CONCLUSION
POLITICAL STATUS OF SULU AT THE TIME OF SPANISH EVACUATION
The cause for which Governor Arolas shed the blood of several
hundred Spanish soldiers and killed some thousands of Moros was
utterly defeated. The tenacity with which the Sulus resisted Spanish
domination, their obdurate opposition and bravery in battle, and their
obstinate passive resistance in peace, baffled all Spanish efforts
to subvert their political organization or gain a single point of
advantage without paying too dearly for it. The Sulus succeeded at
last in inaugurating their candidate as Sultan of Sulu. Their laws
and the administration of their internal affairs were not interfered
with. Their religion, social conditions, national usages and customs
were unaffected by any change whatsoever. Spanish influence and
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the limits of the garrison and no
material reform or progress reached the Moro community through that
channel. No effort was made by Spain to educate the Sulus and no
adequate measure was proposed by her governors which was applicable
to the needs of the Sulus and acceptable to their ideas. The Sulus
felt that there was a strong inclination on the part of the Spanish
Government or some of its recognized agents to change their religion
and destroy their national unity, and consequently they never had
complete confidence in Spanish officers and representatives and
repulsed every influence that tended to establish close relations
between them and the Christians of the Spanish garrison.
No tax or tribute was collected from the Sulus, and their territory was
exempted from the operation of the laws of the Philippine Islands. Sulu
imports could come in Sulu craft free of duty and unhampered by any
vexatious regulation. Duties could be collected by Sulus at all ports
unoccupied by Spain; and if hostilities could have been brought to an
end, the Sulus, in their pursuit of the peaceful vocations of life,
might have felt no appreciable difficulty or inconvenience from
Spanish occupation of Jolo, except the loss of the revenues of the
ports of Jolo and Siasi and some control over the trade of the Chinese.
Slavery remained an established institution of the land and its
continued practice among the Moros was neither denounced nor
restricted. The pearl industry remained in the hands of the Sulus
and pearl fishers and shell dealers paid a variable tax to the sultan
and local chiefs. Piracy was completely suppressed, and the invasion
of Christian communities and the capture of Christians as slaves by
Sulus terminated at the conquest of Jolo in 1876.
Before the campaign of 1876 the sultan ruled with a strong hand, lived
in state, was prosperous and had considerable wealth. The principal
datus lived at Jolo, and the Sulu forces were united. Jamalul A`lam
remained rich until his death, but subsequent wars and licentiousness
reduced the estate of his sons. The separation and dispersion of the
datus, however, weakened the Sulus more than any other cause. Each datu
began to feel more or less independent of the other, their jealousies
increased and became more intense and effectual; their forces were
disunited, and each chief relied solely upon his own fortifications and
following. United action was ignored or became impracticable. Soon the
subordinate chiefs began to feel their importance, gradually asserted
their rights, and assumed greater dignity and power in proportion to
their prosperity and the following they could command. Jamalul A`lam
ruled firmly, had every chief under his control, and held the state
intact. Three chiefs outside of his house were sufficient to sign the
treaty he made with Spain. These were Datu Harun, Datu Raja Lawut
Zaynul `Abidin (Asibi), the father of Datus Kalbi and Julkarnayn,
and Datu Muluk Bandarasa Pula, the son of the famous Datu Daniel,
and the father of the present Datu Pula-pula of Mubu or Tandu. No
maharajas or hadjis figured prominently in those days, and the
panglimas served as state messengers.
As soon as it became known that Jamalul A`lam was dying a condition
bordering on anarchy arose and disorder prevailed as in the days of
Badarud Din. Things grew worse during the regency of Datu Aliyud
Din, and worse still during the civil strife between the latter
and Raja Muda Amirul Kiram. General Arolas and Sultan Harun had to
fight every chief in his turn and every island by itself. Each chief
felt independent of the rest of the country and had his own ideas
as to who should be appointed sultan. Each datu was defended by
his own men only and each had to meet the Spanish forces by himself
unaided. Even Maymbung had to face the mighty foe with forces which
could be assembled from the immediate neighborhood only. Small
detachments did sometimes reënforce the forts of their neighbors,
but the proportion of help so extended to the actual strength of
the forces that could have been united was so insignificant that no
account can be taken of such coöperation.
Thus the total or combined strength of Sulu was reduced to small,
insignificant and disunited entities; the power of resistance
to outside invasion was diminished, but at the same time the
susceptibility of the country to foreign influence became nil. It
was an easy matter for General Arolas to defeat one party or chief
alone, but the necessity of fighting each chief by himself defeated
his purpose and efforts in the end. Unconsciously, Spain brought
on an abnormal condition of affairs in Sulu, extremely difficult to
manage and for which she never found the proper remedy. The ruling
sultan, though well supported by the greater mass of the people,
had neither the knowledge, the tact, nor the strength necessary to
correct the wrong done, and things in general tended rather to the
worse than to the better. The parties created by the civil strife of
1884 existed in 1899 with very little change, and their enmity had
become deeply rooted and ineradicable. The whole northern portion
of the island east of Jolo and eastern Tandu represented a distinct
party unfavorable to Jamalul Kiram II and at times seemed to be
wholly under the leadership of the two brothers, Datus Kalbi and
Julkarnayn. Similar parties existed in Tapul, Lugus, Siasi, and the
Tawi-tawi Group, many settlements having two chiefs, one representing
the sultan and the other the hostile party. To add evil to existing
wrong, the chiefs took advantage of this condition and vacillated in
their alliance from one party to another as it seemed to them more
advantageous for the time being. General Arolas fought both parties,
incurred the bitter enmity of all chiefs and gained for himself and
the cause of prosperity no advantage whatsoever. All the Sulus hated
Spain at heart and welcomed the end of her sovereignty, with the hope
of having more peace and better relations with her successor.
SPANISH POLICY
ATTITUDE OF THE MOROS
The vivid picture presented by the history of Sulu thrills the reader
with scenes of horror, cruelty, and misdirected energies. On one page
we read of how a rich and mighty sovereign stretched his hand across
the border of his domain into the territory of his weak neighbor and
coveted his jewels and treasure, and, being refused, struck terror,
desolation, and destruction in the home of the latter. On another
page we read how, as if possessed by a mighty demon, that weak and
petty king-neighbor summoned the powers of the wind and sea to his aid,
marched upon his strong enemy in the night, assailed him while unaware,
robbed his house, and carried his people away to work for his homely
sustenance. The mighty sovereign wakens in the morning, and in his
rage curses his wretched neighbor and swears vengeance upon him and
his wicked fellow nomads of the sea, but the rich and mighty lord of
the north has enemies and rivals in the west and far south and does
not dare leave his home unguarded. Part of his available warriors
he thought would be sufficient, and their valor and patriotism were
counted on as an additional asset and a sure guaranty of victory. The
sails of a gigantic fleet were unfurled and chariots and steeds were
provided for the triumphal march into the enemy's pearl land. But
the mighty sea rolled and the furious winds blew and the giant did
not prove a match for the weak, for man can not go against nature,
and valor is a poor aid against overwhelming odds. Yet some men's
hearts are made of stone and one or two experiences do not teach them
enough; so we see the same scene repeated time and time again, until
an opportune moment arrived and a new chapter was opened in which we
find the rich sovereign richer and mightier. This time nature takes
sides with might and turns the scales against the weak and petty king
of the south and leaves him wrecked and stranded on his coral reefs.
The Sulu is a Malayan of prominent type, reared in his infancy
by a Brahman priest and brought up to maturity under the care of a
Mohammedan instructor. He rejected his idols as early as 1450 and had
been for more than a century prior to the arrival of Legaspi at Cebu,
a faithful and devoted worshipper of "Allahu Ta'ala," the Almighty and
only God, according to the teaching of the prophet Mohammed and the
holy Quran. He had laws, an established government, an organized state,
an alphabet, and a system of education. By trade he was a planter and
fisher, and both land and sea yielded him plenty. He turned the timber
of his rich forests into boats and utilized the currents of the sea
and the movements of the wind. Navigation came natural to him, and he
sailed to distant lands and traded his pearls for silks and spices. He
had a wide range of experience, and his knowledge of the world was by
no means restricted to one island or to one limited group of islands.
The dominion of the Sultan of Sulu was complete and his power was
well respected throughout the Archipelago. Between Mindanao and
Borneo 150,000 people--Yakans, Samals, and Sulus--lived and obeyed
one man. True, the Sulus had no standing army or navy, but they had
innumerable boats, forts, and firearms, and every able-bodied man was
a soldier and a sailor, always armed, and always ready for a call to
arms. His immediate neighbors were pagans, or "infidels," who paid
him homage and tribute. He was the master of the land and the lord
of the southern seas. He was chivalrous in his manners and received
his friends with liberal hospitality; but he wasted no sympathy or
kindness on his enemy. The enemy of the state was also an enemy to
"Allahu Ta'ala," and no life was deemed too dear to sacrifice for
the cause of home and God. It was the idea of his home that started
the blood rushing through his veins, and religion fittingly fanned
the flame and heated his blood to the boiling point. There is honor
even among thieves, and a nation made up of fierce pirates need not
go begging for dignity, gallantry, and self-pride. Let the Sulu be
idolatrous or a fire worshiper and he will "go juramentado" on the
strength of his faith in wooden or fire gods before he yields to a
master or serves as a slave. He will die before he surrenders. Such
metal is what makes the Sulus brave, independent, and unyielding.
The Sulus watched the progress of Legaspi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon,
saw how the pagan chiefs were subjugated, and witnessed the expulsion
of their brother Mohammedans from Manila. They had played this rôle
themselves, and when the enemy reached their shores they needed no
word of explanation or stimulus to resist, except that which they had
in their breeding and general make-up. Spain instigated hostilities
and coveted their domain; it was not their part to yield, but it was
Spain's clear duty to reëstablish peace before the evils resulting from
war outweighed the good obtained. This she failed to do, and the Sulus
were invaded repeatedly and harassed constantly. Bitter animosity
filled the hearts of the Sulus, and a desire for revenge prompted
them to retaliate; and what can be expected from people of their race
and civilization except cruelty and barbarity in war! We know that
"war is hell" among highly civilized nations and why should we expect
of the Sulus a moral conduct out of proportion to their intellectual
development and the influences of their civilization and religion? The
life of an "infidel" was not a matter of religious concern to them
at all. The Prophet himself led his people against nonconformists and
promised them reward instead of pardon or intercession before God. The
Quran taught them that patriotism is a part of their religion,
and love of home and family left no place for cowardice and no
patience with humiliation. They therefore fought well and fought
cruelly. They raided the enemy's country, robbed him, and carried
away many slaves. Slavery was also sanctioned by their religion and
formed an established custom or method of punishment which took the
place of imprisonment and saved the expense of jails and guards.
Humanity called for different action on both sides; but it evidently
made no impression on the Sulus. Not satisfied with just measures of
war and direct retaliation, they developed an abnormal propensity for
piracy, invaded the Spanish domain frequently for the procurement
of slaves and for other wicked purposes, and committed unspeakable
horrors and atrocities. But to treat evil with evil adds no virtue
to the credit of the other side. We rarely read of wounded Moros
after an engagement, and, strange to say, all wounds of Moros were
invariably immediately fatal. If few Moros were ever kindly treated
after battle, certainly many more were promptly dispatched in a manner
that terminated suffering and life at the same time.
MISTAKES AND DIFFICULTIES OF SPANISH RULE
Had Spain exerted more effort to increase the Jolo garrison in
1646 and trusted the charge of this garrison to an able and upright
administrator, the fruits of the brilliant conquest of General Corcuera
would not have been lost, and in all probability the trouble with
Sulu would have been ended before the termination of the seventeenth
century. However, instead of this course, weak characters were charged
with the management of affairs, and in place of permanent and strong
occupation of the land an insignificant treaty was made with the Sulus
with no intention on the part of Spain of keeping it permanently and
with no hope that it would be kept by the Sulus. Similar mistakes
were frequently repeated and a cruel inhuman strife marked with an
astounding profuseness of bloodshed and terrible loss of life and
evil of all sorts, was prolonged for the space of three hundred and
twenty years without any advantage that is worth considering.
In consequence of all this, the Sulu has been pictured to the outside
world as a black devil incarnate, borne in mischief and conceived
in iniquity; without a human characteristic, barbarous and savage as
his second cousin the orang-utan of Borneo. The Sulu had no means or
chance of pleading his cause before an international court, and his
cry could not be heard or registered by a foreign hand or press. He
was not met except with a predetermination to fight him. He was not
approached except with the intention of sharing his treasure. He
was not invited except to surrender his right of government and no
alternative was offered him except tribute or death. It is out of
reason to expect such people to abandon their customs, traditions,
government, and religion without a struggle. It is out of reason to
expect them to yield to threats and be daunted by a bombshell shot from
a distance. The jungle is thick and extensive, their boats and sails
are ready and light; they know the routes of the sea and can follow
the currents of the ocean in the dark as well as in the light. The
coasts of Borneo and the Celebes are not too far from them, and living
there is as cheap and easy as at home. It is beyond reason to expect
that all sultans, datus, and panglimas will resign their offices,
give up their rank and privileges, and be content to plant corn on
the hillside or catch fish along the beach. The laws of nature are
not ambiguous, and man is man whether his skin is white or brown.
