have not the ability to carry it on. Before I proceed to answer
this objection, permit me, sir, to notice a single inconsistency of
the gentlemen by whom it has been urged. It is this: in one part of
their argument, they represent the people as too happy to enlist,
and in another part as too poor to pay! Both of these propositions,
I presume, cannot be true. Not to dwell longer, however, upon this
contradiction, I do maintain, sir, that the nation is fully able to
prosecute the war. On what does the ability of a nation depend? A
person who will give himself the trouble of examining things rather
than words, will find that it is proportioned to the number of laborers
and the productiveness of their labor. Wherever, from soil, climate,
or improvement, the labor of a country will produce more than a supply
of the necessaries of life, it is evident that the surplus time may be
devoted to idleness, to the production and consumption of luxuries,
or to the carrying on of war. To illustrate this farther--suppose the
labor of a person for five days will support him six, then it is clear,
that the labor of five men will support the sixth man in idleness or
in war. Now, sir, there is nowhere that the labor of seven millions
of people will produce so much as in this country; consequently,
nowhere have seven millions of people so great an ability to carry on
a war. The quantity of circulating medium, whether made of paper or of
silver dollars, has very little to do with the subject. If it is made
of paper, and to a great extent, it only shows that the people are
in their habits commercial; and that the faith of contracts is well
supported. The real ability of a nation lies in what I have stated; and
he must be a weak politician who cannot call it forth.
Mr. Speaker, I will now consider the last, and by far the most
important objection of all; and one, without which, I certainly would
not have spoken. It is, that in consideration of all the circumstances
in which we are placed, it is the duty of this House to withhold
the means of further prosecuting the war. It will not be denied,
I trust, that this is a fair statement of the scope and object of
most of the reasonings which have been employed; and that without
this construction, they would be irreconcilable with common sense.
This doctrine, in my opinion, goes not only to the overthrow of our
constitution, but to the destruction of liberty itself. The principle
of our Government is, not only that the majority shall rule, but that
they shall rule in the _manner_ prescribed by the constitution. So that
if it could be proved that a majority of the people were in favor of
certain measures, it would not be sufficient till they had pronounced
that decision through the _constitutional_ organs. In short, it must
have been a principal object with the framers of our constitution to
suspend, at least for a limited time, the effects of popular opinion.
The constitution has committed the legislative power to three co-equal
branches; and to the same hands has it entrusted the power of declaring
war; while it has expressly confided the treaty-making power (and which
alone can make peace) to two only of those branches. The claim now set
up, goes to invest that branch which has no authority in the matter,
not only with the treaty-making power, but also with a complete control
over the other two branches. Thus _one_ branch of the Government
forcing the nation to _desist_ from doing what _three_, including
itself, had thought best to _perform_. Let us test the correctness
of this principle by applying it to another co-equal branch of the
Government. Let us suppose the President has made a treaty of peace,
which is disapproved of by the Senate--and suppose upon this he should
say, the war ought not to be further prosecuted, and refuse to employ
the public force, would you not impeach him? Most unquestionably you
would. I expressly admit that cases may be imagined, where such a
course would be proper--where it would be not only the duty of this
House to withhold supplies, but where it would be the duty of an
individual to resist the laws; but such are extreme cases, not provided
for by any organization of Government. What, sir, has been the practice
of the British House of Commons? Have they ever refused supplies
because a war was unpopular, since their revolution? Did not the same
Parliament, which resolved that they would consider any man as an enemy
to his country, who would advise his Majesty to the further prosecution
of offensive war in America, still vote the means for carrying on the
war? A similar case occurred when Mr. Fox came last into power--he
disapproved of the commencement and conduct of the war, and yet he
called for and received the necessary supplies.
Mr. CALHOUN observed, that he could offer nothing more acceptable, he
presumed, to the House, than a promise not to discuss the Orders in
Council, French decrees, blockades, or embargoes. He was induced to
avoid these topics for several reasons. In the first place, they were
too stale to furnish any interest to this House or country. Gentlemen
who had attempted it, with whatever abilities, had failed to command
attention; and it would argue very little sagacity on his part not to
be admonished by their want of success. Indeed, whatever interest had
been at one time attached to these subjects, they had now lost. They
have passed away; and will not soon, he hoped, return into the circle
of politics. Yes, sir, as reviled as has been our country's efforts
to curb belligerent injustice, as weak and contemptible as she has
been represented to be in the grade of nations, she has triumphed in
breaking down the most dangerous monopoly ever attempted by one nation
against the commerce of another. He would not stop to inquire whether
it was the non-importation act, or the menace of war, or, what was
the most probable, the last operating on the pressure produced by the
former. The fact is certain, that the Orders in Council of 1807 and
1809, which our opponents have often said that England would not yield,
as they made a part of her commercial system, are now no more. The same
firmness, if persevered in, which has carried us thus far with success,
will, as our cause is just and moderate, end in final victory. A
further reason which he had, not to follow our opponents into the
region of documents and records, was, that he was afraid of a decoy;
as he was induced to believe from appearances that their object was
to draw our attention from the merits of the question. Gentlemen had
literally buried their arguments under a huge pile of quotations; and
had wandered so far into this realm of paper, that neither the vision
of this House has been, nor that of the country will be, able to follow
them. There the best and worst reasons share an equal fate. The truth
of the one and error of the other, are covered with like obscurity.
Mr. C. said he would not multiply proof on a course of conduct the bad
effect of which was too sensibly felt to be easily forgot, and the
continuation of which was but too apparent in the present discussion.
For what was the object of the opposition in this debate? To defeat
the passage of this bill? It has been scarcely mentioned; and contains
nothing to raise that storm which has been excited against it. The bill
proposes to raise twenty thousand men only, and that for one year; and
surely there is nothing in that calculated to lay such strong hold of
the jealousy or fear of the community. What then is the object of the
opposition? Gentlemen certainly do not act without an intention; and
wide as has been the range of debate, it cannot be so lawless as to be
without an object. It was not, he repeated, to defeat the passage of
this bill; no, but what was much more to be dreaded, to thwart that,
which the bill proposes to contribute to, the final success of the war;
and for this purpose he must do the opposition the credit to say, they
have resorted to means the best calculated to produce the effect. In a
free Government, in the government of laws, two things are necessary
for the effectual prosecution of any great measure; the law by which
the executive officer is charged with the execution and vested with
suitable powers; and the co-operating zeal and union of the people,
who are always indispensable agents. Opposition to be successful must
direct its efforts against the passage of the law; or, what was more
common and generally more effectual, to destroy the union and the zeal
of the people. Either, if successful, is effectual. The former would in
most cases be seen and reprobated; the latter, much the most dangerous,
has, to the great misfortunes of Republics, presented at all times a
ready means of defeating the most salutary measures. To this point the
whole arguments of opposition have converged. This gives a meaning to
every reason and assertion, which have been advanced, however wild and
inconsistent. No topic has been left untouched, no passion unessayed.
The war has been represented as unjust in its origin, disastrous in its
progress, and desperate in its farther prosecution. As if to prevent
the possibility of doubt, a determination has been boldly asserted not
to support it. Such is the opposition to the war, which was admitted
on all sides to be just; and which in a manner received the votes even
of those who now appear to be willing to ruin the country in order to
defeat its success.
