on slaves who are Spanish subjects, and the

lowering of duties on slaves of other countries; 3d, requesting of him

assistance in driving out the pirates from their haunts of Balangingi

and other places; 4th, watching the rendezvous of these pirates in

the Bisayas also, in order to destroy them. In this manner and with

hard lessons, with the energetic and continuous warfare spoken of by

the predecessor of your Excellency, the extermination of piracy will

be accomplished without the evils which would follow upon an unwise

and useless war against Sulu, and without the more serious result to

which the same would expose us, and which her Majesty desires your

Excellency to avoid at any cost, the result referred to being the

removal of the Sultan to some other point, which removal England and

Holland might turn to great advantage against our trade.

As to the measures proposed in letter number 16, for the benefit

of the national commerce, her Majesty will determine which is fit,

notifying your Excellency in due season. Meanwhile you should keep

in mind, that as long as the Sulus man their ships with slaves,

your Excellency should prohibit them from trading in Zamboanga and

all other places within the dominions of her Majesty, whenever the

ships which they use shall be manned in whole or in part with slaves

who are subjects of Spain.

Concerning the treaty of peace, protection and commerce, a copy of

which is inclosed in letter number 20, her Majesty has been pleased to

resolve, after careful examination, that it be forwarded with favorable

comment to the Ministry of State for the approval of the Cortes and

the ratification of her Majesty, all of which will be communicated

to your Excellency in due time, its policy being carried out and

its intent carefully observed in the meanwhile, for the purpose of

determining whether there is anything to amend or correct by means

of further negotiation, which would be considered as an appendix to

the treaty. In view of the explanations concerning the first article

of the aforementioned treaty furnished by the commissioner of the

negotiation, her Majesty commands me to repeat to your Excellency

the necessity for carrying out the policy which is prescribed to

your Excellency with regard to acquisition and conquest; in order to

claim those lands referred to in the explanations, if perchance such

claim should be advisable for the purpose of acquiring some point of

military or mercantile value: or in order to set up the claim of the

Kingdom of Spain to those countries, in order that by giving it up,

we may secure other things which may be of real importance to us, such

as reduction in duties, some exclusive privilege, or the possession

of some isolated point of great importance.

The predecessor of your Excellency by addressing to this Ministry all

communications bearing on this matter, has merited the approbation

of her Majesty, because he has avoided many unnecessary steps and

useless delay, and thus your Excellency will continue to do, in the

manner herein indicated.

And finally, her Majesty having noted with satisfaction the favorable

results produced already by the expedition to Sulu, and approving

the idea of not using the fifteen hundred dollars sent by the Bishop

of Nueva Segovia for the redemption of slaves, she commands me to

direct your Excellency to cultivate the friendship of all the chiefs

who, like the Orankaya of Malusu, abandon the pursuit of piracy,

and that suitable orders be issued by the Division of the Marine

of this Ministry, not only that the captain of frigate, Don José

María Halcon, who has so well discharged the duty of negotiating the

treaty, be assigned to that station, but that he also be duly rewarded

for his services as such commissioner; her Majesty not failing to

express the gratitude with which she declares her appreciation to the

predecessor of your Excellency, the aforementioned Don Pedro Antonio

Salazar. All of which is communicated to your Excellency, by Royal

order, for your due information and guidance, instructing you with

regard to the confidential letter, that you carry out the directions

forwarded you separately under this date. God preserve your Excellency.

Madrid, June 23, 1837.

Mendizabal.--Rubricated.

The Governor Captain-General of the Philippines.

APPENDIX XIV

CAMBA'S REPORT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE TREATY OF 1836 AND

ITS BASES, NOVEMBER 16, 1837 [282]

Superior Government of the Philippines

Excellent Sir: In compliance with the provision of the Royal order of

the 24th of April last, requesting, for the information of her Majesty

the record of the correspondence exchanged in regard to the treaty

of commerce made by my predecessor with the Sultan of Sulu, and the

bases of said treaty, I forward the same to your Excellency, with a

few personal observations suggested by a reading of the said papers.

On the 31st of January, 1835, the Tribunal of Commerce forwarded to the

Captain-General, approved by it, a report presented by several business

men who traded with Sulu, setting forth the deceitful methods of the

Datus, or principal people of the island, in their agreements and

contracts, and requesting, in order to restrain and intimidate them,

that the naval division of Zamboanga, or part of it, be stationed in

the port of Jolo during the time the national merchant vessels remain

there for the purpose of making their sales and purchases. A decree was

issued on the 9th of March of the same year, concurring in the opinion

of the Assessor, and declaring that the request could not be granted at

that time, but that it would be taken into consideration as soon as the

circumstances allowed. This is a brief of the document marked Number 1.

On the 9th of February, 1836, José Dugiols, who had sold goods on

credit to the amount of 8000 pesos to the Jolo people, and despaired

of getting paid, presented a new petition, similar to that which

had been sent 11 months before. The Chamber of Commerce approved it,

and requested that a fleet of launches be stationed at Jolo during

the business season, there to gather information which would allow

the Government to take proper action in the matter; it also insisted

that the commander of the fleet be a capable person, who, without

compromising the flag, would know how to conciliate the purpose of

the naval demonstration with the spirit of peace and concord which he

ought to maintain between the crews of our ships and the people of

Jolo. This suggestion, which had already been made in the petition

presented the year before, was favorably endorsed one after the

other by all who intervened in the papers in the case and resulted

in the final resolution of May 31st, which contains 14 articles. The

first provides that it shall be one of the duties of the commander

of the naval division of Zamboanga to protect the Spanish ships while

they are at Jolo, and instructions are given him to that effect. The

second appoints captain of frigate José María Halcon to take charge,

temporarily, of the command of the Division of Zamboanga, and establish

relations of friendship and commerce with the Sulu people. The third

directs him to inform the Sulu Sultan of his visit in the way he may

deem most likely to convince him of the peaceful intentions of this

Government. The fourth directs him to make himself recognized by the

officers and men of our ships, as the commanding authority who shall

maintain them in peace and good order. The fifth charges him not to

allow his men to land, so as to avoid disorder. The sixth directs him

to take action in regard to any excess, as provided by the Code. The

seventh, to hold in check the crews of our ships, so as to give the

Sulus neither reason nor pretence for showing their bad faith. The

ninth forbids the commander of the division and all those under his

orders to enter into any business speculation whatsoever. The tenth

directs the commander to be ever careful to keep all his men within

the bounds of duty. By the eleventh he is directed to see that all

contracts are religiously fulfilled, and, if necessary, to complain

energetically to the Sultan, and by the twelfth to see that our people

fulfil their own. Articles thirteen and fourteen direct the commander

to obtain information about the political and civil conditions of

Sulu and its topographic situation.

