3. The attack upon the Chesapeake.

That we may narrow the point in controversy as much as possible, I

remark that ample and satisfactory atonement having been made for the

violation of our rights by the attack on the Chesapeake, one cause of

disquietude and a prominent one too, has been finally removed. It has

indeed been frequently remarked on this floor, that the satisfaction

offered for the unauthorized attack on the frigate Chesapeake was

long delayed, and very reluctantly offered. However painful it may be

to censure the conduct of our own Government, yet a sense of justice

obliges me to say, that to every overture made by Great Britain to

accommodate this unpleasant affair, our Administration attached

some exceptionable condition which closed the door to an amicable

adjustment. The committee cannot have forgotten the early disavowal

of this wanton aggression on the honor of our flag by the British

Government, and the tender of satisfaction which was made, but failed

because our Minister was instructed to couple with this complaint the

subject of impressment; nor can they have forgotten how indignant

the Ministry and nation were when the President assumed the right of

judging what would best comport with the honor of their King. Few, I

believe, who read the offensive remark, expect a different result from

that which ensued. And while I am upon this subject I take occasion

to remark, that in all our attempts to negotiate with the British

Government there seems to have been some untoward circumstance, some

unfortunate condition, either accidentally or intentionally, attached

to the question at issue, which has defeated the negotiation.

It would be within the scope of my present plan to take a particular

review of the British Orders in Council, as well as the subject of

impressments. But inasmuch as the documents relating to these two

subjects have been laid on every gentleman's table; and more especially

when I reflect that both topics have been very ably discussed by some

gentlemen who have preceded me, and especially by the gentleman who has

just sat down, (Mr. BLEECKER,) I shall content myself with taking but

a brief review of these prominent, and I may add, the only remaining

causes for the present war. As to the Orders in Council, it ought not

to be forgotten, that during several lengthy discussions to obtain

their repeal, as well by our Ministers in London, as at this place,

they have been considered as the prominent point in dispute. So, again,

as to the origin of our restrictive system; it cannot be forgotten that

the friends and abettors of those measures uniformly professed that

they were adopted as retaliatory for the Orders in Council. From the

first partial non-importation act, which passed on the eighteenth of

April, 1806, down to the law of the second of March, 1811, the object

has been, on the very face of the law, to procure a repeal of the

Orders in Council, and of the Berlin and Milan decrees. If any doubt

should remain on the mind of any member of this committee as to this

fact, I beg him to turn his eye to the restrictive code, and I presume

he will find the evidence to be abundant and complete. In this system

of anti-commercial regulations, I find the origin and progress of our

present political calamities. And here, Mr. Chairman, I shall readily

admit, that we had grievances and complaints, great and heavy, against

both of the belligerents; nor have I the least inclination to palliate

or excuse them. My object is to show, what I have uniformly expressed

on this floor, that our system of non-importation, non-intercourse,

and embargo, have been directed against the Orders in Council, as

to Great Britain, and nothing else; and finally, have brought this

country into a ruinous war. Is there a man within these walls, who

does not now believe (as was fully predicted when the law passed) that

the conditions held out to the two great belligerents, to induce them

to repeal their obnoxious edicts, violating the neutral commerce of

the United States, placed the execution of our law in the hands of a

foreign Government? Is there a man of ordinary capacity in the United

States, having the means of information, who now believes that the

Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810,

according to the proclamation of the President of the United States,

solemnly announcing that fact; and that they thenceforward ceased to

violate our neutral commerce? Does not candor constrain all to confess

that, long after the pretended repeal of the aforesaid decrees, our

commerce was harassed in every sea where French cruisers could reach

it? Need I point you to the piratical seizures and burning of American

property in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic seas, by

the privateers and fleets of the French Empire; subsequent to this

pretended repeal, and sanctioned expressly by its authority? If all

other evidence should be deemed insufficient, I inquire whether the

French Emperor himself has not sufficiently humbled this country

(if indeed our cup of humiliation had not been full before) by his

own formal antedated repeal of his Berlin and Milan decrees, long

subsequent to the time imposed on the President by the Duke of Cadore?

It cannot have escaped the attention of the committee, or of the

nation, that Napoleon's decree, respecting the Berlin and Milan

decrees, bears date the 28th of April, 1811, and is explicitly bottomed

on the law of Congress passed March 2, 1811; the sole object of which

law was to confirm the proclamation of the President which had then

been issued more than four months, and the legality of which had

become very questionable. This decree may be found among the documents

accompanying the President's Message of November 4th, 1812, and on the

forty-sixth page of those printed papers.

If further evidence should be needed to prove the abominable fraud

of this transaction, it may be found in the correspondence of our

Minister at Paris, in the summer of 1811, wherein he remarks, that

he had repeatedly demanded evidence of the repeal of the Berlin and

Milan decrees, but none could be obtained. And yet, forsooth, we are

now furnished with a decree dated in April preceding, but not issued

until we are so entangled in French toils, that war with Great Britain

was inevitable. If this fact alone had been understood, I put it to

the candor of this honorable committee to say, whether they would

have consented to the declaration of war against Great Britain at the

time and for the reasons which were given? I say, without fear of

contradiction, that they would not. If my premises are true, and the

inference undisputed, since the Government has been grossly deceived

and drawn into this war, for reasons and causes which did not then

exist, most assuredly it becomes our duty as well as interest to

relieve the country from its pressure as soon as possible.