But, say our opponents, as they were opposed to the war, they are not
bound to support it; and so far has this opposition been carried, that
we have been accused almost of violating the right of conscience,
in denying the right set up by gentlemen. The right to oppose the
efforts of our country, while in war, ought to be established beyond
the possibility of doubt, before it can be justly adopted as the
basis of conduct. How conscience can be claimed in this case cannot
be very easily imagined. We oppose not by laws or penalties; we only
assert that the opposition experienced cannot be dictated by love of
country, and is inconsistent with the duty which every citizen is under
to promote the prosperity of the Republic. Its necessary tendency is
to prostrate the country at the feet of the enemy, and to elevate a
party on the ruins of the public. Till our opponents can prove that
they have a right which is paramount to the public interest, we must
persist in denying the right to thwart the success of the war. War
has been declared by a law of the land; and what would be thought of
similar attempts to defeat any other law, however inconsiderable its
object? Who would dare to avow an intention to defeat its operation?
Can that, then, be true in relation to war which would be reprobated
in every other case? Can that be true which, when the whole physical
force of the country is needed, withdraws half of that force? Can that
be true which gives the greatest violence to party animosity? What
would have been thought of such conduct in the war of the Revolution?
Many good citizens friendly to the liberty of our country were opposed
to the declaration at the time; could they have been justified in such
opposition as we now experience? To terminate the war through discord
and weakness is a hazardous experiment. But, in the most unjust and
inexpedient war, it can scarcely be possible, that disunion and defeats
can have a salutary operation. In the numerous examples which history
furnishes, let an instance be pointed out, in any war, where the
public interest has been promoted by divisions, or injured by concord.
Hundreds of instances may be cited of the reverse. Why, then, will
gentlemen persist in that course where danger is almost unavoidable,
and shun that where safety is almost certain?
But, sir, we are told that peace is in our power without a farther
promotion of the war. Appeal not, say our opponents, to the fear, but
to the generosity of our enemy. England yields nothing to her fears;
stop, therefore, your preparation, and throw yourself on her mercy,
and peace will be the result. We might, indeed, have pardon, but not
peace on such terms. Those who think the war a sacrilege or a crime,
might consistently adopt such a course; but we, who know it to be for
the maintenance of the just rights of the community, never can. We are
farther told that impressment of seamen was not considered a sufficient
cause of war; and are asked why should it be continued on that account?
Mr. C. observed that he individually did not feel the force of the
argument; for it had been his opinion, that the nation was bound to
resist so deep an injury even at the hazard of war; but, admitting its
full force, the difference is striking between the commencement and
the continuance of hostilities. War ought to be continued until its
rational object, a permanent and secure peace, could be obtained. Even
the friends of England ought not to desire the termination of the war,
without a satisfactory adjustment of the subject of impressment. It
would leave the root that must necessarily shoot up in future animosity
and hostilities. America can never quietly submit to the deepest of
injury. Necessity might compel her to yield for a moment; but it would
be to watch the growth of national strength, and to seize the first
favorable opportunity to seek redress. The worst enemy to the peace of
the two countries could not desire a more effectual means to propagate
eternal enmity.
But it is said that we ought to offer to England suitable regulations
on this subject to secure to her the use of her own seamen; and because
we have not, we are aggressors. He denied that we were bound to tender
any regulations, or that we had not. England was the party injuring.
She ought to confine her seamen to her own service; or, if that was
impracticable, propose such arrangements that she might exercise her
right without injury to us. This is the rule that governs all analogous
cases in private life. But we have made our offer; it is, that the ship
should protect the sailor. It is the most simple and only safe rule;
but, to secure so desirable a point, the most liberal and effectual
provisions ought and have been proposed to be made on our part to guard
the British Government against the evil they apprehended, the loss of
her seamen. The whole doctrine of protection heretofore relied on,
and still recommended by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. P.,) is
false and derogatory to our honor; and under no possible modification
can effect the desirable objects of affording safety to our sailors,
and securing the future harmony of the two countries. Nor can it be
doubted, if governed by justice, she will yield to the offer of our
Government, particularly if what the gentleman from New York (Mr.
BLEECKER) says be true, that there are ten thousand of her seamen
in our service. She would be greatly the gainer by the arrangement.
Experience, it is to be feared, however, will teach that gentleman that
the evil lies much deeper. The use of her seamen is a mere pretence.
The blow is aimed at our commercial greatness. It is this which has
animated and directed all of her injurious councils towards this
country. England is at the same time a trading and fighting nation;
two occupations naturally at variance, and most difficult to be united.
War limits the number and extent of the markets of a belligerent,
makes a variety of regulations necessary; and produces heavy taxes,
which are inimical to the prosperity of manufactories and consequently
commerce. These causes combined give to trade new channels, which
direct it naturally to neutral nations. To counteract this tendency,
England, under various but flimsy pretences, has endeavored to support
her commercial superiority by monopoly. It has been our fortune to
resist with no inconsiderable success this spirit of monopoly. Her
principal object in contending for the right of impressment is to have,
in a great measure, the monopoly of the sailors of the world. A fixed
resistance will compel her to yield this point as she has already done
her Orders in Council. Success will amply reward our exertions. Our
future commerce will feel its invigorating effects. But, say gentlemen,
England will never yield this point, and every effort on our part
to secure it is hopeless. To confirm this prediction and secure our
reverence, the prophecies of the last session are relied on. Mr. C.
felt no disposition to disparage our opponents' talents in that line;
but he very much doubted whether the whole chapter of woes had been
fulfilled. He would, for instance, ask whether so much as related to
sacked towns, bombarded cities, ruined commerce, and revolting blacks,
had been realized?
Such, then, is the cause of the war and its continuation; and such the
nature of the opposition experienced, and its justification. It remains
to be seen whether the intended effect will be produced. Whether
animosity and discord will be fomented, and the zeal and union of the
people to maintain the rights and indispensable duties of the community
will abate; or, describing it under another aspect, whether it is the
destiny of our country to sink under that of our enemy or not. Mr. C.
said he was not without his fears and his hopes.
On the one hand our opponents had manifestly the advantage. The love
of present ease and enjoyment, the love of gain, and party zeal, were
on their side. These constitute part of the weakness of our nature.
We naturally lead that way without the arts of persuasion. Far more
difficult is the task of the majority. It is theirs to support the
distant but lasting interest of our country; it is theirs to elevate
the minds of the people, and to call up all of those qualities by which
present sacrifices are made to secure a future good. On the other
hand, our cause is not without its hope. The interest of the people
and that of the leaders of a party are, as observed by a gentleman
from New York, (Mr. STOW,) often at variance. The people are always
ready, unless led astray by ignorance or delusion, to participate in
the success of the country, or to sympathize in its adversity. Very
different are the feelings of the leaders; on every great measure they
stand pledged against its success, and almost invariably consider
that their political consequence depends on its defeat. The heat of
debate, the spirit of settled opposition, and the confident prediction
of disaster, are among the causes of this opposition between the
interest of a party and their country; and in no instance under our
own Government have they existed in a greater degree than in relation
to the present war. The evil is deeply rooted in the constitution of
all free Governments, and is the principal cause of their weakness and
destruction. It has but one remedy, the virtue and intelligence of the
people--it behooves them, as they value the blessings of their freedom,
not to permit themselves to be drawn into the vortex of party rage. For
if by such opposition the firmest Government should prove incompetent
to maintain the rights of the nation against foreign aggression, they
will find realized the truth of the assertion that government is
protection, and that it cannot exist where it fails of this great and
primary object. The authors of the weakness are commonly the first to
take the advantage of it, and to turn it to the destruction of liberty.