After acquainting himself with the foregoing, Captain José María

Halcon inquired what would be the minimum importation duty in Manila

for articles proceeding from Sulu, and asked for instructions in

regard to the importation of arms and ammunition into Sulu by our

ships. In answer to the first question, the Board of Tariffs fixed

at 2 per cent the duty on all articles imported from Sulu to Manila

in its own vessels, [283] except wax and cacao, which would have to

pay 14 per cent under a foreign flag and half that amount under the

national flag; in regard to the second the importation of arms and

ammunition into Sulu by our ships was prohibited.

A letter to the Sultan of Sulu was furthermore given the commander,

accrediting him and explaining his mission, the petition presented by

Dugiols and endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce, requesting that our

business relations with Sulu be granted a protection which experience

made each day more necessary, being thus complied with.

On April 15, 1836, Halcon forwarded the capitulations of peace and

the commercial agreements made by him in the name of this Government

with the Sultan of Sulu. The first consists of 6 articles, by which

the Spanish Government grants the Sultan its protection, which is

accepted by the latter, with a mutual assurance of coöperation between

them against any nation not European. Spanish boats are to be admitted

freely in Sulu, and Sulu boats in Zamboanga and Manila. It is agreed

that a Spanish factory shall be established in Jolo, so as to avoid

damages and delays to our commerce, the same right being given the

Sulus in Manila. Certain rules are established in order to distinguish

friendly from hostile boats. The Sultan is pledged to prevent piracy on

the part of those who recognize his authority; and it is furthermore

agreed that in case of any doubt as to the meaning of any article,

the literal Spanish text shall be followed. In accordance with the

opinion of the Government assessor, these capitulations were approved

by decree of January 20 of this year. The commercial agreements

contain 9 articles. The first establishes a duty of 2 1/2 per cent on

all products brought by the Sulus. The second excepts wax and cacao,

as recommended by the Board of Tariffs. The third provides a duty of

1 per cent for the importation in Zamboanga of products brought by

the Sulus. The fourth provides that the payment of the duties shall

be made in cash in silver. The fifth establishes the dues to be

paid by our boats at Sulu. The sixth fixes the value, in products,

of those dues. The seventh, in its first part, declares, that all

Sulu boats trading without a license shall be treated as smugglers,

under the law of the Kingdom; in its second part it also requires

our boats to show a bill of lading in accordance with the cargo,

on pain of a fine of P500, two thirds to go to the Sultan and one

third to our exchequer. The eighth provides that if the duties are

reduced in Manila and Zamboanga on the articles coming from Sulu, the

same shall be done in Sulu, and that if the Sultan reduces the dues on

foreign ships, he shall do the same for ours. The ninth provides that

in case of doubt the literal Spanish text shall be followed. After

hearing the opinions of the Boards of Commerce and Tariffs, and in

accordance with that of the assessor, the foregoing was approved by

decree of the 20th of January of this year, with a small reduction

of 1/2 per cent on the duties to be paid by the Sulus in Manila, and

an explanation of the proceeding to be followed for the appraisement

of their cargoes in Zamboanga and in Manila.

Shortly before this ratification by the Government, it was decreed on

the 13th of January, at the request of Commissioner Halcon, that in

order to avoid trouble between this Government and that of Sulu, the

captains and supercargoes of the Spanish ships should give no credit

to the Sulus, except with the authorization of the Sultan, under the

penalty of being barred from claiming his protection or that of the

Spanish Government for the collection of such credits; and that all

settlements of the pay of the crews of our ships should be so made

as to avoid the abuse of paying them in kind, instead of currency.

Such is the information which I have found, and am forwarding to your

Excellency in regard to the treaties mentioned. The leading idea in

said treaties is one of distrust towards the people of Sulu, on account

of their treacherous, cruel and perfidious nature. As this is the

only idea which prevails in all our relations with the island, as well

as in the Royal order of August 28, 1751, and the documents attached

thereto, without referring to older time, I can not be persuaded that

the policy of peace and alliance adopted with the Sultan of Sulu can

give our shipping and commerce any substantial and permanent advantage.

Several Royal decrees find fault with such treaties and even order them

to be revoked in case they have been made; and to justify departure

from these sovereign instructions, given with a true knowledge of the

facts, and in accordance with the opinion of the illustrious members of

the Cabinet, there must now be some powerful political reason which I

can not discover. If we take into consideration the very weak authority

of the Sultan over his subjects, and the scarcity of his means in the

midst of datus or chieftains who, with their families and slaves,

constitute distinct communities which are haughty, ambitious and

dangerous to him, we find that there is in Sulu no moral force on

which to rely for the execution of a treaty, even should there be

the best faith and good will on the part of the Sultan.

Furthermore, Sulu and the small adjacent islands produce nothing; even

the rice and fish which the people use for their food come from our

neighboring possessions: what business reasons are there therefore,

capable of calling our attention, or whose profits would pay the

expenses of a fleet placed in observation there? All the produce of

the islands consists of bêche-de-mer and shell which are gathered by

the slaves; [284] the clothing and foodstuffs are furnished them,

on credit, by our own ships; gold, wax and edible nests come from

Mindanao. Hence commerce is confined to a season outside of which

our ships never go near Sulu.

There is therefore little advantage to be derived by our commerce

from these treaties, and this is confirmed by the communication just

received by me from the commander of the Zamboanga division, which I

enclose as number 6. It betrays complete disappointment, and shows the

wisdom of the instructions given in the above mentioned Royal decrees.

The policy which we ought to follow with the Sulus is one of continual

and perspicacious caution, with well conditioned, well situated and

well commanded naval forces, ready to obtain at once satisfaction

for any offense to our flag; and I believe that this could be done

without much trouble, by using steamships, as the Dutch have done

in their settlements in the Moluccas, where they suffered from the

piracy of the Moros much as we do in the Philippines.

The foregoing information covers, I believe, all the points mentioned

in the Royal order of April 24th, last, and which are the object

of the present communication and of the documents which I enclose

therewith. May God keep your Excellency many years.

Manila, November 16, 1837.

Andrés G. Camba.

His Excellency the Secretary of State and of the Department of the

Navy, Commerce, and Colonies.

APPENDIX XV

CAMBA'S REPORT TO THE COLONIAL OFFICE DISCUSSING THE DIFFICULTIES OF

COMMERCE WITH SULU AND THE ADVISABILITY OF MAKING ZAMBOANGA A FREE

PORT, FEBRUARY 23, 1838 [285]

Superior Government of the Philippines.

