Sir, I do not find fault with the Administration for insisting on the

immunity of our flag, as it respects the seamen. I approve of the

principle. It is of that character which at a proper time and with

proper means is (in effect and to all general purposes) attainable,

if we do not by ill-timed and imprudent efforts frustrate it. It is

supposed that the present is the auspicious moment to insist on our

rights. That pressed as Great Britain is by the most powerful enemy the

world ever saw, who threatens her very existence; the impression which

we can make upon her by our arms, will be greater than at any other

time. This very circumstance renders the attainment of our object more

difficult, and makes our case hopeless. Her danger forbids a compliance

with our demands. In her present struggle, her naval power constitutes

her security. Without that she would long since have become a French

province. This every man in England knows and feels. It is well known

that four-fifths of her seamen on board her navy render not voluntary

but compulsory service. Should this principle be established, which

in all cases would afford a secure asylum in our merchant ships, it

is dreaded by British statesmen and the British people, that their

seamen, allured by higher wages and easier employment, would abandon

their service, and thus render their country accessible to their

enemy. Hence you see every Ministry, of whatever political party or

distinction, tremblingly alive to this subject. They dare not touch

it in the present state of that country. No man could maintain his

power a moment after having hazarded the public safety by making an

experiment, the effect of which could not be foreseen, and may be

productive of such disastrous consequences. This spirit is manifest

in all the communications from the British Cabinet to our Government.

We have seen the sentiments of Lord Grenville, Lord Auckland, Lord

Holland, and Mr. Fox, men whose prepossessions were in our favor, and

who on almost every other subject supported our pretensions. On this

subject they resisted our demands, because they dared not grant them.

While I conceive the claims of our Government as not going too far, I

doubt their prudence as to the time and manner of giving them effect.

I fear that instead of realizing our wishes the measures pursued are

calculated to deprive us of every hope hereafter. In the present

unexampled state of the world, according to my limited conception of

our true interest, we ought to have seriously avoided all hostile

collision with foreign powers. We ought to have cherished the resources

within our grasp. Nothing is more obvious than the remark made by the

honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. BLEECKER,) that, with all the

injuries which we received from the belligerents, our commerce was more

extensive and more profitable in the aggregate than if Europe had been

at peace. We might have obtained (and we ought not to have rejected)

such temporary arrangements with England, (with whom our commerce

was chiefly carried on,) which, though they did not embrace all our

interests, would have secured those of first importance and kept us

at peace. The benefits of such a policy are to my mind self-evident.

Should Europe be restored to tranquillity and assume something like its

former appearance, (and I do not believe the present state of things

durable,) we should have been able to have effected every valuable

object, because such a change will probably bring with it a respect for

the rights of nations, which have now no existence but in name. And

should an imposing attitude have been wanting to give effect to our

claims, we should have exhibited an unbroken spirit and unexhausted

resources.

An honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. GRUNDY,) the other day, read

some extracts from the instructions transmitted to our Minister in

London, in 1792. His object was to show the deep interest which the

great man who then presided over this nation felt on the subject of

impressments. I sincerely wish that while gentlemen resort to his

opinions to support theirs, they would consent to imitate his conduct.

Nothing can be more strikingly different than his policy and that which

is now pursued.

In 1793 the subject of impressments did not form the only complaint

against Great Britain. The Treaty of Peace remained unexecuted on her

part. To that was added the great injury which our commerce sustained

by the extensive captures made by her cruisers during that year. The

interest which was felt for the success of the French Revolution,

against which Great Britain had arrayed herself, tended to excite the

nation, even beyond the measure of its wrongs, and ripen it for war.

But the wisdom of WASHINGTON saved us from being drawn into the vortex,

which has since devoured all who approached it. His genius considered

the true interests of his country to consist in the preservation of its

peace; and he had firmness enough to preserve it, though opposed by the

strong feelings of the people. Notwithstanding the accumulated wrongs

which we had received, he sent a messenger of peace, and ultimately

gave his assent to a treaty in which there was not one stipulation even

to restrain the abuses of impressments, which the year before he had

declared could not be longer tolerated. Why was this done by him, who,

to say the least, had as much affection for his country's rights, as

the politicians of the present day--whom fear never influenced--and who

could safely calculate on the support of the people, should he resort

to arms? The answer is obvious. Peace upon almost any terms was better

than a hopeless, endless contest. What a contrast does his example

present to the conduct of those who now direct the destinies of this

nation, and who, while they reject his policy, resort to his opinions

to support their own?

Upon the subject of foreign war, and the objects connected with it,

the opinions of gentlemen of the majority have certainly undergone a

strange revolution since they came into power. Little more than twelve

years ago, they deprecated foreign war as inconsistent with the spirit

of our institutions, and the genius of our Government. Nothing short

of self-defence, when attacked in our own country, was considered as

a justification for abandoning our peaceful pursuits, and mingling

in hostility with European powers. Every other object was deemed

subordinate to the preservation of peace, because with it was connected

every benefit which it had pleased Providence to bestow upon us, and

which our detached situation rendered secure. We now hear those very

gentlemen talk of Rome and Greece in their proudest days, when they

inspired terror into the inhabitants of distant climes and carried

their arms to every quarter of the globe; and their example is held

up for our imitation. The almost boundless extent of our territory is

become too limited, and we hear of conquests in the North and South, as

essential to our security and happiness. In taking a retrospect, and

contrasting former opinions with present conduct, a person would almost

be inclined to distrust his observation, was there not left on record

monuments with sentiments of former times entertained by gentlemen in

the days of humility, when they were struggling against power. Permit

me to call your attention to a resolution of the Virginia Assembly,

adopted in 1798, said to be draughted by Mr. Madison, now President

of the United States, upon this subject. It was then considered the

standard of Republican opinion, by all who professed to be of that

party. It in substance declares, that though the General Assembly view

with indignation the violations of our commerce, the impressment of our

seamen, and other wrongs committed by foreign nations, yet detached as

the United States are from European concerns, they should deprecate a

war waged for any other object except self-defence, in cases of actual

invasion. This resolution had an eye to our relations with France,

from whom we had then received every injury and indignity she could

inflict, and with whom we were in a state of partial hostility; but it

explicitly declares, that we ought to engage in offensive war, for no

object whatever. Let the sentiment be compared with the conduct of the

same men now they are in power.

Sir, I am one of those who doubt our capacity to obtain the conquest

of the British provinces. I believe that the opinion, that we are a

very powerful nation abroad, is a fanciful delusion. To be powerful

abroad, requires a Government of sufficient energy, not only to bring

into action all the physical and pecuniary resources of the country,

but to command them promptly. The very nature of our Government,

where every thing depends immediately upon the people, forbids the

idea that you can effect one or the other. The inconveniences and

privations to which they must be subjected, are sufficient causes with

the great body of the community, who do not perceive very distinctly

how they are to be benefited by an offensive war, to turn their faces

against it. Their Representatives, knowing their feelings, dare not

press them with a heavy hand, which at once destroys every thing like

energy. Besides, the want of promptitude, the characteristic defect of

such a Government, whose powers are divided into many hands, prevents

the resources even within their reach to be obtained and applied in

time to insure success. The consequence of all this is--imbecility

in obtaining, and want of celerity in applying the necessary means.

This may be considered as a very great evil, particularly to those who

have presented to us the example of Rome in her proudest days, when

she was mistress of the world, for our imitation. Sir, I rejoice that

such is the state of my country. It is the legitimate offspring of our

free institutions. The people are strong and the Government is weak;

whenever this state of things shall be reversed, then shall we be able

to inspire terror into other nations. But until that period shall

arrive, we shall exhibit weakness and slowness of action, as to all

offensive and external purposes.

To retain the British provinces as an indemnity for our losses, is

an event which I cannot wish, because I can see no possible benefit

resulting from it. Have we not already territory enough? Is it

desirable to incorporate with us a people composed of heterogeneous

materials, who are not only unaccustomed to our institutions, but

many of whom entertain an unconquerable hatred for them? I believe it

would have been better had we never acquired any foreign territory

at all. If we had been contented with the limits embraced by the old

thirteen United States, the prospects of remaining a united people,

and preserving our free institutions, would, in my conception, be much

more flattering. I am, therefore, opposed to new acquisitions. But

it is repeatedly urged that the possession of Canada is necessary to

secure us from the hostilities of the savage tribes on our northwestern

borders; was this the fact, I might yield my assent to prosecute the

war to attain that object. But experience has shown that we can have

peace with them, though Canada is in the possession of a foreign power.

For seventeen years after the Treaty of Greenville we were entirely

exempt from Indian hostilities; and not until we waged war ourselves,

did they become troublesome upon our frontiers.