In addition to all this, it is a singular fact in the history and

progress of this war, that in five days after its declaration, (viz.

on the 23d of June, 1812,) and as soon as the aforesaid decree of the

French Emperor was made known to the British Ministry by Mr. Russell,

an Order in Council was issued, repealing the former obnoxious orders,

which had been ostensively the most prominent cause of the war; and yet

the President has never issued his proclamation announcing that fact,

as by the terms of the law of March 2d, 1811, he was expressly bound

to do. On this failure of the President to do what the law enjoined on

him to perform, as well as having issued his proclamation of November,

1810, without possessing the facts required by the law to support him,

I make no comment. The account is still unsettled between him and this

injured country.

The Orders in Council having thus been revoked, the continuance of the

war seems to rest upon the impressment of our seamen alone. Give me

leave then to inquire into the grounds of this practice, as claimed by

Great Britain. Is it not bottomed on the ancient doctrine of perpetual

allegiance--or in other words, that the native-born subject can never

so expatriate, as that the mother country may not claim his service

in time of war? Is this a novel doctrine, either as to time, or the

nation who now attempts to enforce it? I venture to say that Great

Britain has practised upon this principle ever since she has been a

nation; and it is farther manifest that France, and all the maritime

powers of Europe, have maintained the same doctrine. Nay, sir, we

maintain the same doctrine in our own country; in proof of which,

witness the President's proclamation at the commencement of this war;

and notice also the recent case of Clark the spy, who was condemned

to suffer death by a court martial, and was pardoned by the President

on the ground of his owing allegiance to the United States, although

residing in an enemy's territory, and having been naturalized or sworn

allegiance to the King of Great Britain. Hence it would seem, that the

principle set up was not novel nor singular. But what is the principle

in contest between the two Governments? Great Britain claims the right

to visit neutral merchant ships on the high seas; and if she finds

any of her natural born subjects, to take them into her service. The

Government of the United States denies to her this right, and asserts,

that a foreigner naturalized in this country, is absolved from all

allegiance to the parent State. The practice of Great Britain under

her principle, has undoubtedly subjected some of our native citizens

to capture and involuntary service, from causes which I need not here

repeat. In all such cases, I take it to be admitted on all hands, that

she sets up no claim, and therefore every abuse of this sort is capable

of remedy. But on this head I have no hesitation in expressing my

unqualified belief, founded on documents which have been laid on our

tables, that the list of such impressed seamen is greatly exaggerated.

Out of the number six thousand two hundred and fifty-seven of American

citizens said to have been impressed, and forming a standing head piece

to the list of our grievances, I very much question if five hundred

native Americans can be found among them all. The documents lately

furnished by the Secretary of State, if carefully examined, will serve

very much to substantiate this fact. Many names are there returned who

have only forwarded their claims to our Consul at London, and who, very

probably, never set foot on American ground. Others again are continued

on the list who have been discharged years ago, and others who have

voluntarily engaged in her service.

The question then at issue, I take to be this--Shall the war with Great

Britain be continued to oblige her to relinquish the practice of taking

from our merchantmen her native British sailors? If we could obtain

the principle by continuing the war, I think it can be demonstrated,

that it would be injurious to the American seamen to have it so

established, inasmuch as it would, by increasing the number of our

seamen, necessarily diminish their wages. But, circumstanced as Great

Britain is, contending for her existence against the most formidable

power on earth, and resting her last hopes upon her navy, I presume she

will never relinquish the principle.

The inquiry has been made, with some solicitude, what will you do

with _naturalized foreigners_? I answer, treat them hospitably, and

extend the arm of protection and all the blessings of government to

them while they continue within your territorial jurisdiction; but if

they leave your territory, and choose to go upon the great highway

of nations, the risk and the choice are their own, as will be the

peril. Put the case fairly to the yeomanry of our country, and let

them understand the subject, that this war is to be carried on for

the purpose of protecting foreigners while sailing on the high seas,

and I very much incline to the opinion, that they would, dismiss the

authors of this war from further service, or oblige them soon to bring

it to a close. Sir, I will not consent to waste one drop of pure

American blood, nor to expend a single dollar, to protect, on the

high seas, all the vagabonds of Europe. Valuable as may have been the

acquisition in obtaining many great and good men as emigrants from

Europe, still I must maintain the opinion, that all the blessings of

liberty and domestic government, which are secured to them in common

with our native citizens, ought to be an ample compensation. I know

it is no easy matter to draw the precise line where protection shall

cease; but in a question of such moment as peace or war, the prosperity

and happiness, perhaps the misery and ruin of our country, I cannot

hesitate as to the course proper to be pursued.

With respect to protections, they have become so much a matter of

bargain and sale, that having been counterfeited and sold in almost

every port in Great Britain, as well as in America, they have long

since ceased to answer any valuable purpose. It has been a fact long

since well established, that a foreigner, who could scarcely speak our

language, could procure a protection in Great Britain purporting to be

evidence of his _American citizenship_. This then may account for the

light and contemptuous treatment given to this species of evidence by

the officers of the British navy.