Excellent Sir: I acknowledge to your Excellency the receipt of two

Royal orders dated the 23d of June of last year, which, with reference

to the treaties made with the Sultan of Sulu, have been transmitted

by your ministry; one replying to the seven communications marked "A"

which my predecessor made in connection with the same subject; the

other confidential, and indicating the policy and measures that should

be carried out with the said Sultan of Sulu and the Sultan of Mindanao.

In communication numbered 5, and dated November 16th last, in

compliance with one of the provisions of Royal order of last April,

I made a minute report accompanied by documentary evidence, of the

antecedents which I encountered relative to Sulu affairs, and at the

same time, could not but intimate in this connection how little I

expected as a result of our treaties, because experience had already

caused me to be suspicious, and also because the various Royal orders

toward the close of the past century confirmed me in this idea;

[286] and indeed the losses which all our commercial expeditions

experienced during the first year of these treaties, the vexations

they suffered and the risks to which the crews as well as the vessels

and their cargoes were exposed during their stay in Jolo, have fully

borne out this view.

Many are the measures and documents which we have here, in which

this same fact is laid down; many are the Royal decrees in which,

in recognition of this fact, the Governors of the Philippines have

even been authorized, by every means in their power and without

counting cost or difficulty, to punish severely the intrepidity of

those infidel barbarians.

In order to arouse and interest the Royal conscience on that point,

it was requisite that there should be repeatedly presented through

various channels and at distinct times substantiated accounts,

non-conflicting and extremely painful, of the various piracies,

cruelties, and vexations, with which those barbarians have kept the

Philippine Islands in the south in a state of fear and depression;

and needful also was it that there should have been employed, in

vain, on account of the religion and the policy of our ancestors,

those gentle measures of peace and union which no civilized people

could resist; but which are ineffectual with barbarous nations who

know no other right than that of force.

From the 14th of April, 1646, when we abandoned possession of Sulu,

which our arms had so gloriously conquered, making a treaty of peace

whereby the Sulus bound themselves to pay us annually, as tribute,

three boatloads of unhulled rice, until the day the Government

again entered into a treaty with them, neither have the Filipinos

succeeded in freeing themselves from their harassments, nor has

the Government reaped any fruit other than continual menace. The

English have had the same experience with the perfidy and bad faith

of those islanders. After having formed, in the island of Balambangan

by a concession made by the Sulus, a settlement destined to be the

emporium for the products of the East in connection with their China

trade, for which this island offers two good ports, they were two

years afterwards surprised by the Sulus themselves, who, knowing the

English had despatched their vessels, took advantage of their absence

by taking possession of the island and the fort constructed therein,

also a great deal of booty, which cost the English East India Company

a loss of more than three hundred thousand dollars. In narrating

this event, Mr. J. H. Moor, who published last year a brief review

of interesting events concerning the islands and lands bordering on

the China Sea, agrees with the views I have expressed, namely, that

these acts of treachery and cruelty on the part of the Sulus are the

offspring of their innate love of robbery and their natural perfidy.

All these facts then will convince your Excellency that the

expectations based by my acting predecessor upon the latest treaties

referred to are too sanguine. They would produce no illusions on

my part, in view of the experience of the past, neither does it

seem to me that their results, looked at with calmness and in the

light of the most exact data, could be of any great advantage to

our commerce. Allowing that the treaties should be religiously

complied with, never would they be of any value, in themselves,

to improve the brutal condition of those islanders. This condition

will always constitute, not only for the Spaniards but also for all

civilized nations, a great drawback to mercantile relations, which,

although founded on principles of utility and mutual advantage,

cannot continue nor be developed except under the most favorable

guaranties. How would our merchants, or the foreign merchants of Sulu

obtain them, where there is neither good faith nor justice, and where

cunning fraud makes even the Chinese dangerous traders? Commerce

is the movement and circulation of wealth. The latter results from

production, and production from the full and unrestricted utilization

of property. Moreover, when property is insecure, when the laws do

not protect it, when the agents of the Government are the first to

disregard it, the mercantile spirit is the first to become alarmed

and, when defrauded, to flee as far as possible from the place where

it does not find that safe haven it requires to expand and to pursue

with skill and perseverance the objects of its calling. Thus it is

that during the period elapsed since the year cited, 1646, up to the

present time, no Spanish merchant has himself had direct dealings with

the inhabitants of Sulu, the Chinese alone being engaged in this trade,

they being the only charterers of our vessels, so that we do not obtain

from said commerce more than interest on the capital invested, subject

to great exposure and risk, which has made and always will make,

this commerce uncertain and of little value. While lack of security

still sets a limit to the extent of our speculation in commerce with

Sulu, lack of advantageous reciprocity adds another factor no less

appreciable. At the time the Spaniards came to the Philippines, Sulu

seems to have been rich in her own natural and industrial products,

and richer still through the large commerce which their exchange

enabled her to carry on with the Chinese vessels which in large numbers

frequented her coasts. Situated almost midway between the Philippines

and the Moluccas, close to two rich islands so fertile and densely

populated as Mindanao and Borneo, it seemed destined by nature to be

the emporium of the commerce of the south. Converted to Islamism by

the Arab Sayed Ali, [287] who landed there from Mecca, how much ought

this principle of civilization in the midst of barbarous nations

have tended to their advancement! But times have changed greatly

since then, and brought their always accompanying vicissitudes. As

Spanish dominion was extended in the Philippines and the Portuguese

penetrated into the Moluccas, they began attracting to their capitals

the wealth and traffic that was accumulating in Sulu, and here begins

a new era. War and desolation, which for a period of eighty years we

inflicted on them, followed, and put in our power this island and its

dependencies, and though independence was later restored, it could not

divert this rich commerce from the trend it had taken. Meanwhile, their

wars and internal dissensions resulted in corrupting their customs,

and there only remained for them the habit of piracy, which ever since

our appearance, they had embraced for the purpose of harassing us.

Since then Sulu has been converted into a refuge for pirates allured

by its favorable position, and these barbarians, being more solicitous

of carrying on their devastations than of cultivating their land,

have not ceased to be the greatest scourge of our inhabitants of

the south. This explains the impossibility of obtaining from them by

entreaty anything in the way of peace and tranquillity, which to them

as well as to us would be so beneficial.

For this reason, Sulu, which contains a population of pirates and

slaves, is nothing more than a shipping point where certain products

are collected from the other islands of the south. It is surrounded by

islands and islets, which form the archipelago bearing its name, and

has a length from east to west of about ten leagues, a width of four

and a half, and a circumference of thirty-two. The total population

credited to the Archipelago is from 149,000 to 150,000 souls, 6,800

of which inhabit Jolo, and in this number are included 800 Chinese.