Mr. DESHA.--Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to detain you long;
my principal object in rising is to conjure gentlemen to bring this
debate to a close. Sir, what can gentlemen flatter themselves by
suffering this discussion to be protracted to so unwarrantable a
length? It cannot be supposed that the substantial part of this House
(I mean those who think much and speak little) will, by theoretical
or sophisticated remarks, be driven from their course. Then, sir,
those long-winded speeches must be either intended for the gallery,
or for gentlemen's constituents. It would certainly be unjustifiable
to sport away the public money; to exhaust the public patience in
making long speeches, merely for the purpose of amusing the ear of the
gallery. And, sir, your constituents would much rather you would act
with decision, with promptitude, in adopting measures calculated for a
vigorous prosecution of the war, that it might be brought to a speedy
and honorable termination, than to take up weeks in detailing the
causes of the war. The people are fully apprised of the causes of the
war, from the documents that have been promulgated; they are satisfied
that it is a just and necessary war: that it has been forced upon us
by the injustice and oppression of our enemy, occasioned in a great
measure by the violent opposition of a party to the Administration.
Sir, act so as to give a vigorous prosecution to the war, and act
promptly, and the people will support you with manly firmness,
independent of the consideration of expense.
Mr. Speaker, this bill contemplates raising twenty thousand men for
one year. Although I shall vote for the bill under consideration, I do
not altogether approve of it. Sir, the time of service is too short to
answer a valuable purpose. I am not so sanguine as to suppose that we
will overrun the British provinces in one season. I should like it much
better if the time of service, as has been proposed, was extended to
eighteen months, and the bounty raised in proportion. You would then
have the advantage of two campaigns; in the last of which, you might
calculate on a certainty of being able to do something of a decisive
character, as you would have the advantage of disciplined troops;
and really, sir, if this bill is to answer any valuable purpose, it
ought to have been passed some time since. Gentlemen certainly must
see that the object of the opposition is procrastination; they have
predicted that the bill under consideration, if adopted, will not only
run the country to extraordinary expenses, swell the national debt to
an enormous size, but that it will ultimately bring disgrace on the
Government. And, sir, they are determined that their predictions shall
be realized, by putting off the passage of the bill until late in the
season thereby preventing you from obtaining the men in time to do
any thing of a decisive character next summer. This, in my mind, is
unquestionably their object; and I believe the ambition of some of them
is such, that, rather than be found false prophets, they would endanger
the only republic in the world. Sir, I do not wish to be understood to
include the whole Federal party; far from it. I believe there are some,
and I hope a considerable portion, who are American in principle, and
would, perhaps, go as far as any American in defending their country's
rights. Sir, it is not my intention to arraign motives; but, speaking
of party, what has been the conduct of the Federalists for twelve years
past, ever since the termination of the Reign of Terror? A uniform
opposition to every thing of a prominent character proposed by the
different republican Administrations. Now, sir, if Mr. Jefferson and
Mr. Madison had been the weakest of men, as well as the wickedest,
(which no man in his senses, who had any respect for his character,
or standing in society, would assert,) they must have accidentally
happened on something right in the course of twelve years.
Mr. Speaker, it is mortifying to see gentlemen who call themselves
Americans, rise up in the face of the nation to palliate and
vindicate the conduct of an enemy, and at the same time reprobate,
in the strongest language of ridicule, every step proposed by the
Administration calculated to counteract the iniquitous and destructive
policy of our enemy. Can such conduct be called American? Sir, when it
ought to be the duty and pride of every man having any pretensions to
American principles, to rally under the governmental standard, in order
to assist in expelling our tyrannical oppressors from the continent, by
which extricating the Government from its present difficulties, you see
the Federal party making every exertion in their power to make the war
a dishonorable one.
I know, Mr. Speaker, that it is in the nature of tyrannical or
despotical Governments to take arbitrary strides; yet, sir, I do
believe that the impositions and oppressions heaped upon the
American Government; the evils under which we at this time labor,
are measurably, if not entirely, attributable to the party hostility
arrayed against the Administration. Sir, they have, by their uniform
opposition, led the British to believe that they had a powerful party
in this country; that parties were nearly equally balanced; that it
would be impossible for a Republican Administration to adhere to any
decided stand taken against England, and that finally the English
party would prevail. Thus, sir, have Government been beset by party.
They have been baffled in every peaceable step calculated to vindicate
our rights, or redress our grievances, until, by the injustice of
our foreign enemy, bottomed on the aid they calculated on receiving
from our domestic foes, the Government have been forced into war.
And now you are told to put a stop to the war, and try once more if
Briton will not do us justice. Degrading thought! Sir, we have already
humbled ourselves in making proposals, and all efforts on the part
of the Administration failed. The world has seen and understood that
the failure was attributable to her own wickedness, and not to our
pertinacity. Sir, the American Administration has exhibited an example
of moderation unparalleled in the annals of the world; our forbearance
has astonished the universe, and we have the consolation to see that
neither the guilt of aggression, nor the folly of ambition, can be
fairly attributed to it. Negotiation, as well as patience, has been
exhausted. Instead of appealing again to the justice of a Government
that makes principle bend to power, we have been necessarily compelled
(though reluctantly) to appeal to arms, and I trust in God that they
will never be laid down short of justice.
Mr. CHEVES rose.--It was for some time during this debate, said he, my
intention to have mingled my unimportant opinions and sentiments with
those of other gentlemen in this discussion; but I gave way from time
to time before the eagerness of others who were desirous of presenting
themselves to your attention, and I had entirely abandoned the idea
of taking any part in the argument; but the sudden and unexpected
indisposition at this moment of my worthy friend and honorable
colleague, (Mr. WILLIAMS,) the chairman of the committee with whom
this bill originated, who was expected to close the debate, has left a
vacuum in the argument which I propose to fill. Could he have addressed
you, as he was prepared and anxious, in the faithful discharge of his
duty to do, it would have rendered the feeble attempt which I shall
make as unnecessary as it would have been impertinent and obtrusive.
I propose, then, to speak, as my honorable friend would probably have
done, generally, but briefly, on the several heads of discussion
which have been introduced into the debate, which has not been on the
bill before you, but on the general merits of the war; the origin,
progress, and continuance of it. I mean not to censure the wide range
which this discussion has taken. It is fair and right in gentlemen of
the opposition to select some occasion during each session on which to
discuss the great questions of state which the public events of the
passing times present; and the one furnished by the bill before you was
perhaps as proper as any other.
Almost all the gentlemen who have addressed you, have very gravely told
you, by way of exordium, of their unquestionable right to do so, and
of the firmness with which they mean to assert and exercise it, as if
there had been, at any time, really an opposition to this freedom of
discussion. These introductions must be a little amusing to the members
of this House and to the attendants in your galleries, who have been
in the habit of listening to the gentlemen. But if there ever could
have been a doubt on this subject, and surely there never was any, the
debate, which I hope is about to be closed, affords an ample refutation
of it. There are parts of this debate which will descend to distant
posterity as a monument of the freedom of discussion in this Hall. I
trust, sir, we shall furnish few such testimonials--I hope never to
see another exhibition on this floor. They must be looked upon with
apprehension by all those who consider the restraints of personal
politeness and the urbanity of social esteem as affording a better
security to those who love peace and good manners, for the preservation
of these valuable objects, than can be lent by the strongest arm or
the severest sanctions which positive institutions have established;
restraints under which even "vice itself loses half its evil, by losing
all its grossness." I shall imitate the example of gentlemen who
followed in the debate--I shall pour oil upon the waves, and endeavor
to still the raging of the storm.