FRIDAY, January 8.

_Mounted Rangers._

Mr. JENNINGS said that it must be recollected by the House, that the

act which was passed at the last session of Congress, for the raising

certain companies of rangers for the protection of the frontiers, had

expired. Those rangers were raised under the apprehension of attacks

from the savages; and these apprehensions have unfortunately been

realized far beyond the general anticipation. When those companies were

raised, Mr. Speaker, we expected long since to have taken possession of

the British Province of Upper Canada, thereby to have intercepted the

connection and communication between the British and the northwestern

Indians. It will therefore readily be perceived, that in consequence

of our disappointed expectations in that quarter, the northwestern

frontier will be more exposed to the savage knife and tomahawk, at the

opening of the approaching spring, than they have been heretofore. This

description of force, if again organized, and stationed at suitable

points without the frontier settlements, will render it more efficient,

and in a better situation to range the woods and prevent the unapprised

attack of the savage upon the helpless women and children. If we had to

expect invasion from a civilized foe, our situation would not excite

so much terror, but the savage character draws no distinction between

the helpless infant and the prisoner of war. Under such circumstances,

no calculation of expenditure ought to have any weight against a

measure calculated to afford a necessary and proper protection to such

an important and extensive frontier of the United States. The secrecy

and facility with which the savages can assail that frontier, renders

it improper that we should depend entirely for protection upon the

volunteers and militia of an adjoining State. They carry with them

their prejudices, and too often forget the sacred rights of private

property. This fact has unfortunately been verified by a petition which

I presented yesterday from the territory which I represent. But I

cannot believe that such is the character of the citizens of Kentucky,

although I do believe that the cause of that plundering, so far as it

did take place in the western part of the territory of Indiana, by a

portion of the Kentucky volunteers, may be found in the unhallowed

exertions of local political purposes, to impress on the minds of

at least some of those volunteers, that they were to defend British

agents, British partisans, and persons having connection with the

savages.

I shall now (said Mr. J.) present to the House the following

resolutions which I have prepared, as well for the purpose of offering

a bounty in lands to those who would volunteer their services as

rangers for the protection of the northwestern frontier, as for the

purpose of inquiring into the expediency of paying the militia and

volunteers who have already rendered important services in shielding

the helpless from savage cruelty:--

"_Resolved_, That the Committee on Military Affairs be, and

they are hereby, directed to inquire into the expediency

of authorizing the President of the United States to raise

at least twelve companies of rangers, by the acceptance of

volunteers or enlistment for one year, to be mounted or

otherwise, as the service may require.

"_Resolved_, That the said committee inquire into the

expediency of allowing a bounty in land to those who shall

tender their services as rangers, and be accepted by the

President of the United States.

"_Resolved_, That the said committee inquire likewise into the

expediency of making provision for compensating the militia

or volunteers, who may have been called out, or whose services

may have been accepted by the Executives of either of the

territories of the United States."

The resolutions were ordered to lie on the table.

_Additional Military Force._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the

bill from the Senate authorizing the raising of twenty thousand men,

for one year, if in the opinion of the President of the United States

the public service shall require it.

Mr. WHEATON said: Mr. Speaker, every intelligent man, whose age has

given him an opportunity of combining experience with observation, must

know that there are times when, on certain questions relating to the

great interests of the nation, the sober remonstrances of truth and

reason are of little or no avail against the misguided impetuosity of

public prejudice. To such a crisis, if we have not already arrived, it

is greatly to be feared that we are fast approaching. To float along

the current of popular opinion requires very little exertion; but the

man that is placed in a situation where the public safety demands that

he should stem the torrent and buffet the storm, cannot but reflect,

with peculiar sensibility, on the very unequal task he has to perform.

The bill, now under consideration, has opened a field of discussion on

the general policy of the war, in which its advocates and opponents

seem to have given full range to their imaginations; and the arguments,

on both sides, have apparently been attended with various success.

There can, however, be little doubt on which side the victory will

finally be declared. It is well known that the majority are determined,

and the bill will pass. I had therefore resolved to take no part in

the dispute, but to content myself with giving a simple vote. But,

reflecting that I am called upon to act on a subject by me deemed

important, not only for myself, but for the good of the people whom

I have the honor to represent, who will be equally interested in the

result, I have felt myself impelled, both by duty and inclination, to

state some of the reasons on which that vote will be grounded.

The bill proposes giving authority to the President of the United

States to raise twenty thousand regular troops, in addition to the

thirty-five thousand already authorized by law. This may be right

or wrong, proper or improper, according to times and circumstances,

and the objects which the measure is contemplated to effect. Were

the country invaded by a foreign foe, and a foe so powerful as to

make this additional number of troops necessary for its defence, I

should say it were right and proper to raise them, whatever expense it

might be to the nation. But if, as the advocates of the bill profess,

these men are to be enlisted, and, together with those heretofore

authorized, are to form a powerful army for the purpose of foreign

conquest, I have no hesitation in giving it, as my opinion, that it

is improper and wrong, or, at least, as the President has told us

respecting the French decree repealing those of Berlin and Milan, that

"the proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to

many objections." Objections, it is apprehended, may arise from want

of powers given to Congress by the constitution, either expressed or

implied, to do this thing, with its professed object in view--that is,

foreign conquest. And if these are unavailing, common reason and common

sense furnish objections, sufficiently strong, to the expediency of

our undertaking such enterprises. Objections, for want of sufficient

powers given by the constitution, may be considered as novel; but,

if sound, they should nevertheless prevail. The war itself is novel,

this being the first of the kind that ever we have undertaken since

that instrument was formed, or since we became an independent nation.