The houses, or rather huts, of the principal place, are estimated to

number 3,500, and that of the petty king, called Sultan, cannot be

distinguished from the rest except for its greater size; all of bamboo

and nipa, weak and poor as their owners, but with cannons of various

calibers which mark the residences of the datus, descendants of the

petty kings, and who themselves constitute the oligarchy of their

Government. I have already stated that the Sultan can do nothing, all

matters being decreed by the convention, or Rum Bichara of the datus,

where the owner of the greatest number of slaves always decides the

questions. [288] Wealth, influence and power, are measured among

them solely by the number of slaves, and this is why they cannot

but be pirates, in order to acquire this wealth, nor can they offer

any guaranty, if it must be accompanied by the renunciation of this

pursuit.

By this picture, which is corroborated by the Englishman Moor in

his description of Sulu, it will be seen that we can expect nothing

from our present relations with Sulu in the way of securing the

tranquillity and prosperity of our islands of the south. Neither

is a system of continual hostility the best way of procuring these

precious gifts, but the promotion and throwing open of avenues of

commerce, directing it to one of our ports, which, in view of its

position, ought to be Zamboanga; and in this I coincide with the

views of my predecessor. Zamboanga, with a different organization,

the concession of a free port for all the products from the south and

those brought in champanes from China, and the free admission of the

exiles who seek refuge there as well as the Chinese traders, aiding

the former in establishing themselves, and exempting the latter from

all taxes for the first ten years, would be, in all probability, the

most suitable point to which to divert from Sulu the little transit

business which remains, to guard, from a shorter distance, against the

piracy of its inhabitants, and to bring them in the course of time,

perhaps, to a more humane mode of living.

But all this requires first the planning of a suitable and adequate

system which, bringing nearer to the islands of the south the

protection and vigilance of the Government of the capital by means

of a subordinate Government embracing its chief characteristics,

would relieve those precious islands from the calamities which up

to the present time they have suffered by reason of their remoteness

and possibly also because of our neglect.

This plan, which I desire to combine with a forward movement in the

great and rich island of Mindanao, a large part of whose coast is

surrounded by the districts of the corregidors [289] of Karaga and

Misamis, will bring about without doubt a new and happy era for the

Filipinos of the south, and place, without the sacrifice of people

or money, a large number of faithful subjects under the illustrious

Government of her Majesty, furnishing the same also with a greater

abundance of resources.

To this end I shall hold in view and faithfully observe the policy

which her Majesty outlines in her confidential Royal order, to which

I reply; its application will be the constant object of everything I

decree and execute. And very happy shall I be thus to make suitable

return for the many proofs of co-operation and esteem, which, for the

past thirteen years I have received from the Filipinos; infinitely

more so, because working at the same time for the better service of

her Majesty in accordance with her Royal plans in which these people

have always found their greatest and surest well-being.

Your Excellency being convinced, then, that these are the sentiments

which impel me and the plans I contemplate for the fulfillment of the

important duties her Majesty has deigned to confer upon me, can from

this reply assure her that as far as I am concerned, nothing shall be

left undone to carry out to the letter the policy she has been pleased

to outline to me, and to merit thereby her august confidence, which

I so earnestly desire. May God preserve your Excellency many years.

Manila, February 23, 1838.

Andrés G. Camba.

The most excellent, the Secretary, Office of Colonial Administration.

APPENDIX XVI

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNOR OF ZAMBOANGA TO THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT

OF THE PHILIPPINES RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF SIR JAMES BROOKE WITH

THE SULTAN OF SULU, TOGETHER WITH OTHER COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO

THE TREATY, 1849 [290]

Office of the Secretary of the Governor and Captain-General of the

Philippines.

Jolo, May 28th, 1849.

Sr. Don Cayetano Figueroa, Zamboanga.

Dear Sir:--I think proper to inform you that yesterday, at three

o'clock in the afternoon, the English war steamer "Nemesis" cast

anchor at this port, coming from Singapore. She brought on board Sir

James Brooke, commissioned to make a treaty of peace and friendship

between Great Britain and the Sultan. This treaty was presented to

the Sultan to-day in the presence of the Datus and a majority of

the people, and after being read in a loud voice it was immediately

approved and ratified. I do not think it necessary to inform you

as to the tenor of said treaty, as Mr. Brooke has told me that he

would go from here to your city for the purpose of communicating to

you everything regarding this matter so that you will be thoroughly

acquainted with all the details. I understand that they have hastened

this matter in view of the recent advices concerning the destruction

of Bali by the Dutch troops and their declared intention of taking

possession of the entire coast of North Borneo, Sulu, and all its

dependencies. In letters received from my partner at Singapore he

tells me that it is certain they are coming, and with a large force,

but it may be not for a month or two. The people here, in view of this

news, have carried everything they have to the interior, and are ready,

whenever the Dutch arrive, to leave the town. We shall see where these

things will stop. Possibly we shall have another case like that of

the French before you leave Zamboanga. Whatever you may decide to

do when you receive this communication, you know that my services

are always at your disposal, and in the event of your determining to

come, there is a house here at your disposition; and I promise you a

friendly reception on the part of the residents. It is my opinion they

are in such a fright that they do not know what to do and business,

of course, is entirely neglected. My brother-in-law, who is the bearer

of this, will inform you in regard to what is going on. He goes to

your town to purchase rice for our house, to provide against a siege;

for rice is dear and scarce here. I remain, your obedient servant,

who kisses your hand.--Guillermo Windham.