The chief difficulties Spain had to contend with in the south arose
out of the natural weakness of her system of administration. Her
Governors-General changed frequently. The Moro question received
a secondary attention, and no definite policy or settled course
of action was ever systematically worked out and followed. What
Corcuera planned was not carried out by his successors, and measures
which were approved by General Terrero were disapproved by General
Weyler and ignored by General Blanco. Had Governor-General Urbiztondo
preceded Governor-General Claveria, Jolo might have been attacked and
conquered before 1851, and had Governor-General Malcampo preceded
Governor-General Urbiztondo, the garrison of Jolo might have been
established twenty-five years earlier.
The policy of Governor Parrado was not followed by Governor Arolas,
and the plans and pledges of the latter were not fully respected
by his successors. Treaties were made to be broken rather than
to be obeyed, and at the end of three hundred and twenty years of
protracted relations with Sulu, no satisfactory policy can be said to
have been decided upon at either Madrid or Manila. The treaty of 1878
was a temporary expedient. It was not intended to express a policy
nor did Spain intend to restrict her influence to the provisions of
a treaty nor to tie her hands so fast for any length of time. Spain
was intent on the complete conquest of Sulu, the assimilation of all
the Moro tribes, and the unification of government, religion, and
civilization throughout the Philippine Archipelago. This ideal was
the hope of all governors of Sulu and formed a concealed motive that
prompted their actions and guided their administration. The governors
of Sulu differed only in their ideas as to the length of time which
should pass before the Sulus should be denied their autonomy, and the
methods by which the change could be best brought around. There were
opportune and inopportune times to interfere, which were left for the
Governor-General to decide, and in the majority of cases his decision
was controlled not by the immediate needs of the occasion, but by
interests pertaining to the general administration of the Archipelago,
which left partial attention and inadequate means available for the
solution of the vexatious difficulties in the south. Generals who
were anxious to distinguish themselves, took the first opportunity
that offered itself, but satisfied themselves with the immediate
results of victory or the simple correction of the wrong calling
for military action, without bearing in mind the general situation
and the requirements of the next step that should be undertaken as
part of a course planned for the carrying out of a settled general
policy. Thus bound to observe the general provisions of the treaty
of 1878, and limited in the authority granted them from Manila and in
the strength of the garrison assigned to Jolo, the governors of Sulu
felt their hands completely tied, and consequently they could not
accomplish much and left matters to drift with the current of events.
During the governorship of General Terrero, Governor Arolas was
given a free hand and sufficient troops to carry out his plan; but
Arolas was not much more than a fighting man and an excellent post
commander, and the evils of his strenuous measures outweighed the good
he accomplished; and when the Jolo garrison was subsequently reduced
by Governor-General Weyler his policy could not be continued and was
necessarily doomed to utter failure.
However, nobody was quicker to note such mistakes and to observe the
needs of the situation than the Spanish officers themselves, especially
inspectors-general who were commissioned to investigate matters and
conditions in Sulu, and historians who made a study of Sulu affairs.
REPORT OF BALTASAR GIRAUDIER
Of works of this nature we give brief accounts of the estimable
report of Baltasar Giraudier, Director of the "Diario de Manila,"
which was presented to the Governor-General, Domingo Moriones, in
1880, and the noteworthy remarks and recommendations of the author of
"Apuntes sobre Jolo," Miguel A. Espina, colonel of infantry.
Baltasar Giraudier accompanied General Malcampo to Jolo in 1876 and
made special inquiry into the situation in the south. He clearly
stated that the terms of the treaty of 1851 could not be carried out
(to advantage). Failure to observe this treaty provoked the sultan and
Sulus to impatience, resistance, and a rebellious attitude. Referring
to the Jolo campaign of 1876 he estimated the strength of the attacking
army at approximately 11,000 troops, and described Jolo as an actual
churchyard, held in a constant state of siege, and a great cost
to the nation in men and money. Naked facts, he asserted, did not
justify former expeditions, and hostilities were often provoked for
ulterior motives. Considerable harm resulted from such misdirected
measures, while much good to both nations could have been derived from
a policy of attraction, frank, loyal, and disinterested. He called the
attention of the authorities to the necessity of a faithful observance
of the terms of treaties, in order to expect and demand with right
and respect a reciprocal observance of such treaties by the Moros;
to the advisability of honoring and strengthening the authority
of the sultan in order to secure his good will and coöperation in
maintaining peace and harmony and in repressing the evil tendencies
of rebellious datus and subchiefs; to the great advantages that may
arise from reëstablishing the salary of the sultan and promoting
those friendly relations which tend to strengthen the Sulu alliance
and render this state a stronghold and a protecting wall against
invasion from foreign countries. He condemned the treaty of 1878 as
limiting the government's freedom of action and checking the progress
and success of the nation's policy.
He reiterated that there is great need and necessity of defining
the policy of the nation relative to Sulu and the Moro country in
general. Such a grave question should be settled on a firm basis
and should not be subject to the caprice of an individual governor
or commander of a war vessel. No opportunity should be allowed for
ignorance, malice, false pretexts, and ulterior motives that defame
the national honor, weaken the policy of the government, or work to
the detriment of the people and the country. He pointed to several
incidents of wrong conduct or imprudence on the part of officials which
provoked trouble and war and left on the Moros an impression that the
Spaniards were acting deceitfully and in bad faith. The general policy
he outlined for the information of the government and for the uniform
conduct of all officials was submitted in the form of recommendations,
the most important of which are briefly noted as follows:
1. The sultan and datus should be treated with respect and
consideration.
2. Immediate justice and impartiality should be strictly
administered and practiced in all cases and under all conditions,
especially when crime or outrage is committed against the Moros;
for such action would demonstrate in an impressive manner an
upright conduct which would command the fullest respect of the
Moros and obedience to law and order.
3. It is of the utmost importance that the belief, temples,
and cemeteries of the people be respected.
4. The speedy punishment of all Moro misconduct and aggression
should be secured through the datu or chief.
5. The fleet should make frequent visits to various islands to
familiarize the people with the flag, to map the country, and to
study conditions in general.
6. Religion should be fully tolerated in the same manner as in
India and Java. Proselytism should be prohibited.
7. The sultan should be invited to live in Jolo; an edifice
should be constructed for his residence which would increase his
dignity in the eyes of his people; and he should be given a high
office in connection with the government (as secretary) which
would engender and promote his interest in the government and
its welfare and secure needed and desirable coöperation between
officers and chiefs.
In conclusion, Giraudier pointed to the wisdom of English and Dutch
policy in affording education to the sons of native princes and
chiefs at public expense, to the necessity of large sacrifices at
the beginning which would be amply compensated for by a general
pacification of the Archipelago in the end.
VIEWS OF ESPINA
Colonel Espina assumed that retrogression was out of the question
and that the flag which was waving over Sulu must be defended and
supported. Sulu could not be abandoned to her fate and Spanish
sovereignty had inevitably to be exercised. Extermination of Moros
he held to be absurd and impossible, and measures so directed he
regarded as injurious and unwise. He entertained strong hopes,
amounting to actual conviction, that Moros could become Spanish in
political organization, sympathy, and civilization, and that their
religion did not form an obstacle to their reformation and assimilation
unless conversion into the Christian religion was insisted upon and
rigorously kept up. He thought that the cause of religion alone was
sufficient to prolong the war indefinitely and lead the Government to
a policy of extermination and failure. Instead of that he advised a
prudent and tolerant policy declaring absolute noninterference with
religion and hearty coöperation with the Sulus in matters of general
concern and public welfare. He considered it of great importance to
occupy all the principal islands of the Archipelago with garrisons
and to establish colonies and agricultural stations at the most
desirable localities and harbors. He wrote at considerable length
on the organization of a rural police force to maintain order and
carry out the various measures of his policy. He pointed out the
advisability of strengthening the authority of the sultan over Sulus,
of rendering his appointment subject to the approval or choice of the
Spanish Government, and of selecting a council of state loyal to the
Spanish Government and serving under salary. The chief features of
the policy he outlined are as follows:
1. The organization of the sultanate should be made or continued
in accordance with the laws and customs of the country, but in a
manner agreeable to the interests of the Spanish Government. Rank,
order, and religion should not be interfered with.
2. The sultan and members of the council of state should be
appointed by the Governor-General and should have salaries.
3. A new treaty should be made in order to rectify those clauses
of the treaty of 1878 pertaining to the maintenance of peace and
the guarantee of safety of life and property.
4. Slavery should be abolished, radically and thoroughly.
5. Compulsory tribunals of justice or courts should be established
to relieve datus and chiefs of the exercise of such functions.
6. Commerce should be encouraged and rendered free for all boats
for a period of twenty-five years.
7. Roads should be constructed to facilitate communication and
transportation from the central region of the island to its
principal harbors.
8. Agriculture should be developed and colonies encouraged.
9. Necessities should be created for the Moros, providing them
at the same time with means for satisfying them. Children of the
sultan and datus should be educated in Manila, and schools for
the Moro dialect should be established and made accessible to
the public.
PURPOSE OF SPAIN
A few closing remarks on the purpose and interests of Spain in Sulu and
the resources she had available for carrying out this purpose may not
be out of place in order to give the reader a clear idea of the final
policy which Spain had for Sulu and to enable him to grasp the scope,
complexity, and difficulties of this problem. However, in discussing
these subjects and the changes they were intended to bring about it
must be remembered that every project on the part of the sovereign
nation or Spain calls for consideration from two points of view--the
first is whether the agency employed was sufficient and adequate
to impose the change and carry it through; the second is the amount
of resistance such a project encountered on the part of the subject
nation or Sulu, and in case the resistance could be overcome, whether
or not a nation like that of the Sulus was developed sufficiently
for the requirements of the change and for subsequent adaptation to
the system it was proposed to inaugurate.
Inasmuch as the treaty of 1878 was not abrogated and no distinct
effort was actually made to disregard it, it should be regarded as the
official and most authentic expression of Spain's relation, rights,
and purpose in Sulu. The terms of this treaty gave Spain indisputable
sovereignty over Sulu, the right to occupy all necessary points and to
establish military garrisons wherever needed, the right to establish
custom-houses at occupied points, the right to limit or control the
importation of firearms, the right to suppress piracy and to demand
the Sultan's coöperation in its suppression.
The degree or amount of sovereignty Spain was to exercise over Sulu
was very indefinitely stated. The term "indisputable" does not signify
"complete," as some hasty reports on Moro affairs have expressed
it. The aim of the treaty was to exclude Great Britain, Germany, and
other foreign nations from the Spanish sphere of influence over Sulu,
and the word "indisputable" should be interpreted in this sense, which
is clearly expressed in the Sulu text of the treaty. At that time
there was no intention on the part of Spain to assume the control
of Sulu internal affairs and the Sulus endeavored to guard their
complete freedom and right to continue their political organization,
laws, and religion by specifying those powers which Spain had a right
to exercise over them and by declaring emphatically that all their
customs, usages, and religion should not be changed. The Sulu word for
"customs" signifies laws, organization, and administrative methods. It
is the political not the social sense of the word about which they were
so very particular. The treaty did not entitle Spain to interference,
or to institute any measure that tended toward political change or
reform in Sulu. The sultan was left supreme in the exercise of his
authority over Moros. The treaty simply secured undisputed Spanish
control over Sulu's foreign relations and commerce and incorporated
Sulu into the Philippine Archipelago in this sense only. It further
established peace within the Archipelago by checking any possible
revival of Sulu piracy. It appears that both distinguished governors,
Martinez and Parrado, interpreted the treaty in this sense, and the
Sulus certainly so understood it.
Two important steps were taken by Spain later than 1878 in order to
modify the relations established by the treaty. The first of these
steps was a resolution to appoint the Sultan of Sulu or control the
succession to this office. This occurred in 1886 when Sultan Harun
was declared by the Spanish Government, in answer to the requests
of Governor-General Terrero and Governor Arolas, as the legitimate
sultan. By this act the Madrid Government asserted its right to a
degree of actual sovereignty over Sulu internal affairs and backed its
assertion with the necessary force and partially carried it through
at the hands of Governor Arolas. Jamalul Kiram II finally recognized,
to a certain extent, Spain's authority in this matter and accepted
her right of approval or confirmation of the election.
The second step was an attempt to exact tribute from the Sulus. This
was done by a decree issued in 1894 by Governor-General Blanco
directing that a census be taken of Sulu and a poll tax of 1 "real"
per capita be collected. Advantage was taken at that time of the strong
desire of Raja Muda Amirul Kiram to become sultan. Sultan Harun was
persuaded to resign, and the measure adopted for the collection of the
tribute resulted in the payment of a sum of money or its equivalent by
Amirul Kiram and the latter's appointment as sultan. The scheme was a
compromise by which Spain attempted to assume more control over Sulu,
and Amirul Kiram secured his appointment as sultan without having
to go to Manila for this purpose. However, the attempt to impose a
tribute on the Sulus appears to have failed completely. No census
was taken and no tribute was asked in later years.
The purpose of Spain, in accordance with her official declarations,
may therefore be summed up as follows: 1. Complete control of Sulu
foreign relations; 2. Complete control of Sulu commerce; 3. The right
to appoint the sultan; 4. The right to impose tribute on the Sulus.
The first two propositions were legitimate and proper. Both could be
accomplished and retained by virtue of Spain's naval power, merchant
marine, and friendly foreign relations with the European nations. The
Sulus had no navy and no steam vessels. Their native boats could not
offer any significant resistance and were powerless to oppose the
Spanish navy. Ever since 1844 the latter was in the ascendant and by
1870 it had completely overpowered the Sulu naval forces. Both these
propositions were conceded to Spain in the treaty of 1878 and were
justly held ever since. They strengthened the unity of the Philippine
Archipelago and secured strength and permanent internal peace.
The third proposition, the right to appoint the sultan, was in effect
defeated. It was poor policy. At the end of the bloody struggle that
arose because if it, Spain retained only the right to confirm the
choice of the nation. Had Governor Arolas confined himself to this
point he would have won without a contest and without engendering
hostility and ill feeling toward his Government. Had a test of arms
been the sole arbiter of the question Governor Arolas might be said
to have won his point completely, for his forces defeated those of the
Sulus in every encounter; but the tenacity of purpose, persistence, and
patriotism of the Sulus outlived his determination, and what was won by
force and cruelty was given up in the end as inadvisable and impolitic.
The fourth proposition fell through. The best argument that can be
advanced in its favor is that a tribute was actually paid by the
Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1894 and that the tax was not imposed in
later years because of the extensive campaign conducted in Mindanao
and the frequent changes of Governor-General, and also because of
the Tagalog insurrection of 1896. Such argument is more in the nature
of an apology than a defense. There is some significance in exacting
tribute from the Sultan of Sulu, but the principal of the tribute was
utterly defeated. The sultan evidently evaded the question entirely as
soon as he felt secure in his office. Such a measure would certainly
have been opposed by the Sulus. They would have risen to a man and
sacrificed more life and treasure in this cause than in the previous
one of the appointment of their candidate for the sultanate. The nation
was somewhat divided in the former case, but in the matter of resisting
the payment of a tribute there was not a dissenting vote. They would
have fought most vigorously and unitedly. Governor Arolas did not
exhaust their fighting powers; they could have fought just as well in
1888 as in 1886-87. One party alone advanced against Jolo in 1895,
and a band attacked landing soldiers in 1897. To pay tribute to a
foreign power meant vassalage in their opinion, and this they could
not tolerate. They would fight, not on the strength of a careful and
intelligent estimate of their power as compared to that of Spain,
but because they would not tolerate the idea and their national honor
would prompt them to exhaust their strength before they would yield
to such a humiliating proposition. Their fighting power was only
one unit of their national resources; their national independence,
national character, unity and stability of organization were other
units which added considerable strength to their resistance. What
they could not defeat they would have left alone; what they could
not tolerate they would have evaded; what they could not evade they
would have run away from.
An exaggerated degree of honor and self-pride, uncontrolled by
a certain degree of intelligence, culture, and moral courage, is
dangerous. Courage unencumbered by prosperity or wealth and spurred
by abnormal religious sentiment, becomes desperate, reckless, and
fanatical. Moreover the treatment by a highly civilized nation of
another limited in culture and development is under moral restrictions
similar to those pertaining to the treatment by a man of mature age of
a minor. A minor can not be blamed for lack of mature reason, and no
more can be expected of him than he is able to do. He must further be
treated with equity and justice, though he is weak and helpless. It
was impossible for the Sulus to change their character at once. It
was absurd to expect of them any action contrary to their natural
disposition and national character. It was the duty of the sovereign
nation to recognize the national character of her inferior and treat
her wisely and justly. Tact might have been mightier than an army
and wise measures might have worked wonders. Nations can be educated
and can develop like individuals and force is a poor agent where the
carrying out of a certain measure is intended to bring about reform.
Spain imposed tribute upon the Sulus without being prepared to enforce
its collection and before the Sulus were ready for such a measure
and the relation it involved. Granting that the funds derived from
the tax were to be used for the benefit of the Sulus the principle
underlying the institution of the tax is repugnant to the people and
no means were used to remedy this feeling or train the people for
its tolerance. No savage or semicivilized nation can be reformed and
governed without initial expense, nor can reform be effected in a day,
although forces and funds are available in plenty.
RESOURCES OF SPAIN
In their bearing on the subject under consideration the resources of
Spain may be divided into three divisions--her fighting power, her
government machinery or system of government, and her racial influence.
Her fighting power includes all the forces of the army and navy which
she could bring to bear on Sulu and her ability to support them. The
largest Spanish force that ever assembled on the soil of Sulu was
that commanded by Governor-General Malcampo in the expedition of 1876;
this was estimated at from 9,000 to 11,000 troops. In January, 1888,
the military forces of the Philippine Islands numbered 12,800 men,
of whom 1,400 were Spaniards and the rest natives. Governor Arolas
never commanded more than 2,000 troops in his various expeditions
and never needed more than that number. A garrison force of 700 men
proved sufficient to repulse a general attack on Jolo in 1881. We may
therefore safely conclude that a force of 2,000 native troops stationed
in Sulu was sufficient for all purposes and considerations. Such a
force should have been kept in Sulu all the time. The moral effect
of maintaining it would be to suppress any attempt at opposition
and to check the tendency to mischief or rebellion. The fact that
there is a ready force behind an order or request prompts obedience
and conformity, before deceit or plots can have time to grow. Wise
measures are more effective and peace is assured. Besides, the honor
of the sovereign power is constantly maintained and no chances for
disregard or dishonor are allowed. Force back of a wise administrator
is a potent factor for good. It need not be used except rarely and
when absolutely necessary. Force is evil only when it is allowed to
rule the head of the administrator and, like every other agency, it is
good only when it is wisely directed. It was therefore necessary and,
in as far as it was needed to back a competent administration, it
should have been provided. Spain could have easily kept such a force
in Sulu all of the time. She had the troops and the means to support
them. She, however, did not do this, and only part of the time did
the Sulu garrison have the required strength. However, the facility
of transporting troops from Zamboanga to Jolo and the preponderance
of her naval forces reduced this deficiency to a minimum and the
fighting power of Spain may, as far as our purpose is concerned,
be deemed to have been adequate to rule Sulu.
The chief weakness in the Spanish régime lay in her system of
government. Her government machinery proved ineffective and
inadequate. No competent men were educated into the needs of the
situation and given permanent charge of Sulu affairs. Temporary
military commanders were put in command without the necessary
preparation for the requirements of the office. No special ability was
needed to conduct an office already organized, to execute laws already
established, or to carry out a system of government already laid out;
but it required higher abilities to establish sovereignty over a
new state like Sulu, lay down a definite, settled, and wise policy,
and carry out the regeneration and reform of a nation. Besides too
frequent changes in the office of Governor-General, the governors of
Sulu were also allowed too short terms. More than thirteen governors
ruled Sulu in the course of twenty-three years, from 1876 to 1899. Not
one of these felt that it was his duty to institute a permanent policy
for Sulu, or believed that he was going to stay long enough to carry it
through, and that he was going to be held responsible for its conduct,
whether it failed or succeeded.
The government of a state is entitled to as much consideration as
any business undertaking and there is no reason why it should not
be conducted on sound and businesslike principles. Such methods as
characterized the government of Sulu would have ruined any business
establishment and could not have done justice to any nation or body
of men it represented. The men in responsible positions trusted the
transmission of all official actions and communications to interpreters
of limited capacity and strength of character. No governor could
speak Sulu and verify the translation of his letters and orders. His
knowledge of Sulu affairs and his ideas and opinions were necessarily
colored by the opinions or designs of his interpreters. The strength of
Spain's assertion and declaration of her rights to rule Sulu, exclude
foreign interests, appoint the Sultan of Sulu, and impose tribute
on the Sulus was based on the meaning of the word "sovereignty"
which does not appear at all in the Sulu text of the treaty of
1878. The Sulu copy of the treaty uses in this connection the word
"agad" which means "follow." In the translation of this document from
Sulu into English a point was stretched and "agad" was interpreted as
"obey." While the Sultans of Sulu felt that they were independent and
free in their administration of Sulu internal affairs, and that they
were only obliged to give Spain preference, and ally themselves on her
side when foreign nations interfered, governors like Arolas read the
word "sovereignty" in the Spanish text and tried to inforce its full
and actual sense. The Sulus felt that the Spanish governors were thus
transgressing the limits of their authority, and the Spanish governors
thought at the same time that the Sulus were unreliable and deceitful,
a most undesirable and unfortunate condition of affairs.
The missionaries in the northern islands acted differently. They talked
the language of the natives and performed their duties creditably
and with unquestionable success. They understood the people, knew
their real conditions, sympathized with them, and worked out their
religious regeneration admirably. The governors of Sulu did not take
any such view of their duties; they had some zeal, but they lacked that
understanding of human nature and the forces of regeneration that the
missionaries mastered. They had no idea of how a Sulu law or custom
could be modified and reformed, for they never acquainted themselves
sufficiently with the laws and customs of the people and never paid
much attention to the feelings and public opinion of the Sulus. They
trusted every measure to force and could not think of reform without
compulsion. A missionary who observed the intense fear of demons on the
part of some pagan Filipinos converted several of them by means of a
picture of hell and satan, and gradually taught them the principles
of Christianity. But the governors of Sulu could never detect any
relation between Sulu and Spanish laws and could never find a method of
approach from one side to the other. Their form of government failed to
adapt itself to the conditions of the country and could neither merge
into the Sulu organization nor adapt the Sulu organization to its
system. No sympathies bound the two races or the two organizations,
and no foundation for unification and subsequent assimilation could
be laid. Spanish jurisdiction remained within the garrison, and its
machinery could find no application outside the walls of Jolo.
The amount of force needed to reduce and reform Sulu varies in
accordance with the policy pursued. Considerable light can be thrown
on this subject by a study of the circumstances and causes which gave
rise to Datus Ayunan, Mandi, Piang, Ara, and Pedro Cuevas or Kalun.
Datu Ayunan lived at Taviran and was much lower in rank and influence
than either the Sultan of Bagumbayan or Datu Utu. Having grievances
against Datu Utu he shrewdly allied himself with the Spanish forces and
rendered them valuable assistance. In a short time he rose to power,
dignity, and fame and died greater in the estimation of the country
than his overlord, the Sultan of Bagumbayan.
Datu Piang married the daughter of Datu Ayunan and learned his
methods. As soon as Datu Utu's attitude toward him became unbearable
and hostile he offered his services to the Spanish authorities and won
their protection and support. By shrewd tactics he dispossessed his
former master Utu of his best lands, attracted most of his following
and caused his downfall. At the time of the Spanish evacuation he had
become the richest Moro in Mindanao and the most influential chief
in the island.
Datu Ara had Chinese blood in him. He married his daughter to the
Gugu [224] of Magindanao, won the favor of the governor of Kotabato,
and ruled over all Moros on the southern branch of the Mindanao River
below Tamontaka. He was strong and well respected.
Datu Mandi married the daughter of a Samal chief of Zamboanga and
through his tact and ability to speak Spanish established for himself
a respectable position over the Samals of Mindanao. He served the
interests of Spain faithfully and bore arms in her behalf against
Bisayans and Lanao Moros. The recognition and support he obtained from
the Spanish Government raised him to the rank of a datu and gave him
supremacy over all the chiefs of the peninsula of Zamboanga. A close
observation of Datu Mandi's ability and attitude toward the government
renders it clear that the influence this man could bring to bear on
his people was immense. It is no exaggeration to state that had his
influence been tactfully utilized, he could have easily, with the aid
of one company of Spanish troops, reduced to submission all Moros and
Subanuns living between Point Flechas and Sindangan on the outskirts
of Dapitan. There never existed a Moro chief more tactful, pliable,
forceful, and favorable to the reorganization of the Moro community
and its system of government along modern and civilized lines.
With little aid from the governor of Zamboanga, Pedro Cuevas made
himself the real lord of northern Basilan. His power was further well
respected throughout all the Basilan Group of islands. With no more
than two companies of troops at his disposal he could have acted as
the Spanish representative and subordinate ruler or governor of all
the Basilan and Balangingi Groups of islands and could have effected
any reform desired.
By tact and ability these men obtained Spanish influence and support
and rose from the lowest ranks of the people to positions of great
power and dignity. Had the Spanish Government employed such men to
further its influence by enlarging their following and extending
their territories and spheres of activity, there is no doubt that
a very significant step would have been taken which would have made
clear to the Spanish authorities successful methods of procedure and
new lines of policy that lead to success.