Gentlemen, fruitful in epithets, yet rather fruitful in their abundance
than in their variety, have called this an unjust, wanton, wicked,
and unnecessary war. I, on the contrary, assert it to be a just and
necessary war. One characteristic difficulty here presents itself,
which has occurred in all the discussion in and out of this House
on this subject. What is a just and necessary war? By the advocates
of war it is asserted that the injuries and insults of the enemy
demanded war, and rendered this war just and necessary. The opponents
of war admit the magnitude of the insults and injuries, but deny the
inference. They assert that the war is unnecessary and not justifiable,
because the pecuniary expenditure and loss will exceed in value the
commercial objects for which we are contending. The advocates of war
deny both the premises and the conclusion. The objects of the war are
not merely commercial, but, if they were, the inference is denied.
They admit that the pecuniary expenditure and loss will exceed the
pecuniary value of the commercial objects for which they contend, but
they deny that a war for commercial objects is therefore unnecessary
or indefensible. To an intelligible argument it seems, therefore, under
these circumstances, necessary that we should begin by some definition
of a just and necessary war; and yet it seems to be a melancholy labor
in a great and free State, where public sentiment should be unequivocal
on such subjects, to proceed by rules of logic to establish great
first principles of public sentiment; but I fear that, as all good
things are purchased by concomitant sacrifices, we have not obtained
the innumerable blessings and advantages of the freedom of speech and
of the press for nothing. I fear they have sometimes substituted an
erring reason for a better guide--the great uncontaminated current of
public feeling--the moral sense of the nation, of which the honorable
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINCY) so often tells so much.
But we must inquire, what is a just and necessary war? A war is just
and necessary when waged to protect and defend the violated pecuniary
interests of the country; or to defend and secure the sovereign rights
and independence of a country; or, lastly and principally, to support
and maintain the national honor. The last, indeed, embraces all the
others; and, if I have distinguished, it is rather in conformity with
custom, or for the purpose of elucidation than from any practical
separation which I admit between the last and the former. But I
am likely to incur the derision of the honorable gentlemen in the
opposition by speaking of national honor. They seem not to have
admitted the term into their vocabulary; they treat it as a new
language; they remind me of the character of _Goldfinch_ in one of
_Holcroft's_ plays, who, when he hears the Romans mentioned, exclaims,
"Romans! Romans! who are they?" So the gentlemen, "national honor!
what's that? what's that?" Yet, sir, strange as it may seem to the
honorable gentlemen over the way, the maintenance of the principle
of national honor, by which I mean that principle which animates and
sustains an elevated fitness of character and conduct, is the only
justifiable cause of war; and, if necessary, the principle ought to be
maintained by all the sacrifices of war in its worst shape. No war is
justifiable or necessary which is waged merely for pecuniary objects,
if we can suppose such a war, for all wars involve expense and loss
greater than the amount of any pecuniary objects for which they can
be waged. On the ground of interest merely they would not, therefore,
be justifiable; and there is to be superadded, what cannot be valued
in money, the value of human life. But the value of every thing is
founded on the security with which it is enjoyed. One unpunished
violation of right provokes another and another, until all security is
destroyed; and, therefore, it is necessary to resist given infractions
of pecuniary right by sacrifices beyond the value of the right itself,
because resistance is necessary to the security of all other pecuniary
rights--nay, to the security of all other rights. Security of rights
is a political thing; it is the protection of Government; it derives
its value, and a great portion of its power, too, from a faithful
and unrelaxed application of it to all the rights and interests of
a nation; and is diminished in its value, and in its power also, by
any failure to afford the protection which is due by Government to
the subjects and the interests under its control. To abandon any
interest is to abandon all, and to protect one is to protect all; war,
therefore, waged to protect one political right is waged to protect
all political rights; no war is, in consequence, made for any given
right merely as such, but for all the rights and interests which are
bound together in a nation under the social and civil compacts. To
compare the expenditure and losses of war with the value of commercial
objects, which may be the immediate cause of war, is to talk idly,
and to forget the true end of all war and the first great purpose of
Government--security. A great man (Sir James Mackintosh) has said,
"the paramount interest of every State, that which comprehends all
others, is security." Will you, then, it may be inquired, go to war to
avenge the infraction of the smallest right under the protection of
Government, and for this object jeopardize every other, and spill the
blood of your fellow-citizens? Certainly not. There is a fitness which
cannot be defined in anticipation, but which is easily discoverable
when the occasion occurs, which determines when a war is necessary.
It may depend upon the nature of the injury; on the character which
the nation has acquired; on its ability to avenge the injury; on the
character of the nation which has inflicted the injury, and a thousand
other circumstances. The question ought always to be, What becomes
the nation? What is due to the national honor? What is necessary to
sustain an elevated fitness of character and conduct in the nation?
If the injury sustained be one which cannot or will not probably be
repeated, it is less necessary to avenge it. If the nation be poor
and feeble, it may be obliged to submit to the violation of a great
right. If it be great and powerful, it must sometimes resent a smaller
injury; it may sometimes disdain to notice a considerable aggression
upon its rights; in short, in no instance is the expense of the war a
rule which will prove it just and necessary, or otherwise; in every
instance is national honor, that is, a fitness of character and
conduct, the rule by which its necessity and justifiable character are
determinable. Generally when a nation is able to resist with effect the
infraction of important pecuniary rights, it seems indubitable that an
elevated fitness of character and conduct requires resistance. But this
obligation is increased, and is less doubtful when any of the sovereign
rights of a nation are infringed, as in gross and reiterated insults to
the national flag, habitual violations of the personal liberty of its
subjects, invasion of its territories, and the like; these are assaults
upon its independence, and there is no room left for an inquiry into
the fitness of resistance; it may indeed be supposed to change from a
question of expediency to an act of necessity; it is a struggle for
self-preservation; the nation acts upon a principle which is inherent
in the meanest insect, and of which inanimate matter is not divested;
the worm, when trodden on, writhes in resistance as well as anguish,
and the reaction of inanimate matter seems to be the repulsive act of
self-preservation.
What, then, did an elevated fitness of character and conduct require
of the American Government, in relation to Great Britain, at the
moment war was declared? What does it still require? I repeat, the
war is a just and necessary war. This will be proved by adverting to
the causes of the war. What, then, were the causes of the war? They
were principally new and before unheard-of blockades--the Orders in
Council, which have been generally so called, by way of pre-eminence;
the spoliations of our commerce under various unfounded and insulting
pretexts, and the impressment of our seamen. I am not permitted by the
circumstances under which I address you to go at length into any of
these subjects. But I may ask, what on the ocean did we enjoy but by
the sufferance of Great Britain? What insults, what injuries had we not
suffered? When did they begin; when, though they may have been varied
in character, were they relaxed in degree, and when were they probably
to cease?
Great Britain has been properly selected as the first object of our
hostility. When a proposition was made to include France as well as
Great Britain in the declaration of war, gentlemen on neither side
of the House did support it. The opposition prints throughout the
Union laughed it to scorn. Few men thought of resisting both at once.