If the constitution gives Congress any power to carry on foreign

wars, those powers must be collected from expressions it contains,

or from some clear and necessary implication from something that is

therein expressed. It will be very readily admitted, that our national

Government is a Government of a very simple construction, and that it

possesses very limited powers; being established by compact, not by

conquest, it has not all the powers incident to the sovereignties of

other countries; not produced _by_ conquest, it was not made _for_

conquest. "The enumeration of certain rights in the constitution shall

not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people;

and the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution,

nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,

respectively, or to the people." The framers of this constitution took

particular care, not only to define the powers they intended to give,

but the objects to which that power should be applied, and therefore,

but for those defined objects, Congress have no powers at all. The

objects are first pointed out clearly and plainly, and then the powers

necessary to their attainment. The people of this country, after having

effected the Revolution and established their independence, considering

their great transmarine distance from the nations of the Old World, and

all their jarring and rival interests, flattered themselves with the

expectation of long peace. Unapprehensive of being attacked at home,

they had no idea of making war for the purpose of conquest abroad.

"Peace and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with

none," was their motto, and the same sentiment has been sanctioned by

a man, whom the advocates of this war have never ceased to admire.

An aversion to standing armies was among the causes that induced the

Declaration of Independence; without standing armies, it was then

believed, and we now know full well, foreign wars cannot be carried

on. Foreign wars did not, therefore, come within the scope of that

policy that dictated the constitution. I am not insensible, that, by

the constitution, a power is given to Congress to declare war, (not to

make it,) but their power is not to be exercised but in the spirit of

that instrument, and for the attainment of some or all of the objects

for which it was framed. And what are those objects? Why, and for

what was the constitution made? Its authors have told us. It was for

"the forming of a more perfect union, establishing justice, insuring

domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defence, promoting the

general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves

and our posterity," and all these benefits for the people that then

did, or who thereafter should, belong to, or reside in the territory

then embraced by the United States, and none other. The constitution

was not made for any other, nor can it give jurisdiction over any

other. If all or any of these objects are endangered, and it can be

made to appear that raising the additional army proposed by this bill

be necessary to the preservation and security of them, and can afford

a rational prospect of producing such an effect, then my objections to

the measure, so far as they arise from the apprehension of the want of

constitutional authority, will be obviated. But here, permit me to ask,

whether adding twenty thousand new troops to our present regular army,

will be likely to have the effect of forming a more perfect union among

the people of these States, or whether the little progress already made

in the war has not produced fearful apprehensions of a sad reverse?

If justice be not already established in our country, can there be

any probability that a more formidable army will effect an object so

desirable? No; for it is a well-known maxim, as true now as in those

ancient times when it was written, that "_Inter arma leges silent_."

So romantic an idea, as being able to establish justice through the

world, could not have entered the heads of those that framed the

constitution. Much has been said respecting the laws of nations; but

they are now nowhere to be found, but in those books that treat on that

subject; they were formed by the nations of the civilized world, and

evidenced by the treaties, compacts, and agreements, entered into by

them; but the Governments of Europe, in their struggle for power and

dominion, seem to have disregarded or broken them down; and they being

the majority in number, and superior in strength, it is not at present

in our power to build up and enforce them. The unavoidable state of

the world must be submitted to, until human nature shall, by its Great

Author, be corrected. Nor can we, from what we have experienced,

promise ourselves, from foreign war, an increase of tranquillity at

home. But we are authorized, and are bound to provide for our common

defence, and to raise armies, as well of regulars as militia, for

that purpose, whenever the unfortunate situation of our country may

render such a measure necessary; and our raising of a regular army

could never have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution

for any other purpose, and therefore give no authority so to do, and,

as if conscious that this were the case, the committee that penned

the act passed by Congress in June last, declaring war, made use of a

form altogether unusual in other countries on similar occasions. The

act declares that "war exists between the United Kingdoms of Great

Britain and Ireland, and the United States;" going upon the idea,

that hostilities had then been actually commenced against us by that

Government, and our country invaded by a British armed force. Such a

doctrine would have been very proper, and it might have been proper to

raise armies in pursuance of it, had it been true. But such was not the

fact. No hostile invasion of the country, by the British Government,

had then been made, attempted or threatened. But some may say, and do

say, that, if it were not a point then, it is now, and that, therefore,

if we had no right to raise regular armies then, it being a time of

peace, we may feel ourselves fully authorized now, since war has been

declared, to raise new ones, or make additions to the old. This,

indeed, would be contrary to a principle universally received and

adopted, that no one should be permitted to take the advantage of his

own wrong.

I know it is a doctrine, that the ruling party in this country, both

in and out of this House, are every day zealously endeavoring to

inculcate, that even admitting the war to have been wrong, at its

commencement, it has now become the constitutional duty of its original

opponents to afford every aid and encouragement to its prosecution.