Batavia, March 20, 1849.--It appears that the expedition against Jolo

is a matter fully determined upon. It is said that two steamers, two

frigates, and a corvette, operating at the present time against Bali,

are in readiness to set sail the first part of July. I expect that the

publishers of the Singapore paper will publish an article entitled,

"Labuan, Sarawak, the northeast coast of Borneo and the Sultan of

Sulu," by Baron Hoeveel, published in Holland in the first number

of the "Journal for Netherlands India," during the month of January

last, in which he informs his compatriots that if the Government of

Java had followed the counsels of Resident Gronovius of Sambas in

1831 or those of Resident Bloem of Sambas in 1838, they would long

ago have had treaties with the Sultan of Bruney which would have

closed Sarawak and the northern coast to all flags except the Dutch,

and that the questions with the English Government would not have

arisen, but that now it is not worth while to discuss it with the

court of St. James. England is in possession, and she will stay in

possession if she considers it to her advantage. He tells them to

be on their guard, because if they do not have a care the English

will make another move; and he indicates the point which calls for

immediate and indispensable protection, namely, the northeast coast

of Borneo: that is to say, from Sampan Manjee Point to the Cape of

Kamongan (the Straits of Makassar), which he says are tributary to the

Sultan of Sulu. He gives information concerning the different stations

for the principal departments: Malsedu (or Kinabalu), Manjedore and

Tiroen, designating the bay of Sandakan for the first establishment,

as soon as they have taken possession of this side. He enumerates

the products of this part of the world: the pearls, the diamonds,

the iron and gold mines, the birds'-nests, the trepang, etc.; so that

he has strongly influenced the minds of the Dutch. And he concludes

by stating that in the next article of his paper he will discuss the

Sultan's possession in relation to the government of the Dutch Indies,

offering some suggestions as to how his countrymen may avail themselves

of the advantages of this rich territory. It is a truly interesting

article and appears to me no less curious than reasonable. The editor

of the Journal of the Eastern Archipelago will do a good service to

his countrymen by making a translation of it, but it must be done

very soon. I am too busy to write a paper of such length, otherwise

it would have given me pleasure to send you one for your own use. I

reiterate the necessity for despatch, for I really believe that

the Dutch government will work for its own interests in accordance

with the plans which the Baron has marked out. The English will not

relish the idea of their oriental Government sleeping and permitting

the Sultan to make, under coercion, a treaty such as must be made in

order to forward the plans of Van Hoeveel. The vessels of the King

of the Low Countries, the "Prince of Orange," "Sambi," and "Argo,"

with five others, set sail on the 15th of this month, transporting

1,800 men in the direction of Bali. Afterwards they are to carry to

Surabaya, on the 25th proximo, 5,000 men more, besides from 2,500 to

3,000 coolies, 12 cannon, 2 mortars, etc., etc. Receive, etc.

These are notices taken from a letter to hand, from a trustworthy

person in Singapore.--Figueroa.

Military and Civil Government, Plaza de Zamboanga.--No. 101.--

Department of Government.--Excellent Sir:--Notwithstanding the fact

that the lieutenant governor of this province informs me that he

transcribed and forwarded to your Excellency, while he was in charge

of the civil government during my absence in Malusu, the letter which

Mr. William Windham, a merchant of Jolo, sent me under date of May

28th, it seems to me well to send the original to your Excellency,

which I now do, retaining a copy of it for the purpose of reference

at any time. As your Excellency may note if he will compare its

contents with the text of the treaty of the 29th of the same month

of May, made with the Sultan of Sulu by the English Consul-General

to Borneo, Sir James Brooke, there is, between the terms of the former

and the spirit of Article 7 of the latter, a notable lack of agreement;

wherefore it has not seemed to me well to place entire confidence in

the offer of Windham, who may be suspected of partiality, and I have

concluded, therefore, to move in such a delicate matter with all

possible tact and foresight and in accordance with developments, which

may become extremely complicated. Considering the great interest

which the agents of the English Government show in these questions

concerning Sulu and the part of Borneo subject to the Sultan, I

immediately suspected that the announcement of the imminent arrival

of a considerable Dutch force in the archipelago was only a strategem

to obtain, through surprise and fear, the realization of the agreement

or treaty referred to; but it having been possible for me to secure

fresh data through a different channel, confirming those which Windham

furnished me,--which latter I obtained through Mr. Brooke and the

captain of the "Nemesis," and herewith transmit to your Excellency,--

I am of the opinion now that the expedition of the Dutch to Jolo is an

enterprise fully determined upon, although it may very well be delayed

or postponed by fortuitous circumstances difficult to foresee. In the

event of the appearance of the Dutch expedition, I shall never believe

that it is with the object of confining its field of action to

punishing the place of residence of the Sultan in a more thorough

manner than was done in the attempt made in April of last year; but

that they intend to conquer and occupy the Island and its dependencies.

If this should be so, I am equally of the opinion that the Government

of your Excellency, notwithstanding its conspicuous firmness and

well-known energy, will not succeed in getting them to recede from

their purpose, as everything goes to show they have determined to

carry it out in the face--most assuredly--of our known and declared

rights and claims to the rule of that land. I venture, therefore, to

believe that the only way to prevent the serious detriment which would

result to this colony, under the wise and worthy government of your

Excellency, from the occupation of Sulu, avoiding at the same time a

conflict between the Spanish and Dutch Governments, respectively, would

be, by means of persuasion and by taking advantage of the state of

extreme alarm now existing in Sulu, to anticipate them by a recognition

of the sovereignty of Spain, floating our national flag under

guaranties which would make impossible (without manifest violence) this

proposed unprecedented aggression. I am convinced that besides flying

the national flag and having the sovereignty of Spain recognized in a

formal manner, the principal guaranty must be--and I shall require it

unconditionally--that they shall agree to let us garrison with Spanish

troops the principal fort of Sulu, the residence of the Sultan. To this

end I have decided to embark in the pilot boat "Pasig" and make my way

to Jolo without delay, where, if I do not obtain the results which I

have here set forth, it will certainly not be through lack of zeal and

activity, but through encountering obstacles beyond my control or

influence, and owing to difficulties incident to the temperament of

those people and the ancient prejudices which, owing to a series of

events stretching through centuries, they feel towards us, as is only

too well known to your Excellency. To aid me in these operations and

to meet possible contingencies--since there will be needed there, in

case of success, an expert and trustworthy officer--and to carry out

reconnaissances and make plans which cannot fail to be always of the

greatest usefulness to the government at Manila, I shall invite the

chief of engineers of this place, Don Emilio Bernaldez, to accompany

me, if the exigencies of the service do not demand his presence here

and at Pasanhan. All of which I have the honor to lay before your

Excellency in the hope that it may merit your entire approval. May God

preserve your Excellency many years.

Zamboanga, June 8, 1849.

Cayetano Figueroa.

His high Excellency the Governor and Captain-General of these

Philippine Islands.

Office of the Secretary of the Governor and Captain-General of the

Philippines.