The voice of both parties appeared to be against it. The Government,
obliged to resist, was obliged to select its enemy. Should France have
been selected? With the blood of our citizens insultingly slaughtered
without the slightest provocation, on the shores of our own territory,
unatoned for till the moment of the declaration of war, with the
habitual impressment of our seamen in every sea, with the continual
and reiterated violation of your right to seek where you choose a
market for your native produce, all before your eyes, and with no hope
of a discontinuance of these injuries, we are told that we ought to
have diverted our enmity from Great Britain, and directed it against
France. Where, sir, could we attack France? Where are her colonies
into which we could carry our arms? Where could we subjugate her
provinces? Where are her ships?--where her commerce? Where could we
have carried on against her any of the operations of war? Would the
chivalry of gentlemen on the other side of the House have suggested an
invasion of France? An honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. GOLD)
said it would not have required another man nor another ship, to
have resisted France. But, why, I pray you? Because such a resistance
would have been confined to the idle and nugatory act of declaring
it. Effectual resistance would have been impracticable. Gentlemen
would resist France, would declare war against France, merely to show
their indignation at her perfidy and injustice; and here I confess
my feelings go with the gentlemen--I would do so too, had we no
other enemy to contend with. But if we had abandoned or deferred our
resistance to the injuries of England and as a pretext for it assailed
France, would not the act have been idle and weak? Would it not have
been wicked, to borrow one of the epithets which gentlemen have applied
to the war with England, so to have sported with the public feelings
and the national resentment as to have declared war against France,
the minor aggressor, whom we could not touch, and to have suppressed
our resentment against Great Britain, whose injuries were unlimited
and unceasing, and whom alone we could reach? But why, sir, are the
injuries these nations have done contrasted, and those of the one made
an apology for those of the other? Why are we partisans of either? Have
we no country of our own? Is there a land upon the globe so fair, so
happy, and so free? And, beholding and enjoying these blessings,
"Breathes there a man with soul so dead
Who never to himself hath said,
_This is my own, my native land_!"
Sir, I feel neither as a Frenchman nor Briton, but as an American.
As a citizen of the United States, I bear no affection to any other
country. If I have any feeling of partiality for either of the great
belligerents, it is for the country, and the people of Great Britain.
From them I draw my blood in a very short descent. But that nation is
the injurer of my country, and I can see her in no other light than
that of an enemy, nor can I find any apology for her in the injuries
France has done us. Sir, the Government did right in discriminating
between Britain and France, and selecting the former. It was the only
mode of real practical resistance. The world would have laughed at us
had we declared war against France, who was no longer able to injure
us, whom we could not assail with effect, and have left the unceasing
injuries of Great Britain to go on unresisted and unresented. The
world would have considered it as a mere cover for our pusillanimity.
I say, then, that the Government was not tricked into a war with Great
Britain. It was commenced in the prosecution of the best and most
deliberate policy. It was the only honorable and practicable course. If
there has been an error, and I think there has, it was in not having
long since resisted England. War against England should have followed
the first embargo; that was a wise measure, but it could not endure
forever; it carried the policy of commercial restriction upon the enemy
as far as such a policy should ever be carried, which from its nature
can only be temporary. It at the same time prepared the nation for war;
it brought home your wealth and seamen; it brought home your vessels,
and placed you in the attitude in which the nation ought to have been
previous to war, and its termination ought to have been followed by
immediate and vigorous war. The pulse of the nation was high, and the
confidence of the people in their rulers and resources great. Distrust
has grown out of the hesitation and timidity then manifested. If the
embargo had been followed up by war, some of the greatest injuries we
have since suffered would not have occurred. France would not have
ventured to have seized and sequestered our vessels and property as she
subsequently did. She was tempted to do it because she saw we would
suffer and submit to any injury.
Gentlemen say, that popular opinion was against the war. I deny it,
sir. It was called for by popular opinion; and this will not be
disproved, however soon popular opinion shall incline to peace, and
gentlemen on the other side of the House regain the reins of power,
as they are not unlikely to do, however just and necessary the war.
Any man who thought with half the ability with which the gentlemen do,
must have believed that in voting for war, he was probably surrendering
himself politically a victim on the altar of his country; yet it is
frequently declared, that the majority have declared this war to
preserve their seats. They declared it against popular opinion, too, to
preserve their seats, which they hold by the tenure of popular opinion!
Are gentlemen serious? Look at the history of nations, and see if the
war-makers have been generally the peacemakers.
But war was prematurely declared, it is said, because we had not a
regular disciplined army at the time. Preparation for operations on
land must have been relative to the defence of our own territory, or
the invasion of the enemy's territory. The militia are the proper
and the adequate defenders of the soil on which they live; for this
purpose we did not want any other army. They might have been made
more extensively useful. I join not with their revilers--I wish that
their usefulness had not been circumscribed by a doctrine subversive
of the true principles of the constitution which was maintained on
this floor. I rejoice that I combated that doctrine; yet I do not
mean to consider them as a fit army of invasion. I acknowledge that
we were not prepared with a regularly-disciplined army, qualified
for the invasion and conquest of the enemy's country. But should we
have been prepared by winter, the time to which gentlemen wished to
have deferred the declaration of war? It is a truth that a Government
like ours never will, and never can, be prepared for war in peace.
The great and effective preparation for war must grow out of the
progress and events of the war. Notwithstanding our disasters on land,
I believe our preparation is greater, and our situation better, than
it would have been had the war been deferred. We were to expect, in
the commencement of the war, to suffer such misfortunes. Except in
the affair of Detroit, nothing has happened which should cause us to
blush: that disgrace, like the disgrace of the Chesapeake, will be the
harbinger of glory--I take it as an omen of victory. I pledge myself,
if the war continue it will be so in the event. As the war stands at
this moment, we have suffered little, and we have humbled the pride of
the enemy where it was most insulting. We have insured the confidence
of the nation, from the seashore to the mountains beyond them, as far
as our population reaches, in our naval ability. I ask the gentlemen
on the other side of the House, whether we have not gained something
in this respect by the war? In one word, who would now commence the
war and take the chance of better success in preference to the actual
fortune of the war since it has been declared. It was not prematurely
declared. I now contend the war ought to be continued. Some gentlemen
have thought fit to say in debate, that the only alleged cause of war
was formed by the Orders in Council. But from their own act, their
celebrated protest, I will prove the contrary. Impressment is there
enumerated as among the causes of war, as it was in all the public
acts of the time relative to the causes of war. Without more words, I
am authorized in asserting that impressment was one of the principal
causes of the war; and although had the Orders in Council been revoked,
and their revocation known to us before war was declared, we would no
doubt have temporized longer; yet this cause itself must in the end
have produced war.
It appears that very soon after the General Government went into
operation, this practice was the subject of remonstrance; this was
under the Administration of General WASHINGTON. It has been the subject
of negotiation and remonstrance under every succeeding Administration.
But it is alleged, because it was not settled in the Treaty of 1794,
that it was not considered by General WASHINGTON as justifiable cause
of war, and it is inferred that it ought not now to be considered as
sufficient cause for the continuance of the war. What, sir, shall
constitute cause of war? The spoliation of your property? Not so, say
gentlemen, because the expenditure for redress will be greater than
the injury sustained. The violation of the personal liberty of your
citizens and the degradation of the ensign of your sovereignty? No,
say gentlemen, General WASHINGTON did not consider these as sufficient
cause of war. Will, then, any injury, or any combination of injuries,
authorize or require national resentment? The reasoning of the
gentlemen would lead us to a negative conclusion. But in their estimate
of the actual causes of the present war, they appear to consider the
business of impressment as trivial, and the Orders in Council as
every thing. What, sir, will you go to war for property, the value
of which is only relative, and which, compared with personal liberty,
is worthless, and refuse to go to war for the personal liberty of the
citizen? for that which is alike
"Given to the fool, the vain, the evil--
To Ward, to Waters, Chartres, and the Devil!"