But this is a doctrine that I think no one can yield his assent to,

till he is made to believe that two lines, constantly diverging,

may finally meet in the same point. If our country has been in any

degree invaded, and such invasion be in consequence of our having

first invaded the territories of the invaders, it is proper for us,

by withdrawing the cause, to put an end to the effect. The last, and

not the least object of the powers given by the constitution, is "to

secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Many

arguments cannot be necessary to show the tendency of foreign wars to

destroy liberty. I believe history does not furnish an instance of

any people long free, after engaging in the mad projects of foreign

conquest. While Rome was content with her ancient boundaries, her

inhabitants were blessed with freedom; but, afterwards, jealousies,

tumults, insurrections, and seditions, and those two great plagues

and scourges of mankind--anarchy and tyranny--following in the train,

destroyed every vestige of liberty among that people. Is there any

liberty left among the people of France, or of those countries that

France has conquered? Fortunate for them, if they are less enlightened

than we are; for, in such case, though slaves, they may not be quite so

miserable ones. "The very age and body of our constitution, its form

and pressure," indicative of the genius and temper of the people that

adopted it, are all opposed to the prosecution of wars for conquest.

Such enterprises must not be undertaken, or the constitution must be

destroyed. Gentlemen seem already inclined to attribute the disgrace

and defeats that have hitherto marked our progress in this war, rather

to the form and constitution of our Government, than to the weakness

and folly of its Administration. The French Emperor has been extolled,

and his mode of conducting wars has been more than intimated as being

worth our imitation. If, in making foreign conquests, we would have

his success, we must make use of his means, and then we may bid adieu

to our former happy institutions, our laws, and our liberty. On this

ground, therefore, I am opposed to the progress of this war. But if I

had not a scruple left, as to the authority given to Congress by the

constitution to make this war for conquest, (and perhaps I ought not to

have,) my sense of its inexpediency, while I shall have any regard for

the welfare and prosperity of my country, will forever forbid my giving

it the smallest aid.

Mr. H. CLAY (Speaker) said he was gratified yesterday by the

recommitment of this bill to a Committee of the whole House, from two

considerations: one, since it afforded to him a slight relaxation

from a most fatiguing situation; and the other, because it furnished

him with an opportunity of presenting to the committee his sentiments

upon the important topics which had been mingled in the debate. He

regretted, however, the necessity under which the Chairman had been

placed of putting the question,[32] precluded him from an opportunity

he had wished to have enjoyed of rendering more acceptable to the

committee any thing he might have to offer on the interesting points it

was his duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he was to speak on this

day, of which he was more sensible from the ill state of his health, he

would solicit the attention of the committee for a few moments.

I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. C., when I found this

bill permitted to pass silently through the Committee of the Whole, and

that, not until the moment when the question was about to be put for

its third reading, was it selected as that subject on which gentlemen

in the opposition chose to lay before the House their views of the

interesting attitude in which the nation stands. It did appear to me

that the loan bill, which will soon come before us, would have afforded

a much more proper occasion, it being more essential, as providing

the ways and means for the prosecution of the war. But the gentlemen

had the right of selection, and having exercised it, no matter how

improperly, I am gratified, whatever I may think of the character of

some part of the debate, at the latitude in which for once they have

indulged. I claim only, in return, of gentlemen on the other side of

the House, and of the committee, a like indulgence in expressing, with

the same unrestrained freedom, my sentiments. Perhaps in the course

of the remarks which I may feel myself called upon to make, said he,

gentlemen may apprehend that they assume too harsh an aspect; I have

only now to say that I shall speak of parties, measures, and things, as

they strike my moral sense, protesting against the imputation of any

intention on my part to wound the feelings of any _gentleman_.

Considering the situation in which this country is now placed, in

a state of actual war with one of the most powerful nations on the

earth, it may not be useless to take a view of the past, of various

parties which have at different times appeared in this country, and

to attend to the manner by which we have been driven from a peaceful

posture. Such an inquiry may assist in guiding us to that result--an

honorable peace--which must be the sincere desire of every friend to

America. The course of that opposition, by which the administration

of the Government had been unremittingly impeded for the last twelve

years, was singular, and, I believe, unexampled in the history of

any country. It has been alike the duty and the interest of the

Administration to preserve peace. Their duty, because it is necessary

to the growth of an infant people, their genius and their habits.

Their interest, because a change of the condition of the nation

brings along with it a danger of the loss of the affections of the

people. The Administration has not been forgetful of these solemn

obligations. No art has been left unessayed; no experiment, promising

a favorable result, left untried to maintain the peaceful relations

of the country. When, some six or seven years ago, the affairs of the

nation assumed a threatening aspect, a partial non-importation was

adopted. As they grew more alarming, an embargo was imposed. It would

have attained its purpose, but it was sacrificed upon the altar of

conciliation. Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate! Then came a

law of non-intercourse, and a general non-importation followed in the

train. In the mean time, any indications of a return to the public law

and the path of justice, on the part of either belligerent, are seized

with avidity by the Administration--the arrangement with Mr. Erskine is

concluded. It is first applauded, and then censured by the opposition.