My apprehensions are not solely confined to the danger resulting from

military power; there are other consequences equally to be dreaded,

which I fear may overwhelm us, should we continue in this course. There

is one peculiarly delicate, but equally important--so delicate, that

gentlemen have supposed it ought not even to be mentioned. Sir, shall

I not be permitted to point to the yawning gulf beneath? Shall I not

attempt to arrest your progress in the path where lies a serpent that

will sting you to death? I deprecate disunion as an event pregnant with

every evil. The moment it happens, civil liberty is banished from this

country. I feel deeply interested that it should not happen. Permit

me, however, to observe, that a union is connected by a consciousness

which is felt that the various interests of the different sections are

consulted and protected, and not by force. If you wish to perpetuate

the Union, you must preserve that opinion. The moment that it shall

no longer exist, the ties that bind us together become feeble indeed.

The present war, though ostensibly waged for principles in which the

Northern and Eastern people have a deep interest, is considered by

them--and they certainly understand their interest best--as calculated

to prostrate it. They feel the evils of your measures daily, and they

see no prospect that they ever will be benefited by them. The physical

power of the country is in their hands, and it requires nothing but

public sentiment, which quickly follows public interest, and you ripen

them for a state of things most of all to be deprecated. I hope we

shall avert the evil by banishing the cause of discontent.

Besides the immediate physical evils which present themselves as

probably resulting from our measures, there are other moral evils which

I must dread. Our Government was made to secure the happiness of the

people, and every thing which even remotely is calculated to impair

their moral sense, will have an effect upon their situation. When the

people shall become attached to principles inconsistent with morality,

or with their tranquil, civil pursuits, their prosperity and their

freedom are at hazard. The spirit of conquest and of military glory,

however fascinating, is baneful to the prosperity and liberty of every

country. This spirit has shown itself in our country, of late, in an

unusual degree. We have become tired of the peaceful character of our

pursuits; and we want nothing but success on this first attempt to

encourage us to become a great military nation, attempting conquest in

every quarter. Whenever that happens, we shall share the destiny of

other nations. When the same spirit and the same councils prevail, the

misery of the mass of the people is the support of the national glory.

One of the evils which I dread, as attending the war, and in my opinion

not the least, Mr. Chairman, is, that we have united our exertions with

the efforts of the great destroyer of mankind, who, having prostrated

the independence of almost every nation on the continent of Europe,

has drawn us into our present situation, to assist him in humbling his

remaining enemy, whose destruction is, above all others, nearest his

heart. I do not believe that gentlemen are so far lost to all sense of

their country's interest, as designedly to unite the destiny of this

nation with him, who lives only to destroy. I believe them, when they

declare that such is not their intention. But we are united in fact.

His ostensible object is the liberty of the seas: so is ours. His

successes are our successes, and his defeats are our defeats. Being

thus associated in fact--having one common object--if the war continues

any time, we shall be associated in name also. When pressed beyond

our present expectation by our enemy, we shall not make any difficulty

in submitting to arrangements which may appear to us advantageous, but

which are calculated to fasten us to the car of the conqueror. We may

want men to enable us to obtain the object of our offensive operations

in the North; France can furnish them. We may want ships to defend our

coast; we can obtain them from the same quarter. But, for these things,

we must stipulate an equivalent; and what can that be, but to unite in

striking England from the list of independent nations?

Mr. ROBERTSON.--Mr. Chairman, I am well aware that the House will

listen (if it listens at all) with much reluctance to a further

discussion of the subject under consideration. Nevertheless, it is

my intention explicitly, but concisely to state some of the reasons,

which influence me to support the measure proposed; some of the views

connected with them, which command my approbation, and induce my

aid. Sir, I propose to make a few remarks on the bill itself, and

subsequently, without following gentlemen in the wide and expansive

range of argumentative, declamatory, and defamatory eloquence, in which

they have thought fit to indulge, to reply to some of the observations

which struck me with most force, and which my memory still retains.

The honorable Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs is entitled

to the thanks of this House, and of the nation, for the able and lucid

exposition he has given, of the plan intended to be pursued by the

Government in the prosecution of the war in which we are engaged, and

of the objects for the attainment of which an increase of the Military

Establishment is deemed necessary. What is that plan, and what are

the objects in contemplation? The power of the nation is to be called

out; a portion for a defence of our seacoast and extensive frontier;

the residue to be sent forth to battle against our implacable foe, to

drive him from the American continent, and thus to insure our future

peace, if not our Union and independence. These objects are avowed, and

efforts and energy are necessary to their success.

The propriety of defending our country can be denied by none. This

proposition is clear. Even the gentlemen on the other side of the

House (as it is fashionable to speak) do not oppose it. For myself

I do not hesitate to say, it presses itself on my feelings with

irresistible force. When I take into consideration the exposed

situation of the people whom it is my pride and honor to represent,

when I view them surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians,

skirted by strongholds in the possession of a nation devoted to our

foe, containing in the bosom of their country a class of beings

always on the watch to overwhelm them in ruin, I lose sight of other

considerations, and am compelled to urge, as I do most earnestly, that

no obstacles may be thrown in the way of our complete protection.

I have lived for some years in the country to which I have called

your attention. I have not been altogether an inattentive observer,

nor indifferent to its interests. The neglected state of the militia

under the territorial government, its present unorganized and unarmed

state, have not escaped my notice. But we must "blame the culture, not

the soil." The inhabitants are brave, expert in the management of the

horse and in the use of arms. The materials are good. It is unnecessary

to dwell on these, or to mention other circumstances of an internal

nature. Suffice it to be observed, our situation is insecure. I have

stated, sir, that we are surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of

Indians. I will not recount their numbers, nor blazon their powers of

doing mischief. Those facts are too notorious to require repetition.

I have stated that strongholds in our immediate neighborhood are in

the possession of a people devoted to our enemy. The Spaniards on our

eastern frontier are under their perfect control. They considered

the English as fighting for the independence of Spain, their native

country, their religion, and their King. In their towns an extensive

British trade is carried on, and from their ports, where they refit,

issue forth the armed vessels of that nation to the annoyance of the

commerce of our country. The Indians too are excited against us. On

my journey from New Orleans to this place, passing through the Creek

confederacy, I received certain information that the Spanish commandant

at St. Marks had assured them that their friends the British were

expected soon in considerable force at that place and at Pensacola, and

that they should be furnished with arms and other munitions of war to

be used against the Americans. Sir, humanity to that people, as well

as the irresistible claims we have to protection, require that a force

should be stationed on the Mobile and Mississippi sufficient to prevent

the effect of British and Spanish machination, or to throw back on

themselves the evils of hostility.

I now proceed to examine some of the objections which have been made,

not to the bill, but to the further prosecution of the war. The war is

denounced as unconstitutional, cruel, the effect of French influence,

and as intended to place James II. on the throne of America. In making

the first objection, gentlemen could not have been serious; they

could not have expected that it would have been deemed worthy of an

answer. The power to make war belongs to all nations; is of the essence

of Government; but the Constitution of the United States gives it

expressly, in so many words: "The Congress shall have power to declare

war, to raise and support armies." Whether the war be defensive or

offensive, depends on circumstance and accident, but cannot affect the

right. If war be defensive and offensive, still the whole is equal to

its parts. But to what does this doctrine lead? Do gentlemen believe

it to be true? Then it becomes their duty to move for the appointment

of a committee to inquire into the circumstances of the capture of the

Macedonian, and if it be discovered that she was taken at more than a

marine league from the shore, to cashier the American officer, declare

the attack and capture unconstitutional, and restore the vessel to her

former master. Then an enterprise, giving rise to a new era in maritime

history, and entwining round the brows of the United States a wreath

of imperishable laurel, turns out to be a violation of that instrument

on the sacredness of which depends the Union and happiness of America.

The war is not unconstitutional, nor can it, by any possibility, be so

considered.

But it is said that, as the Orders in Council are repealed, the

question of impressment is the only one in controversy between the

United States and Great Britain; and, on the subject, the honorable

gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. PEARSON,) has, without difficulty,

settled principles about which jurists have differed in opinion. He

contends that individuals cannot divest themselves of their allegiance;

that the right of expatriation does not exist; that the practice of

naturalization is wrong. These opinions are as erroneous as they are

repugnant to every principle of human liberty, and owe their origin to

feudal times and feudal States; times and States, the prolific sources

of the vilest principles in politics and morals.

I believe that every civilized nation under the sun is in the practice

of naturalizing foreigners. The omnipotent Parliament of Great Britain

exercises this right. The rights of all independent nations are equal.

Whatever course Great Britain pursues in relation to the subjects or

citizens of other countries, these countries are authorized to pursue

in relation to the subjects of Great Britain. Whatever her admirers

may say to the contrary, if she does not acknowledge, she is compelled

to act in conformity to this principle. Where is there in her history

an example of her punishing as a traitor, a Briton naturalized by a

foreign Government, although found in arms against her? If a subject

could not divest himself of his natural allegiance; if once a subject

always a subject, were true, how is it that Napper Tandy was suffered

to escape punishment? Why was he not hanged as a traitor? He was born

in Ireland, became a French citizen, served in war against his native

country, was taken, tried, and found guilty of high treason; but when

a terrible retaliation was threatened by France, in the event of his

execution, that nation, which never yields to threats, restored him to

his then adopted country.