You will wage war, and not to rescue your fellow-citizens from
imprisonment and stripes? But however this subject was to be viewed
before we were actually involved in war, it must now be put on
a footing of certainty; if our claim be not secured it will be
surrendered; to make peace without obtaining any security against
the abuse of which we complain, would be to acquiesce in it, and to
acquiesce in it would be to surrender the rights of the country. This
was the reasoning of Mr. King, who in one of his communications to
Government on this subject says, he has abandoned negotiation, because
to acquiesce in the views of the British Government would be to
surrender our rights. And shall I be obliged, sir, to come here with
volumes of documents to prove the rights of the citizen; to demonstrate
that the naval officers of Britain have not a right to incarcerate
him; to drag him to the gangway and flog him? Shall I be obliged by a
laborious process of reasoning to prove the obligation of Government to
rescue him from such suffering? No, gentlemen generally have abandoned
this ground, and say, that the impressment of our citizens is, under
proper circumstances, justifiable cause of war; and the gentleman from
North Carolina, (Mr. PEARSON,) who opened the debate on this subject
says, that if a fit proposition, accompanied by means calculated to
give it a fair chance of success, were tendered and did not procure a
cessation of the practice of impressment, he would support the war.
What is the proposition which he submits? That we shall prohibit from
serving in our ships the seamen of Great Britain and other foreign
seamen, and confine our crews to our own citizens. This being done he
will support the war. I challenge gentlemen on the other side of the
House to say distinctly to the people, for whom an honorable gentleman
(Mr. QUINCY) has said this debate was intended, that this war should
not be continued for the protection of our seamen; they will not, they
dare not. But if they are against the continuance of the war, it is on
that ground and no other. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
RANDOLPH) says, Great Britain has a right to insist on the services of
her own subjects, and that England would not be England if she could
not command them. I say that America will cease to be America if she
suffers her to command them at the price of the liberty of her citizens
and the honor of her flag. The same gentleman says, England will
nail the flag to the mast and go to the bottom with it, rather than
surrender the right of taking her seamen from on board our merchant
vessels. I hope, sir, we shall imitate the noble example she sets us,
and make every sacrifice rather than give up our citizens to bondage
and stripes.
But, say gentlemen, the public law of all nations on earth, ancient
and modern, has denied the right of expatriation. Admit that they are
correct, and for the purpose of the argument, I do admit that such
is the general law. But what is this law as modified by the practice
of nations? Every nation which has thus forbidden expatriation has
at the same time granted naturalization, and the general practice of
nations is undoubtedly the law of nations. Does not England naturalize
foreigners? Does she not naturalize your citizens? If she does not do
it as generally as you do, it is because it is not her policy to do so;
it is enough that she naturalizes your seamen; it is enough that all
nations have, at the same moment, forbidden expatriation and granted
naturalization. The law must be the result of neither exclusively,
but of both these practices. Mr. Burke, (the great Edmund,) who was
certainly no innovator, denominates Charles XII. the murderer of
Patkul. Patkul was born a Swedish subject and had repeatedly taken up
arms against his Sovereign; he was adopted by Russia and had been her
Minister at the Court of Poland. Charles XII., the Sovereign to whom
his natural allegiance was due, obtained possession of his person and
put him to death--this act Mr. Burke denominates murder!
Governments which have naturalized foreigners have protected their
naturalized subjects, and the Government to whom the native allegiance
of such subjects was due, though they have denied the right of
expatriation, have not impugned the protecting interposition of the
adopted sovereign. If they have, it has been considered as an act of
unprincipled violence, and in the instance of Patkul has merited and
received the denomination of murder. On this subject I will quote a
single sentence from one of Mr. King's letters; he says, "it behooves
the British Government to adhere to the principle of natural allegiance
wholly, or renounce it wholly." Contending themselves for the right
of naturalization, can the British Government deny it to others? On
the part of this Government sufficient evidence of its pacific and
accommodating disposition appears in its offer to surrender every thing
it can, consistently with national faith. On the part of Britain a
protraction of the war, by refusing to meet us on the terms proposed,
can proceed from no other motive than a determination to continue that
abuse of power which she has inflicted and we have suffered so long.
The ground taken by this country is what we must insist upon keeping,
and I doubt not we will succeed if we contend for it as we ought.
The informality of the negotiation between our Chargé d'Affaires and
the British Government has been mentioned as a cause of its failure.
If there had been an amicable disposition on the part of the British
Government, the authority would have been considered ample. If there
be not an amicable disposition we will negotiate in vain. We must
fight, or we shall never succeed in obtaining a recognition of our
rights. I will advert to one argument of the gentleman from New York,
(Mr. EMOTT,) who has examined this subject with ability. It is that
one which appeared to me to make the greatest impression on the House.
He said he had examined the voluminous document on the subject of
impressment, which was printed during the last session by order of the
House, and that it did not appear from that document that more than
ninety-three American seamen had been impressed in the year 1809; from
which I believe every one who heard him inferred that it was proved
affirmatively by that document, that no more than ninety-three American
seamen, who were named therein, were impressed in that year. Now, what
is the fact? The document does not state in one case, perhaps of eight
or ten, when the impressment took place, and there are one thousand
five hundred and fifty-eight persons named in that document. Of course
the gentleman could not be authorized to say that but ninety-three,
or any other precise number, were impressed in 1809. All those, the
date of whose detention is not stated, may have been impressed in
1809. It is probable much the greatest portion was. A more particular
examination of this point of inquiry will prove the magnitude of the
evil. From the 1st of April, 1809, to the 30th of September, 1810, a
period of eighteen months only, a single agent of this Government, in
London, received one thousand five hundred and fifty-eight applications
from impressed seamen. How many were unable to apply? Men imprisoned on
board ships of war, scattered over the ocean and on distant stations,
how could they apply to Mr. Lyman in London and give in their names?
The number impressed must have been great, indeed, when a single agent
in the short space of eighteen months, registered the names of one
thousand five hundred and fifty-eight applicants. Of this number a part
was discharged, acknowledged to be Americans beyond the possibility
of denial; a small number is detained as being born in England, and
the remainder are detained under various pretexts--such as supposed
to be born in England, being on distant stations, having consular
certificates proving them Danes, Swedes, &c.; as if they had any better
right to take from on board an American vessel a Swede or a Dane than
an American citizen. Even their own doctrine goes to assert a right to
seize none but their own subjects. I ask, now, whether the impression
made by the gentleman from New York was a just one? Whether it does
not appear probable that at least one thousand of those contained in
this list were impressed without even a plausible pretext? But if in a
single statement I make out a result so variant from the statement of
the gentleman, I beg you and the public to test the other statements
of the gentleman in the same way. Not, sir, that the gentleman made
the statement with any unfair intention, for no man is more honorable
or correct--he has my highest esteem--but, it will show how liable we
are to err--nay, how prone we are to err when our feelings and habit of
thinking run with our argument. So much for impressment. It is an abuse
such as cannot be tolerated by an independent nation. It is one which
ought to be resisted by war.