No matter with what sincerity the Administration cultivates peace,

the opposition will insist that it alone is culpable for any breach

between the two countries. Because the President thought proper, in

accepting the proffered reparation for the attack on a national vessel,

to intimate that it would have better comported with the justice

of the King (and who does not think so?) to punish the offending

officer, the opposition, entering into the royal feelings, sees in

that imaginary insult abundant cause for rejecting Mr. Erskine's

arrangement. On another occasion, you cannot have forgotten the

hypercritical ingenuity which they displayed to divest Mr. Jackson's

correspondence of a premeditated insult to this country. If gentlemen

would only reserve for their own Government half the sensibility which

is indulged for that of Great Britain, they would find much less to

condemn. Restriction after restriction has been tried; negotiation

has been resorted to, until longer to have negotiated would have

been disgraceful. Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing a

trial, what is the conduct of the opposition? They are the champions

of war; the proud, the spirited, the sole repository of the nation's

honor; the exclusive men of vigor and energy. The Administration, on

the contrary, is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous--"incapable of being

kicked into a war." The maxim, "not a cent for tribute, millions for

defence," is loudly proclaimed. Is the Administration for negotiation?

The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted with negotiation. They want to

draw the sword and avenge the nation's wrongs. When, at length, foreign

nations, perhaps, emboldened by the very opposition here made, refused

to listen to the amicable appeals made, and repeated and reiterated

by the Administration, to their justice and to their interests; when,

in fact, war with one of them became identified with our independence

and our sovereignty, and it was no longer possible to abstain from it,

behold the opposition become the friends of peace and of commerce. They

tell you of the calamities of war; its tragical events; the squandering

away of your resources; the waste of the public treasure, and the

spilling of innocent blood. They tell you that honor is an illusion!

Now we see them exhibiting the terrific forms of the roaring king of

the forest. Now the meekness and humility of the lamb! They are for

war, and no restrictions, when the Administration is for peace; they

are for peace and restrictions, when the Administration is for war. You

find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the colors of every

party, and of all nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose: to

steer, if possible, into the haven of power.

During all this time the parasites of opposition do not fail by cunning

sarcasm or sly inuendo to throw out the idea of French influence, which

is known to be false; which ought to be met in one manner only, and

that is, by the lie direct. The Administration of this country devoted

to foreign influence! The Administration of this country subservient

to France! Great God! how is it so influenced? By what ligament,

on what basis, on what possible foundation, does it rest? Is it on

similarity of language? No! we speak different tongues; we speak the

English language. On the resemblance of our laws! No! the sources of

our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On

commercial intercourse? No! we have comparatively none with France.

Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments?

No! here alone is the liberty of man secure from the inexorable

despotism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. Where, then,

is the ground of such an influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by

arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous and ridiculous as the

insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are

persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will,

no doubt, think it incredible (but I have nevertheless been told the

fact) that an honorable member of this House, now in my eye, recently

lost his election by the circulation of a story in his district, that

he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof of the

charge was rested on a statement of facts which was undoubtedly true.

The gentleman in question it was alleged had married a connection of

the lady of the President of the United States, who was the intimate

friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States, who

some years ago was in the habit of wearing red French breeches. Now,

taking these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman, are too good a

logician not to see that the conclusion necessarily followed!

Throughout the period he had been speaking of, the opposition had

been distinguished, amidst all its veerings and changes, by another

inflexible feature--the application of every vile epithet, which our

rich language affords, to Bonaparte. He has been compared to every

hideous monster and beast, from that of the _Revelations_ to the most

insignificant quadruped. He has been called the scourge of mankind,

the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the infidel, and--Heaven

knows by what other names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an obscure

lady in a city, not very far off, who also took it into her head, in

conversation with an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the

affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction of the balance of

power, stormed and raged about the insatiable ambition of the Emperor;

called him the curse of mankind--the destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman

listened to her with perfect patience, and when she had ceased, said to

her, with ineffable politeness: "Madam, it would give my master, the

Emperor, infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you thought of him."

Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget that they stand on American soil;

that they are not in the British House of Commons, but in the Chamber

of the House of Representatives of the United States; that we have

nothing to do with the affairs of Europe--the partition of territory

and sovereignty there--except in so far as these things affect the

interests of our own country. Gentlemen transform themselves into

the Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country, and forgetting,

from honest zeal, the interests of America, engage, with European

sensibility, in the discussion of European interests. If gentlemen

ask me, if I do not view with regret and sorrow the concentration

of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply that I do. I

regret to see the Emperor of China holding such immense sway over the

fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain

possessing so uncontrolled a command over all the waters of our globe.

And if I had the ability to distribute among the nations of Europe

their several portions of power and of sovereignty, I would say that

Holland should be resuscitated, and given the weight she enjoyed in

the days of her De Witts. I would confine France within her natural

boundaries--the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine--and make her a

secondary naval power only. I would abridge the British maritime

power, raise Prussia and Austria to first-rate powers, and preserve

the integrity of the Empire of Russia. But these are speculations. I

look at the political transactions of Europe, with the single exception

of their possible bearing upon us, as I do at the history of other

countries or other times. I do not survey them with half the interest

that I do the movements in South America. Our political relation is

much less important than it is supposed to be. I have no fears of

French or English subjugation. If we are united, we are too powerful

for the mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined. If we

are separated, and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey to the

weakest of them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our country will

not be worth preserving.