But gentlemen are opposed to the further prosecution of the war. Do

they contend that the causes which rendered it necessary have been

removed? Have we obtained the objects for which it was commenced?

Is the new and before unheard-of system of blockade abandoned? A

system which, under the pretence of being a military measure, was

converted into a commercial scheme beneficial to the belligerents,

and destructive alone to the rights of the neutrals. Have our citizens

been restored to their country? Is any disposition evidenced to omit

tearing them from their homes and families in future? What will be the

consequence of laying down our arms, of shrinking from our present

attitude? We are at the feet of Great Britain: and after having for

years attempted in vain to obtain justice, we are to recommence

fruitless negotiation. Admit that we are unable to enforce our demands,

to support our independence, that we cannot carry on war, that the

friends of the British Government in this country (to use their

own expression) will not permit us; in such a situation, with such

admission, to expect justice would be folly in the extreme. England

would return to her habitual spoliations, would re-establish that

state precisely the most beneficial to herself, the most injurious to

us: infinitely better to her than peace on fair terms, for then the

opportunity would be lost of feeding and enriching her navy at our

expense; better than war, as the numerous prizes brought into her ports

of late very clearly prove. Formerly the losses were exclusively ours.

Yes, sir, willingly would she return to, and forever continue, her

former career of depredation; and the next ten years would add another

thousand to the thousand American vessels already carried into her

ports.

Too long did we suffer disgrace and degradation. Peace, with all its

blessings, may be enjoyed at too dear a price. But yet, while it was

possible to preserve it, we shut our eyes against the most flagrant

injuries; we affected not to hear the loudest insults. Peace was

congenial to our habits, favorable to the principles of our Government.

It was not to be apprehended it would be, nor cannot be now believed

that it was wantonly abandoned. Whilst tranquillity prevailed it was

wise to dwell on its advantages. Now, that in spite of all our efforts

we are at war, it is well to inquire whether circumstances may not grow

out of it favorable to our future happiness and prosperity.

The British possessions in America present themselves to our view and

invite a conquest. I am struck with the contrariety of opinion which

prevails among gentlemen. Some of them speak of the country as barren,

the climate as inclement, the inhabitants thereby scattered over the

face of the territory. If this be true, it will not be considered

as worth defending, and as by its loss Britain loses nothing, the

sympathy which she seems to have excited, and the doleful jeremiads to

which her anticipated disasters have given rise, are as unnecessary

as they are misplaced. But others say, no doubt from its importance

to its European sovereign it will be defended to the last extremity;

that the United States cannot take it; that the army we propose to

send into the field will prove insufficient. When gentlemen differ so

widely, no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from their opinions.

Sir, Canada will be defended, and it is from a belief of that fact,

and from a knowledge of the force which Great Britain may bring into

the field, that the troops now demanded become necessary. We have

heard an estimate of that force too often to be again repeated. It has

lost nothing of its magnitude and importance. Its valor has received

the highest praise, and we are triumphantly asked if we expect to

intimidate Great Britain.

Sir, none but cowards calculate on the cowardice of their foe. We do

not expect to intimidate her. We expect to meet her armies in the field

and to vanquish them. The power of Britain must be extinguished in

America. She must no longer be permitted to corrupt the principles and

to disturb the peace and tranquillity of our citizens. Our frontier

inhabitants must not be kept in dread and danger from her Indian

allies. And never shall we be secure among ourselves, and exempt

from the mischievous intrigues of Europeans, until European power is

expelled across the Atlantic. The gentleman from Massachusetts says,

that Canada entered into the scheme of the war. It certainly does now

enter into the scheme of the war. Sir, no citizen of the United States

would have given his consent to an unprovoked attack on that country

merely for the purpose of getting possession of it. But I do, for one,

rejoice that, under present circumstances, we thus have an opportunity

afforded us, not only to make our enemy feel our power, but to drive

him from this continent, and to remove one of the most frequent causes

of war among nations--neighborhood and contiguity. The evils of peace,

on the terms of gentlemen in opposition, cannot be borne. Let us then,

with firmness, persevere in the contest in which we are engaged, until

it can be terminated on principles compatible with the rights and honor

of the nation.

The committee now rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit

again.

TUESDAY, January 12.

_Additional Military Force._

The House again resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, on the

bill to raise an additional army of twenty thousand men, for one year.

Mr. EMOTT addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I mean no common-place remark, when I declare to you,

that I address you on the subjects which have been brought into this

debate, and as I think properly so brought, with great reluctance.

My general deportment since I have been honored with a seat on this

floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the committee that I feel an

unwillingness to mingle in the war of words which is carried on here.

There are causes which add to this repugnance on the present occasion.

The debate has been continued for such a length of time, and in part

has been conducted with so much asperity, that the minds of all have

become fatigued, and the passions of many inflamed. I know, and I duly

appreciate the difficulties which, under such circumstances, surround

and face the speaker. But, sir, there are considerations of public

duty, and individual propriety, which urge, nay, demand of me, to ask

your patience, and the indulgence of the House, while I present to you

and to them my view of the great subjects involved in this discussion.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware that, in the discussion I am about commencing,

I shall render myself obnoxious to the wit of gentlemen who think

that, to bring into view other topics than those which arise out of

the details of the bill now on your table, is to go beyond the range

of legitimate debate. The bill contemplates the raising an additional

military force of twenty thousand men; thus increasing the Military

Establishment, or the standing army of the country, to upwards of

fifty-five thousand men. Now, sir, with the details of this bill I

have nothing to do. Nay, I will confess to you that I like the bill as

it stands, providing for enlistments for one year only, better than

I should were it amended, as has been proposed, by prolonging the

terms, precisely for the reason that the force will be less efficient

and dangerous, and more under legislative control. I meddle not with

the fitness of the instrument. That is the business of other men;

but, being opposed to the continuance of the war offensively, as I

was to its commencement, I cannot consent to grant any further force

to carry it on. The only check, or control, which the Legislature can

constitutionally have over a war after it is begun, is in withholding

the means; and, in voting the means, either in men or money, every

member of the Legislature ought to be satisfied of the necessity of

prosecuting the war.

According to my best judgment, sir, this war was improperly commenced,

and it is unnecessarily continued; and I shall now proceed to explain

the grounds of that judgment by an examination of the causes of the

war, as they existed at its commencement, and as they now remain. As

this is the first time the subject has been brought into debate, and,

indeed, the earliest opportunity which has been allowed, of an open

discussion, I am sure I shall be pardoned for going into detail, if I

even should be tedious, as I know I shall be uninteresting. It is a

right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly my reasons and

motives for the votes which I have given, and may give, in relation to

the war, after what has been said in this House, and out of it, about

the opposition to the views of the Administration.

In making this examination, I shall pass in review, in as brief a

manner as possible, the three great subjects of complaint against

Great Britain; her orders of blockade, her Orders in Council, and her

practice of impressment. But for one or all of these, the war certainly

would not have been declared; and I may assume that, for but one or

all of these, the war ought not to be continued. I cannot, indeed,

but recollect, that the gentleman from Louisiana has mentioned the

conquest of Canada, and of the Floridas, as causes for the continuance

of the war. As respects the Canadas, I have heretofore understood that

their reduction might be a consequence of the war, but never until now

did I know that it was to be shifted into a cause for carrying it on.

And, in regard to the Floridas, I will not consent that their conquest

should, in the existing relations of this country, be either a cause

or consequence of war. I will confess to you, that an invasion of the

colonies of Spain at this time, under the stale excuses of convenience

or necessity, strikes me with abhorrence. It is not only against the

genius of our Government, and, as I hope, the character of our people,

but, if persisted in, will be a foul blot in our national history.

[Here the speaker entered into an elaborate documentary

investigation to show that the Decree of Blockade, and the

Orders in Council, were not adequate causes for war at the time

it was declared--and that both these causes had since ceased

to exist, the Orders in Council having been revoked, and the

fictitious, or paper blockades, discontinued.]

Impressment of Seamen.--The injury done to our seamen under the British

practice of impressment, was also made a cause of the war, and to the

eye, at least, it is the only one which now remains.

Mr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject is attended with

adventitious difficulties, growing out of the times and the state of

the country. The public mind, in some sections of the Union, is in such

a feverish state on this account, from tales oft told of bondage worse

than negro slavery, and of condemnation without trial, that the person

who is willing to "hear the other party," is at once branded with

foreign partialities, and threatened with the trial by mob. Besides,

sir, it is intimated that a negotiation is to be had, or may possibly

be attempted, which may be affected by an open discussion of the topic.

In point of duty, I feel myself called upon to take some notice of the

subject, but my view of it will be less perfect than in a different

situation I should think desirable.