The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and decided in
the affirmative--For the bill 77, against it 42, as follows:
YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., William Anderson, Stevenson Archer,
Daniel Avery, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Josiah Bartlett,
Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge, Robert
Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, John C. Calhoun,
Francis Carr, Langdon Cheves, James Cochran, John Clopton,
Lewis Condict, William Crawford, Richard Cutts, Roger Davis,
John Dawson, Joseph Desha, Samuel Dinsmoor, Elias Earle,
William Findlay, James Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Thomas Gholson,
Isaiah L. Green, Felix Grundy, Bolling Hall, Obed Hall, John
A. Harper, Aylett Hawes, John M. Hyneman, Richard M. Johnson,
Joseph Kent, William R. King, Abner Lacock, Peter Little, Aaron
Lyle, Thomas Moore, William McCoy, Samuel McKee, Alexander
McKim, Arunah Metcalf, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah Morrow,
Hugh Nelson, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, Stephen Ormsby, Israel
Pickens, James Pleasants, jun., Benjamin Pond, William M.
Richardson, Samuel Ringgold, Thomas B. Robertson, John Rhea,
John Roane, Jonathan Roberts, Ebenezer Sage, Lemuel Sawyer,
Ebenezer Seaver, John Sevier, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, George
Smith, John Smith, William Strong, John Taliaferro, George M.
Troup, Charles Turner, jr., William Widgery, and Richard Wynn.
NAYS.--John Baker, Abijah Bigelow, Hermanus Bleecker, James
Breckenridge, Elijah Brigham, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin
Chittenden, Matthew Clay, Thomas B. Cooke, John Davenport, jr.,
William Ely, James Emott, Asa Fitch, Thomas R. Gold, Charles
Goldsborough, Edwin Gray, Jacob Hufty, Richard Jackson, jun.,
Philip B. Key, Lyman Law, Joseph Lewis, jr., William Lowndes,
Archibald McBryde, James Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Joseph
Pearson, Timothy Pitkin, jun., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy,
John Randolph, William Reed, Henry M. Ridgely, William Rodman,
Daniel Sheffey, Richard Stanford, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel
Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Uri Tracy, Laban Wheaton, Leonard
White, and Thomas Wilson.
_Ordered_, That the title be, "An act in addition to the act, entitled
'An act to raise an additional military force, and for other purposes.'"
FRIDAY, January 15.
_Land claims in Missouri Territory--Confirmation
of private claims--Pre-emptions._
Mr. HEMPSTEAD observed, that he had certain resolutions to submit,
on which, as they were somewhat in detail, he would ask the liberty
to make a few remarks. Under the second section of the first act for
adjusting land claims in the Territory of Louisiana, (now Missouri,)
each actual settler was entitled to six hundred and forty acres of
land, together with such other and further quantity as heretofore had
been allowed for the wife and family of such actual settler, agreeably
to the laws, usages, and customs of the Spanish Government. A majority
of the Board of Land Commissioners in that Territory were, under
that section, so liberal in their grants, that it excited the alarm
of Government. This alarm, sir, was soon transferred to the people,
and has continued ever since; because a majority of the Board passed
from one extreme to the other, and granted, in many instances, only
one hundred, one hundred and fifty or two hundred arpens, where they
had before granted seven or eight hundred arpens. The grants for the
smaller quantities are contained in the lists of grants, and being
final against the United States, would never come before Congress,
unless upon petitions from individual claimants. Other boards of
Commissioners, acting under the same law, have granted to the actual
settler in every instance, when the law had been complied with, six
hundred and forty acres; and it would seem to me, sir, that the people
of the Missouri Territory are entitled to the same justice.
The second resolution is to provide as well for rejected claims,
in which no testimony has been adduced, as when testimony has been
received; and to prevent individual claimants from loading our table
with petitions. The mode pointed out will present all claims to
Congress at one time. With these observations I shall submit the
resolutions for the sanction of the House:
_Resolved_, That the Committee on the Public Lands be
instructed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing,
in favor of the claimants, the re-examination of the grants
of land made by the board of Commissioners for ascertaining
and adjusting the titles and claims to land in the district
of Louisiana, under the second section of the act, entitled
"An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims
to land within the Territory of Orleans and the district of
Louisiana," passed the 2d of March, 1805; and also the grants
made by the Recorder of Land Titles for the Territory of
Missouri, under that part of the third section of the act,
entitled "An act further providing for settling the claims to
land in the Territory of Missouri," passed the 13th of June,
1812, which provides for settlement of donation rights in all
cases where the quantity of land granted is less than six
hundred and forty acres; and that said committee have leave to
report by bill, or otherwise.
_Resolved_, That the Committee on the Public Lands be
instructed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the
Recorder of Land Titles for the Territory of Missouri to
receive testimony in all the claims to land in which none has
been adduced, and which are rejected in the report made by the
late board of Commissioners for ascertaining and adjusting the
titles and claims to land in the then district of Louisiana,
now Territory of Missouri; and, afterwards, to arrange into
classes, according to their respective merits, as well the
claims embraced by this resolution, as the other rejected
claims mentioned in said report, and made abstracts containing
the substance of the evidence in support of such claims,
and such other information and remarks as may be necessary
to a proper decision thereon, and report on said claims to
the General Commissioner of the Land Office; and that said
committee have leave to report by bill, or otherwise.
_Resolved_, That said committee be instructed to inquire into
the expediency of granting the right of pre-emption to actual
settlers on the public lands in the said Territory of Missouri;
and that said committee have leave to report by bill, or
otherwise.
The resolutions were then agreed to.
MONDAY, January 18.
Two other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, PELEG TALIMAN; and from
Pennsylvania, WILLIAM PIPER, appeared, and took their seats.
_Encouragement to Privateer Captures._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill
"relating to captures."
[The bill provides that compensation shall be allowed to the officers
and crews of our public vessels, for vessels of the enemy necessarily
destroyed at sea after their capture.]
Mr. BASSETT stated to the House the considerations by which the
Naval Committee had been induced to report this bill. It grew more
immediately out of the case of the Guerriere destroyed by the
Constitution--a case precisely in point. Such a principle as that which
the bill proposed, he believed, had been engrafted in the British
service. It was at least required by equity and sound policy, where
the public service required the destruction of a vessel for fear of
recapture by the enemy in its disabled state, that some compensation
should be made to the captors in lieu of that which would have accrued
from the sale of the vessel had it been brought into port.
Mr. H. CLAY (Speaker) spoke in opposition both to the principles
and details of the bill. He was disposed to believe the principle
unprecedented in any other country; but even if it were not, he thought
it ought not to exist in this country. It would have the effect to make
it the interest of the captor, unless the vessel should be immediately
on the coast, or in the very mouth of our rivers, to destroy the
captured vessel. On consulting the underwriters, gentlemen would find
the premium required on bringing in a vessel of any description from
any considerable distance, would be equal to one-half her value;
and, as proof of it, Mr. C. instanced the high insurance even from
Charleston and New Orleans, along our own coast, to a northern port.
The strongest possible temptation would, therefore, be offered by
giving half the value of the destroyed vessel to the captors in case of
her destruction. Mr. C. moved to strike out the first section of the
bill.
Mr. BASSETT replied to Mr. CLAY, and defended the bill, on the ground
of expediency and of precedent. In the British nation, he said, rewards
were always liberally bestowed on skill and valor, and they must
always be by every country that wishes to encourage these qualities in
its citizens. The principle did exist in the British service, not by
statutory, but by admiralty regulations; and in all such cases rewards
had been liberally dispensed.