In one respect there is a remarkable difference between Administration

and the Opposition--it is in a sacred regard for personal liberty. When

out of power, my political friends condemned the surrender of Jonathan

Robbins; they opposed the violation of the freedom of the press, in the

sedition law; they opposed the more insidious attack upon the freedom

of the person, under the imposing garb of an alien law. The party now

in opposition, then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the unhappy

Robbins, and passed those two laws. True to our principles, we are now

struggling for the liberty of our seamen against foreign oppression.

True to theirs, they oppose the war for this object. They have indeed

lately affected tender solicitude for the liberties of the people, and

talk of the danger of standing armies, and the burden of taxes. But it

is evident to you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign idiom.

Their brogue betrays that it is not their vernacular tongue. What! the

opposition, who in 1798 and 1799, could raise an useless army to fight

an enemy three thousand miles distant from us, alarmed at the existence

of one raised for a known specified object--the attack of the adjoining

provinces of the enemy? The gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted

by his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand, alarmed at the

danger of our liberties from this very army!

I mean to speak of another subject, which I never think of but with

the most awful considerations. The gentleman from Massachusetts, in

imitation of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained us with Cabinet

plots, Presidential plots, which are conjured up in the gentleman's

own perturbed imagination. I wish, sir, that another plot of a much

more serious kind--a plot that aims at the dismemberment of our

Union--had only the same imaginary existence. But no man, who had paid

any attention to the tone of certain prints, and to transactions in

a particular quarter of the Union for several years past, can doubt

the existence of such a plot. It was far, very far from my intention

to charge the opposition with such a design. No, he believed them

generally incapable of it. He could not say as much for some who were

unworthily associated with them in that quarter of the Union to which

he referred. The gentleman cannot have forgotten his own sentiment,

uttered even on the floor of this House, "peaceably if we can, forcibly

if we must;" in and about the same time Henry's mission to Boston was

undertaken. The flagitiousness of that embassy had been attempted to

be concealed by directing the public attention to the price which the

gentleman says was given for the disclosure. As if any price could

change the atrociousness of the attempt on the part of Great Britain,

or could extenuate in the slightest degree the offence of those

citizens who entertained and deliberated upon the infamous proposition!

There was a most remarkable coincidence between some of the things

which that man states, and certain events in the quarter alluded to.

In the contingency of war with Great Britain, it will be recollected

that the neutrality and eventual separation of that section of the

Union was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened, since the

declaration of war, that British officers in Canada have asserted to

American officers that this very neutrality would take place? That they

have so asserted can be established beyond controversy. The project is

not brought forward openly, with a direct avowal of the intention. No,

the stock of good sense and patriotism in that portion of the country

is too great to be undisguisedly encountered. It is assailed from

the masked batteries of friendship to peace and commerce on the one

side, and by the groundless imputation of opposite propensities on the

other. The affections of the people are to be gradually undermined.

The project is suggested or withdrawn; the diabolical parties, in

this criminal tragedy, make their appearance or exit, as the audience

to whom they address themselves are silent, applaud or hiss. I was

astonished, sir, to have lately read a letter, or pretended letter,

published in a prominent print in that quarter, written not in the

fervor of party zeal, but coolly and deliberately, in which the writer

affects to reason about a separation, and attempts to demonstrate its

advantages to different sections of the Union, deploring the existence

now of what he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for the arrival

of the period when they shall be eradicated.

The war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the

pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of

retaliatory Orders in Council--a pretension by which she undertook

to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no

farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause

of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of

impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians

to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity

for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question

other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the

war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes

of the war; so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings

of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before

this House, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate,

would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true they

wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending that they did not

choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of

the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to

another fact that transpired--an important fact material for the nation

to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our

journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. MCKEE) moved, in Committee of the

Whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken

upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of

whom seven belonged to this side of the House, and three only to the

other.

It is said that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of

France; and that had she furnished the document in time, which was

first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented.

I will concede to gentlemen every thing they ask about the injustice

of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability

was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense of that

injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was

undoubtedly extremely exceptionable. But I maintain that, had it made

its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed;

and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British

Government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than

to the letters of the British Minister, addressed to the Secretary of

State, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will

be recollected by the committee that he exhibited to this Government a

despatch from Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly

avowed, that to produce the effect of the repeal of the Orders in

Council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked

as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that

despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on

the 10th of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed

this House, and was pending before the Senate, (and which, I have no

doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: "I have

no hesitation, sir, in stating that Great Britain, as the case has

hitherto stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without the greatest

injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral

nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them

in force against other States, upon condition that France would except

singly and specially America from the operation of her decrees." On

the 14th of the same month, the bill still pending before the Senate,

he repeats: "I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure

you, that if you can at any time produce a full and unconditional

repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it in your

character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any

question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet

you with a revocation of the Orders in Council. Previously to your

producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as

unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our Orders in Council."