The President, in the war Message, thus introduces the subject:

"British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating

the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing

and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a

belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but

of a municipal prerogative over British subjects." As this does not

present the case in its true light, I shall, for the purpose of fairly

bringing to view the conflicting claims of the two nations, give you

an extract from the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe, of the 5th of

January, 1804, containing instructions for a treaty with Great Britain:

"With this exception, (persons in the military service of an enemy)

we consider a neutral flag on the high seas, as a safeguard to those

sailing under it. Great Britain, on the contrary, asserts a right to

search for and seize her own subjects; and under that cover, as cannot

but happen, are often seized and taken off, citizens of the United

States, and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries, navigating

the high seas, under the protection of the American flag."

The claim, then, on the part of the British is, that in time of war

they have a right to enter neutral merchant vessels on the high seas,

to search for and seize their subjects, being seamen. On our part it

is, that on the high seas the flag shall cover and protect all sailing

under it, whether British subjects or American citizens. These are

distinctly the claims of right on the part of the two nations, and I

shall so consider them, without regard to practice apart from right.

One or two remarks, sir, before I enter upon the subject. The first

is, that I do not mean to moot the point, relative to the rights of

our naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties towards them.

But this I will say, that I am willing to give them all the protection

which the situation of the country and its true interests will justify.

I know that the unruly passions and the meddling dispositions of

some foreigners, have raised prejudices in the minds of many persons

against all foreigners. But I know, also, and I speak without reference

to political opinions or prejudices, that among our naturalized

citizens are to be found men, and many men, too, of great worth and

respectability, and who are extensively useful to the country. These

men have my good will, and it is certainly my wish, that they should be

fostered and protected, as far as it can be done, without putting at

hazard the great interests and the permanent welfare of the country.

But, sir, to this class of our citizens, the claim that they are

to be protected on the high seas by our flag, is really of little

importance. Our claim never was, and I am sure never will be, that they

are to be protected, if they put themselves within the power of their

former Sovereign, by going to his ports, or placing themselves on his

territories. And yet such is the state of the commerce of the world,

that it can scarcely happen in a mercantile voyage, in this or the

other hemisphere, that the vessel will not at some time be in a British

port, and the crew on British ground; our right of flag will not then

save our adopted citizens from impressment. For the slight benefit,

therefore, to our naturalized citizens, which can arise under our

claim, if established, I am sure the well-meaning and reasonable part

of them will not ask the country to continue the war on their account.

Another remark which I wish to make is, that I am most decidedly

the friend, nay, sir, if you please, the partisan, of the seamen of

the country. I have no doubt that this nation is destined to be a

great maritime power; and that, in times not very far distant, we are

to owe our prosperity, as a commercial people, and possibly, under

Providence, our security, to our seamen. I am therefore a friend to

"seamen's rights," properly understood and fairly enforced; but this

shall not blind me to the rights of others. Besides, in a war to be

carried on for seamen alone, and that, too, on the abstract question

of the right of flag, I can see great danger to the seamen in their

just claims to protection; and, I must beg their friends, in and out

of this House, to reflect before they act. As surely as the war is

continued on this ground alone, so surely will seamen become unpopular,

and their rights be neglected. When the evils of the war press upon the

country, and press they will; when the many lives sacrificed, and the

countless millions expended, shall be brought to view, is it not to be

apprehended that seamen and their claim will be remembered, only as the

cause of the scenes of expense and blood through which we are to pass?

It is not dealing fairly with our seamen, to make them the scape-goats

of this war.

The British then claim the right, in time of war, to take their seamen

out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas.

_Is this claim a novel one?_ That the claim is novel, is certainly

intimated by the Committee of Foreign Relations, when they say that

the impressment of which we complain, is "a practice which has been

unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has

been a party since our Revolution." Indeed, it has been most roundly

asserted, and by many it is believed, that the British claim was made

for the first time after our war; that it originated in views hostile

to our commerce and maritime rights; and that in practice it is only

brought to bear upon us. In truth, however, whatever may be the justice

of the claim, it is not a recent one. It has, in a greater or less

degree, been practised on in all the wars in which England has been

engaged for the two last centuries.

The instructions to armed ships are not frequently made public; but it

so happens, that we have in print an instruction on this very point,

given in 1646, by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord High Admiral of

England, to Sir John Pennington, which goes beyond the present claim:

"As you meet with any men of war, merchants, or other ships, belonging

to any foreign Prince or State in any road where you, or any of His

Majesty's fleet, may happen to come, you are to send to see whether

there be any of His Majesty's subjects on board; and if any seamen,

gunners, pilots, or marines, (whether English, Scotch, or Irish,) be

found on board, you are to cause such of his Majesty's subjects to

be taken forth, and so disposed of as they shall be forthcoming, to

answer their contempt of His Majesty's proclamation in that kind."

These instructions were modified in the reign of Charles the Second,

so as to exclude public armed vessels, and with this modification

they have come down to the present times. If it were at all necessary

to the purposes of my argument, I might show that this right has been

exercised both towards France and Holland, long before we had existence

as a nation. Their vessels have been searched, and British seamen taken

from them. But enough has been said to prove that the claim, if unjust,

is not novel.

_Is the claim peculiar to the British?_ I am justified in saying that

this claim, in time of war, to search for and seize seamen in neutral

merchant vessels, on the high seas, has been made and exercised by

every maritime nation in Europe. To be more particular--I assert, and

stand ready to prove, that it has been made and enforced by France as

well as England, and is now. It would be a waste of time to go very

much at large into the French usages on this subject. I propose to do

little more than to refer to one or two French ordinances, and then

show from our State papers their practical application to us.

By the French laws, and they are ancient laws, the seamen of the

country are all classed, and enrolled, and licensed. In 1784, an edict

was made which is still in force, declaring, that any classed seaman,

who shall, in time of peace, be found serving in foreign ships, shall

be sentenced to fifteen days' confinement, and reduced to the lowest

wages, and serve two years extraordinary at the lowest rate; but those

who, in time of war, shall be arrested in foreign ships, or passing

into foreign countries, shall be sentenced to three years' service

in the galleys. Under the authority of this, and similar ordinances,

the French have taken their seamen out of our vessels, and in some

instances our seamen with them.

Mr. Chairman, the first proof relative to the committee, is the

impressment document of January last, known to the American people as

the 6,057 document. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, at the close of

the introductory report, says, "it is equally impossible, from the want

of precise returns, to make an accurate report of the names or number

of _citizens of the United States, who have been compelled to enter

into the French service, or are held in captivity under the authority

of that Government_, whether taken from vessels captured on the high

seas, or seized in rivers, ports, or harbors; the names of a few only,

greatly below the number believed to be so detained, being within the

knowledge of this Department. A detail therefore is not attempted, with

respect to this part of the call of the House of Representatives." Yes,

sir, it is known to the Administration, that some of our citizens have

been compelled to enter into the service of the French Emperor, while

others are held in captivity by him. Ask, however, for their names, and

you have for answer, that all the persons detained are not known to the

Government, and therefore it cannot be material that you should have

the names of any. Say to gentlemen, here is a case of American rights

violated, and you will be told, that the injury, in practice, is not

of sufficient importance to justify strong measures against the French

Government. Be it so. But attempt to prove to the same gentlemen, that

the practical operation of British blockades and Orders in Council, is

not such as to require war, you will then hear, that it is necessary to

fight about the principle.

I have one other paper to lay before the committee, on this subject.

For some years back, the information about French impressments has

been general and vague, or altogether withheld. Formerly this was

otherwise. In a report respecting the impressment of seamen in 1797,

made by the Secretary of State to this House, on the 27th of February,

1798, we have the names of upwards of twenty American citizens, taken

out of American vessels, on the high seas, by French privateers. We

have more, sir. This same report states, that two French seamen named

Lewis had been impressed from on board the American ship Bryseis by

a French Commodore's ship; that Francis Gibbons, a native of France,

but married and resident at New London in Connecticut, was impressed

from the American ship Edward, at Rochefort, by authority of the

French Republic, and put on board a French ship of war: and that Henry

Doughty, an American, was impressed at sea from the American brig Elsa

by the French frigates Lapancy and Thetis. I could instance other

cases, but these are sufficient to show, that neither the claim nor the

exercise of it is peculiar to the British.

If this right, or claim of right, however, is made a mere pretext by

any nation to seize and detain our seamen, I am willing to allow that

it would be a cause of war. But even in this case, war ought not to

be waged until we have done our duty to our seamen and the offending

nation, by making suitable regulations to prevent the employment

of the seamen of such nation. Have we done this, as respects Great

Britain? Perhaps some such regulation is to be found in the law which

defines what vessel is an American vessel, and which, as such, is

entitled to hoist our flag. Look at it, sir. According to the act of

December, 1792, an American ship is one wholly owned by an American

citizen, and commanded by a person also a citizen. The crew may be all

foreigners--all Englishmen, if you please--all English deserters. In

this, therefore, we find no security to the British Government.