Mr. BACON opposed the bill as inexpedient and unprecedented. To show
that it went beyond the British legal provisions in that respect, he
quoted a statute of that nation which allows to the captors of vessels
so destroyed, as the bill contemplates, a bounty of five pounds for
every man found alive on board said captured vessels, the aggregate
to be equally distributed among the crew of the captors. Further, he
believed, that Government had not gone.
Mr. CHEVES on this remarked, that every encouragement was afforded to
British naval officers, by their Government, as well by promotions
to higher office and to nobility, &c., which were not known in this
country, as by pecuniary rewards and pensions, not in all cases by
statutory, but by Executive sanctions. He was disposed to be liberal to
our officers, to foster our rising navy. But, though friendly to the
principle, he objected to the particular details of the bill, which
he thought susceptible of modifications which would be better made
in select committee than in the House. He, therefore, moved that the
committee rise.
Mr. QUINCY objected to the principle of the bill, which he thought
fundamentally questionable. He was for providing specially by statute
for each case after its occurrence, where the circumstances of the
case required an exercise of liberality by Congress, and to legislate
generally for future occurrences.
The committee then rose, reported progress, and were refused leave to
sit again; and,
On motion of Mr. CHEVES, the bill was recommitted to the Naval
Committee.
TUESDAY, January 19.
_Privateer Pensions._
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the
bill regulating pensions to persons on board private armed ships.
[This bill directs that the two per cent. reserved in the hands of
consuls and collectors, in pursuance of an act of June last, respecting
private armed vessels, &c., be paid into the Treasury, to constitute a
fund for pensions to persons disabled on board private armed vessels,
of the mode and degree of which disability the log book of each vessel
is to be evidence.]
Mr. BURWELL moved to strike out the vital section of the bill, with a
view to try the principle. In support of the motion, he remarked that
he conceived it improper to adopt a principle so extremely liable to
abuse as this, especially when pensions had been refused to at least
equally meritorious sufferers during the Revolution. The evidence
which the log book of a vessel would afford, would be so very liable
to error, and so indefinite, as not to be entitled to that conclusive
weight given to it by the bill. The proper course, he conceived, would
be, to leave the subject open to the annual disposition of Congress;
which was now the case with certain other pensions.
Mr. BASSETT stated, in reply, that, at the last session, two per cent.
having been reserved from the wages of the seamen on board private
armed vessels, for the avowed and declared purpose of constituting
a fund for pensions to the wounded, this bill now merely indicated
the mode of carrying this provision into effect. The money had been
reserved by the collectors and consuls, and as it was never the
intention of Congress to make them a present of it, it remained for
Congress to direct the mode of its distribution. If the principle was
incorrect, it ought to have been objected to when the pledge was given
by the House last session on the subject.
The question on striking out the section was negatived by a very small
majority; and the committee rose and reported the bill.
Mr. STOW made a motion going to confine the pensions allowed by the
bill to such as should be disabled in actual service, and spoke in
support of his motion.
Mr. MCKIM opposed the motion. The services rendered by the privateers
were valuable to the country and ought to be encouraged. The duties on
prize goods, he said, brought into the port of Baltimore alone, had
amounted to three hundred and fifty-four thousand dollars. This showed
the importance of this system in a pecuniary point of view.
Mr. STOW questioned the benefit rendered to the public interest by
privateering, and said he was in favor of letting this fund accumulate,
and first see whether there was sufficient to pension those having
received known wounds in action, before they agreed to extend it to all
casualties on board private armed vessels.
Mr. LITTLE asserted the utility of privateers and their efficiency as a
means of annoying the enemy, He bore testimony to the bravery they had
displayed in all conflicts with the enemy, and to the injuries they had
inflicted on his commerce. The enterprising individuals concerned in it
ought to be encouraged; for, by the impediments to the prosecution of
their enterprise, many had been already discouraged and had dismantled
their vessels. If properly encouraged, they would scour every sea,
however distant, and ransack every port and harbor in search of the
enemy. He was in favor of exhibiting the most liberal disposition
towards them.
Considerable further debate took place on the amendment, which was at
last agreed to by a very small majority.
Mr. RHEA subsequently moved to recommit the bill to the same committee
which reported it, for the purpose of amendment; and the bill was
recommitted.
WEDNESDAY, January 20.
_Astronomical Observatory._
Mr. MITCHILL, from the committee to whom was referred the memorial of
William Lambert, and the report made thereon by the Secretary of State
at the last session, presented a bill authorizing the establishment of
an Astronomical Observatory; which was read twice, and committed to a
Committee of the Whole on Friday next.
The report is as follows:
On the 27th December, 1809, Mr. Lambert addressed the House of
Representatives upon the expediency of establishing a first
meridian for the United States at their permanent seat of
Government. This was ordered for consideration to a select
number of gentlemen, who, on the 28th March, eighteen hundred
and ten, laid upon the table an able and learned opinion,
accompanied with scientific calculations illustrative of the
object. They concluded their investigation by recommending that
provision should be made, by law, for determining, with the
greatest accuracy, the distance between the City of Washington
and Greenwich in England, and that the proper instruments
should be procured.
Afterwards, on the 23d January, 1811, the memorial was referred
to a select committee; and, on the 23d of the ensuing February,
that committee was discharged, and the memorial referred to the
Secretary of State for his consideration.
Conformably to the desire of the House, that officer wrote to
the Speaker a letter which, after having been read, on the
third day of July, 1812, was ordered to lie on the table. That
letter was, on the 8th December last, ordered to the present
committee, who have diligently weighed the matters which it
contains.
It is their opinion that astronomical observations are highly
useful to a navigating and commercial people, already eminent
for their progress in science and the arts, and who are
laboring for the completion of their national dignity and
splendor.
The most ready method of obtaining the information to be
derived from noting the phenomena of the heavens, is by the
establishment of an observatory. This may be erected at the
city of Washington. By such an institution, means may be
adopted not only to fix the first meridian, but to ascertain
a great number of other astronomical facts and occurrences
through the vigilance of a complete astronomer.
THURSDAY, January 21.
The House met with closed doors; and, after being opened, another
member, to wit, from New York, PETER B. PORTER, appeared, and took his
seat.
FRIDAY, January 22.
_Encouragement to Privateers._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
report of the Committee of Ways and Means on the petitions of Joshua
Barney and Stephen Kingston.
The resolution, reported by the Committee of Ways and Means, "that
it is inexpedient to legislate upon the subject of the petitions,"
was disagreed to; and the following was reported to the House as a
substitute thereto:
"_Resolved_, That any right or claim of the United States to
British property which may have been captured by American
privateers, arising from forfeiture under any provision of the
non-importation acts, ought to be relinquished for the benefit
of the captors."
The question on the original resolution was also disagreed to by a vote
of the House. For disagreeing 61, against it 47.
And the resolution proposed in Committee of the Whole as a substitute,
was, as stated above, agreed to; and was referred to the Committee of
Ways and Means to bring in a bill in pursuance thereof.
_Impressed Seamen._
The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES:
_To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States_:
I transmit, for the information of Congress, copies of a
correspondence between John Mitchell, Agent for American
Prisoners of War at Halifax, and the British Admiral commanding
at that station.
I transmit for the like purposes copies of a letter from
Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy.