10. To extend the foregoing provisions, not only to deserters, but to
all seafaring people.
These propositions went completely to secure to Great Britain the
services of all her seafaring subjects, except such as were naturalized
under our laws, which amounted to but few, indeed; thirteen hundred
British seamen only having been naturalized since the commencement of
our Government, and, in all probability, an equal number of our seamen
have been naturalized by Great Britain during the same period. Yet, to
my astonishment, have I heard it stated, during this debate, that our
Government had made no serious propositions to secure to Great Britain
the services of her seamen.
But equitable as these propositions were, they were rejected.
Notwithstanding, sir, our Government, anxious in their pursuit after
peace, have gone still further; they have, through our late Chargé
d'Affaires in London, (Mr. Russell,) proposed to Great Britain to
exclude from our naval service, as well public as private, all her
seamen, including those which may hereafter be naturalized; and
notwithstanding the liberality and justice of this proposal, it, like
all others, has been made without producing the desired effect. And
what more, sir, could have been asked of us, required, or granted, than
is contained in these offers? Nothing more, unless, indeed, they had
asked for our independence, and, yielding to the requisition, we had
granted it. When an American vessel is at sea, it is amenable to no
laws but those of its own country and the laws of nations; and where,
in either of these, will the advocates for impressment find their
justification? Sir, had not the practice of impressment been treated
as a casual, a trivial circumstance, during this debate, I should not
have presumed to trouble the House with my desultory remarks; and my
principal object in addressing the House, was to ask their attention
to a document which appears to have been overlooked, and which, if
necessary, will place the abomination of that practice in colors too
strong to be mistaken.
Here Mr. K. read the following extract of a letter from the Secretary
of State to Mr. Monroe, dated January 4th, 1804--
"The whole number of applications made by impressed seamen
to our Consul in London, between the month of June, 1797,
and September, 1804, were two thousand and fifty-nine. Of
this number, one hundred and two seamen only were detained as
British subjects, which is less than one-twentieth of the whole
number impressed. Eleven hundred and forty-two were discharged,
or ordered to be so, and eight hundred and five were detained
for further proof, with the strongest presumption that the
greater part, if not the whole, were Americans, or other
aliens, whose proof of citizenship had been lost or destroyed."
It is, then, evident, from this document, that, for every British
seamen obtained by this violent proceeding, a number of Americans, or
other aliens, with whom Great Britain has no right to meddle, not less
than twenty for one have been the victims to it. Sir, have we become
so lost to the real independence and sovereignty of the country, that
we are prepared to yield to this degrading, debasing, and humiliating
badge of vassalage?
The Romans, of old, had a practice of making the governors of those
countries they conquered pass annually beneath their yoke, as a mark
of submission; but we, doomed to humiliation far greater, are made
to pass daily, nay, hourly, beneath one much more galling. Some
gentlemen object to the propositions made by Mr. Russell, and assert
that he was not authorized. They should recollect that Mr. Russell's
letter, containing this final offer to the British Government, was
communicated to this House by the President, and, had it not met with
his concurrence, it is presumable he would, in his communication, have
expressed his disapprobation towards it. Nay, a similar offer has been
made by the Secretary of State to Admiral Warren.
I know not whether the feelings of shame or indignation predominate in
my breast, when I see gentlemen constantly laboring to place their own
Government in the wrong; and, in contradiction to the official records
of this House, insist that we are contending for the employment of
foreigners.
The language of our Government upon that subject, is this, sir: that,
if the oppressed and unfortunate inhabitants of Europe, escaping from
their tyranny and panting after their long-lost liberty, seek a refuge
in our happy country, upon their compliance with our naturalization
laws, we are willing to extend to them those blessings we enjoy; but
should they become dissatisfied with the advantages which the interior
of the country affords them, and they think proper to depart from our
shores, we say to them, we will not risk our peace for their protection
beyond our territorial limits. So far from our contest with Great
Britain being for the employment of her subjects, it is a contest for
shielding a large and valuable portion of our fellow-citizens from
British thraldom, under the lash of which they have too long labored;
and who will dare discriminate in that protection which is equally due
to all, that is due to the meanest individual in the community, and
withhold it from a class of men who have done honor to the American
character, and covered themselves with glory?
Mr. RANDOLPH rose, apparently laboring under the effects of a serious
indisposition, and addressed the Chair.
I rise (said he) with a heart saddened by the disgrace of our common
country, and sickened by the way in which the business of the State has
been managed.
Of the temper and virulence which have manifested themselves in this
debate, I shall not have any occasion to divest myself in the course of
the very few remarks which I fear I shall be enabled to make, because
towards them I have no purpose. Indeed, when I look around me, I am
exceedingly sad; and I know not now if it will be in my power to go on.
I had intended, if time and health permitted, to address to this
Assembly some few observations, confined principally to the change
which has taken place in the relations of our country since the
declaration of war, not only respecting that belligerent with whom we
are engaged in hostilities, but her adversary also. But the course
that this debate has taken imposes upon me a painful duty, which I
trust God will give me strength to discharge: the duty of reviewing
past transactions in the Government, which, from my heart, I would,
instead of bringing them up on the present occasion, gladly discharge
from my memory. But self-defence is the first law of nature. The merest
reptile, the worm itself, will turn when trod upon. Nor is the force of
the blow lessened by its being dealt, as in the present case, by the
hand--I will not say under the garb and circumstances--of Friendship.
It was my lot, sir, and I may assuredly say my misfortune, to take
some little share in those transactions which brought about a civil
revolution in the Government of this country. I hope that I am
understood. I feel I shall be understood, when I speak of this, by
all wise and good men; and it is with them only that I wish to hold
intercourse--to commune. It is of their good opinion alone that I am
ambitious, if indeed ambition dwell any where in my heart.
Let me endeavor to recall to recollection the state of things about the
period when I had the unhappiness to dedicate myself to political life.
Through the opposition, bold but just, which was made by myself, and
those associated with me, to the measures of that Administration,
an entire change was effected in the control of the Government. One
Administration was ejected from power, and another took its place. Is
it necessary for me to descant upon the topics of difference which then
separated the two great parties in the Government? Is it necessary
for me at this time of day to make a declaration of the principles
of the Republican party? Is it possible that such a declaration could
be deemed orthodox when proceeding from lips so unholy as those of an
excommunicant from that church? It is not necessary. Those principles
are on record; they are engraved upon it indelibly by the press, and
will live as long as the art of printing is suffered to exist. It is
not for any man at this day to undertake to change them. It is not
for any man who then professed them, by any guise or circumlocution,
to conceal apostacy from them, for they are there--there in the
book. What are they? They have been delivered to you by my honorable
colleague--what are they? Love of peace, hatred of offensive war;
jealousy of the State Governments towards the General Government, and
of the influence of the Executive Government over the co-ordinate
branches of that Government; a dread of standing armies; a loathing
of public debt, taxes, and excises; tenderness for the liberty of
the citizen; jealousy, Argus-eyed jealousy, of the patronage of the
President. From these principles what desertions have we not witnessed?
Will you have a list of them? I shall not undertake it.