Zamboanga, June 5th, 1849.--Mr. Consul-General:--I have the honor

to inform you that from notices received from Jolo, it has come to

my knowledge that during your stay there with the steamer "Nemesis"

you negotiated a commercial treaty with the Sultan Mohammed Pulalun;

and as I am entirely ignorant of its essential clauses, and as my

Government has for a long time past, and especially of late, been

in possession or enjoyment through solemn treaties, the first made

with the Malay chiefs, masters of the coasts of Sulu, of the right

that our commercial flag be at least as privileged as any other; and

in view of the indisputable rights which Spain has to the territory

in question, rights not merely of prescription; I have the honor to

request, in view of the close friendship which unites our respective

Governments and which I honor myself in maintaining, that you have

the kindness to give me, officially, knowledge of the said treaty and

a copy thereof in order that I may forward it to the most excellent,

the Governor-General of these Philippine Islands, without prejudice

to my making before you, if the spirit of any of these articles

so requires, the remonstrances that may be necessary to uphold the

rights of Spain.--Receive, Mr. Consul-General, the assurance of my

consideration, etc.

C. de Figueroa.

To Sir James Brooke, Consul-General of her Britannic Majesty in Borneo

and Governor of Labuan.

H. M. S. "Nemesis," June 3rd, 1849.--Sir:--I have the honor to reply

to your communication of this date; and as the quickest way to furnish

your Excellency with the information desired, I enclose herewith a copy

of the agreement recently made with the Government of Sulu. It would be

unprofitable to discuss at this time the rights of Spain to which you

make allusion, and the interests of Great Britain, which are involved,

but as the best means of preserving the cordial relations which should

always exist between the public servants of our respective governments,

I propose to forward our present correspondence to the Secretary of

Foreign Affairs of her Britannic Majesty. Nevertheless, permit me to

say that my opinion is that the interests of Spain and of Great Britain

in these seas should be considered entirely harmonious and equally

opposed to any system of oppression or of monopoly.--I have the honor

to be, with the greatest consideration, Sir, Your obedient servant.

Brooke, Commissioner and Consul-General.

To His Excellency C. de Figueroa, Governor of Zamboanga.

Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland, desirous of encouraging commerce between her subjects and

those of the independent princes in the Eastern seas, and of putting

an end to the piracy which has up to this time hindered said commerce:

and his Highness the Sultan Mohammed Pulalun who occupies the throne

and governs the territories of Sulu, animated by like sentiments

and desirous of co-operating in the measures which may be necessary

for the achievement of the objects mentioned; have resolved to place

on record their determination on these points by an agreement which

contains the following articles: Article 1. From now on there shall

be peace, friendship, and good understanding between her Majesty

the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and his Highness Mohammed

Pulalun, Sultan of Sulu, and between their respective heirs and

successors, and between their subjects. Article 2. The subjects of

her Britannic Majesty shall have complete liberty to enter, reside,

carry on business, and pass with their merchandise through all parts

of the dominions of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu, and they shall

enjoy in them all the privileges and advantages with respect to

commerce or in connection with any other matter whatever which are

at this time enjoyed by, or which in the future may be granted to,

the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation; and the subjects

of his Highness the Sultan of Sulu shall likewise be free to enter,

reside, carry on business, and pass with their merchandise to all parts

of the dominions of her Britannic Majesty, in Europe as well as in

Asia, as freely as the subjects of the most favored nation, and they

shall enjoy in said dominions all the privileges and advantages with

respect to commerce and in connection with other matters which are now

enjoyed by, or which in the future may be granted to, the subjects or

citizens of the most favored nation. Article 3. British subjects shall

be permitted to buy, lease, or acquire in any lawful way whatever all

kinds of property within the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of

Sulu; and his Highness extends, as far as lies within his power, to

every British subject who establishes himself in his dominions, the

enjoyment of entire and complete protection and security to person

and to property--as well any property which in the future may be

acquired, as that which has already been acquired prior to the date

of this agreement. Article 4. His Highness the Sultan of Sulu offers

to allow the war vessels of her Britannic Majesty and those of the

India Company to enter freely the ports, rivers, and inlets situated

within his dominions and to permit said vessels to supply themselves,

at reasonable prices, with the goods and provisions which they may

need from time to time. Article 5. If any English vessel should

be lost on the coasts of the dominions of his Highness the Sultan

of Sulu the latter promises to lend every aid in his power for the

recovery and delivery to the owners of everything than can be saved

from said vessels; and his Highness also promises to give entire

protection to the officers and crew and to every person who may be

aboard the shipwrecked vessel, as well as to their property. Article

6. Therefore, her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Ireland, and the Sultan of Sulu, bind themselves to adopt

such measures as lie within their power to suppress piracy within

the seas, islands, and rivers under their respective jurisdiction

or influence, and his Highness the Sultan of Sulu binds himself not

to harbor or protect any person or vessel engaged in enterprises of

a piratical nature. Article 7. His Highness the Sultan of Sulu, for

the purpose of avoiding in the future any occasion for disagreement,

promises to make no cession of territory within his dominions to any

other nation, nor to subjects or citizens thereof, nor to acknowledge

vassalage or feudality to any other power without the consent of her

Britannic Majesty. Article 8. This treaty must be ratified, and the

ratifications will therefore be exchanged in Jolo within two years

from date. Home Copy.--Brooke.--Approved, etc.--Signed and sealed

May 29, 1849.

Zamboanga, June 5, 1849.--Mr. Consul-General:--I have received the

letter which you have done me the honor to send under date of the day

before yesterday in reply to mine, and I acknowledge receipt of copy of

the treaty which you negotiated with his Highness the Sultan of Sulu

on the 29th May last. I have no remarks to make, Mr. Consul-General,

with respect to the first six articles of the treaty, for the

clauses they contain are not of such an urgent character that my

Government cannot postpone their discussion if it so deems advisable;

but I might perhaps create in the future serious embarrassment to our

respective Governments should I allow Article 7 to pass unnoticed. It

establishes two principles of the most vital importance: (1st) His

Highness the Sultan binds himself to recognize the sovereignty of no

power without previously notifying her Britannic Majesty; and (2nd)

to make, likewise, no cession of the least portion of the territory

of his dominions to any State, person or corporation. With relation

to the first point, and waiving for the moment the question whether,

because the Sultan is in possession, with slight exceptions, of the

coast of Sulu, this island must be regarded as his exclusive domain,

it is my duty, Mr. Consul-General, to inform you that for a long time

past the said Sultan of Sulu has admitted and acknowledged himself

to be under the protection of her Catholic Majesty, recognizing the

sovereignty of Spain in a public way and in official documents which

his Excellency the Governor-General of these Philippine Islands will

be able to produce at the proper time and place. As regards the second

point: I find no objection to the pledge of his Highness having all the

force of free right with respect to those parts of his dominions lying

outside of the island of Sulu, namely, the north and northeast part of

Borneo, now under the rule of the Sultan; but under no circumstances

with respect to the said island of Sulu and its neighboring islands;