But, we have also the law of May, 1796, which provides, that the

collectors may register seamen calling themselves American, and grant

certificates of citizenship. Out of this law, it is presumed, has

grown the practice of granting protections, as they are called--papers

procured from notaries and magistrates, ofttimes on the most barefaced

perjuries, and always considered as a species of negotiable property

for value received. Sir, these protections, in their abuse, are a

scandal to the nation. It has made false swearing an employment, and

the granting of false papers a business. The price of such a paper is

as well known in the great seaport towns as is that of your stocks. All

ages and complexions and tongues may have this badge of citizenship, by

paying the charges in such cases provided. If this, however, was not

so; if protections were only granted to real Americans; it is difficult

to see how this is to prevent the employment of British sailors. It is

not necessary that the persons navigating an American vessel should

have them.

This act of ours was presented to the British Government by Mr. King,

in January, 1797, and Lord Grenville, on the 27th of March following,

in a manner highly conciliatory, and certainly with much force, stated

specific objections to the law. The Executive, when in July last he

answered the call of the Senate for papers relative to impressments,

omitted this letter of Lord Grenville, but he gives a letter from the

then Secretary of State, to our Minister at the British Court, of the

third of October, 1797, in which the force of the objections seems to

be admitted: "Lord Grenville's observations on the act of Congress for

the relief and protection of American seamen, present difficulties

which demand consideration at the ensuing session." Nothing was,

however, done at that or any future session. In truth, we have done

nothing to prevent the employment of British seamen in our public or

private ships; and they are to be found in both. And yet, with this

fact staring us in the face, we are called upon to say that the war is

altogether just on our part!

It will probably be urged that the British practice under this claim,

in its application to us, was sufficient to prove that the reclamation

of their seamen was not so much the object of the British Government,

as the seizure of our seafaring citizens: that it had become so

outrageous as not only to justify, but to require war. Without, sir,

meaning to excuse or to palliate the taking even the cabin boy, if done

knowingly and wittingly; and being willing to admit, that about the

period of the attack on the Chesapeake, we had much and serious cause

to complain on the subject, I must be permitted to say that I have not

evidence to satisfy me, that when we declared war, the practice of the

British was such as to prove that the claim on their part was a mere

pretext to take our sailors. In truth, I believe, if the Administration

have not deceived themselves on this subject, that they have attempted

a gross deception on the public.

The instructions given at this day, by the British Admiralty to a

naval commander, on this subject, directs him, "when he meets with

any foreign ship or vessel, to send a lieutenant to inquire whether

there may be on board of her any seamen who are the subjects of His

Majesty; and if there be, to demand them, provided it does not distress

the ship; he is to demand their wages up to the day; but he is to do

this without detaining the vessel longer than shall be necessary, or

offering any violence to, or in any way ill-treating the master or

his crew." Mr. Monroe may perhaps recognize in this, the instructions

shown to him after his arrangement, and of which he declared himself

satisfied; but whether he does or not, it must be conceded that it

provides for a moderate exercise of the right. The person who is to

make the search is an officer of some standing; he is only to take

seamen who are British subjects, excluding thereby, not merely our

citizens, but all foreigners; and he is not to take even British

seamen, if, by it, he destroys the crew, or endangers the vessel.

Allowing the right to exist, it is difficult more fairly to regulate

its exercise.

But it may be urged that the practice of the British commanders does

not correspond with these instructions; that they search and seize at

large, according to their will and pleasure. I know, sir, that the

habits and education of a military man, not unfrequently make him act

as if power and right meant the same thing: and I, therefore, have

no doubt that there have been abuses. But I do most conscientiously

believe that these abuses have been greatly magnified, and are, even by

the well meaning, vastly overrated. I am aware that I shall be referred

to the impressment document of last session. This document, sir, is so

illy understood, and has been the source of so much misrepresentation,

that I must be allowed slightly to review it.

The Secretary, in the report says, that the list transmitted had been

received from our agent at London, and "contains the names of American

seamen and citizens who have been impressed and held in bondage in

His Britannic Majesty's ships of war, for the several quarters of

1809 and 1810." The list is headed, "A return or list of American

seamen and citizens who have been impressed and held on board of His

Britannic Majesty's ships of war, from 1st of April to the 30th of

June, inclusively," and so of the other quarters. Now the plain meaning

of this is, if any meaning it has, that the persons whose names were

thus sent to us were impressed and made to serve on board British armed

ships, at some period in the years 1809 and 1810. Indeed, this has been

so stated in this House, and in the Administration prints. And yet the

most superficial examination will show that this is not true. Let me

read to you one or two names: "4868. David Wiley." In the column of

the "result of applications and remarks," we have this explanation of

his case: "Impressed on shore at New Brunswick, and taken on board the

Plumper, was detained two days, when the commander put him on board a

vessel bound to Aberdeen, from thence worked his passage to London, and

appeared at this office 29th August, 1805; is evidently an American.

Discharged." Here, then, we have a man who was not on board a British

ship in 1809, and whose "bondage" did not probably continue more than

two days.

Again, "4936. Richard Butler, representing himself of Petersburg,

Pennsylvania. Impressed 1797 at the Cape of Good Hope, from the Mercury

of Baltimore, and detained on board the Garland." Remark: "Remained

on board the Garland two months, then draughted to the Tremendous, in

which he served two and a half years, was then discharged; has never

received his wages or prize-money; says he was well used on board both

ships. Was discharged as an American citizen at the Cape of Good Hope;

his pay and prize-money lists were given to the consul at the Cape.

Discharged." This man, therefore, according to the statement of our

Consul, so far from having been impressed and held on board a British

ship in 1809, had been impressed in 1797, and discharged in 1799. I

might, sir, give you many other cases equally strong, but these are

sufficient to prove that, by design or mistake, the document is wrongly

headed; that the persons named in the list were not all on board

British ships in 1809 and 1810; and, therefore, that, in its general

results, it does not show the state of the British practice in those

years.

In truth, the list is nothing more than the return of the names of

persons who, within the year, had applied to Mr. Lyman, our Consul and

agent for seamen, for protections against future, or for his aid in

getting released from present impressment. It was his duty, as I do

not doubt it was made his interest, to receive all applications, and

when necessary, to lay them before the proper British authority. Jew

and Greek, Turk and Christian, the growth of our own soil, and the

produce of other countries, all threw themselves upon Mr. Lyman, and

he, laboring in his vocation, granted patents of citizenship, or made

his claim on the British Admiralty. Sir, there is not a man who, in

practice or by inquiry, has made himself acquainted with the manner

in which this business is transacted, but knows that many foreigners

who never saw this country, or sailed under its flag, have attempted,

by application to our agents abroad, to shield themselves against

British impressment. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, needs no

information on this subject, having himself resided in London as our

Minister. It was the duty of our agent to send home some account of

his proceedings, and I have no objection to his making such a list as

we have before us. But I do object to its being palmed on the American

nation as a true history of British impressments affecting our people

and nation. I pray you look at this list. In the year commencing in

April, 1809, and ending in March, 1810, we have about nine hundred and

forty names; and of these, about seven hundred are given with blanks

in the columns for the "towns and States of which they represent

themselves to be citizens"--"when impressed"--"where impressed"--"ships

from whence taken"--"nations"--"masters." The time and the result of

the application are only given. And from these entries in Mr. Lyman's

book you are called upon to admit that the applicant was an American,

and that he was impressed in the year 1809 by the British, on the high

seas, out of an American vessel. Really, this is asking too much.

Mr. Chairman, I have examined the list from April, 1809, to April,

1810, with great attention, for the purpose of ascertaining the number

of impressments which took place in that year, and I will now make to

you one or two statements, which may cast some light on the subject of

the British practice. The number which, by the list, appears to have

been impressed in that year, is one hundred. It will be understood that

in this number I do not include those whose names are carried out in

blank, as has been stated. It is uncertain whether such persons ever

were impressed; and, at all events, it is fair to presume, that their

service on board British ships had commenced before 1809, or otherwise

there could be no difficulty in giving dates. Of the one hundred,

seventy-six were discharged, and six had deserted, leaving less than

twenty to be accounted for.

Another result: Of the persons thus taken, fifty-seven were impressed

on shore, and forty-three at sea. Again: Thirty of these seamen, when

impressed, made part of the crews of British vessels, and thirty-four

American vessels; and of the thirty-four, twelve were taken on land;

leaving about twenty-two persons taken from American vessels on the

high seas. It is possible, sir, that in these statements I may not be

perfectly accurate; I am certain, however, that I am substantially so.

I do not mean to represent that this is a full account of all the

impressments which took place in 1809; on the contrary, I admit that

it is not. Many impressments were certainly made of persons undeniably

British subjects, who would scarcely think of applying to Mr. Lyman,

and will not, therefore, be found in his book. Many persons, also,

having a right to his interference, were not then known to him. My

object in making these explanations, was to show that the 6,057

document does not furnish such strong evidence of British aggression as

has been supposed.

The number of our seamen impressed by the British has been so variously

represented, that I have, from motives of curiosity as well as duty,

been desirous to arrive at something like a reasonable certainty

on the subject. We hear of ten, twenty, nay, forty thousand of our

citizens, confined in the floating dungeons of Great Britain, fighting

her battles against their will. The evidence of this, however, is only

to be found in the imagination of gentlemen. It is the old story over

again, of the "six men in buckram." In part representing the greatest

commercial State in the Union, it may be expected that I have some

personal knowledge on this subject, but indeed I have none such to

give. Is there not in this some proof that the evil has been magnified?