Principle does not consist in names. Federalism is a real thing--not
a spectre, a shadow, a phantom. It is a living addition to the power
of the General Government, in preference to the power of the States;
partiality for the Executive power, in distinction to that of the
co-ordinate Departments of the Government; the support of great
military and naval force, and of an "energetic" administration of
the Government. That is what is called Federalism. Yes, an energetic
Administration, not in its real, but technical sense; for it has a
sense as technical as any in our laws. _That_ is Federalism. And, when
I am opposing the course which looks toward the rearing up of great
Military and Naval Establishments, of an extent not only incommensurate
with the necessity but the ability of my country, I care not with whom
I vote; I will be true to my principles. Let any man lay his finger
upon a vote in which, since I have had the honor (if, indeed, it be an
honor) of a seat in this House, I have departed from those principles,
and I will consent that, _quoad hoc_, I am a Federalist. But it will be
in vain to search for such a vote.
So strenuous, sir, had been the contest--so hot the spirit of rivalship
between the two contending parties--that, after the Revolution of 1801,
a curious spectacle was presented to this nation and to the world--a
spectacle which, I am bold to say, never did before make its appearance
in any Government, and never will appear again. It was this: that, as
if the character that each party had borne when in collision with one
another was indelible, the two parties, after power was transferred
from one to the other, did actually maintain the same character which
they had derived from impressions received during their late conflict:
and the admiring world saw with astonishment the case of an opposition
minority attempting to force upon a reluctant Administration patronage
and power, which that Administration put by, and sternly refused to
accept. Yes, sir; for a time so completely had the Republicans been
imbued with the principles which they professed whilst in a minority,
that, after becoming the majority, the Federalists pressed on their
old adversaries power and patronage, to which they absolutely opposed
themselves, repelling, for a season, every project of the kind. Is it
necessary for me to allude to the reduction of the Army--to say by whom
it was made? Sir, the proposition for it was originally made by the
personage now addressing you; it came from what was then considered
the Governmental side of the House. And by whom was it opposed? By
gentlemen who had so long fought under the banners of a Government of
"energy," that they were not content to submit to the diminution of its
patronage or its power, even in the hands of their political opponents.
I speak of facts. Such a case will never occur again. Nay, indeed, in
a little time, the sweets of power had their effect on one side of the
House, as the frowns of adversity had upon the other; and after awhile,
the court and country parties as easily changed sides as right and left
do when a man turns upon his heel.
Yes, sir, the tone of this House was soon changed. We succeeded,
however, in the reduction of the Army; but I will trust to the
recollection of gentlemen, upon all sides of the House, by what
instrumentality this change was effected. The Commander of that Army
was retained in his position. I have not leisure, health, or strength,
to go into the details; gentlemen will remember them. Meanwhile, peace
with this country was negotiated in France by the commissioners sent
by Mr. Adams, and was followed up very soon afterwards by the short
respite that the truce of Amiens gave to European combatants, wearied
rather than satiated with slaughter. These events placed this country
in the happiest condition. Of the proceeds of the direct and internal
taxes voted by the predecessors of the administration of Mr. Jefferson,
one moiety at least came into the Treasury after their dismissal from
office. But these proceeds were not necessary to give an overflow
of money into the Treasury, which we never ceased to have until we
departed from those principles of government and that policy which
brought us into power. We sailed on for some time in the full tide of
successful experiment, unobstructed by squalls or adverse gales, if we
except only the Yazoo breeze. That question was, if I forget not, the
first cause of a breach between those persons who had a direct lead in
the Government of the country. There were men who did not hesitate, in
opposition to all the heads of your Departments, to throw themselves
into the breach at that time attempted in the constitution of the
country, to defend it, and to defend it with success. It appears, from
some documents that have lately been laid upon our table, that errors
of that day have been perceived, and that tender consciences which at
that time revolted, are now entirely reconciled to the compromise which
was then stamped with the reprobation of almost every honest man from
Georgia to Virginia. There were considerations of personal feeling
which gave to other parts of the Union, and to certain individuals
therein, a bias on that subject; and I should be extremely sorry to be
considered as passing any thing like general censure upon the advocates
of that measure in or out of this House. I refer only, of course, to
those who were not parties concerned in the fraud.
At that time, sir, all was prosperity and joy. At that time were
accumulated in the Treasury those surpluses which, in one year,
nearly equalled the sum for which, in the present year, the revenue
is deficient, notwithstanding the loan of last year, and to make up
which deficiency the head of the Treasury has been able to devise no
other means than a resort to new loans. Yes, sir, there were then those
surpluses in the Treasury, the ghosts of which lingered along its
vaults for a time after their corporeal bodies departed, and were then
heard of no more.
But to proceed. The expenditures of the Government, during the first
four years of the Jefferson Administration, exclusive of payments on
account of the public debt, averaged only eight millions of dollars a
year. In the four last years of the Jefferson Administration, those
expenditures were very greatly increased, amounting in the year
1808, (the last of the four,) without any increase of Army and Navy
expenditures, to upwards of sixteen millions of dollars--rivalling
the expenditures of any one year of Mr. Adams's war, and amounting
to one-half as much as was expended by the Father of his Country in
his eight years of the Presidency, during which he was called upon to
establish public credit, to maintain a bloody Indian war, and to lay
the foundation of that character of integrity which the Government
has so long sustained abroad, notwithstanding the misconduct of its
rulers. Yes, sir, it is a curious but notorious fact, that in 1808 and
1809--and I speak of 1809, for, although the present incumbent came
into office on the 3d of March of that year, expenses were incurred and
voted in his predecessor's time--the expenditures of the Government
outraged all belief when compared with the objects on which they
were lavished. And here, Mr. Chairman, let me put to you, and to the
gentleman on my right, if it be within the compass of any man's powers
to detract more from the merit of an administration of the Government
of the United States in managing at least one branch of the revenue
than has been done by that honorable gentleman? What has he said? I
will not repeat his words; to do so would be odious, invidious; but I
well know if what he did say had come from the other side of the House,
it would have been set down to the rancor of party spirit; to personal
spleen; or to want of respect for the White house, or the Red house, or
some other house. What has become of that vast amount of money? No man
knows; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, so help me God, no
man will ever know.
I find, as I anticipated, a difficulty in dragging along my miserable
body, and my feeble mind, in this discussion; a difficulty not less,
perhaps, than that of dragging along with me the attention of members
of this House. I ask its patience, its pardon, and its pity.
But to continue. In this prosperous state of our country, the war in
Europe was renewed, or about to be renewed. The Government of the
United States would naturally, from the situation of affairs in that
quarter of the world, experience a temporary diminution in its revenue,
which it need not feel or regard, because it had been enabled to make
that noble provision for a sinking fund, for lessening the national
debt, for paying off the mortgages on the estate of every man in the
country and of those who are unborn. It had made that noble provision,
which was attempted to be diverted to the necessities created by the
policy of the last four years of Jefferson's Administration, and
the actual diversion of which, I believe, was the first act of this
Administration. It had made that appropriation of eight millions of
dollars for a sinking fund, not to be touched for any other purpose,
and which, at the time of the appropriation, no man dared to believe
would be gambled away.