for not only can Spain not recognize in any power the right to

intervene in the matter of ceding or not ceding the island of Sulu

and its surrounding islands, as it is claimed can be done according

to the terms of Article 7 of the Treaty; but Spain does not recognize

this right even in the Sultan and Datus of Sulu, because, as I have

had the honor to inform you, Mr. Consul-General, these territories

belong to Spain, by a right not prescribed, by a right in no way

established by the conquest of this archipelago, but positively

through the willing submission of the real natives, the Gimbahans,

who do now, and who at the end of the 17th century did, constitute

the most numerous portion of its population, whose oppressors were

then and are now the Sultan and Datus, Malay Mussulmans. At this very

time the chief of the Gimbahans, this unfortunate and enslaved race,

cherishes with respect and veneration his loving remembrance of Spain

and holds in his possession the proofs of what I assert. This fact

established, Mr. Consul-General, I am forcibly constrained to protest,

which I accordingly do, against every claim in its favor by your nation

on the terms of the said Article 7 of the treaty referred to of May

29th of the present year, since it prejudices the incontestable and

recognized rights of the crown of Spain to the sovereignty of the

territory of the island of Sulu and its surrounding islands, and to

its sovereignty over the present possessors of the coasts of this

archipelago, begging that you will kindly acknowledge receipt of this

letter in order to cover my responsibility to my Government. Receive,

again, Mr. Consul-General, the assurances, etc.

C. de Figueroa.

To Sir James Brooke, Consul-General for her Britannic Majesty in

Borneo and Governor of Labuan.

H. M. S. "Nemesis," June 5, 1849.--Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge

receipt of your communication; and as the matter in question will

probably have to be discussed between our respective Governments,

I think it better not to take up the objections raised by you in

connection with Article 7 of the treaty recently negotiated with

his Highness the Sultan of Sulu. I have the honor to be, with great

consideration, Sir, Your obedient servant.

Brooke, Commissioner and Consul-General.

To His Excellency, Col. C. de Figueroa, Governor of Zamboanga.

Military and Civil Government, Town of Zamboanga, No. 100, Government

Department.--Most Excellent Sir:--On reëmbarking at Malusu, March

31st last, returning from the operations which I had conducted against

the same on that same day, following instructions received from your

office in a communication of the 17th of the said month of May, the

result of which I reported to the most Excellent the Captain-General

in an official letter of the 2nd instant, No. 209, the war vessel of

the English East India Company, the "Nemesis" was sighted and soon

afterwards cast anchor in our vicinity. Aboard the vessel was Sir

James Brooke, Consul-General for his country in Borneo and Governor

of Labuan; and as a result of a long conference I had with the latter

gentleman in regard to recent events in Sulu--which conference it

was agreed to continue in this place immediately upon my arrival

here--I gave him, successively, the two communications of which I

attach copies; with them I send to your Excellency letters dated the

3rd and 5th instant replying to mine in terms that your Excellency

will see embodied in the two original letters of corresponding dates,

which I likewise enclose herewith, retaining copies of them, as also

an authorized copy of the treaty or agreement of the 29th of last

May, also enclosed; feeling confident that the indulgence of your

Excellency will approve my action in this delicate matter. May God

preserve your Excellency many years.

Zamboanga, June 6th, 1849.

Cayetano Figueroa.

The most Excellent, The Governor and Captain-General of the

Philippines.

Copies.--José María Peñaranda: (his flourish).

APPENDIX XVII

COMMUNICATION FROM THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE

SECRETARY OF STATE, RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF SIR JAMES BROOKE WITH

THE SULTAN OF SULU; AUGUST 16, 1849 [291]

Office of the Captain-General and Governor of the Philippines.

To his Excellency, The Secretary of State and of the Office of

Gobernación of the Kingdom, I have the honor to state the following,

on this date, and under No. 499.

By the communications which I had the honor to send your Excellency

from Zamboanga on the 23rd of June and 4th of July last, and that of

the General second in command, No. 482, your Excellency must have been

informed of the treaty which has been made in Jolo by the Englishman

Sir James Brooke, of the answer of the Governor of Zamboanga to the

latter and his negotiation with the Sultan and Datus to have the

treaty left without effect, without obtaining the least satisfaction.

It will therefore be necessary that the question be settled between the

two Cabinets, and I believe that Holland will take our part, as she has

an illfeeling against England on account of the latter's usurpations

in Borneo, contrary to the spirit of the treaty of March 17, 1824,

between the two countries, and must fear to see her rich possessions

surrounded by those of so powerful a rival. The communications of her

Majesty's Consul in Singapore and his confidential correspondence with

the Governor-General of Java, which he has forwarded to the Secretary

of State, show that the Dutch Government wishes to maintain the most

friendly relations with Spain. Although the English press in Singapore

and Hong-Kong are still speaking of a Dutch expedition against Jolo,

nothing has been done hitherto, and the favorable season for such an

expedition has passed.

As the correspondence between Brooke and the Governor of Zamboanga will

probably play an important part in the future correspondence with the

British Government, I believe it is my duty to submit a few remarks in

regard to the action taken by the said Governor. Notwithstanding that

the objections, which he submitted to Brooke in regard to Article 7

of the treaty, were well founded, he ought not to have entered upon

such a discussion, and much less to have particularized it in such

a way: he ought to have protested against the treaty as a whole,

and to have declared it null, as made without the consent of Spain,

which holds not only a protectorate, but sovereignty or dominion over

the territory. The second defect that I find in the same letter to

Brooke, is his basing our right to the sovereignty over Sulu on the

"free submission of the true natives of the Gimbahan race, who live

in the interior of the island and are oppressed by the Sultan and the

Datus." Although there is some truth in that statement, and we might

take advantage of this element in case of a war with the Sultan,

I believe that it ought not to have been made under the present

circumstances, as, on the same principle, we would invalidate the

rights founded by us on the different treaties made by Spain with the

Sultan and Datus of Sulu. The acknowledgment made by the latter of the

sovereignty of Spain during over two centuries and more especially in

the treaties of 1646, 1737 and 1836, by the first of which they pledge

themselves to pay, as vassals, a tribute of three boatloads of rice,

as recorded in the Archives, is a powerful argument in favor of our

rights, which the Sultan has often confirmed in his communications

to this Government and in the passports which he gives his subjects,

on printed forms supplied by my predecessor;--I enclose herewith a

copy of one of said passports.