Similar lines of action could have been adopted in Sulu by taking
advantage of existing parties and factions. Once the sympathy of
one Sulu party was obtained and its forces bore arms on behalf of
or on the same side with Spain, the door would have been opened for
effective influence and wise measures directed along the line of
cleavage would have been bound to produce results. A minimum of force
would then be needed, and strained relations and discord would give
way to friendship and concord. The history of Sulu is not wanting
in proof that wise attractive methods have been more effective than
force and arbitrary rule, and, once we reflect upon Abu Bakr's rule
and the wonderful reformation he worked out, then we realize what
was and what was not a wise policy for Sulu.
Little attention has, as a rule, been given to race characteristics
as a potent factor in a nation's policy. The racial character of
the sovereign nation bears on the ruled nation in several ways--in
the conduct and demeanor of officials in their official and social
relations with the chiefs and common people, in the demeanor of
soldiers and civilians in their social intercourse with the mass of the
people, and in the industrial or business relations of the two nations.
The Sulu datus and chiefs are very courteous and polite and
are unusually keen to notice personal discourtesy. Impulsive and
unconciliatory methods are bitterly resented, and an abrupt manner
may in itself be sufficient to defeat any measure. The people in
general have no patience with an impetuous officer and hate to be
discourteously treated even by their datus. Treated with disrespect
by the authorities or disregarded by the ruling race, they become
exclusive, evasive, indifferent, unsympathetic, and discontented. The
ruling race can be polite, courteous, and civil in all its social
relations with those under it and yet retain its racial supremacy
and social position, and win the respect and submission of the ruled
race. If ordinary civil duties require good breeding and good manners,
the duties of the Spanish officer toward the native chiefs certainly
demanded the highest qualities of a gentleman and the most sympathetic,
upright, and firm disposition possible. Many Spanish officers possessed
these qualities and conducted their offices with full dignity and
credit, but it can not be said that all officers were so fully
qualified. Such facts in themselves are sufficient to determine the
quality of the person to whom state affairs in Sulu should be trusted.
Further, the reform of a nation can never be fully accomplished without
the aid of her chiefs and leaders. The coöperation of the natives is a
very potent factor for good, and a system of government which aims at
the elevation of a conquered nation must find a place in its machinery
for the activities of natives of ability and influence. Hence the
necessity of successful coöperation with natives and the importance
of securing higher qualifications in men holding the highest offices
of government. The fewer such officers are and the abler they are,
the better and safer the result will be. Such men can overcome racial
prejudices and national sentiments and grievances and by the manner in
which they discharge their duties, they can command the approval and
respect of the ruled nation, gain its sympathies to the side of the
government, and maintain peace, prosperity, and good relations between
the governing and the governed nations. However, these results were
not obtained by Spain in Sulu. The religion and racial prejudices of
the two nations were never overcome and the Sulus maintained a feeling
of revulsion and distrust toward Spaniards and Christian Filipinos.
Great aid is rendered the government when the ruling race is competent
and resourceful enough to utilize the services of the ruled race and
at the same time give it sufficient space and latitude for the exercise
of its energies and the satisfaction of its ambitions. A most favorable
industrial relation can be maintained, if the capital of the sovereign
nation can find opportunities to invest in the conquered territory,
buy up its crude products, and promote its natural resources. The
natives then find work to do, increase in prosperity, and look upon
the existence of the ruling race as favorable for their development
and progress, but in case the subjugated nation is crowded out of its
territories and robbed of its resources by keen competition, greed,
or undue domination on the part of the ruling race, hostilities are
bound to arise and disaffection extends from industrial relations to
politics and may lead to trouble and rebellion.
Many Spaniards seemed to regard Sulu as a very desirable country for
colonization and offered many suggestions as to the most favorable
sites for factories, the best industries that could be developed,
and the best methods and means of exploitation. Several farms were
started in the vicinity of Jolo, but they were abandoned even before
the evacuation of the islands, and no effective step can be said to
have been taken by Spain to colonize Sulu except the building up of the
town of Jolo itself. This subject has therefore played no important
part in the policy exercised by Spain in Sulu and very little can be
said in this connection. It must, however, be stated that the lands
of the Archipelago of Sulu are extremely limited in area and should
have been reserved for the Sulus. Perfect disinterestedness should
have been exhibited by the Spaniards in this regard. [225]
APPENDIXES TO PART II
APPENDIX I
THE PACIFICATION OF MINDANAO BY RONQUILLO
[Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609.] [226]
Shortly after Don Francisco Tello had taken over the governorship,
news was brought of the death of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa in
Mindanao by Brother Gaspar Gomez of the Society of Jesus. The latter
brought the body for burial in the college of Manila, of which Don
Esteban was patron. Juan de la Xara wrote that he had charge of
affairs, that he had settled in Tampakan, [227] that he intended to
continue the pacification and conquest of the island as should seem
most advisable, and that reënforcements of men and other things should
be sent him. It was learned that he intended to make an ill use of
the government, and would not remain dependent on, and subordinate
to, the governor of the Philippines; and that he was depriving the
heirs of Esteban Rodriguez of what lawfully belonged to them. It
was learned that, in order to make himself safer in this respect,
he was sending his confidants to the town of Arévalo in Oton where
Don Esteban had left his wife, Doña Ana de Osseguera, and his two
small daughters, with his house and property, to persuade Doña Ana
to marry him. This resolution appeared injurious in many respects,
and the attempt was made to rectify matters. But in order not to
disturb the affairs of Mindanao, the matter was left alone for the
present, until time should show the course to be followed. And so it
happened that when Juan de la Xara left the camp and settlements of
Mindanao, and came hurriedly to Oton to negotiate his marriage in
person--although the widow of Don Esteban had never been favorable
to it--Don Francisco Tello sent men to arrest him. He was brought to
Manila, where he died while his trial was being conducted.
After the imprisonment of Juan de la Xara, Don Francisco Tello
immediately sent Captain Toribio de Miranda to Mindanao, with orders to
take command of the camp and to govern until some one should agree
to continue the enterprise. When he arrived at Mindanao and the
soldiers saw that Juan de la Xara's schemes had been defeated, and
that the latter was a prisoner in Manila, with no hope of returning,
they obeyed Toribio de Miranda and the orders that he brought.
In Manila the governor was considering carefully the necessary
measures for continuing the war, since the island of Mindanao was so
near the other pacified islands, and the island itself contained some
provinces that professed peace and were apportioned as encomiendas
and had Spanish magistrates, such as the rivers of Butuan, Dapitan,
and Karaga, so that it was desirable to pacify the whole island and
subject it to His Majesty. The royal treasury was spent and could
not bear the expense; and Esteban Rodriguez had bound himself by a
legal writ to carry the war to entire completion at his own expense,
in accordance with the terms of his agreement. The guardian of his
children and heirs brought the matter before the court, and refused
to fulfill this obligation on account of Esteban Rodriguez's death. In
order not to lose time, for what had been commenced had to be continued
in one way or another, the governor decided to prosecute it, drawing
the necessary funds from the royal treasury, either on its own account
or on the account of Esteban Rodriguez's heirs, if such should be
according to law. The governor then searched for a person to go to
Mindanao, and selected Don Juan Ronquillo, general of the galleys. The
latter was given the necessary reënforcements of men and other things,
with which he reached Mindanao. He took command of the Spanish camp and
fleet which he found in Tampakan. He confirmed the peace and friendship
with the chiefs and people of Tampakan and Lumagan, restored and set
in better order the Spanish settlement and fort, and began to make
preparation for the war against the people of Bwayan. [228] He spent
many days in making a few incursions into their land and attacks on
their forts, but without any notable result, for the enemy were many
and all good soldiers, with plenty of arquebuses and artillery, and
had fortified themselves in a strong position. They had many other
fortifications inland and went from one to the other with impunity,
whenever they wished, and greatly harassed the Spaniards, who were
little used to so swampy a country. The latter found themselves short
of provisions without the possibility of getting them in the country
on account of the war, inasmuch as the camp contained many men,
both Spaniards and the native servants and boatmen, and it was not
easy at all times to come and go from one part to another in order
to provide necessities.
Meanwhile Don Juan Ronquillo, seeing that the war was advancing very
slowly and with little result, and that the camp was suffering, drew up
a report of it, and sent letters in all haste to Governor Don Francisco
Tello, informing him of the condition of affairs. He wrote that it
would be better to withdraw the camp from Mindanao River, so that
it might not perish; and that a presidio could be established on the
same island in the port of La Caldera, which could be left fortified,
in order not to abandon this enterprise entirely, and so that their
friends of Tampakan and Lumagan might be kept hostile to the people of
Bwayan. Meanwhile he and the rest of the camp and fleet would return
to Manila, if permitted, for which he requested the governor to send
him an order quickly. Upon the receipt of this dispatch, Governor Don
Francisco Tello resolved to order Don Juan Ronquillo, since the above
was so and the camp could not be maintained, nor the war continued
advantageously, to withdraw with his whole camp from Mindanao River. He
was first to make a great effort to chastise the enemy in Bwayan, and
then to burn the Spanish settlement and fort and go to La Caldera,
fortify it, and leave there a sufficient garrison with artillery,
boats, and provisions for its maintenance and service. Then he was
to return to Manila with the rest of his men, after telling their
friends in Tampakan that the Spaniards would shortly return to the
river better equipped and in great numbers.
Silonga [229] and other chiefs of Bwayan were not neglecting their
defense, since, among other measures taken, they had sent a chief
to Ternate to ask assistance against the Spaniards who had brought
war into their homes. Thereupon the King of Ternate dispatched a
numerous fleet of caracoas and other boats to Mindanao with cachils
[230] and valiant soldiers--more than 1,000 fighting men in all--and
a quantity of small artillery, in order to force the Spaniards to
break camp and depart, even could they do nothing else. When the news
reached Bwayan that this fleet was coming to their defense and support,
they made ready and prepared to attack the Spaniards, who also having
heard the same news were not careless. Consequently the latter turned
their attention more to the main fort, and reduced the number of men
in the smaller forts on Butil [231] River and other posts, mouths,
and arms of the same river. These served to strengthen the garrison of
the main fort and the armed galleys and other smaller craft, in order
to use the latter to resist the expected attack of the enemy. The
enemy having gallantly advanced to the very fort of the Spaniards
with all their vessels and men, attacked and stormed it with great
courage and resolution, in order to effect an entrance. The Spaniards
within resisted valiantly, and those outside in the galleys on the
river assisted them so effectively that together, with artillery and
arquebuses, and at times in close combat with swords and kampilan,
they made a great slaughter and havoc among the men of Ternate and
those of Bwayan, who were aiding the former. They killed and wounded a
great number of them and captured almost all the caracoas and vessels
of the enemy, so that very few boats escaped, and they were pursued
and burned by the Spaniards, who made many prisoners and seized immense
booty and many weapons from the enemy. As soon as possible after this,
the Spaniards turned against the settlements and forts of Bwayan where
some of their results were of so great moment that the enemy, seeing
themselves hard pressed and without anyone to help them, sent messages
and proposals of peace to Don Juan Ronquillo, which were ended by their
rendering recognition and homage, and the renewal of friendship with
the people of Tampakan, their ancient enemy. In order to strengthen
the friendship, they sealed it by the marriage of the greatest chief
and lord of Bwayan with the daughter of another chief of Tampakan,
called Dungunlibur. Thereupon the war was apparently completely ended,
provisions were now to be had, and the Spaniards with little precaution
crossed and went about the country wherever they wished. The people of
Bwayan promised to dismantle all their forts immediately, for that was
one of the conditions of peace. Then the Spaniards returned to their
fort and settlements at Tampakan, whence Don Juan Ronquillo immediately
sent dispatches to Governor Don Francisco Tello, informing him of the
different turn that the enterprise had taken. In view of the present
condition he requested the governor to issue new instructions as to
his procedure, saying that he would wait without making any change,
notwithstanding the arrival of the answer which he expected to his
first report, for conditions had now become so much better than before
that the governor's decision would be different.
The governor had already answered Don Juan Ronquillo's first dispatch,
as we have said above, when the second dispatch arrived with news
of the successes in Mindanao. Suspicious of the men in the camp who
had constantly shown a desire to return to Manila, and little relish
for the hardships of war, and fearing lest they would return at the
arrival of the first order, executing that order and abandoning the
enterprise which had reached such a satisfactory stage; and thinking
that it would be unwise to abandon the river, the governor made haste
to send a second dispatch immediately by various roads, ordering them
to pay no attention to his first orders, but to remain in Mindanao, and
that he would soon send them what was necessary for further operations.
It seems that this message traveled slowly; for, the first having
arrived, they obeyed it without any further delay, and camp was
raised and the country abandoned. To their former enemy of Bwayan
they gave as a reason that the governor of Manila had summoned them;
and to their friends of Tampakan they said that they would leave
men in La Caldera for their security, and that assistance would be
sent them from Manila. This news caused as much sorrow and sadness
to the latter as joy to the people of Bwayan. Then, after burning
their fort and settlement, the Spaniards embarked all their forces as
soon as possible, left the river, and went to La Caldera, 24 leagues
farther down in the direction of Manila. Having entered port, they
built a fortress and left there a garrison of 100 Spaniards, with
some artillery, provisions, and boats for their use.