The war in Europe brought to this country, among other birds of
passage, a ravenous flock of neutralized carriers, which interposed the
flag of neutrality, not only between the property, but even between
the persons of the two belligerent powers; and it was their clamor
principally, aided by the representations of those of our merchants
who saw and wished to participate in the gains of such a commerce,
that the first step was taken in that policy of restriction, which it
was then foreseen would lead to the disastrous condition in which we
now find ourselves. Yes, it was then foreseen and foretold. What was
then prophesied is now history. It is so. "You," said the prophet,
"are prospering beyond all human example. You, favorites of Almighty
God, while all the rest of the world are scourged, and ravaged, and
desolated by war, are about to enter into a policy called _preventive_
of war; a policy which comes into this House in the garb of peace,
but which must end in war." And in war it _has_ ended. Yes, sir, we
have been tortured, fretted, goaded, until at last, like some poor man
driven from his family by discord at home, who says to himself, "any
thing, even exile, is better than this," we have said that we will take
war; we will take _any thing_ for a change. And when war came, what
said the people? _They_ said, "any thing for a change!"
At that time circumstances occurred, and I hope the House will pardon
me for alluding to them. It is absolutely necessary that I should do
so. They have been spoken of by others before me; they were at the
time, and have been since, detailed in the most solemn manner on the
floor of this body. A denial of them has been challenged and never
received. At that time, I repeat, circumstances occurred which made
it my duty to oppose the projects of the Executive Government of this
country in its relations with foreign powers.
At that time nothing that the _Spanish_ Government could do, not even
the invasion of our own territory, not even the capture and carrying
off, not from our decks, but our soil, a portion of our citizens,
could rouse this House to a spirit which would, in my judgment, have
comported not only with its honor, but was absolutely indispensable
to its dignity. We were wanting in the assertion of the rights of our
own country over its soil and jurisdiction, by which assertion, then,
we might have averted the calamities which have since befallen us; but
a project for that purpose, recommended by the committee to whom that
subject was referred, did not meet the approbation of the House. And
from that day and date, the black cloud has thickened over us; has
become more and more dense. From that day and date, have we departed
from those counsels--in my humble judgment, at least--from those
principles, adherence to which had induced the people of the United
States to clothe us with their power and confidence.
What have we done since? From that day, with a short interruption, the
policy of this Government has actually subserved, as far as it could,
the purposes of _France_. I speak of facts; of facts susceptible of
proof, which may be felt, seen, touched, heard, and understood by all
except those too indolent to examine them, or too ignorant for the
light of truth to have any effect upon their understandings. I say,
sir, that the policy of this Government has, from that time, subserved
the purposes of France. And how do I prove it? Why, sir, by way of
meeting the French decrees, which prohibit to us all intercourse with
Great Britain, we cut off the intercourse between us and the whole
world. We virtually held out to our great commercial cities--to Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston--the same language as
Bonaparte had held to his own cities: "I know that you are suffering,
and unhappy; that the grass is growing in your streets; that the
ships at your wharves are rotting, until they are fit only for fuel;
that your trade is dwindling only to nothing; but what is all that to
my continental system? What are a few seaport towns--enterprising,
wealthy, and prosperous, as indeed they are--what are they, compared
to my continental system?" And, sir, what was our "restrictive"
system? Similar in point of effect--certainly cotemporaneous in
point of time--to Bonaparte's "continental system." Sir, it is a
matter susceptible of demonstration, if I possessed the physical
power to go through with it, that the system recommended by the then
President of the United States, of laying an embargo on all ships and
vessels in our ports, for the purpose of "keeping in safety these
essential resources," took place in consequence of a communication
from our Minister in Paris to this Government, transmitting certain
correspondence of his with the French Government. And although in the
message to both Houses of Congress, recommending the measure, the
President does use the term "belligerent powers," I do attest the fact,
and I call upon other gentlemen, who know it, to attest it also, that,
while the message purposely referred to both "belligerents," not one
scrip of manuscript relating to the other "belligerent" accompanied
that message; nor was there any thing contained in that message
relating to that "belligerent," but a scrap from an English paper,
about the size of a square of its columns, containing some speculations
of a London editor; and I say that there did not exist in this House,
nor in this nation--if there did, let the evidence be produced--any
knowledge of the existence of the orders in council, which have been
put forward as justifying the embargo. If their existence had been
known at the time, would the President in his message recommending an
embargo have failed to notice the fact? Would he not have used it as
one of the strongest inducements to the adoption of this system? Would
those "orders" not have been published in the National Intelligencer,
which is considered--and certainly not without cause, in view of
certain things which we have lately seen in it--to be the Court
paper? Produce the National Intelligencer of that date; there is not
one syllable to be found in it concerning the Orders in Council. No,
sir, in his message on the occasion referred to, the President did
not produce any _acts_ of the "belligerents" referred to, but only
the correspondence between General Armstrong, our Minister at Paris,
and that Government, on the subject of the construction of one of its
first decrees. It was in consequence of the more recent decrees of
France, and not of the British Orders in Council, that the embargo was
recommended and laid. And yet, in the discussion which came off on that
measure, it was represented as a weapon against England, which would be
more efficient than any war, and must bring her to our feet: it would
give effect to the object which Bonaparte had in view, of destroying
her by consumption, by cutting her off from the commerce of the world.
Although I state these facts, I know that it may be proven--and I am
sorry that it can--by reference to the journals of this House, and by a
report, too, of an honorable and respectable committee of this House,
that the embargo was designed to obviate the effects of the Orders in
Council.
But, sir, it is indisputably true, that there was no mention in the
embargo message of those Orders in Council--no allusion to them in
debate upon it--no knowledge of them at the time that the embargo law
was passed, that can be proven by any document whatsoever entitled to
the least respect; and I will even go so far as to allow as evidence
the authority of any newspaper. The members of that committee had
heard so much of the Orders in Council, and the effect that it was
pretended that the embargo would have upon them, that in their report,
speaking of them, they absolutely transposed cause and effect. It is
unfortunate that it should be so; but it is nevertheless true. Events
subsequent to the period to which I have now brought myself have been
detailed in this debate in a manner so clear, so lucid, so convincing,
by two honorable gentlemen from New York, that there is no need of
my repeating the narrative: but I must be permitted to say that the
statement made yesterday by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT,)
will be refuted when Euclid shall come to be considered a shallow
sophist, and not before. My honorable friend from the same State,
who spoke a few days ago, called upon gentlemen to handle that part
of the subject--the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and
the inveiglement thereby of this country into a war with England--in
a manner more able than, he was pleased to say, he himself had done
it. The attempt to do this would, indeed, be to gild refined gold, to
paint the lily, to add to the perfume of the violet--in all cases a
most ridiculous and wasteful excess. And yet, sir, the situation in
which I unhappily stand, and in which it was my lot to stand at the
conclusion of the last session of Congress, compels me to say a word on
this subject. You will remember, sir, that it was my misfortune, during
the first session of this Congress, to oppose the attempt to impress
upon this House and the nation certain most preposterous, absurd, and
false propositions; for the temerity of which effort I came under the
censure--implied, at least, if not to say direct--of this honorable
body. The contrary propositions, which I undertook to maintain, were,
first, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the first
of November, 1810, and that the only evidence of any such repeal, up
to that date, was _the President's Proclamation_ of the second of that
month; and secondly, that the British Orders in Council did, in point
of fact, establish no serious insurmountable obstacle to negotiation
between that Government and the United States. Why, sir, I shall not
here go into any argument on this point; if I had the ability, I have
not the will; and, if I had the will, I have not the ability. Nor can
it be necessary, when the Emperor of France himself comes into court,
and cannot reject his own authority, as borne in his own laws. Yes,
sir, he did come forth, and, in his antedated decree of the 28th of
April, 1811--though it unquestionably ought to bear date full twelve
months later--does, in the most offensive of all possible ways,
establish the fact, not only that the Berlin and Milan decrees were
not repealed (as all the world knew except the President of the United
States) on the first of November, 1810, but that they were in his mind
when he issued his decree, dated 28th April, 1811. They were repealed,
finally, in consequence--of what? Of your doing that which for years
he had been attempting, by menace and blandishment, to induce you to
do--that is to say, embark in war with England, taking sides with
France, "causing," as the phrase was, "our flag to be respected:" And
this, too, after your having posted up in the ledger of this House that
war with one of the "belligerents" was equivalent to submission to the
other!
My other proposition was, that the Orders in Council constituted no
insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between this country and Great
Britain. And what was the fact in regard to them? Why, that almost at
the time that this position was taken on this floor--a few weeks only
thereafter--the Orders in Council were repealed.
I put it to you, sir, and to the great mass of the people of this
country--to the honest, laborious, unsuspecting, kind-hearted,
confiding, generous, and just people--had the fact been known that the
French decrees were _not_ repealed, and that the Orders in Council
_were_ repealed, whether any man, in any station, would have had the
confidence to propose a declaration of war against England, taking part
against her, and siding with France in the conflict in which those
nations are engaged?
And, whilst I am upon this subject, permit me to say, suppose the
proposition which was repeatedly made--in more than one instance by
the person who is now addressing you, and supported with the greatest
ability by gentlemen on the other side of the House--to postpone
our declaration of war against Great Britain until the autumn, when
we might be in some state of preparation and readiness for it--had
succeeded, what would have been the consequence? At this time we should
have been at peace; we should have been lying secure in that snug safe
haven of neutrality, in which the good sense of the greatest and best
men of this country have always attempted to moor the public ship.
_Now_, where are we? And shall this war be called a popular war; a war
of the people; a war called for by the public voice, into which this
country has been plunged, not more by the agency of the friends of
Government than of its enemies, in the hope of the latter that this
Administration would sink and founder in it, and they rise to power
thereupon? Is it possible that that can be deemed a war of the people,
a popular war, which has enabled a gentleman known to be of the most
respectable connections, and possessed, I believe, of considerable
talent--but who, put in competition with the veteran politician now
at the helm of Government, is but a boy in politics--a person whose
pretensions are so extremely inferior, to rival the present Chief
Magistrate in the confidence of the people, and for a time, as you
know, make him tremble for his re-election? It is, however, some
consolation to reflect that, in all free Governments, the public
voice will sooner or later be heard upon all their measures, and in
condemnation of those which the opinion of that public detests and
execrates. This is a great law of politics; it is to the political
what gravitation is to the physical world; it cannot be counteracted.
Statesmen know it, feel it; they do not reason to it, but from it; they
never lose sight of it, but are guided by it in all their measures. And
those of us who live to see the next Congress, will live to see the
effects of that law in this House.
Sir, we have passed so many laws, we have had so many objects for
enticing the belligerents on the one hand and coercing them on the
other, and enticing and coercing them together, that I feel some little
difficulty, in the present state of my brain, in referring to them by
title or date; but it is the law passed on this subject, in consequence
of which the celebrated letter of the 1st of August of the Duc de
Cadore was written, to which I desire most particularly to refer. If,
after the proclamation of the President of the United States of the
1st of November thereafter, issued in consequence of that letter,
revoking so much of our non-intercourse law as related to France, an
unbroken warfare being kept up by France on our commerce--a fact as
notorious as the existence of any fact in nature--was it not good
cause for reinstating the law in relation to France, and putting her
on her ancient ground? Then I would be glad to know, for one, whether
our continuing at war with England was any better cause for keeping
up the interdiction in relation to her, after she had revoked her
Orders in Council? In other words, it being admitted by gentlemen on
one side, as it has been contended by gentlemen on the other, that the
revocation of the Orders in Council by Great Britain was such a one as
did satisfy the terms of the non-intercourse act, what was the reason
that the proclamation required by our law in such case did not issue?
Why, sir, the state of war between the United States and Great Britain
being offensive on our part--being of our own making--was held to be a
cause why we cannot execute our law as relates to her. Now, whilst the
continued war upon us by France, by seizures of our merchant vessels
and their cargoes, is not considered an obstacle to its execution in
regard to her, is it not as clear as the noon-day sun, that if the
making of war by France on the United States did not constitute any
good cause for withholding the revocation as to her, when she professed
to have repealed her Berlin and Milan decrees, there was no reason
why it should not have been extended to Great Britain also, when she
actually repealed her Orders in Council?
I am extremely at a loss to say whether my judgment, my memory, my
imagination, or my command of words, fit me for the expression of the
few scattered ideas I have on this subject; I fear that they may fail
me. But I believe it will be conceded, on all hands, that if, after
the revocation of the British Orders in Council, the President of the
United States had, as he honorably might have done, made that repeal
the basis of negotiation with Great Britain, there is not a man in this
country--certainly there is none among his admirers and adherents--who
would not have hailed him as the restorer of the peace and prosperity
of the country, which had been so idly (I had almost said so wickedly)
disturbed. But, regardless of every consequence, we went into war
with England as an inconsiderate couple go into matrimony, without
considering whether they have the means of sustaining their own
existence, much less that of any unfortunate progeny that should happen
to be born of them. The sacrifice was made. The blood of Christians
enjoying the privileges of jury trial, of the writ of _habeas corpus_,
of the freedom of conscience, of the blessings of civil liberty,
citizens of the last Republic that ambition has left upon the face
of a desolate earth--the blood of such a people was poured out as an
atonement to the Moloch of France. The Juggernaut of India is said
to smile when it sees the blood flow from the human sacrifice which
its worship exacts; the Emperor of France might now smile upon us.
But no, sir, our miserable offering is spurned. The French monarch
turns his nose and his eyes another way. He snuffs on the plains of
Moscow a thousand hecatombs, waiting to be sacrificed on the shrine
of his ambition; and the city of the Czars, the largest in the world,
is to be at once the altar and the fire of sacrifice to his miserable
ambition. And what injury has the Emperor of Russia done to him? For
what was he contending? For national existence; for a bare existence;
for himself and the people who are subject to his sway. And what, sir,
are you doing? Virtually fighting the battles of his foes; surrendering
yourself to the views of his adversary, without a plea--without any
thing to justify your becoming the victims of his blasting ambition.
Yes, sir, after having for years attempted to drive us by menace into
war with England, when he has seen us fairly embarked in it, and the
champions of human rights bleeding in his cause, the Ruler of France
has turned with contempt from your reclamations; he has left your
Minister, who was charged with those reclamations, to follow him in his
Russian campaign, to whip up his jaded Pegasus, and, travelling at his
heels, to overtake him if he can.[34]
For these injuries and insults what atonement has been made? What
satisfaction has been received for your plundered property? And what
is the relation in which you stand to France? At this moment, when
it is well known that it would not require one additional man in the
army or navy to make good, in the eye of nations, your character as an
independent and high-spirited people, you are prostrate at the feet of
your's and the world's undoer. Is there any thing yet wanting to fill
up the full measure of injustice you have sustained? Gentlemen on all
sides are obliged to admit that the provocation which we have received
from France is ample; that the cup of it is overflowing. And yet, what
is our situation in relation to that destroyer of mankind--him who,
devising death to all that live, sits like a cormorant on the tree
of life; who cannot be glutted, nor tired, with human carnage; the
impersonation of death; himself an incarnate death?
All this, I say, does prove--and if it does not I call on gentlemen to
disprove the fact--that there is a difference in the standard by which
we measure French aggressions and the aggressions of any other people
under the sun. When Spain was the ally of France she was--what? She was
secure from our indignation. There was not a murderer, a barbarian, in
all our Western wilderness that was not safe under the Spanish cloak.
For why? Because the King of Spain, such as he was--for he wore only
the semblance of a crown--was in alliance with France; and he must not
be touched.
But what has _Revolutionary_ Spain done? What offence has she
committed against France? That she is not only helpless, destitute
of resources, unable to return a blow, but, above all, is coveted
by France, are considerations which cannot justify, on the part of
France, conduct towards her more infamous than that of the English
at Copenhagen--conduct cowardly as it is unprincipled. But, sir, I
forewarn gentlemen of the Southern country--I do beseech them, with a
sincerity which no man can have a right to question--to beware how they
transfer the theatre of war from the rocks and snows of Canada to the
sandhills, the rice-fields, the tobacco plantations of the Southern
States. For them to think of voluntarily consenting to make that region
the theatre of the war, would compel me to believe that they are on the
verge of that madness which precedes the destruction of all doomed by
Heaven to perish.
Sir, I have just touched, with trembling and faltering hand, some of
the preliminary observations which I had intended, at some time or
other, to make, into which I have now been prematurely forced to enter,
not more unexpectedly than unavoidably, by the strange turn which this
debate has taken.
There are two other points--for, in respect to the Orders of Council,
I shall not say a word about them--upon which I am very anxious to
offer myself to your attention: the one the celebrated point of
impressment, which, though it has been very ably handled, is not yet
exhausted: the other the Indian war on our Western border. And I also
wish to say something on the subject of negotiation. In the midst of
a war with one of the greatest powers of Europe, why should the gleam
of the tomahawk and the scalping-knife, the cries of massacred women
and children reaching our ears--why should these fright us from our
propriety? Why, we are told the Indians of the West have been stirred
up to war with us by British agents. But what is the fact? That we
have no Indian war, but a war of our own seeking, as I have already,
in the course of this session, read to you certain proofs; and I will
now give you another. It is this: It is agreed on all hands--no man
has attempted to dispute it--that, in the affair of the battle of
Tippecanoe, the commander and the officers distinguished themselves
by the greatest gallantry. How has it happened, then, that while we
have been freely voting medals to those gallant officers of our navy
who have distinguished themselves on the ocean--and I hope we shall
vote them something more substantial--not a whisper has been heard in
relation to those who have been engaged in this expedition against the
Indians? The subject has not been even inquired into.
Do we know, at this moment, as a Legislature, the causes of that
disastrous business--I call it so from its consequences--or by whose
authority this war was made? Or, is it come to this: that Governors
of our Territories are to consider themselves as so many Hastings
and Wellesleys of our country, and that, while they do not involve
us in war with Christians like themselves, they may go to any extent
in exterminating the Red Barbarians here as in the East Indies
Governors and Proconsuls of the British Government do there in regard
to uncivilized powers of that quarter of the globe? Is it discovered
that our Territorial Governors may at pleasure invade the territory
of other nations--for, inconsiderable and contemptible though they
be, the Indian tribes _are_ nations--in like manner that the British
authorities make war upon those nations of the East? Yes, sir, not only
is this a war of our own seeking--not only we had it in our power to
keep the peace--but in the country which was the scene of the battle,
and in the adjacent country, it was the most popular war ever waged.
The frontier people of this country have been in the habit of driving
the heathen before them; and to them the chase of the deer, the elk,
and the antelope, is not so grateful as that of the red men they
hunt. I believe that it is the cause of serious regret to many of the
people of the West that there is now no longer any motive to drive
them from their lands. As to the Red Men, the Big-Knives have, without
any foreign prompting or instigation, driven them off from a country
more extensive than that over which the Emperor of France wields
his sceptre. So I put aside this item of Indian war altogether as a
matter of account in the list of our grievances against the British
Government. There is not a shadow of foundation for believing that
these Indians were or could have been instigated to take up the hatchet
against us until hostile arms had been taken up against them. When
driven to the wall they must fight or die--the last alternative left to
them--for which nobody can blame them.
It was, sir, a saying of one of the best men who ever wrote, in
correspondence with a friend, that he had no time to write a shorter
letter; and I can truly say that I have not _time_ to deliver a shorter
speech. I know that this question will be taken to-day, for I have been
so admonished; and my own very severe and sudden indisposition, which I
am almost ashamed to name, will compel me to detain your attention much
longer than under other circumstances would have been the case.
A word, now, on the subject of impressment. Our foreign trade had
grown beyond the capacity of either our tonnage or seamen to manage.
Our mercantile marine was an infant Hercules; but it was overloaded
beyond its strength: the crop was too abundant to be gathered by our
hands alone. The consequence was, and a natural one too, that not
only the capitalists flocked into our country from abroad to share
in our growing commerce, but the policy also of our Government was
adapted to it, and a law was passed to enable us to avail ourselves
of the services of British seamen and seamen of other countries. And,
in doing this, we availed ourselves of the pretext--which, as long as
the countries to which they belonged winked at it, was fair for us to
use--of taking these British seamen for Americans. It was in 1796 that
commenced the act, to which reference has been made, and that system of
"protections," as they were called, the very mention of which, at this
day, causes a burst of honest indignation in the breast of citizens
whose situation enables them to ascertain their true character. If
these "protections," so termed, have not been forged all over Europe,
it is only for the reason that the notes of a certain bank of which
I have heard have not been forged, viz: that, the bank being broke,
its notes were so worthless that people would not even steal them.
The "protections" are attainable by everybody; by men of all ages,
countries, and descriptions. They are a mere farce. The issuing of them
has gone far to disgrace the character of the country, and has brought
into question and jeopardy the rights of real American citizens. This
question of impressment, delicate as it has been said to be--difficult
as in one view it certainly is--is, of all others, in my judgment,
the most compact. With the gentleman from New York, I will say that
the tide of emigration has brought to the shores of our country many
most valuable characters; some of them persons with whom I have the
honor of being in habits, not only of intimacy, but friendship. I
believe there does not exist one man of this description, who comes
_bona fide_ to this country to settle himself and children here, that
would require you to go to war on his account. And, sir, I believe
that the belligerent position itself in which you now find yourself
will relieve you in a great degree of this evil, for many seamen who
have so long, by virtue of these "protections," passed themselves off
for American, will find it to be very convenient to be Portuguese
or Swedish seamen, or seamen of some other State than the United
States--some State that is not at war with England. Sir, there is a
wide difference between the character of American seamen and seamen of
every other country on earth. The American seaman has a home on the
land, a domicil, a wife and children, to whom he is attached, to whom
he is in the habit of returning after his voyages; with whom he spends,
sometimes, a long vacation from the toils of maritime life. It is not
so with the seamen of other countries. For the protection of men of the
first description, I am disposed, if necessary, to use the force of the
country, but for no other. I know, indeed, that some gentlemen who have
spoken much on the subject of the principle of impressment, will tell
you that the right to take from a neutral vessel one seaman, if carried
to its extent, involves a right to take any, or all seamen. Why, sir,
in like manner, it might be argued that the taking illegally of one
vessel at sea involves the right to take every vessel. And yet, sir,
who ever heard of two nations _going to war_ about a single case of
capture, though admitted not to be justified by the laws? Such a case
never did and never will occur.
Of one thing we are certain: it rests upon no doubtful ground: that
Great Britain, rather than surrender the right of impressing her own
seamen, will nail her colors to the mast, and go down with them. And
she is right, because, when she does surrender it, she is Samson shorn
of his strength: the sinews of her power are cut. I say this openly
in the House of Representatives; and I am not communicating to the
enemy a secret of any value, because she has herself told us that she
can never surrender it. She has told us so, not when she stood in the
relation of an enemy toward us, but in the friendly intercourse of
the British Ministry with our late Commissioners at London. Turn to
the book: I wish the honorable gentleman, if he has it, would for a
moment let me have the use of it. You are told in that book that every
effort was made by the American Commissioners to effect a relaxation
of this right; that the British Ministry evinced the sincerest desire
to give satisfaction to them on this point: _but_ what? The Admiralty
was consulted; they waked up out of their slumbers the Civilians at
Doctors' Commons to deliberate upon it; and they came to the conclusion
that the Government of Great Britain could not give up that right.
Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, the Commissioners of the United States
to negotiate a treaty with the Government of Great Britain, in their
correspondence with their own Government, give this fact to excuse
themselves for failing to accomplish their object, and to prove that
every thing had been done that could be on their part, and every thing
conceded on the other side that the most friendly disposition could
warrant--and here I do not speak of masked friendship, but of real
friendship. Although every thing possible had been done, this right of
impressment of her own seamen was a _sine qua non_ on the part of Great
Britain--one which would not, could not, must not, be surrendered. And,
sir, if this question of the right of impressment was one on which we
were to go to war with Great Britain, we ought to have gone to war
_then_; because we were then told by the highest authority in that
Government that this was a point which never would be given up.
I find, sir, that I cannot trust my broken voice to _read_ the book,
now that it is in my hand, but must rely upon my recollection for facts.
Now, this question lies as I have said, in a very small compass. The
right of Great Britain to take her own seamen from your merchant
vessels, (if it be a right,) is one which she has exercised ever since
you were a People, wherever occasions for its exercise have occurred.
Will you not only go to war, but wage a _bellum ad internecinum_ for
it? Will you wage an endless war of extermination for this right,
which, you have known for two and twenty years of your national
existence, she will not relinquish? A gentleman from Tennessee, of
whose capacity few men have more respectful opinion than myself, has
quoted the diplomatic correspondence as far back as 1792, to show what
General WASHINGTON's opinions were on this question of impressment, and
this opinion of the Father of his Country is now held up to the people
of the United States for the purpose of enlisting their prejudices
in the conviction that, by involving the country in warfare, we are
at this moment treading in the footsteps of that great man, and
acting upon his principles. Nothing can be more untrue. To say that
the Treaty of Louisiana was negotiated two years after the letter of
instruction quoted from the Washington Administration, and that that
treaty contained no provisions on this point, is a reply in full on
this course of argument. But what does the correspondence referred to
prove? What every treaty, what every negotiation, has proven: that
England would not give up this point, although she made offers for
guarding against abuse--offers more favorable to us than ours to her.
And yet the Administration of this Government have had the hardihood or
the folly to plunge the nation into a war for it--for a point on which
General Washington, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jefferson, men differing from
each other as may be in every aspect, had been content to negotiate,
rather than go to war for its assertion.
What was the offer made to our Government by the British Ministry? If
I do not forget, their offer was that they would not impress American
seamen. Their offer to us was not accepted, but it was beyond question,
in my opinion, more beneficial than the proposition which we on that
occasion made to them.
But it may be said that the right of search cannot be endured; that
the protection of our flag must be held inviolate; that if a search
of our ships be permitted for British seamen, they may actually take
American seamen. Sir, there is no doubt of the fact that by mistake,
sometimes perhaps by wilful misconduct, on the part of officers engaged
in the search, such a thing may happen. But, should we not think it
exceedingly strange that the misconduct of an officer of the American
Government, in one case in twenty if you will, should be a cause of
war for any nation against us? It is one of those cases which does
occur, and will forever occur, to a neutral power, whenever a general
war is lighted up. It is one of the prices which this country has to
pay for its rapid accession of wealth, such as is unheard of in the
annals of any other nation but our own. And this, sir, is the state of
things in which we have undertaken, in children's language, to quarrel
with our bread and butter; and to identify ourselves with one of the
belligerents in a war in which we have no proper concern. I will not
touch at all the abstract question of the right of impressment: it has
been so much more ably handled by others that I shall not say a word
about it. I address myself to the common sense of the planter, the
farmer, the agriculturist of our country--are you willing upon such
grounds as these to continue this war? I have no doubt what will be
their answer.
On these subjects I have delivered my sentiments more than once before
in this House. I think of them with horror as the accursed cause of
this war. Not that the men who are in power are worse men than other
people, but that they have brought upon this land of peace and freedom
issues the end of which it would be impossible for any human being to
divine.
One thing is certain, that the right of search does practically
exist, and has been acknowledged by all nations. The President of the
United States and his Secretary of State, as great masters of the Law
of Nations, will be among the first to acknowledge it; they _have_
acknowledged it, and by our treaties with foreign powers, this country
has heretofore acknowledged it, so far as concerns the right to search
for contraband goods and enemy's property. Suppose that there are
notorious abuses under this right: should we be justified in declaring
that no search whatever of our merchant vessels shall be allowed?
There is no doubt that, under the color of the right of search--for
I am advocating its lawful purposes only--abuses have been committed
on neutrals; and as long as men exist it will be so. The liability to
abuse of this right is the price which neutrals pay for the advantages
which they derive from their neutrality; and I should like to know
whether it would be for me to join in the contest in which these
belligerents are engaged for the recovery of my _neutral_ rights. Where
are those rights when great maritime powers become belligerent? There
are neutral rights undoubtedly, but there are also neutral duties. And
shall a neutral nation, a nation which has in that character prospered
and flourished more than any people on the face of the globe, sacrifice
those rights and those advantages, and resort to war against one of
those belligerents--and for what? For a point of honor! Yet, whilst in
this Quixotic spirit we have gone to war with England; although we have
been robbed, reviled, contemned throughout by the Emperor of France, we
can see no cause of war with him!
What shall we say of the _French_ doctrine in relation to this subject
of impressment? If that has been dwelt upon in this debate by any
honorable gentleman of this House it has escaped my notice. What is
the French doctrine on this subject--established at the time when the
United States stood in relations of peace and amity to that power, when
every heart beat high with sympathy for the success of French freedom;
when some of those who have since transferred their admiration, I will
not say their love, to the present head of the French Government, to
the enemy of French freedom, and all freedom, to all commerce, and
right, and religion--at the time when some of those who have since
so lamentably changed on this subject felt an interest for freedom
and France scarcely inferior to that which they felt for freedom and
America? What were then the doctrines of the French Government? That
all who spoke the English language should be treated as Englishmen,
unless they could give proof to the contrary; the _onus probandi_ lying
on those who spoke the language of Locke, and Newton, and Milton, and
Shakspeare. Yes, sir, whilst the English Government establishes no such
doctrine, the French Government acts upon the principle that speaking
the English language is _prima facie_ evidence of your being a British
subject, and would justify their treating you as an enemy, the burden
of the proof to the contrary being thrown upon yourself.
And, sir, is it nothing to the bill which we are now debating, for
raising an additional army of twenty thousand men--or is it a departure
from order to hint on this floor at a circumstance which all men
are employed and occupied in discussing at their firesides?--that
this army, to constitute an aggregate of fifty-five thousand regular
troops, is about to be put under the control of the man who was
the author of the Anonymous Letters at Newburg at the close of the
Revolutionary war, inciting a handful of men, the remnant of the old
American army--perhaps not numbering six thousand altogether--to give
_a master_ to the nation? Is that a consideration to have no weight
upon such a question as this? With me, sir, it is conclusive. I will
tell gentlemen on both sides of the House that a Government or a man
may despise a calumny--that the arrows of slander will fall blunt and
harmless upon them--provided that the Government and the man be true
to itself and himself. Yes, sir, ask yourself this question in regard
to any man, to whom you are about to confide important trusts: Does
he pay his just debts? Is he a man of truth? Does he discharge as he
ought the duties of a friend, a brother in society? After having done
that, be his politics what they may, and his peculiarity of opinion
in politics what it may, he is a good man; he acquires the esteem of
all who know him; he is impenetrable to mere vulgar calumny. This
Government ought to employ men of real worth and capacity: it is not
always that those showing qualities attracting attention in private
life, or as companions, are of _real_ capacity. Do those who administer
the Government make it a rule to employ in the public service none but
men of real capacity, or worth, of integrity, and of high character?
Do they give their contracts and offices without fear, favor, or
affection, to men of responsibility and character--to such men as you
would in private life give your own contracts to? Or do they bestow
them, as is done in some Governments differently constituted from ours,
where church preferment and military preferment are sometimes made
a dirty job of Parliamentary interest? Do they employ men of clean
hands, with fair characters; or is every caitiff, without examination,
welcome to their arms, provided he can bring with him the proof of his
treachery to his former employers? It depends on these facts whether
confidence is due to any Administration of the Government.
Sir, I have much yet to say which appeared to me, when I rose, not
to be unworthy your attention; but I confess to you, with feelings
something like contrition, that my opinion on this subject has
undergone a change.
There is one point, however, on which I do not know how to speak in
this place with the reverence which is due to it. I cannot pass it
over, and yet I know not how to touch it. Yes, sir, there is one
reflection pressing itself as a crown of thorns upon my own head,
which I am bound to present to the consideration of this Assembly and
this people. Is it fitting that the only two nations among whom the
worship of the true God has been maintained with any thing like truth
and freedom from corruption; that the only two nations among whom this
worship has been preserved unstained, shall be the two now arrayed
against each other in hostile arms in a conflict in which, let who will
conquer in the fight, his success in one point, if that be an object,
will have been attained: so much of human life, liberty, and happiness,
will have perished in the affray--in the service of this scourge with
which it has pleased God, in his wisdom and justice, not in his mercy,
to inflict mankind? Is it fitting that those hands which unite in
giving to idolaters and to the heathen the Word of God, the Book of
Life--that those hands, and those alone, should be thus drenched in
each other's blood? Will you unite as a Christian with your Protestant
brother across the Atlantic for these noble purposes, and then plunge
the dagger into his breast with whom you are associated in a cause so
holy--one so infinitely transcending the low, the little, the dirty
business we are called upon here to transact? I hope that the sacrifice
may be stopped. We have nothing to expect from the mission of our
Minister to the Ruler of France, whether at Moscow, or wherever else he
may be. The Deity or Devil whom we worship is not to be mollified by
our suppliant appeals. Let us turn from him--come out of his house--and
join in the worship of the true and living God, instead of spilling the
blood of his people on the abominable altar of the French Moloch.
Sir, I have done. I could have wished to continue my remarks further,
but I cannot.
When Mr. RANDOLPH concluded, the House adjourned.
THURSDAY, January 14.
_Additional Military Force._
The House then resumed the consideration of the bill to raise twenty
additional regiments of infantry for one year.--The question being on
the passage of the bill.
Mr. STOW, said: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the delicacy and novelty of
my situation, as well from the indulgence of the House, as from the
neutral course which I mean to pursue. He must have been indeed an
inattentive observer of mankind who proposes to himself such a course
without being exposed to difficulties and dangers from every side. Our
country has experienced them too long from the great belligerents of
Europe, and an individual will quickly find them here. For even this
House is not exempt from its great party belligerents who issue their
conflicting decrees and Orders in Council; and, in imitation of the
hostile Europeans, it is sometimes a sufficient cause of condemnation
to have been spoken with by the adverse side. Yet, notwithstanding all
these dangers, I mean to launch my neutral bark on this tempestuous
ocean, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions, and humbly hoping
for the approbation of my country and my God.
The proper extent of the discussion growing out of this bill seemed to
be confined to these inquiries: Can the force contemplated be obtained?
If obtained, will it accomplish the end proposed? And lastly, will
the force be an economical one? If the discussion had been confined
to these limits I would have listened, and not have spoken; but, sir,
it has taken a wider range, and assumed a more important aspect. It
has embraced the present, and past, and the future. The causes of the
war, and the mode of conducting it, have been investigated, and even
confident predictions have been made as to its end. The history and
the state of our negotiations have been carefully examined--and the
Presidential order of succession has been scrutinized by the light of
experience as well as that of prophecy. We have sometimes been forced
into the scenes of private life; and, at other times, we have been
chained to the car of Napoleon. In short, sir, the discussion has
ranged as wide as existence, and, not content with that, the speakers
"have exhausted worlds, and then imagined new." I do not pretend to
censure this--it may be well for the people to have their political
concerns thus splendidly dressed and passed in review before them.
But still I will attempt to call the attention of the House from the
regions of fiction, of fancy, and of poetry, to the humble, but I
trust no less profitable, sphere of reality and prose. Passing by many
of those things which have amused by their ingenuity, or surprised
by their novelty, but which do not deserve a serious answer, I will
endeavor to state distinctly the grounds taken by the opponents of this
bill, or rather the opponents of furnishing the means of prosecuting
the war: Firstly. It is alleged "that the war was originally unjust."
Secondly. "That if the war was originally just, it has become unjust
to continue it in consequence of the revocation of the British
Orders in Council." Thirdly. "That it is inexpedient to prosecute
the war, because we have no means of coercing our enemy or enforcing
our claims." Fourthly. "That we are unable to support the war." And
fifthly. "That, in consideration of all these circumstances, the House
ought to withhold the means of further prosecuting the war."
First, then, it was alleged that the war was originally unjust. Here
let me call on the House to distinguish between unjust and inexpedient.
Nothing can be more important than to have clear and distinct ideas
about those words which lie at the bottom of a science, or inquiry.
This is happily illustrated in mathematics--there every word, by the
help of diagrams, is carefully defined; and the consequence is, that
there are no disputes among mathematicians, while their labors have
done honor to mankind. A thing may be just and yet inexpedient: the
justice of an act relates to the conduct of another, the expediency of
our own situation. It may be just for me to sue the man who withholds
from me the smallest sum; and yet so inexpedient as to be even
ridiculous. Thus a war may be perfectly just, and at the same time
highly inexpedient. This, if I mistake not, was the ground generally
taken the last year by the opponents of the war, particularly by the
gentleman from Virginia before me, (Mr. SHEFFEY,) which pointed out the
distinction which I have endeavored to do, though with more ability
and success. I hope the House will bear this distinction in mind;
because it is of the greatest importance in the investigation which I
intend to make. Before I enter further on the argument, I ask the House
to indulge me for a moment while I explain my views relative to the
commencement of the war. I never saw any want of provocation on the
part of Great Britain. I never for an instant doubted the justice of
the war, while I urged its inexpediency with all my might. I considered
man placed here by a beneficent Providence, on a fertile soil, and in a
happy climate, enlightened by science, and protected by the wisest of
laws. By our Revolution cut adrift, as I may say, from the old world,
before the storm which was about to desolate Europe arose, I fondly
hoped that this new world would furnish one fair experiment of what
science, liberty and peace, might achieve, free from those corruptions
which have eternally attended on war. I hoped to see the country
improved, and bound together by roads and canals, to see it adorned
by literary institutions, and by every establishment which reflects
honor upon man. Nor do I yet believe that this was an Utopian vision,
or an idle dream. I still believe it might all have been realized by a
different course--but the nation has determined on war, and, though it
was not my choice, I still maintain that it is not unjust.
I shall now examine the second proposition, "that if the war was
originally just, its further prosecution is unjust." On what ground
does this rest? It is this, that the Orders in Council were the cause
of the war; those orders having ceased, the prosecution of the war
becomes unjust. Here again justice and expediency are confounded.
It was never maintained, that the Orders in Council rendered war
more just than many other outrages, though they went farther to
prove its expediency, and even necessity. It therefore follows,
that their repeal does not affect the justice of the war; unless
accompanied with compensation for the spoliations committed under
them, and atonement made for other wrongs. Neither of these, is it
pretended, has been done; except so far as relates to the affair of
the Chesapeake, and which I purposely left out of the catalogue of
grievances. An injury which was a just cause of war, remains a just
cause for its continuance, till atonement is offered, or till it is
settled by negotiation. But, sir, an ample justification of war remains
in the impressment of our seamen. The claim on our part is not, as
has been alleged, a claim to protect British seamen--it is a claim
to protect American citizens. Nay, more, as respects the justice of
the continuance of the war, it is a claim only, that they will cease
from the practice during the truce, that it may be seen whether it is
possible to arrange it by negotiation. Is it unjust to continue the
war, till this demand is complied with? or does any American wish to
see his country prostrated still lower?
Having thus far explained my ideas relative to the justice of the
commencement and continuance of the war, I will now proceed to answer
the third objection, namely: That it is inexpedient to carry it
on, because we have no means of coercing our enemy--of compelling
him--to what? barely to a just and honorable peace; for that is all
we demand. And have we no means of doing this? Better, then, to
surrender the charter of our independence, confess we are incapable
of self-protection, and beg his most gracious Majesty to again take
us under his paternal care. Such a doctrine, sir, is as unfounded,
as it is degrading to the American character. We have ample means of
compelling Great Britain to do us justice; they are to be found in
the value of our commerce; in the enterprise of our privateers; in the
gallantry of our ships of war, and the conquest of her provinces. Our
custom (considering her in the light of a mechanic or merchant who
supplies) is of vital importance to Great Britain. It is not to be
measured by its amount, in pounds, shillings, and pence, but by the
strength and support she derives from the intercourse. For, while I
admit that Great Britain does not send half her exports to the United
States, I do maintain, that the custom of this country is of more
importance to her, than that of the whole world besides. It is with a
nation as with an individual, if he exchange luxuries for luxuries, or
superfluities, such as ribands for ribands, which he consumes, he adds
nothing to his wealth; but if he exchange his luxuries, or his ribands,
for bread, or for such materials as give scope to his industry, he is
then benefited, and enriched by the interchange. Such is the situation
of Great Britain with regard to America. She, and her dependencies,
receive more of provision, and raw materials, from America, than from
all other parts of the world together. Our trade exactly gives effect
to her industry, her machinery, and her capital. And it is this which
has, in a great degree, enabled her to make such gigantic efforts in
the awful contest in which she is engaged. Our privateers; will they
have no effect on Great Britain? Will she learn nothing from the loss
of three or four hundred ships? And will she be insensible to the
efforts of our little Navy? Can they touch no nerve in which Britons
feel? Far different are my conclusions, from what I have seen in
British papers--they show that she is tremblingly alive to that subject.
Sir, I will now consider her provinces, about which so much has been
said. I, too, will speak of that wonderful country, called Canada,
which unites in itself all contrarieties! Which is so cold and sterile,
as to be not worth possessing; and so fertile, that if, by any calamity
it should become ours, it would seduce away our population; which is so
unhappy under the British Government as not to lure our inhabitants;
yet so happy, that it is criminal to disturb their felicity;--whose
inhabitants, if united with ours, would destroy us, because they have
none of the habits of freemen; and who, well knowing the privileges of
their free Government, will defend them to the last. A country which is
of no importance to Great Britain, and whose loss would not make her
feel; a country which is so valuable to Great Britain that she will
never give it up. A country so weak that it is inglorious to attack it;
and a country so strong that we can never take it. But, sir, leaving
these, and a thousand other contradictions, the work of fancy or of
spleen, I will present to the House what I believe to be a true view of
the subject, drawn from a near residence and much careful examination.
Canada is of great importance both to Great Britain and the United
States. It is important to Great Britain in the amount and kind of
its exports. In the last year preceding war, its exports amounted to
between seven and nine millions of dollars, an amount almost as great
as the exports of the United States preceding the Revolutionary war.
And had the most discerning statesman made out an order, he could not
have selected articles better adapted to the essential wants of Great
Britain. It has been said that Canada is of less value than one of the
sugar islands of the West Indies. Sir, in the present state of the
world, Canada is of more importance to Great Britain, in my opinion,
than the whole West India Islands taken together. In danger, as she
is, of being shut out from the Baltic, and fighting for her existence,
she wants not the luxuries, the sugars, and the sweetmeats of the West
Indies--she wants the provisions, the timber, the masts, and the spars
of the North.
Canada is also of the greatest importance to the United States, in
a commercial and political point of view. I have in a great measure
explained its commercial importance, by stating its exports; a large
portion of which were the products of the United States. Let an
attentive observer cast his eye for one moment on the map of North
America; let him bear in mind, that from the forty-fifth degree of
latitude the waters of Canada bound for a vast extent one of the most
fertile, and which will become, one of the most populous parts of the
United States; and he will readily perceive that the river St. Lawrence
must soon be the outlet for one-third of all the products of American
labor. The same circumstances will enable it to lay an impost on
one-third of our imported articles. Nor will the evil to our revenue
end here. Great Britain will be enabled to smuggle her goods through
this channel into all parts of the Union. It will be in vain that you
attempt to counteract her by laws; from the great length and contiguity
of her possessions, she will forever evade them, unless by your laws
you can change the nature of man. But its greatest importance is in a
political point of view: for, although not as happy in its government
as the United States, it is sufficiently so to draw off multitudes of
our new settlers, when the intermediate lands of the State of New York,
which separate it from New England, shall be fully occupied. From this
circumstance it will divide the American family, and, by the commercial
relations which I have pointed out, it will exert a dangerous influence
over a part of our country; for the transition from commercial
dependence, to political allegiance, is too obvious to be insisted
on. Having endeavored to show the importance of Canada to both of the
contending nations, I I will only add that it is within our power.