I have sought for information in quarters where only it is to be found,

among the shipping merchants and ship owners of the country. I will

now furnish you with the opinion of an intelligent gentleman from

Marblehead, whose means of information are ample, and whose veracity

will not be doubted. I mean my friend from Massachusetts, who sits

before me. (Mr. REED.) He has favored me with this statement.

"In answer to your inquiry relative to the seamen of

Marblehead, I have to remark that the average shipping of that

port, for the last twenty years, may be estimated at about

19,006 tons, of which it is fair to calculate ten thousand

tons were employed in foreign commerce, and the residue in the

fisheries and in the coasting trade. Allowing six men to every

hundred tons, which is the usual estimate, it gives an average

of eleven hundred and seventy-six seamen in all, and six

hundred in our foreign trade, each year; the number of seamen,

therefore, employed from Marblehead for the last twenty years,

must have been considerable, say five thousand. I have resided

at that place nearly twenty years, and, during the greater part

of the time, have been actively engaged in commerce. According

to my own recollection, aided by that of others who have the

best means of information, I do not believe that twenty of

the seamen of Marblehead, native or naturalized, have been

impressed by the British within the twenty years, and it is not

known that one has been demanded without being released."

As there is no reason to suppose that Marblehead has been more

fortunate with respect to impressments than other places, we have here

something whereby to form an estimate of the number of our seamen

taken by the British. My own conviction is, that the American seamen,

impressed and held by the British, at the commencement of this war,

did not much exceed five hundred in all, and certainly did not amount

to one thousand. Permit me, sir, to mention one circumstance which

speaks loudly on this subject. If the practice of impressment had been

as outrageous as has been represented, it must have fallen with great

force on the Eastern States, as it is there the mass of our seamen

are found. We are then to expect much feeling and passion on this

account. The war must be popular when the cause of it is brought home

to every man's door. No such thing, sir. The war is confessedly odious

there. It is in States where seamen never grew that the war has its

strongest advocates. It is there that you principally find the dark

pictures of sailors' sufferings, and hear the loud and long appeals to

the sympathies and passions of the people about seamen's rights and

seamen's injuries.

I have now, sir, finished the remarks which I intended to make on the

British claim and practice of impressment. We have for years past

had so much idle declamation on the subject, that a dispassionate

investigation of it appeared to me to be called for. In the course of

these remarks, I have attempted to show that the claim was neither

novel nor peculiar, and it is not wholly unsupported by reason; that

our true interest calls more for a fair regulation of the practice than

an abandonment of the rights; and that the conduct of the British, of

late, has been such as to warrant an opinion, that an arrangement may

be made, having for its object a proper regulation of the practice,

leaving the rights of both nations, whatever they may be, untouched.

Sir, with this view of the subject, it is not possible for me to

consent to the adoption of measures, having for their object the

further prosecution of the war offensively on our part; and I cannot,

therefore, vote for the bill on your table. The war has not yet assumed

a character. We have, indeed, added much, and are about to add more,

to the public debt. Already a portion of our citizens are burdened

with oppressive exactions in the form of duties, and heavy taxes are

staring all in the face. But yet our homes and altars remain safe and

unpolluted. Let us seize this moment to give the nation peace, and

the people happiness. This is the appointed time, and if we do not

improve it, I fear my country is to suffer in its prosperity and its

institutions. For Heaven's sake let us pause!

Mr. MACON said after failing in his attempt to amend the bill, he had

considered it of very little importance; indeed, in its present form,

he was not anxious whether it passed or not; and he had intended not

to have troubled the committee on the subject, but the strange course

which the debate had taken had called him up almost against his own

consent. He could truly say that he would not have offered a word to

the committee, had not those who oppose the bill have brought into the

discussion French influence, operating by a sort of magic on every

act of the Executive. The conduct of the Executive had undergone

the strictest scrutiny by these gentlemen, and their own arguments

would, in his opinion, convince every impartial man, that it had been

perfectly fair and upright to all foreign nations; the least attention

to the documents, which have from time to time been published, would

also convince every man of it, and satisfy all that the great object

of the Government had been peace, and that peace was maintained

until it could no longer be done without surrendering almost every

national right worth preserving. Mr. M. said he would endeavor in his

observations to follow the example which had been set the last two

days: not to utter a word to wound the feelings of any one; nor would

he refer to the documents, because every member possessed them, and

they had been published for the information of the people; and he was

sure that the committee must be tired with hearing a sentence here,

and a paragraph there, read from them. The true way to understand them

was to read the whole. But he had never been in the practice of making

many quotations from books or documents, and he thought it unnecessary

to make any now. He was clearly of opinion that the gentlemen who were

opposed to the Administration had the right to say whatever they

thought of it, and to select the subject on which they would speak; and

as they had made the selection, he hoped they would have an opportunity

now to deliver their sentiments. He, however, regretted that they had

selected this bill; because, of all the bills which may be brought

before the House the present session, not one, he thought, would

require despatch more than this. The loss of a day now may be the loss

of the next campaign. He had expected that this general debate, which

seems to include every thing but the bill, would have been delayed

until the loan should be under discussion.

The points made in the debate seem to be: impressment; the right to

expatriate; the right to naturalize; and French influence; neither

of which have any connection with the bill, which is to raise troops

for one year. Sir, said Mr. M., I will not retort a charge of British

influence, and so balance one assertion against the other, because I

do not believe that there is much of either in the nation; but if I

was to say there was none, I should not say what I believe. People

may honestly differ in opinion as to the effect which the success of

England or France over the other might have on the interests of the

United States, without being under the influence of either; and this,

no doubt, is the case with thousands.

I will, before I proceed further, notice some of the observations made

by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT.) If I have not understood

him or any other gentleman correctly, I hope that I shall be corrected;

because it is my sincere desire to state their statements fairly; and

it is not always possible to take down their own words. He said, if

there was any English influence, it was the influence of Locke and

Sidney. As well might he have spoken of the influence of any other

patriots who lived before us. Their influence will be respected

wherever their works shall be read; but that sort of influence is

not the influence of which we have heard so much, and which I intend

hereafter to notice. He also mentioned the influence which drove the

first settlers to Plymouth. Yes, sir, that influence was truly British,

and that sort of influence Great Britain has been exercising ever since

the first settlers, by their own industry and exertions, got into a

situation to be useful to her; and that influence, or rather that

persecution, compelled the first settlers of Carolina to leave the

other provinces, and to settle a second time in the woods, and, as soon

as they were able, to pay taxes. That same influence followed them,

and made their condition much worse. It pursued the people in every

part of the continent, until they declared themselves independent; and,

from that day to this, she has not treated the United States as she has

treated other independent nations.

Mr. Chairman, I was astonished when the gentleman told us he was not a

friend to standing armies; and, almost in the same breath, said that,

at the last session, he voted for raising the twenty-five thousand men,

and that he did not mean to go to war when he gave the vote. For what

purpose, then, could they be wanted? Experience had already shown that

the old establishment was quite sufficient in time of peace. Indeed, a

very considerable part of that was raised soon after the affair of the

Chesapeake, and under an expectation that war would follow, and not for

a regular peace establishment.

The same gentleman told us, that impressment by the British Government

was no new thing. This is certainly true as far as regards her own

subjects, and from her own vessels; but the systematic impressment of

foreigners from foreign ships, is a new thing; and that, too, when

the men and the ships both belong to the same nation. That Government

never attempted to impress Spaniards, Dutch, French, Swedes, or

Danes, from vessels belonging to the same nation with the person; and

it is this new doctrine, which operates solely on us, of which we

complain. The question between us and England has nothing to do with

the doctrine that free ships shall make free goods, or free men, if

gentlemen please. And why draw that into the debate on the impressment

of American citizens from American vessels? No law or precedent can

be produced for this abominable and wicked practice. It was never

attempted to be justified, notwithstanding impressment is no new thing

with her. Every Sovereign, said the gentleman, has a right to the

service of all his subjects in time of war. But this right is like some

others which Sovereigns claim; it is without a remedy. Of what avail

is the proclamation of the Prince Regent in this country, ordering

the British subjects home? None. Many of them are still here, and,

probably, will remain until the termination of the war, and the British

Government will never dream of punishing one of them for disobedience.

But, admit this right in Sovereigns to its fullest extent, and it does

not give one Sovereign the right to impress the citizens or subjects

of another; nor does it justify such an act; of course it does not

touch the act of which we complain; that is, the impressing of American

seamen from American vessels.

It is curious that, throughout this whole debate, there seems to have

been drawn a distinction between the rights of a man who cultivates the

soil, and of him who follows the sea, and that this distinction should

have been drawn by those who claim to be the champions of commerce and

of a navy, and who have told us that agriculture and commerce were

inseparable. Ought it not, then, to follow, that the rights of those

employed on land or water should also be inseparable? This strange

doctrine, as was observed by the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr.

ROBERTSON,) may dust the eye, but cannot stagger the understanding of

any one.

The same gentleman said, that we had taken no measures to exclude

British seamen from American vessels. For what purpose were protections

given to American seamen? Surely to protect them against impressment,

and to show that we had no desire to protect others; and what more

ought to have been done, he did not tell us. I ask, did any nation

ever do more? Besides, has not the United States, over and over

again, offered to make an arrangement with England on the subject of

sailors, which should be satisfactory to both, by securing to each the

use of their own sailors? and has she not always refused to make any

arrangement about them? And it may be fairly asked here, what measures

Great Britain has taken to prevent her officers from impressing our

seamen? None that I have heard of, and she is the aggressor. We have

not injured her, while she has been impressing our sailors whenever she

wanted and could find them. If the United States wanted sailors ever so

much, they could not impress one of hers, and she knows this; and she

would not suffer one of them to be impressed by any foreign power; and

we must determine to defend the rights of ours, or it will be idle to

talk about navigation, commerce, and a navy. Indeed, if commerce and

agriculture be inseparable, you must defend the rights of the persons

concerned in both, or both must be injured. There are no neutrals able

to carry our products to market, and if you will not protect your

seamen, they will not carry them.

It is worthy of remark, that, for twenty years past, the Government of

the United States has been trying to settle the question of sailors

with Great Britain, and that every attempt has failed, and that it is

just now discovered that we have always begun wrong. My colleague (Mr.

PEARSON) and the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. PITKIN,) it appears,

could settle this great question without much difficulty. If they can,

I wish most sincerely they would. I am, however, apprehensive that they

are a little mistaken, because General Washington, when President,

having Major Pinckney, now Major General Pinckney, for Minister at

London, tried without effect. Mr. Adams renewed it with Mr. King for

Minister; Mr. Jefferson with Colonel Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, now the

Attorney General; and Mr. Madison, with the last named Pinkney. All

these Presidents and Ministers, with the aid of every Cabinet, have

failed. Every description of political opinion, with the greatest

talents, have been employed and done nothing. At the end of twenty

years we have gained nothing, and lost our labor; the question is as

unsettled as ever; and we have been worsted in this way, that, while we

were negotiating, they were impressing seamen.

We have been told by my colleague, that it is not the right, but the

abuse of impressment of which we complain. It is true, sir, that we

do not complain of Great Britain impressing her own subjects; she may

do as she pleases with them; that is no concern of ours; all we ask

of her is to keep her hands off our people; and we deny her right to

impress American citizens; and if the abuse be the impressing them,

of that we do complain, and not without just cause, because she has

impressed many of them, and compelled them to fight her battles; and

I have understood, after we had declared that war existed between her

and us, that she detained those she had before impressed as prisoners

of war, and this may be a part of her public law. Indeed, we have

heard much about universal law and public law, neither of which, from

the statements made, seem to have much regard to right or justice,

which ought to be the foundation of all law. One universal law seems

to be, that Sovereigns can command their subjects to return home in

case of war; another, that no person can expatriate himself; and Great

Britain is no doubt willing to acknowledge another, by which she might

impress sailors from all the world. As to the first, we need not

trouble ourselves about it; and the second, the United States have not

acknowledged; and we are now contending against impressment; and permit

me here to observe, that the republicans have always considered the

impressment of citizens a more serious injury than the spoliation of

property.

I must return to Porcupine's paper,[33] which, as well as I now

recollect, never contained a sentence in favor of the Revolution,

or much in praise of the constitution, if it was praised at all; no

outrage was committed which it did not approbate; a few of the outrages

of that time shall be stated: The Rogue's March was played under the

window of the man who drew the Declaration of Independence, The man

who first took up arms after the fall of Charleston, and whose body

had been almost riddled in defence of his country, was a member of

Congress, and was insulted at the circus. Another member, of no common

cast of mind, was insulted at the theatre; a man who will do his duty

in whatever situation he may be placed. Another, returning home with

his family, was insulted and almost mobbed; he is now one of the

Cabinet, mentioned by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. QUINCY.)

If I was not almost exhausted I would give some of the details of these

then fashionable transactions. I will only add, it was nothing in those

days for a few men to whip a printer whose publications they did not

like. All these outrages and violations of law, it is believed, were

not only approved by the editor of the before-named paper, but other

Federal papers also. This same editor claimed to have more subscribers

for his paper than any other editor in the Union. And after he returned

to Europe, he wrote and published about some of his former supporters.

Had this have been a French editor, and acted toward the Federal party

as he did toward the Republican, and the subscribers to his paper

Republicans, could not those who look at every thing now done to find

French influence, have had as good a field to hunt in as any they have

yet found? At the very time these events took place, the majority

talked as much about French influence as the minority now does; they

had clues, sub-plots, ocean massacres, and a hundred other equally

ridiculous and unfounded tales, which circulated for a day. I have

mentioned these things not with an intent to wound the feelings of

any man living, but with a view of trying to persuade those who talk

so much about French influence, to look at both sides of the question

about foreign influence; and if they will, I hope we shall never hear

of it again in this House.

Mr. Genet, when he was Minister of France, began to intrigue, for which

he was dismissed. Mr. Liston, when he was Minister of England, began

the same work, for which he was not dismissed. If the Republicans had

then been in power, and Liston a French Minister, could not a strict

examination of the documents have placed it as easily as many other

acts have been to French influence?

While all these things were doing, and many others quite as strange,

the gentlemen call themselves the followers of General WASHINGTON. If

they be truly his followers, they ought to adhere to his principles,

and attend to his last advice. Every act of his went to perpetuate the

Union and to attach the States to each other. I fear the sentiments

contained in his farewell address to the nation are getting out

of fashion with those who claim to be his exclusive followers; or

why do we hear within these walls, the foundation of which he laid

for union, union, union; disunion spoken of, "peaceably if we can,

forcibly if we must;" and why listen to idle and unfounded tales about

foreign influence, which can never injure us as long as we stick to

the old maxim--united we stand, divided we fall? Straws show which

way the wind blows! What has become of the newspaper called the

Washington Federalist? The name was, I have understood, changed to the

Independent American; out of that, I believe, was raised the Federal

Republican--all good names; but why lose the name of Washington to a

paper supported by his exclusive followers? And this is the first time

to my recollection that they have adopted Republican in their calendar.

I have heard that Federalism is not now the same that it was when Mr.

Adams was President: we shall know more about this if ever they get

into power again; be this as it may, every man has a right to change

his opinion; it is a right which no Government can take from him, and

when convinced that he is wrong, it is his duty to change. But I had

thought, when Mr. Adams was President, we were told that he followed

the plan of General Washington, and that he was then a favorite with

the party who elected him, but a great change has taken place in

regard to him. I always thought him an honest man, and I think so

still. After Mr. Adams got out of fashion, Colonel Burr became so

great a favorite with the Federal gentlemen who were then in Congress,

that they voted thirty-five times for him to be President, when they

must have known that not one elector who voted for him intended him

for President. Afterward, Mr. Madison was a favorite; but, after the

refusal of the British Government to ratify the arrangement made

with Mr. Erskine, they examined the matter, and discovered he had

not done right, and he got out of fashion. Then the late worthy and

venerable Vice President and Colonel Monroe became favorites; Colonel

Monroe got out of fashion about the time he was appointed Secretary

of State; and, lastly, Mr. De Witt Clinton became a favorite. I hope

he will not be injured by it, but he seems to be losing ground, as we

have been told it was not his merit that induced the Federalists to

support him for President, but the demerit of Mr. Madison. This does

not appear to be a good reason, because they might have selected a man

from their own party, who they thought had merit. But all these things

may be the doings of those who, a former member of this House called

ultra-Federalists; and it will be recollected that all these men became

favorites, on the old doctrine of, "divide and conquer;" and it ought

not to be forgotten that, when Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie returned

from France, their political friends were a little shy of them;

indeed, I should not be surprised if Messrs. Jay, King, Walcott, and

Dexter, should not much longer be favorites. If we may judge from the

public prints, Commodore Rodgers is no longer one, though he, like the

others, is understood to be a Federalist; but these men will never say,

"peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must." I would really thank any

gentleman to tell me what is now meant by the party name, Federalist.

It is a fact on record, that General Washington did not approve of

self-created societies, and I have understood that some of the people

who claim to be his exclusive followers, have their self-created

Washington Benevolent Societies, wherever they can establish them, and

that they are political societies, and they were intended to oppose

some other society; perhaps the Tammany. This could not justify the

proceeding. As to myself, I do not care if there was one in every three

miles square in the nation, so that I am left free not to be a member.

We naturalize, without hearing a complaint from any quarter, emigrants

from Great Britain, of every trade and profession, merchants, lawyers,

doctors, and even divines; to which may be added tradesmen and

mechanics; they all go where they please, live among us, and take part

in the politics of the day. If foreign influence could be introduced

into the country by naturalizing, we should have more of British than

of French; but naturalizing seems well enough for every body but a

sailor, but do not permit him to become a citizen; he will be in

the way of native sailors, who want encouragement; besides, we know

that Great Britain will impress him, and we know as well, when her

officers want men, they care not whether they are American or English.

The native American has never complained that the naturalizing of

foreigners of his trade or profession, injured him; nor has a complaint

been heard from a native seaman against naturalizing foreign sailors;

and we have had experience enough to know that our merchants could

complain, and complain almost against their own complaint. Let their

property be captured, or expected to be captured, under a new order in

France or England, and more complaints will be made about it, than the

impressing of a dozen citizens. The situation of the merchant, when

plundered, is bad enough, but his property is not taken away without

a trial of some sort before a judge learned in the law, whose duty it

ought to be to decide according to law; he also employs lawyers to have

justice done him. Not so with the sailor; when impressed, there is no

learned judge to decide his case, or lawyer to have justice done; force

is law to him, and his oppressor judge; he is put on board ships, and

compelled to fight battles, in which neither he nor his country have

any concern: deprived of the right to complain or petition; he is poor,

friendless--Great God! can it be possible, that we shall yield the

point of impressment, for the sake of carrying on a little trifling

trade by hook or by crook!

All agree that we ought to fight for the rights of native seamen, and

all agree that some of them have been impressed; why not all, then,

join, heart in hand, to maintain their rights? Is it because the

British officers impress from our vessels others besides natives? This

cannot lessen their just claim to the protection of their country. We

have, however, been told that only ninety-three persons were impressed

in one year from American vessels; if only three of them had been the

sons of the gentleman (Mr. EMOTT) who gave the information, I ask,

would he have been contented with the long investigation of documents,

to ascertain if any of the diplomatic meanders turned towards French

influence? No, sir, he would not; he would have demanded of the

National Government to have his children restored to his arms; he

could demand this in a way to be heard. Far different is the case with

these unfortunate parents who have had their sons impressed; they are

too poor and friendless to be heard; the rights of the nation may be

abandoned by little and little, until none be left; exactly as you

may take a cent at a time from one thousand dollars, until none be

left. All must determine to protect American seamen on board American

vessels, or not hereafter pretend to claim any jurisdiction over the

vessels when they are out of the limits of the United States. If a

single citizen should be impressed on American land, the whole nation

would be in a flame; the right to protection is the same, whether on

American land or an American vessel.

It has been said that we do not act justly; that we encourage British

seamen to run away, because we do not apprehend them and send them

back, when they have run away from their vessels; they run away before

our people see them, of course there is no encouragement to the running

away. As to the sending them back, we are not bound to do it; and if it

depended on me one should never be sent back, until the British ceased

impressing and plundering our citizens, and I would agree that every

man who engaged in the war on our side should have the right to be

naturalized, though he fled from British naval tyranny.

It is remarkable that, while we hear not a word said to justify England

for impressing and plundering the people of the United States, that so

much should have been said to prove that we ought not to have gone to

war with her, and that we were wrong in doing so. This is the best way

that could have been devised to keep her aggressions out of view; not

to say a word about them, and talk a great deal about the hardships of

war, and the taxes which must be imposed to carry it on, winding up all

their lamentations for the state of the country, with, if it was not

for the war, a little trade could be carried on. Impressment, then,

is a mere trifle, compared with this trade, and it may be that Great

Britain understands it so, and is willing to gratify us with this trade

for kin-sake, as long as we are contented to be impressed for kin-sake.

The citizens who are impressed would tell her, if telling would release

them, that nations are no kin.

This surely has been the most unfortunate Government from its

establishment to the present time that ever existed; almost every thing

that has been done is wrong: it was wrong to fix the seat of Government

here; it was wrong to place this House and the houses for the offices

so far from each other; it was wrong to give paper protections to

American seamen; it was wrong to have a little mercy in the revenue

laws; it was wrong to repeal the internal taxes; I believe that was

called oppression--though I am no prophet, I venture to predict, that

to lay them to carry the war on will be wrong also; to take Canada

would be wrong;--indeed, it would be difficult to find any thing which

has been done right, according to the modern Federal creed. How are we

to get things right? Give up the chair you are in to one, the White

House to another, and they will soon give you a sedition law which will

put all right. The great discovery which these gentlemen have made,

that so much has been wrong under every Administration, would surprise

the people, were they not this moment astonished at the discovery of

perpetual motion by Redheffer--two such great discoveries must add

vastly to the character of the nation.

The attempt to take Canada is so wicked that some of the gentlemen

are quite alarmed at it. We hear of the unoffending Canadians, but not

of the unoffending sailor; at one time they are the most unoffending

and loyal people in the world, at another they are French, and not fit

to be united in our Government. We have heard much of the same sort

formerly said about the people of Louisiana, and they have become a

State, without any trouble to themselves or the Union. What has become

of that high Federal spirit which disdained to buy Louisiana? Where is

it when Canada is mentioned? The Federalism which desired to conquer

Louisiana and keep it by force of arms, is changed when Canada is the

question. The outrageous conduct of Great Britain is as much worse than

that of Spain, as her impressment and plundering were worse than the

refusal of the right of deposit. For one, I am willing to have Canada

and Florida, and have them you must before many years. The situation of

Mobile is such as to compel you before very long to take possession of

it. Canada and Florida would rid us of bad neighbors, and make us more

happy.

The committee then rose and reported the bill.

The several amendments made in Committee of the Whole were agreed to by

the House.

Mr. FITCH again moved to strike out the 4th section, giving the

President exclusively the appointment of all officers under the rank of

field officers.

The question was decided in the negative by yeas and nays. For the

motion 34, against it 74.

And the bill was then (half past six o'clock) ordered to be engrossed

for a third reading, without a division.

And on motion, the House adjourned until to-morrow.

WEDNESDAY, January 13.

_Additional Military Force._

The bill, in addition to the act passed at the last session "to raise

an additional military force"--the object of which is to raise twenty

regiments of men for one year, if deemed necessary by the President to

the public service--was read a third time, and the question stated,

"Shall the bill pass?"

Mr. KENT.--Mr. Speaker, it is with great reluctance I rise to trouble

the House with any remarks of mine, at a time when their patience must

be so completely exhausted, by the unusual length of the debate which

has already taken place upon the subject before you. The bill on your

table proposes to raise an additional military force of twenty thousand

men, and it has been objected to on account of its expense, and the

consequent danger growing out of it to the liberties of our country. We

are, sir, in a state of war; and what is evidently the course which we

should pursue whilst in that situation? We should advocate and support

such measures as are calculated to bring that war, justly made on our

part, to a speedy, honorable, and successful conclusion. Viewing the

bill on your table as a measure of that description, I shall give it

my support, regardless of that additional expense which gentlemen so

emphatically dwell upon. Nay, sir, it is better to expend the thirty

millions of dollars (even if that sum was necessary) so repeatedly

spoken of on the other side of the House as the cost of the war for two

years, to accomplish our object, than to expend the same sum in five

years, even if we could effect our object with equal certainty.

However commendable economy may be in every other situation in life, in

war it is inadmissible; it loses its character; it becomes parsimony:

you might as well attempt to unite profusion and avarice as war and

economy. All that the utmost prudence can require of you when in a

state of war, is to make your means ample; lay your plans well; and to

the judgment and the skill in these particulars only can you look for

economy or for savings; for the want of an inconsiderable supply of men

or money, a campaign might prove disastrous, to recover which would

require an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure.

The Army has been represented as dangerous to the liberties of the

country. At one moment we are told that, when it shall be completed,

it will be unequal to the conquest of a petty province adjoining us,

and not exceeding in population the State of Maryland; the next moment

we are told that it will endanger the liberties of seven millions of

freemen. Arguments thus paradoxical need no refutation. Sir, I do not

pretend to have any military experience, and I am willing to concede

the point to those possessing it, that men enlisted for three or five

years are preferable to those enlisted for one year as proposed by

the bill; yet I feel confident that every object will be accomplished

by this bill that is intended. It is not proposed to rely solely on

an army of this description to carry on the war; you have nearly a

sufficient military force authorized for five years, and you want the

men to be raised by this bill only as auxiliaries, till the ranks of

that army can be filled. With these observations on the bill before

you, I shall proceed to make a few remarks upon what has fallen from

gentlemen on the other side of the House; in doing which I shall

endeavor to confine myself to what has not been noticed by others, or,

if attended to, not sufficiently so.

If I understood an honorable gentleman from Connecticut correctly, who

addressed you the other day, (Mr. PITKIN,) he said we were contending

for the employment of foreigners. We contend, sir, for nothing which,

as an independent nation, we are not entitled to, and which the laws

of nations do not guarantee to us. What have been the propositions

heretofore made by our Government to Great Britain upon this subject?

I find, by a recurrence to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and

Pinkney with that Government, in 1806, that we made the following

propositions, the most material of which were omitted yesterday (not

intentionally I hope) by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. EMOTT.) Here

Mr. K. read the following proposals from the public documents of 1807

and 1808. We offered--