At this juncture the governor's second message to General Don Juan
Ronquillo arrived, to which the latter replied that he was already
in La Caldera, and could not return to the river. Then, without any
further delay, Don Juan Ronquillo went to Manila with the balance of
his fleet, by way of the Provinces of Oton and Panay. The governor,
having heard of his coming, sent to arrest him on the road before
he entered the city, and proceeded against him by law for having
withdrawn the camp and army from Mindanao River, without awaiting the
orders he should have expected after the favorable turn that affairs
had taken. Don Juan Ronquillo was set at liberty on showing a private
letter from the governor, which the latter had sent him separately
with the first instructions, to the effect that he should return
to Manila with his troops in any event, for they were needed in the
Islands for other purposes; and because of this letter Don Juan had
determined not to await the second order.
APPENDIX II
THE PACIFICATION OF MINDANAO [232]
[Concerning the pacification of the Island of Mindanao in the
year 1600.] [233]
In the relation of the last year you will have learned how occurred
the death, in the pacification of the Island of Mindanao, of Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa, who offered to carry out this pacification
under the conditions which he stipulated with Gomez Perez Dasmariñas,
formerly governor of these islands, copies of which were sent
to His Majesty and to Master-of-Camp Juan de Lajara, formerly of
the said expedition, who succeeded to his place when the camp was
abandoned, and came to Manila. Don Francisco Tello, Governor and
Captain-General of the said Philippine Islands, who at that time
had taken possession of the government, was considering how to aid
and stimulate the said pacification at the expense of the heirs
of Esteban Rodriguez, and with the agreement of the captains and
persons who were long resident and experienced in war in the said
islands. Don Juan Ronquillo was appointed commander of the galleys
to prosecute the said pacification, and in the meantime, in order to
be present and continue the expedition, Capt. Toribio de Miranda was
sent forward to encourage and animate the troops, under orders to
keep them in his charge; and in case the post should be abandoned,
and a retreat made to Manila, he should detain the troops and return
to Mindanao. The said Capt. Toribio de Miranda having arrived at the
Island [234] of La Caldera, which lies 40 leagues from the river of
Mindanao, there found the whole camp, which was returning from the said
islands. Conformably to the orders which he had, he turned back and
fortified the site where they had first been, which was on the river,
4 leagues from the forts of the enemy. Juan Ronquillo, having been
dispatched to Mindanao, had taken the camp in his charge, and begun
to achieve some success. He achieved a victory in the battle which he
fought with the Ternatans, who had entered with 800 men to give aid
to the people of Mindanao. Before these successes, he had written a
letter in disparagement of that country (a copy of which was sent to
His Majesty), on account of which, in a council of war which had been
held, the General Don Ronquillo had been ordered to make a last effort
against the Mindanaos, doing them all possible damage. He was then to
come to the Island [235] of La Caldera and there build a fort, to be
garrisoned with a hundred Spanish soldiers, with artillery, arms, and
munitions, and leave them there as a check upon Ternate and Mindanao,
in charge of a good soldier, one of the captains of the camp, and
with the rest return to Manila. Although Don Juan Ronquillo received
this order, after having won considerable victories, he again wrote
that he would not abandon that place, even if such were the order,
because it would not be expedient to retire from the camp and comply
with what had been ordered, when he was leaving the Island of Mindanao
already pacified, the chiefs, with whom he had used gentle means, that
they might all be more contented, having again rendered submission to
His Majesty, and likewise as the King of Sulu again rendered obedience
and submission. Confiding in this, Capt. Cristobal Villagra, whom Don
Juan Ronquillo had appointed commander of the garrison of La Caldera,
had sent 30 soldiers to the Island of Sulu for supplies. They found at
this time in Jolo a Mindanao chief, an uncle of the King of Mindanao
and a brother-in-law of the King of Sulu, who had been driven out
of Mindanao because he was rebellious. He treacherously killed 13
Spanish soldiers. When news of this was brought, Juan Pacho was
sent to take the troops of La Caldera in charge, and, when it should
seem best to him, to try to inflict punishment with 600 Spaniards;
the enemy unfortunately killed the said Juan Pacho and 29 Spaniards,
the rest of them retiring without any success. This news having come
to the governor, he sent in place of Juan Pacho, Capt. Toribio de
Miranda, a person in whom he had entire confidence, with an order not
to attempt any punishment until he had force enough for it. After
this Capt. Toribio de Miranda arrived at La Caldera on the 26th of
August, 1599. When the garrison was given into his charge he put
the defensive works in order, and with the arms which he brought,
and those which he found in the fort, he armed all the troops,
amounting to 114 soldiers. As directed by an order of the governor,
he sent a chief of the Pintados [Bisayans] to Mindanao with letters to
the chiefs of the island, in which he informed them that they would be
protected, favored, and upheld in justice, as vassals of His Majesty,
and that with this object a garrison had been placed in La Caldera;
and that to aid in maintaining it, and in covering the expenses which
they had caused in the war by their disobedience, the largest possible
quantity of tributes would be collected for His Majesty, and that he
would send for them shortly, which had not been done earlier because
the Mindanaos had been so spent and afflicted. Having arrived on the
2d of September at the river of Mindanao, and delivered his dispatch,
this chief was well received, and found the people in the settled
state in which Gen. Don Juan Ronquillo had left them. Raja Muda,
the main chief of Mindanao, in the name of them all, sent him back
on the 15th of the said month, offering to give to His Majesty all
the tribute which they could collect.
At this time news from the chief captain of Malacca having reached the
governor, to the effect that in the Sunda, [236] 150 leagues from that
port, there had been seen a number of English ships, whose designs were
not known; and, a little later, word from the commander of the fort of
Maluco that there were at Ternate, within the port, two English ships
with 400 men and 50 pieces of artillery; a council of war was held
as to what was best to do. The said council decided to withdraw the
garrison from La Caldera to Cebu, so that the enemy should not take
that place; and, if they should attempt to do damage to that province,
they would find it in a state of defense. Accordingly an order was
sent to Capt. Toribio de Miranda to withdraw with the troops, arms,
artillery, and munitions, dismantling the fort; he was also told that
he could return shortly to the island; with more troops and arms, in
order to assist in its defense. On the 9th of September Capt. Toribio
de Miranda arrived at Cebu, with all the troops, artillery, arms,
and munitions; and at the same time Gen. Don Juan Tello arrived at
Cebu with a hundred men, who came as reënforcement from the city
of Manila. Having spent six months there and commenced to build a
fort of stone, the governor, as they had no more news of the English
referred to, sent an order to the said Don Juan to come to the city
of Manila--which he did with the hundred men. leaving the Province
of Cebu in a prosperous condition, with the troops which are usually
kept there, and those of the garrison of La Caldera, which in all
amounted to 250 Spaniards.
After all this, in June of 1600, the governor received news, by way
of Malacca, that the ships which had passed to the South Sea belonged
to Dutch merchants, who had come to load with spices in the Maluco
Islands. Having transacted their business, they had returned to their
own country by way of India, without doing any damage to the islands
of the west; it therefore seems that we are safe, notwithstanding
the news received of those enemies.
APPENDIX III
THE MORO RAIDS OF 1599 AND 1600
[Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609.] [237]
The Spanish garrison left in La Caldera, at the withdrawal of Don
Ronquillo's camp from the river of Mindanao, passed into command
of Captain Villagra at the death of Capt. Juan Pacho in Jolo, and
was suffering for lack of provisions; for neither the people of the
river could give them to the Spaniards, nor would the Sulus furnish
any on account of the war declared upon them. Therefore the garrison
urgently requested Governor Don Francisco Tello either to aid their
presidio with provisions, soldiers, and ammunition, or to allow them
to retire to Manila--a thing of which they were most desirous--since
there they gained no other special result than that of famine, and
of incarceration in that fort, and of no place wherein to seek their
sustenance. The governor, in view of their insistence in the matter,
and having but little money in the royal exchequer, with which to
provide for and maintain the said presidio and for the same reason
the punishment that was to be inflicted upon the Sulus for their
outrages upon the Spaniards, and their insurrection was deferred--and
thinking that the return to Mindanao matters would be a long question,
he was inclined to excuse the difficulty and anxiety of maintaining the
presidio of La Caldera. In order to do it with a reasonable excuse he
consulted the Audiencia and other intelligent persons, and requested
them to give him their opinion. But he first communicated his wishes
to them and gave them some reasons with which he tried to persuade
them to give him the answer that he desired. The Audiencia advised him
not to remove or raise the garrison of La Caldera, but to reënforce
and maintain it, and to attend to the affairs of Sulu and the river
of Mindanao as soon as possible, even if what was necessary for those
two places should be withdrawn from some other section. They said that
this was the most urgent need, and the one which required the greatest
attention in the islands, both in order to pacify those provinces and
to keep them curbed; lest, seeing the Spaniards totally withdrawn,
they should gain courage and boldly venture still farther and come
down to make captures among the Pintados [Bisayans] and carry the
war to the very doors of the Spaniards. Notwithstanding this reply
the governor resolved to raise and withdraw the garrison, and sent
orders to Captain Villagra immediately to burn the fort which had
been built in La Caldera, to withdraw with all his men and ships,
and return to Manila. This was quickly done, for the captain and the
soldiers of the garrison waited for nothing more than to dismantle
the fort and leave. When the Sulus saw the Spaniards abandoning the
country, they were persuaded that the latter would return to Mindanao
no more, and that they had not sufficient forces to do so. Thereupon
they gained fresh resolution and courage, and united with the people
of Bwayan on the river, and equipped a number of caracoas and other
craft, in order to descend upon the coast of Pintados (Bisayas)
to plunder them and make captives. The people of Tampakan, who
lost hope of receiving further help from the Spaniards, and of the
latter's return to the river, since they had also abandoned the fort
of La Caldera and left the country, came to terms with and joined
the people of Bwayan, their neighbors, in order to avoid the war and
injuries that they were suffering from the latter. Then all turned
their arms against the Spaniards, promising themselves to make many
incursions into their territory and gain much plunder. Accordingly
they prepared their fleet and appointed as leaders and commanders of
it two of the experienced chiefs of the river of Mindanao, called
Sali and Silungan. [238] They left the Mindanao River in the month
of July of the year 1599, in the season of the vendabals, [239]
with 50 caracoas, containing more than 3,000 soldiers armed with
arquebuses, kampilan, carasas, [240] other weapons with handles, and
many culverins, and steered toward the islands of Oton and Panay, and
neighboring islands. They passed Negros Island and went to the river
of Panay, which they ascended for 5 leagues to the chief settlement,
where the alcalde-mayor and some Spaniards were living. They sacked
the settlement, burned the houses and churches, captured many native
Christians--men, women, and children--upon whom they committed many
murders, cruelties, and outrages. They pursued these in boats more
than 10 leagues up the river, and destroyed all the crops. For the
alcalde-mayor, and those who could, fled inland among the mountains,
and accordingly the enemy had a better opportunity to do what they
pleased. After they had burned all the vessels in the river, they
left the river of Panay with their boats laden with pillaged goods
and captive Christians. They did the same in the other islands and
towns which they passed. Then they returned to Mindanao, without
any opposition being offered, with a quantity of gold and goods and
more than 800 captives, besides the people whom they had killed. In
Mindanao they divided the spoil, and agreed to get ready a larger
fleet for the next year, and return to make war better prepared. [241]
This daring attack of the Mindanaos worked great injury to the Pintado
Islands [Bisayas], both on account of their deeds there and also on
account of the fear and terror with which they inspired the natives;
because of the latter being in the power of the Spaniards, who kept
them subject, tributary, and disarmed, and neither protected them from
their enemies, nor left them the means to defend themselves, as they
used to do when there were no Spaniards in the country. Therefore many
towns of peaceful and subjected Indians revolted and withdrew to the
tingues, [242] and refused to descend to their houses, magistrates,
and encomenderos. [243] As was reported daily, they all had a great
desire to revolt and rebel, but they were appeased and reduced
again to subjection by a few promises and presents from their
encomenderos and religious who showed great pity and sadness over
their injuries. Although in Manila people regretted these injuries,
and still more those which were expected in the future from the enemy,
they did nothing but regret them--since the governor was ill provided
with ships and other necessities for the defense--and reckon them
with the loss which they had suffered for having raised the camp on
the river of Mindanao and dismantled the presidio of La Caldera.
As soon as the weather permitted, the Mindanaos and Sulus returned
with a large fleet of more than 70 well-equipped ships and more than
4,000 fighting men, led by the same Silungan and Sali, and other
Mindanao and Sulu chiefs, to the same Islands of Pintados [Bisayas],
with the determination of taking and sacking the Spanish town of
Arévalo, which is situated in Oton. Capt. Juan García de Sierra,
alcalde mayor of that province, having heard of this expedition and
of the designs entertained by the enemy, took the most necessary
precautions, and gathering into the town all the Spaniards who
lived there and in its neighborhood, shut himself up in it with
all of them. Then, having repaired, as well as possible, a wooden
fort there, he gathered there the women and their possessions. He
and the Spaniards--about 70 men--armed with arquebuses, awaited the
enemy. The latter, who intended to attack the river of Panay again,
passed Negros Island and made for the town of Arévalo, where they
anchored close to the native settlement. Then they landed 1,500 men
armed with arquebuses, kampilan, and carasas, and, without stopping
on the way marched against the Spanish town which was the object of
their attack. The Spaniards, divided into troops, sallied forth and
opened fire with their arquebuses upon the enemy with such vehemence
that they forced them to retreat and take refuge on board their
caracoas. So great was the enemy's confusion that many Mindanaos
were killed before they could embark. Capt. Juan García de Sierra,
who was on horseback, pursued the enemy so closely to the water's edge
that the latter cut off the legs of his mount with their kampilan and
brought him to the ground, where they killed him. The enemy embarked
with a heavy loss of men, and halted at the Island of Gimarás, [244]
in sight of Arévalo. There they counted their men, including the dead
and the wounded, who were not a few, and among whom was one of the
most noted chiefs and leaders. Then they sailed for Mindanao, making
a great show of grief and sorrow, and sounding their bells [245]
and tifas. [246] They made no further delay at Pintados [Bisayas],
deriving little profit or gain from the expedition but much injury,
and loss of men and reputation, which was felt more deeply upon their
arrival in Sulu and Mindanao. In order to remedy this disaster, it
was proposed to renew their expedition against the Pintados at the
first monsoon with more ships and men, and it was so decided.
APPENDIX IV
GALLINATO'S EXPEDITION TO JOLO
[Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Dr. Antonio de Morga, Mexico,
1609.] [247]
The daring and audacity of the Mindanaos and Sulus in making incursions
with their fleets into the Islands of Pintados [Bisayas] had reached
such a state that it was now expected that they would come as far as
Manila, plundering and devastating. In order to check them, at the
beginning of the year 1602, Governor Don Francisco Tello, deriving
strength from weakness, determined that the expedition against Sulu
should be made at once, without more delay, in order to punish and
pacify it, with the forces and men whom Capt. and Sargento-mayor
Juan Xuarez Gallinato held in Cebu and in the Pintados [Bisayas]
together with more men, ships, and provisions, which were sent him,
accompanied by the necessary documents and instructions for him
to enter the island, chastise its king and inhabitants, and pacify
and reduce it to the obedience of his Majesty. By this means, until
there should be an opportunity to settle the affairs of Mindanao,
which is quite near Sulu, the audacity of the enemy would be checked;
and by bringing the war into his own country, he would not come out
to commit depredations. Captain Gallinato set out on this expedition
with 200 Spanish soldiers, ships, artillery, enough provisions for four
months--the time which it was thought the expedition would last--and
with Indians as rowers for the ships and for other services that might
arise. When he arrived at Sulu, at the bar of the river of this island,
which is 2 leagues from the principal town and dwellings of the king,
he landed his men, artillery, and the necessary provisions and left
his ships under a sufficient guard. The islanders were all in the town
and dwellings of the king, which are situated on a very high hill above
some cliffs, and have two roads of approach through paths and roads so
narrow that they can be reached only in single file. They had fortified
the whole place, intrenched it with palms and other woods and a number
of culverins. They had also collected provisions and water for their
sustenance, besides a supply of arquebuses and other weapons. They
had neither women nor children with them, for they had taken them out
of the island. They had requested aid from the people of Mindanao,
Bruney, and Ternate, and were awaiting the same, since they had been
informed of the fleet which was being prepared against them in the
Pintados [Bisayas]. Gallinato determined to pitch his camp near the
town before this aid should arrive, and to attack the fort. After he
had quartered himself at a distance of one-half league, in a plain
facing the ascent, he sent interpreters with messages to the king and
chiefs of the island, calling on them to surrender, and telling them
that good terms would be given them. While waiting for an answer,
he fortified his quarters in that spot, intrenching himself wherever
necessary. He mounted the artillery in the best position for use,
and kept his men ready for any emergency. A false and deceptive answer
was returned, making excuses for the excesses that had been committed,
and for not complying just then with what had been asked of them, and
making loud promises to do so later. All this was with the object of
detaining the captain in that place, which is very unhealthy, until the
rains should set in, his provisions run short, and the arrival of the
expected aid. After this answer had been received the Sulus, thinking
that the Spaniards had become more careless on account of it, swarmed
down quickly from the said fort in a large body of probably somewhat
over one thousand; and armed with arquebuses and other weapons with
handles, kampilan, and caraças, attacked and assaulted the quarters
and camp of the Spaniards. This could not be done so secretly as not
to be seen by the Spaniards and allow them opportunity to prepare
to receive the Sulus before their arrival. This the Spaniards did,
and having permitted the natives to come all together in a body to
the very inside of the quarters and trenches, as soon as the Sulus
had discharged their arquebuses the Spaniards opened fire upon them,
first with their artillery, and then with their arquebuses, killing
many, and forcing the rest to retire in flight to the fort. The
Spaniards pursued them, wounding and killing to the middle of the
hill. But seeing that farther on the paths were so narrow and rough,
they retreated before the heavy artillery fire from the heights
and the large stones hurled down upon them and returned to their
quarters. Upon many other days efforts were made to reach the fort,
but without any result. Thereupon Gallinato, in consideration of the
war being prolonged beyond what had been expected, built two forts,
one where he kept his ships in order to defend them and the port;
and the other one-half league farther on in a suitable place where
they could take refuge and communicate with the camp. The forts were
built of wood and fascines and fortified with the artillery from the
ships. The Spaniards shut themselves up in these forts, whence from
time to time they sallied, making incursions as far as the enemy's
fort. The latter always remained shut up in their fort without ever
choosing to come down or to yield; for he was convinced that the
Spaniards could not remain long in the island. When Gallinato saw that
the rains were fast setting in, that his men were becoming ill, and
that his provisions were failing without his having accomplished the
desired task, and that it could not be accomplished with his remaining
resources, and that the enemy from Mindanao with other allies of theirs
were boasting that they were gathering a large fleet in order to drive
the Spaniards from Jolo, he sent news of all that had occurred to the
governor of Manila, with a plan of the island and fort and a relation
of the difficulties which the enterprise presented. He sent this in a
vessel, by Capt. and Sargento-mayor Pedro Cotelo de Morales, toward the
end of May of the year 1602, in order to obtain instructions as to his
procedure, and the necessary reënforcement of men and provisions. The
captain was charged to return quickly with the answer. * * *
At the same time that Governor Don Pedro de Acuña entered upon
his administration, the captain and sargento-mayor, Pedro Cotelo
de Morales, arrived from Jolo with the advices and report of Juan
Xuarez Gallinato concerning the state of affairs in that island,
whither he had gone with the fleet at the beginning of that same
year. The governor, on account of the importance of the matter,
wished to make every effort possible, and determined to send him
supplies and a reënforcement of some men, which he did as soon as
possible. He was ordered to at least make an effort to punish that
enemy, even if he could do nothing more, and whenever the opportunity
presented itself, to go to do the same thing in the river of Mindanao,
and return to the Pintados [Bisayas]. When this commission reached
Jolo Gallinato was already so worn out, and his men so ill, that the
reënforcements only made it possible for him to get away from there;
accordingly without seeing to another thing, he broke camp, burned the
forts which he had built, embarked, and went to Pintados, leaving the
people of that Island of Sulu and their neighbors, those of Mindanao,
emboldened more than ever to make raids against the Pintados, and
the islands within, which they did.
The governor, without delaying any longer in Manila, hastily started
for the Island of Panay and the town of Arévalo, in a galliot and
other small vessels, to see their needs with his own eyes, in order to
provide for them. He left war matters in Manila, during his absence, in
charge of Licentiate Don Antonio de Ribera, auditor of the Audiencia.
As soon as the governor left Manila, the auditor had plenty to look
after, because a squadron of 20 caracoas and other vessels from
Mindanao entered the islands as far as the Island of Luzon and its
coasts, making captures. Having taken some ships bound from Cebu
to Manila, they captured 10 Spaniards in them, among them a woman
and a priest and Capt. Martin de Mandia, and they took them off with
them. They entered Calilaya, burned the church and all the town, and
captured many persons of all classes among the natives. Thence they
passed to the town of Balayan to do the same, but the auditor, having
received news of the enemy in Manila, had it already in a state of
defense with 50 Spaniards and a captain and some vessels. Consequently,
they did not dare to enter the town or its bay, but crossed over
to Mindoro, where, in the principal town, they captured many men,
women, and children among the natives, seizing their gold and
possessions, and burning their houses and church, where they captured
the prebendary Corral, curate of that doctrina. They filled their
own ships, and others which they seized there, with captives, gold,
and property, staying in the port of Mindoro as leisurely as though
in their own land, notwithstanding that it is but 24 leagues from
Manila. Capt. Martin de Mendia, prisoner of these pirates, offered,
for himself and the other Spanish captives that, if they would let
him go to Manila, he would get the ransom for all, and would take
it, or would send it within six months, to the river of Mindanao,
or otherwise he would return to their power. The chief in command of
the fleet agreed thereto, with certain provisions and conditions,
and caused the other captives to write to the effect that what had
been agreed upon might be fulfilled, and then he allowed the captain
to leave the fleet. The latter came to the city, and upon receiving his
report, the auditor sent munitions, ships, and more men to Balayan than
there were there already, with orders to go in pursuit of the enemy
without delay, saying that they would find him in Mindoro. Capt. Gaspar
Perez, who had charge of this in Balayan, did not start so quickly as
he should have done in order to find the enemy in Mindoro, for when
he arrived he found that he had left that port six days before, laden
with ships and booty, to return to Mindanao. Then he went in pursuit
of him, although somewhat slowly. The enemy put into the river of a
little uninhabited island to get water and wood. Just at that time
Governor Don Pedro de Acuña, who was hastily returning to Manila,
from the town of Arevalo, where he had learned of the incursion of
those pirates, passed. He passed so near the mouth of the river, in
two small champanes [248] and a virrey, [248] with very few men, that
it was a wonder that he was not seen and captured by the enemy. He
learned that the enemy was there, from a boat of natives which was
escaping therefrom, and then he met Gaspar Perez going in search of
the enemy with twelve vessels--caracoas and virreys and some large
champanes. The governor made him make more haste and gave him some
of his own men to guide him to where he had left the pirates the day
before, whereupon they went to attack them. But the latter espied
the fleet through their sentinels whom they had already stationed in
the sea, outside the river. Accordingly they left the river in haste,
and took to flight, throwing into the sea goods and slaves in order
to flee more lightly. Their flagship and almiranta caracoas protected
the ships which were dropping behind and made them throw overboard what
they could and work with all the strength of their paddles, assisted by
their sails. The Spanish fleet, the vessels of which were not so light,
could not put forth enough strength to overtake all of them, because,
furthermore, they went into the open without fear of the heavy seas
which were running, inasmuch as they were fleeing. Yet some of the
ships of Capt. Gaspar Perez, being lighter, got the enemy's fleet,
sunk some caracoas, and captured two, but the rest escaped, although
with great danger of being lost. Without accomplishing anything else,
the fleet returned to Manila where the governor had already entered,
very much disturbed that things should have come to such a pass that
these enemies, who had never dared to leave their houses, should have
been so daring and bold as to come to the very gates of the city,
doing great damage and making captures.
APPENDIX V
OLASO'S EXPEDITION IN 1629 [249]
[Relation of events in the Philippine Islands and other surrounding
regions, from the month of July, 1629, until that of 1630.] [250]
I shall commence the affairs of these islands with the expedition to
Jolo. It is an island of the Archipelago, rebellious for years past,
and its natives, who are Mohammedans, have made a thousand incursions
against us in these islands, pillaging whenever opportunity arises,
burning villages and churches, and capturing numerous people.
In order to remedy all these evils, Governor Don Juan Niño de Tabora
determined to equip a powerful fleet in order to destroy that enemy and
conquer a stronghold which nature has made in their island so lofty
and so difficult of approach that there is no better stone castle,
for the approach to it is by one path, and it has some artillery
which defends it. The people are courageous and warlike. For our
fleet were collected 1 galley, 3 brigantines, 12 freight champanes
(which are like small pataches) [251] and about 50 caracoas. The last
named are the usual craft of these islands, and generally have thirty
or forty oars on a side. All these vessels together carried about 400
Spaniards and 2,500 Indians, and they had considerable apparatus and
war supplies. It was quite sufficient for another conquest of greater
importance than the one on which they were going.
All that fleet departed, then, from the port of Dapitan on March
17. Dapitan is the port nearest to the enemy, and the Island of Sulu
was reached in [blank space in the Ventura del Arco MS.] days. At
dawn our men were landed, and began the ascent to the stronghold. The
master-of-camp, Don Lorenzo de Olaso, who was commander in chief
of the fleet, preceded the men. The Sulus defended their stronghold
with valor. They killed some of our men and wounded eight, among them
the master-of-camp himself. He was overthrown, as if dead, and went
rolling down the hill. However, he was not dead, but only wounded,
nothing more. Our men retired on the run, and to speak plainly, such
terror entered into them that they did not dare to attack again. They
skirted the island in their craft, entered the villages, burned,
wrecked, destroyed them, and killed a few people. They brought back
some captives with them whom the Sulus had taken from us. A violent
storm overtook them, which compelled them to weigh anchor, and they
retired stealthily. Thus so powerful a fleet as that was lost. It was
such a fleet that never has one like it been made for the Indies in
these islands. The Sulu enemy were left triumphant, and so insolent
that we fear that they will make an end of the Islands of the Pintados
[Bisayas] which are the nearest ones to them, and which they infest
and pillage with great facility.
APPENDIX VI
CORCUERA'S CAMPAIGN IN JOLO [252]
In my last letter I wrote to your Reverence of the result of the first
attack, which was unfortunate, because the Moros repulsed us, as I told
your Reverence. Not less unfortunate will be the news that I shall
now relate, [253] which it is yet necessary for me to tell, in order
to fulfil my duty and to remove the clouds arising from rumors and
letters that will go there. I am here and see everything; and there is
never a lack of those who tell many new things and exaggerate matters
that are not so great as they will relate and descant there, where
no one can report and declare what has happened. It is as follows:
Since that attack, we have made two others. The first was with five
mines which we had made, with which we expected to blow up a great
part of those walls. All of the mines were fired, and thinking that
they would cause the same effects as the others our men retired
farther than they ought to have done. Four of the mines exploded,
and did not a little damage among the enemy. They, full of fear,
fled down from their position; but, as the mines did not make the
noise that we expected, we did not, accordingly, get there in time,
as we were quite distant because of our fear lest the mines do us
harm. The Moros retook their position, so that we were repulsed this
time, as we had been the other, with the death of a captain, while some
men were wounded. The fifth mine was left, and did not explode that
time. Hence its mouth was looked for, and having found it, we tried
two days after that to make another assault. The assault was made after
the mine had exploded. That mine was larger than the others had been,
and caused much damage. But the Moros fortified themselves again,
with greater strength than they had the last two times, and defended
themselves in their trenches, which had been fortified with many
stockades and terrepleins, so that we could not enter. We lost some
soldiers on that occasion, who tried to show that they were bold and
valiant. Among them was the sargento-mayor, Melon, who was struck by
a ball which passed through him and carried him off in two days. May
God rest his soul! Thereupon, we retired to our posts and endeavored
to collect our men and carry away the wounded, who were many. We
have lost four captains of renown in these three assaults--namely,
Captain Pimienta, Captain Juan Nicolas, Captain Don Pedro de Mena, and
Sargento-mayor Gonzales de Caseres Melon. Besides these three assaults,
another misfortune happened to us on St. Matthew's day, which was as
follows: Captain Rafael Ome, going with forty-six men and two hundred
Indians to make a garo [254] (as we say here), and having taken up
quarters in a field, where there was a fortified house, arranged
his posts at intervals and ordered his men to be on their guard. But
since man proposes and God disposes, the posts were either careless,
or God ordained it thus; for suddenly the enemy rushed upon our men,
who could not unite, as they were by that time scattered through the
forest. The enemy, having caught them off their guard, made a pastime
of it, killing twenty-six men, and carrying off arms, powder, balls and
fuses. I regard that event as the greatest of all our losses. Among
those of our men killed there by the enemy was Captain Lopez Suarez,
a fine soldier. Our men were not disheartened by these reverses,
except such and such men. The governor well sustains the undertaking
with [all his powers of] mind and body. He has surrounded the entire
hill with a stockade and a ditch, and has sown the ground with sharp
stakes so that the enemy may neither receive aid nor sally out from
it. At intervals there are sentry-posts and towers, so close that they
almost touch. There were six barracks along it, so that if any tower
should be in need the soldiers in them could go to its defense. Some
of them have six men, others four, and those which have least three
men, as a guard. The enclosure is one league long and surrounds the
hill. I do not know which causes the more wonder, the fort of the
Moros or the enclosure of the Spaniards which restrains the Moros,
so that they issue but seldom, and then at their peril. We are day
by day making gradual advances. Today a rampart was completed which
is just even with their stockades, so that we shall command the hill
equally [with the enemy]. God helping, I hope that we shall reduce
their trenches, and then we shall advance from better to better. May
God aid us; and si Dominus a custodierit civitatem frustra vigilat qui
custodit eam. [255] Father, prayers and many of them are needed. Will
your Reverence have them said in your holy college, and excuse me and
all of us for what we can not do. I forward this letter, [hoping] for
its good fortune in the holy sacrifices of your Reverence, etc. Jolo,
March 31, 1638. To the father-prior of Manila.
PAX CHRISTI, ETC.
I would like to be the bearer of this letter, and to fulfil my desires
of seeing your Reverence and all the fathers and brothers of your
Reverence's holy college. That is a proposition for which credit
may be given me, but the time gives space only to suffer; and thus
do we have to accommodate ourselves to it, and to check our desires,
drawing strength from weakness. I must content myself with writing,
which would be a pleasant task, if I could do it at my leisure, and not
so hastily as I have made known in certain letters that I have sent
to your Reverence--not losing or neglecting any occasion at which I
could write. And so that this opportunity should not pass without a
letter from me, I have hastened my pen beyond my usual custom, and
have written very concisely and briefly--although I could write at
greater length, and give account of many things which I leave for a
better occasion. That will be when it is the Lord's pleasure for us
to see each other. Moreover, I have no pleasant news to write, since
that which I could write would all be to the effect that we have not
gained this enchanted hill; and that, at the times when we have tempted
fortune, we have retired with loss of some men and many wounded.
Continuing, then, in the same style as the last letter, I declare
that since the first assault, in which we were driven back with the
loss of Captain Don Pedro Mena Pando, Adjutant Oliva, and Alférez
Trigita, we have made two other assaults. One was on the twenty-fourth
of March, the eve of our Lady of the Assumption. The second was on
the twenty-eighth of the same month. In the first, we trusted to the
mines that had been made, by means of which we expected to make a safe
entrance. We would have made it had our fear of receiving harm from
them matched the little fear of the enemy--who, as barbarians, did not
prepare for flight, although they knew our designs. Of the five mines,
four blew up; and as was seen, and as we afterward learned here from
some captives, there was a great loss to the enemy. As soon as they
saw the fire, they took to flight; but our men, being at a distance,
could not come up to seize the posts that the enemy abandoned,
until very late. That gave the Moros time to take precautions, so
that when we had come up, it was impossible to gain a single thing
which the mines had given us. On that occasion both sides fought very
valiantly. The wounded on our side were not many, and our dead even
fewer; among the later was Captain Pimienta. We were forced to return
to our posts without having gained more than the damage wrought by
the mines. The loss of those people was considerable, while not few
of them perished because of the severity of our fire. But with the
opportunity of the fifth mine which remained (which could not have
its effect, because the fire-channel of the others choked it), the
third attack was made inside of two days, by first setting fire to
that mine, and by arranging the men better than on the day of the
previous assault. They were set in array by the governor, who in
person came up to these quarters on that occasion. They set fire to
the mine, and more was accomplished than on the preceding days. Many
of the enemy were killed; but, as the entrance was so deeply recessed,
it could not be forced so freely by us, for the Moros were able to
defend it from us, with so great valor that we could not take it. Our
men fought with so great spirit and courage that it was necessary for
the leaders to use force with them in order to get the men to retire,
when they saw the so superior force of the enemy. On that occasion
they killed seven of our men, besides wounding many. Among the latter
was Sargento-mayor Melon, who was shot through the lung by a ball. He
died on the second day, to the grief of all this army. Thereupon his
Lordship made his men retire to their quarters, and commanded that the
fort should not be attacked, but that they should proceed to gain it by
the complete blockade of the enemy, as we are doing. By this method,
I think that we shall make an entrance into the fort. Already we
have one bulwark, which we have made level with their entrenchments;
and we are raising our works one and one-half varas [256] above them,
so that we are dislodging them with our artillery. They are retiring
to the interior of their fort. By this means we hope to gain entrance
into all their forts; and, once masters of them, I trust by God's
help that we shall conquer their stronghold, and that they will humble
themselves to obey God and the king.
Before those assaults, on St. Matthew's day, Captain Raphael Ome went
out to make a garo, as they say here, and to overrun the country. In
this island the level country is heavily wooded as nearly all of it is
mountainous. He took in his company about fifty men (i.e., Spaniards)
and two hundred Karaga Indians. The captain reached a field, and having
lodged in a fortified house, such as nearly all those houses are
(for those Indians of the mountain, who are called Guimennos, [257]
build them for their defense), he placed his sentries and seized the
positions that he judged most dangerous. But since non est volentis
neque currentis, etc., either because of the great multitude and the
wiliness of the enemy, or (as is more certain) because the sentries
were careless, and the other men asleep, the enemy came suddenly and
attacked our soldiers--with so great fury that they killed twenty-six
men, among whom was Captain Lopez Suarez, a brave soldier. The leader
and captain, Ome, was in great danger. He fought in person with so
great valor that, although run through with a spear, he attacked and
defeated his opponent, laying him dead at his feet. Few of our men
aided him, and many of them retreated immediately, thus allowing
the enemy to capture from us twenty firearms, with fuses, powder,
and balls. That was a great loss, and it is certain that we have not
hitherto had a greater. And if any loss has occurred, it has been
due to the neglect and confidence of the Spaniard.
Today two Basilan Indians came down from the hill to ask for mercy,
and for passage to their own country. They say that they are sent by
the datus in the stronghold who came from that island of Basilan or
Tagima; and that, if permission and pardon were given to them by the
pari [i.e., Corcuera], one hundred and thirty of them would come down
in the morning. We regard this as a trick of that Moro; and, although
it may be as they say, we are taking precautions, and are watching for
whatever may happen. If they should come, they will be well received;
and that will not be a bad beginning to induce others to come from
the hill. I shall advise your Reverence of such event on the first
occasion. What we know that they are suffering within [the fort] is
the disease of smallpox and discharges of blood, together with great
famine; because we have surrounded the entire hill with ditches and
stockades, set with sharp stakes, which run around it for more than
one and one-half leagues, and within musket-shot [of their fort] is a
sentry-post [garita] or tower in which three men and three Bantayas
are staying. By that means the enemy cannot enter or go out without
being seen; and, when they do that, they are given such a bombardment
that scarcely does any one dare to go outside of their walls. The
hill is a beautiful sight, and if it were enjoying holy peace instead
of war, it would be no small matter of entertainment and recreation
to survey the landscape at times. The Moro does not like to see us,
and is looking at us continually from his stronghold and yelling and
scoffing at us--as they say sometimes that the Spaniards are chickens;
again, that they are sibabuyes, [258] and again, that they will come
to set fire to us all, and kill us. The Moro is a great rascal and
buffoon. I trust in God that in a little while He will be ready for
our thanksgivings [for the defeat of the Moros]. Will your Reverence
urge His servants to aid us with their sacrifices and prayers. Those,
I believe, it will be that must give us the victory, and that must
humble the arrogance of this Mohammedan. His Lordship is displaying
great firmness and patience, as he is so great a soldier. Already has
he almost raised a stone fort on the beach, for he intends to leave
a presidio here, and I think that it will be almost finished before
he leaves. Nothing else occurs to me. Of whatever else may happen,
your Reverence will be advised on the first occasion. If I have gone
to considerable length in this letter, it is because I have known,
one day ahead, of the departure of this champan. I commend myself
many times to the holy sacrifices of your Reverence. This letter
will also serve for our father provincial, etc. Jolo, April 5, one
thousand six hundred and thirty-eight.
The Moro has returned today with a letter from the queen and all the
stronghold, in which they beg pardon and humiliate themselves. May
God grant it, and bring them to His knowledge. I shall advise you of
the result. I hear that Datu Ache is dead. If that is so, then the
end has come. Today, the sixth of the above month.
PAX CHRISTI.
Deo gratias qui dedit nobis victoriam per Jesum Christum Dominum
nostrum. [259] I have written your Reverence another letter, by way of
Oton, telling you that it was our Lord's pleasure to give us a joyous
Easter-tide, the beginning of what has happened. His Divine Majesty
has chosen to bestow upon us an overflowing blessing, by the reduction
of these Moros so that they should come, abased and humiliated, to
beg His governor for mercy; for, whether it was the latter's plan
to go to treat for peace at Basilan for their men, or whether they
should send them all, that they might see how the governor viewed their
petition, the following day they came with letters from the queen [260]
for Father Pedro Gutierrez and his Lordship. Therein she begged the
father to protect her, for she wished to come to throw herself at the
feet of the hari of Manila, and to beg his pardon for the obstinacy
that they had shown hitherto. The father answered for his Lordship,
in regard to the pardon, that if they agreed to do what was right,
they would be very gladly pardoned; but that in regard to their coming
it was not time, until they would humbly give up the arms which they
had taken from us, and the captives, vessels, and holy ornaments;
and that, even though the queen had so great authority, so long
as the king did not come, he must declare and show his willingness
to accept what the queen had written. Accordingly, the king wrote
to the same father and to his Lordship next day, begging the same
thing and more earnestly. But he was not allowed to come--which he
urgently entreated--until they should have given up the arms and
other things of which they robbed us. Difficulties arose over this
point, as to which of the two things was to be done first. The Moro
declared that he wished to treat first of the peace, and the points
on which they were to agree; and therefore it was necessary to see
the hari of Manila first of all. But Don Sebastian, as he was so
experienced in these matters of war (in which God has inspired him
with so wise resolutions, and given him even better results) held firm
to his proposals. Two days passed, but at last the king agreed to the
terms, by giving up the pieces of artillery which he had captured from
us. There were four iron pieces; and, in place of one which had burst,
one of bronze was requested, which many mines had buried. Afterward
we found the broken piece, by opening the mouth of one of the mines:
and he gave it to us willingly--saying that he had thus brought the
broken piece, and that he ought not for that reason to give another in
its place; and that which had been asked from him had been bought for
forty basines of gold at Makassar. In order that the Spaniards might
see what an earnest desire for a permanent peace was in his heart,
and that he was greatly inclined to it, he sent also some muskets,
although few and poor ones. In what pertained to the captives, he
said that he would surrender those that he had, but that he could not
persuade his datus to give up theirs; still he would ask them to give
their captives. At most, he sent eleven Christian captives, counting
men, women, and children. He had already spent the holy vessels, for,
since it was so long a time since they had been brought, he had sold
them to the king of Makassar; but he said that he and all his property
were there, to satisfy the Spaniards for any injury that they had
received. The king petitioned his Lordship to allow him to visit him;
and his Lordship granted such permission for Quasimodo Sunday.
The datus [sic] were very angry that the king was so liberal, and
because he humbled himself so deeply; accordingly, they opposed his
leaving the hill to talk with the governor. They tried to prevent it,
but the king overruled by the reasons which he gave to the datus, and
which father Gregorio Belin gave to him. His Lordship gave hostages
for the king, and ordered Captain Marquez and Captain Raphael Ome to
remain as such. They asked for Admiral Don Pedro de Almonte and two
fathers, but that was not granted to them. Finally they were satisfied
with the two said captains, persons of great esteem and worth; and the
king came down to talk with his Lordship, accompanied by many chief
men. His Lordship received him with such display as he could arrange at
short notice, under a canopy of damask, and seated on a velvet chair,
with a cushion of the same at his feet. Another cushion was placed
at his side upon a rug. As the king entered the hall, his Lordship
rose from his seat, and advancing two steps, embraced the Moro king;
then he made him sit down on the cushion that had been prepared. Then
his Lordship also seated himself beside the king in his chair, while
at his right side was his confessor, and at his left stood a captain
of the guard and the sargento-mayor. Grouped behind the confessor
were the fathers who were in the quarters on that occasion. There
were two Augustinian Recollects, and one Franciscan Recollect, and
a secular priest. Then came Father Gutierrez, and Father Gregorio
Belin. The king requested permission to rest a little first, for he
came, one of his servants fanning him (haciendole paypay), lifting
up from time to time the chinina which he wore--open in front,
in order to catch the breeze, and to enable him to shelter himself
from the heat, or to get rid of the fears with which he had come. His
chief men seated themselves after him on that open floor, a seat very
suitable for such nobility, who esteemed it as a great favor. Then when
the king was rested, or reassured from his fears, they began their
discourses or bicharas, talking, after the manner of these people,
by the medium of interpreters--namely, Father Juan de Sant Joseph,
an Augustinian Recollect, and Alférez Mathias de Marmolejo, both good
interpreters. The governor set forth his conditions. The agreement
made was: first, that the banners of the king, our sovereign, were
to be hoisted on the stronghold; second, that the men from Basilan
were to be permitted to leave the stronghold and go to their country;
third, that the Macassars and Malays were also to leave and return to
their own lands; and fourth, in order that the first condition might
be fulfilled without the rattle of arms and the shedding of blood,
all the enemy were to come down to our quarters, while the king and
queen and their family could come to that of the governor. The Moro
king did not like this last point; but, as he saw that matters were
ill disposed for his defense, he had to assent to everything. But,
before its execution, he begged his Lordship to communicate the
terms with his men and datus, saying that he would endeavor to get
them all to agree to the fulfilment of what his Lordship ordered;
and that in a day and a half he would reply and, in what pertained
to the other conditions, they would be immediately executed. This
happened, for the Basilans descended in two days with all their men
and families--in all, one hundred and forty-seven. Some fifty or sixty
did not then descend, as they were unable to do so. The Macassars
refused to descend until they received pardon from his Lordship,
and a passport to their own country. Therefore their captain came to
talk with his Lordship, who discussed with him what was to be done
with him and his men. The latter are very humble and compliant to
whatever his Lordship should order. His Lordship answered that he
would pardon their insolent and evil actions, and they could descend
with security of life; and that he would give them boats, so that they
could go away. Thereupon the captain, giving a kris as security that
they would come, returned, and immediately began to bring down his
property and men. The Malays came with them, for all those peoples
had united against the Castilians. They are the ones who have done
us most harm with their firearms, and have furnished quantities of
ammunition for all the firearms of the Sulus. At the end of the time
assigned to the king for answering his Lordship in regard to the
matters which he had discussed with him, he was summoned, in order
that what had been recently concluded might not be hindered, as his
Lordship had many matters to which to attend. If he would not come,
his Lordship was resolved immediately to continue his bombardment
and fortifications, saying that he would make slaves of all whom he
captured. With this resolution, the queen determined to come to visit
his Lordship; and, so saying and doing, she summoned her chair, and
had herself carried down to the quarters of Don Pedro de Almonte,
which is the one located on their hill, and which has given them
so much to do. She sent a message to the governor, begging him to
grant her permission, as she wished to see him. His Lordship sent a
message to her, to the effect that he would be very glad to see her,
and that she would be coming at a seasonable time. She came to the
hall borne on the shoulders of her men, accompanied by some of her
ladies and by her kasis, who was coming with pale face. She alighted
at the door of his Lordship's hall. He went out to receive her,
and with marked indications of friendship and kindness led her to
her seat, which was a cushion of purple velvet; and his Lordship,
seated in his own chair, welcomed her through his interpreter,
Alférez Mathias de Marmolexo. She responded very courteously to the
courtesies of the governor; for the Moro woman is very intelligent,
and of great capacity. She did not speak directly to the interpreters,
but through two of her men, one of whom was the kasis; and often he,
without the queen speaking, answered to what was proposed. The queen
petitioned and entreated the governor to desist from entering the
stronghold, for the women, being timid creatures, feared the soldiers
greatly. And if his Lordship was doing it to oblige her and the king
her husband to descend, she said that they would descend immediately,
with all their people. Thus did she entreat from him whom his Lordship
represented; and I desired that she should obtain this favor. His
Lordship answered her that he would do so very willingly; but that he
had an express mandate for it [i.e., to gain the fort] from his king,
and that, if he did not obey it, he would lose his head. "I do not
wish," said Tuan Baluka (for such is the name of the queen), "that
the favor which I petition be at so great a price and danger to your
Lordship. Consequently, will you kindly grant me three days? and in
that time I, the king, and our people will descend without fail." His
Lordship thanked her anew, and added that with this she obliged him
to fulfil strictly what he had promised her. "Indeed," said the queen,
"I have no doubt of it; for, being in the gaze of so many nations that
your Lordship has to conquer, it is clear that you must fulfil what
you have promised me; for your Lordship's actions toward me would
be understood by all to be those that you would have to perform
toward all." This terminated the discussion. His Lordship ordered
a collation to be spread for the queen and her ladies; and then his
Lordship retired, so that they might refresh themselves without any
embarrassment. Then, having dined, the queen returned to her stronghold
with the retinue that she had brought. Before she left the quarters
she was saluted by the discharge of two large pieces of artillery,
which had been made ready for that purpose. She was greatly pleased
by that, and the next day began to carry out her promises, by sending
down a portion of her possessions. The Makassars and Malays also
brought down their property with her, and immediately embarked. I
had written up to this point to this day, Saturday, the seventeenth
of this month of April, hoping for the end of all these incipient
results and expected events regarding this stronghold; the issue has
been such as we could expect from Him who has also been pleased to
arrange and bring it to pass. Last night the queen came down to sleep
in our camp or quarters, with some of her ladies. In the morning she
went to report her good treatment to her people; for she was received
with a salute of musketry and large artillery, and a fine repast. All
that has been done to oblige her to encourage her people, for they
were very fearful, to descend immediately. More than two thousand
have now descended, and our banners are flying on the hill, and our
men are fortified on it. May God be praised, to whom be a thousand
thanks given; for He, without our knowledge or our expectations, has
disposed this matter thus--blinding this Moro and disheartening him,
so that, having been defeated, he should surrender to our governor, and
give himself up without more bloodshed. We are trying to secure Datu
Ache; if we succeed in this, I shall advise you. Now there is nothing
more to say, reverend Father, except to give God the thanks, for He
is the one who has prepared and given this victory to us; and to beg
all in your Reverence's holy college to give thanks that the college
has had (as I am very certain) so great a share in the achievements
[here]. The governor is very much pleased and we all regard him in the
proper light. The men are full of courage, and even what was carefully
done is now improved. I am the humble servant of your Reverence whom
I pray that God may preserve as I desire, and to whose sacrifices I
earnestly commend myself. Jolo, April 17, 1638.--Juan de Barrios.
All the Sulus descended, in number about four thousand six hundred,
to the sea. Finding themselves down and outside the enclosure, they
all fled, under cover of a very heavy shower of rain--leaving all
their possessions, in order not to be hindered in their flight. Many
mothers even abandoned their little children. One abandoned to us a
little girl who had received a dagger-stroke, who received the waters
of baptism and immediately died. There is much to say about this, and
many thanks to give to God, of which we shall speak when it pleases
God to let us see each other. Today, the nineteenth of this month of
April, 1638.--Barrios.
The governor sent messages to the king and queen by two kasis,
asking why they had fled. They replied that since all their people
had fled, they had gone after them for very shame, but that they
would try to bring them back and to come, and this was the end of the
matter. The result was exceedingly profitable for our soldiers and
Indians; for the Sulus, fearful because they thought that, if they
became scattered, they would all be killed, abandoned whatever they
were carrying--quantities of goods, and chests of drawers--which our
soldiers sacked. Above, in the stronghold, they found much plunder. It
is believed that the king and queen will return, but not Datu Ache;
but this is not considered certain.
LETTER FROM SANBOANGAN [261]
PAX CHRISTI
I am not writing to anyone [else], for the lack of time does not allow
me to do so. Therefore will your Reverence please communicate this to
the father provincial, Father Hernandez Perez, Father Juan de Bueras,
and the father rector of Cavite.
When our men were most disheartened at seeing that the fortress on
the hill was so extensive, and that it was becoming stronger daily;
that the mines and artillery had seemingly made no impression on it;
that we had been repulsed four times; and that our men were falling
sick very rapidly: in order that it might be very evident that it
was [all] the work of God, ambassadors came from the hill to beg his
Lordship for mercy. He received them gladly, and asked them for the
artillery that they had plundered from the Christians, etc. They
brought down four pieces, which they had taken from the shipyard,
and brought to us some Christians. Next day, more than one hundred
and fifty people from Basilan descended, who surrendered their arms,
and then about fifty Makassars, who did the same; and all were embarked
in the patache.
Next day the king and queen went down and slept in the camp of Don
Sebastian. On the following day (which was the day agreed upon when
all were to descend from the hill), seeing that it was already late,
the king and queen said that they would go to get their people. The
governor granted them permission, and went to a camp that was located
opposite the gate of the stronghold. All the Sulus descended, carrying
their goods, arms, etc., to the number of about four hundred soldiers,
and more than one thousand five hundred women, children, old men,
etc. They reached the governor's camp and Don Pedro de Francia told
the king that they must surrender their arms. The latter replied that
he would surrender them to none other than to the governor. Thereupon,
they went to summon his Lordship; but the Sulus, seeing that they were
going to summon him, fled, under a heavy shower that was falling,
and abandoned all their goods. A vast amount of riches, many pieces
of artillery, and versos, [262] falcons, muskets, arquebuses, etc.,
were found. The cause of the Moros fleeing was their great fear that
they were to be killed. On our part, since Don Sebastian Hurtado held
all their stronghold, and had left only thirty men in his quarters
(in order that Datu Ache might not escape), and as that number could
not resist so many people, the Sulus were, on the contrary, allowed
to go without any firearms being discharged.
More than two hundred and fifty of the Sulus have died, and they
were perishing in great numbers from dysentery because the women and
children were placed under ground for fear of the balls. That and the
fear of the mines caused their surrender; for it was impossible to
take their fort by assault. The interior strength of that stronghold
is so great that the Spaniards were surprised; and all recognize
that it has been totally the work of God, and [a result of] the
perseverance of Don Sebastian, who ever said that all must die or
capture the stronghold. Somewhat more than two hundred Christian and
more than one hundred Moro women have come from the stronghold during
this time. All the Moro women are fearful. Up to date eighty-three
Spaniards have died from wounds, and many of them from disease.
THE KILLED
Sargento-mayor Melon
Captain Don Pedro de Mena
Captain Don Juan Nicolas
Captain Don Pimienta
Captain Don Lope Suarez