The British, who doubtless do not feel very certain about their rights,

try to excuse their conduct through the press, as they did when they

occupied Labuan by force. The Singapore Free Press of the 6th of July

published an article in which it alleges, for the purpose of proving

that Sulu has always been considered as a sovereign independent power,

that we said nothing to England when she accepted the cession of the

island of Balambangan, between Borneo and Palawan. Even supposing

the fact to be true, there would be nothing astonishing about it,

considering the distress and the lack of means of the Government

at that time, after the war which, but a few years before, it had

miraculously carried on against the English who held Manila and many

other places in the islands, and the work it had to do in order to

put down interior rebellions, to reorganize the administration and to

reëstablish normal conditions in the provinces which had been left

uncontrolled during four years and had suffered the consequences of

circumstances so unfortunate. Furthermore, the cession of Balambangan

cannot be considered as an act of free will on the part of the Sulus,

since they took advantage of the first opportunity to drive the British

off the island, when they had hardly started to firmly establish

their trading posts. The newspaper also mentions the doctrine

of Walter, which says that an agreement similar to that existing

between the Spanish and Sulu Governments does not entirely derogate

the sovereignty of the protected state, which can make treaties and

contract alliances, except when it has expressly renounced its right

to do so; and that if the first state fails to protect the other, the

treaty is invalidated; the author of the article adds that this is our

case, since we allowed the Dutch to attack Sulu without interfering,

or, as far as known, requiring a reparation or the assurance that

such an attack would not be renewed.

With regard to the first point, the reference to Walter is correct,

but Walter adds in the same paragraph that "the protected nation is

bound forever by the treaty of protection, so that it can undertake

no engagements which would be contrary to said treaty, that is to say,

that would violate any of the express conditions of the protectorate,

or be inconsistent with any treaty of the said class:" how then

could Article 7 of the treaty made by Brooke be valid, when by said

article the Sultan pledges himself to recognize the sovereignty of

no power without the previous consent of her Britannic Majesty, and

not to cede the smallest part of the territory of his dominions to any

state, person or corporation, said Sultan having already recognized the

sovereignty of Spain and the rights of the latter over the greater part

of his territory, in which the island of Palawan, which was ceded to

us in the last century by the kings of Bruney is included by mistake.

In regard to the second point, the author of the article is also in

the wrong: for this Government was neither aware of the intentions

of the Dutch, nor was its assistance requested by the Sultan; and

your Excellency knows in what terms I wrote to the Governor-General

of Java about that matter.--If I have given so many details, despite

their not being new to your Excellency it is because the article of the

Singapore Free Press may have been inspired by the British Government,

and deserves therefore not to be left unnoticed.

In the event of which I am writing, your Excellency will see the

fulfilment of my predictions, and it may perhaps be only the prelude

of events of still greater importance.

Thus I cannot but earnestly recommend to your Excellency's notice

the necessity that the Governor of the Philippines have very

detailed instructions or very ample powers to proceed as regards

the Southern regions in accordance with what he believes best

suited to her Majesty's interests and to the security of these rich

possessions. In this connection I take the liberty of recommending to

your Excellency such action as our Sovereign the Queen may deem most

wise on my communication (consulta) number 359 and others relative

to the same subject.

Perhaps, as I mentioned in my communication of the 4th of July last,

the only advantageous issue for us would be to send a strong expedition

and to occupy Jolo, our action being warranted by the piratical acts

committed by several small boats of Bwal, Sulu; the Dutch may avail

themselves of the same excuse and send an expedition before us, if,

as is possible, other pancos [292] [Moro boats] have gone south for

the same purpose; but anyhow the behavior of the Sultan and Datus of

Sulu would give us excellent reasons for taking action against them

at any time.

God keep your Excellency many years.

Manila, August 16, 1849.

The Count of Manila.

His Excellency, the Secretary of State and "Gobernación."

APPENDIX XVIII

REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO TAXES AND IMPOSTS ON NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS

IN SULU [293]

General Government of the Philippines, Treasury Department, Manila,

February 24th, 1877.

In view of the communications of the politico-military governor

of Sulu of October 6th of last year, in which he suggests to this

general government the concession of various exemptions in favor of

the natives of these islands and of any Chinamen who shall establish

themselves in the said place, to the end that by this means there may

be promoted the immigration which the interests of that island demand:

In view of the reports issued in the premises by the central

administration of imposts, the office of the insular auditor, [294] and

the insular departments of civil administration and the treasury: and

Deeming it expedient, for the realization of the high purposes that

required the military occupation of Jolo and for the progressive

and efficacious development of the moral and material interests of

this young colony, that there should be granted certain exemptions

for the encouragement of the immigration thereto of the greatest

possible number of inhabitants: this office of the general government

in conformity with the suggestions made by the treasury department,

and in accordance with the statements made by the department of civil

administration, disposes the following:

1. All immigrants to the island of Sulu, of whatever class, race,

or nationality, who shall establish themselves definitively in the

same, engaging in agricultural, industrial, or commercial pursuits,

or in any art, trade, or occupation, shall be exempt during ten years

from all the contributions or taxes imposed, or which in the future

may be imposed, upon the inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago.

2. The children of immigrants to Sulu, born in said island or who

establish themselves there before becoming taxpayers in the pueblos

of their birth, shall commence to pay taxes at the age of twenty-five

years, but shall be exempt from military service so long as they

reside in the said island.

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and communicated

to the council of administration, the office of the captain-general,

and the insular department of civil administration; and shall be

returned to the treasury department for such further action as may

be proper.

Malcampo.

General Government of the Philippines, Treasury Department, Manila,

August 10, 1887.

In view of the investigation conducted by the intendant-general

of the treasury with the object of determining whether it would be

expedient to prolong the term of exemption from all kinds of taxes

and imposts in favor of natives and of immigrants of whatever race or

nationality who are established, or who shall establish themselves,

in Sulu for the purpose of engaging in any kind of industry, commerce,

profession, art, or trade, or in agriculture:

In view of the reports issued by the said directive bureau of the

treasury and the politico-military governor of Sulu:

And considering that exemption from all burdens constitutes one of

the most efficacious means of encouraging the immigration demanded by

the interest of the archipelago in question; this general government,

in conformity with the suggestions made by the office of the intendant

of the treasury and the politico-military governor of Sulu, disposes

that the term of exemption granted by superior decree of this general

government of February 24th, 1877, shall be understood as extended

for another term of ten years, the said extension to be reckoned

from the day following that on which the first term expires, that is,

from the 25th day of February of the current year.

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette; the Government

of his Majesty shall be informed thereof and a copy of the records

transmitted; it shall be communicated to the council of administration,

the tribunal of accounts, the office of the Captain-General, and the

insular department of civil administration; and shall be returned to

the office of the intendant of the treasury for any further action

that may be proper.

Terrero.

Office of the Governor-General of the Philippines.