Thus, sir, you see that the British Government would not be content

with a repeal of the French decrees as to us only. But the French

paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy

the British Government. It could not, therefore, have induced that

Government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders in

Council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding

of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not

have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended that, in point of

fact, it did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council. This I deny.

After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the

British Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the

world knows, that the repeal of the Orders in Council resulted from

the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the effect

upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law,

or to the warlike attitude assumed by this Government, or to both. But

it is said that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from

what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war,

the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me into an

examination of the grounds for continuing the war.

I am far from acknowledging that had the Orders in Council been

repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the

declaration would have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this,

from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say with

any degree of certainty what would have been the effect of such a

repeal. Each member must answer for himself. I have no hesitation

then, in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of

American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how

have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true,

has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but

she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain

contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She

waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it _in terrorem_

over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a

repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June

last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have

prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay

down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow,

in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first

instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great

struggle for a nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through its

habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but

seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential

rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards,

their recognition. The war of the Revolution is an example of a war

began for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged in its

commencement against the right asserted by the parent country to tax

the colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence. The idea

of independence was repelled. But the British Government would have

relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties

saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and

they achieved our independence. When nations are engaged in war, those

rights in controversy, which are acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace,

are abandoned. And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall

be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment?

And, sir, what is this principle? She contends that she has a right

to the services of her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this

right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in

our vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I deny

that she has any right, without her jurisdiction, to come on board

our vessels on the high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit of

enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further

contends that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her

and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns. I do not mean to

go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is

contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and

practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain, in the very case

of foreign seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints upon naturalization

than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original

allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new

allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly,

that the Sovereign having possession of the subject would have a right

to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction

of his primitive Sovereign, he may resume his right to his services,

of which the subject by his own act could not divest himself. But his

primitive Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of

his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of another Sovereign, or

upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it

belongs to the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this

discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle,

objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her

practice--no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the

inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set

up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist without

the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press

gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as

naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of

the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable

to the principle--a principle which, if it were theoretically right,

must be forever practically wrong. We are told by gentlemen in the

opposition that Government has not done all that was incumbent on it

to do to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain;

that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by

the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government has done too

much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them

without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants

to his negro slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without

molestation." What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to

take all who are not provided with them. From their very nature they

must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a

mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an

ear mark. The colors that float from the mast head should be the

credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen

have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not

being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this

country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such

splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia should

visit one of them in his oppressor's prison and attempt to reconcile

him to his wretched condition. She would say to him, in the. language

of the gentlemen on the other side, "Great Britain intends you no

harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects;

having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail

upon her by peaceable means to release you, but I cannot, my son,

fight for you." If he did not consider this mockery, he would address

her judgment, and say, "You owe me, my country, protection; I owe you

in return obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old

Massachusetts, where live my aged father, my wife and my children.

I have faithfully discharged my duty. Will you refuse to do yours?"

Appealing to her passions, he would continue, "I lost this eye in

fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent; I got this scar before

Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution when the Guerriere

struck." If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the

accents of mingled distress and despair,

"Hard, hard, is my fate! once I freedom enjoyed,

Was as happy as happy could be!

Oh! how hard is my fate, how galling these chains!"

I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven

by an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot

be, that his country will refuse him protection!

It is said that Great Britain has been always willing to make a

satisfactory arrangement of the subject of impressment; and that Mr.

King had nearly concluded one prior to his departure from that country.

Let us hear what that Minister says upon his return to America. In his

letter dated at New York, in July, 1803, after giving an account of

his attempt to form an arrangement for the protection of our seamen,

and his interviews to this end with Lords Hawkesbury and St. Vincent;

and stating that, when he had supposed the terms of a convention

were agreed upon, a new pretension was set up (the _mare clausum_,)

he concludes: "I regret not to have been able to put this business

on a satisfactory footing, knowing as I do its very great importance

to both parties; but I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the

interests of our own country, in refusing to sanction a principle that

might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim

to prevent." The sequel of his negotiation, on this affair, is more

fully given in the recent conversation between Mr. Russell and Lord

Castlereagh, communicated to Congress during its present session. Lord

Castlereagh says to Mr. Russell:

"Indeed there has evidently been much misapprehension on

this subject, and an erroneous belief entertained that an

arrangement in regard to it has been nearer an accomplishment

than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in Congress--I

mean those who were opposed to going to war with us--have

been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed

the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct

of the American Government. This error probably originated

with Mr. King; for, being much esteemed here, and always well

received by the persons in power, he seems to have misconstrued

their readiness to listen to his representations, and their

warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of

America in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction

on their part of the propriety of adopting the plan which he

had proposed. But Lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought

he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment

to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be

attended with formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles.

This is obvious from a letter which his Lordship addressed to

Sir William Scott at the time."

Here Lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before

him, in which Lord St. Vincent states to Sir William Scott the zeal

with which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject of impressment,

confesses his own perplexity, and total incompetency to discover

any practical project for the safe discontinuance of that practice,

and asks for counsel and advice. "Thus you see," proceeded Lord

Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King on this subject was

entirely unfounded."

Thus, continued Mr. CLAY, it is apparent, that, at no time, has the

enemy been willing to place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I

will speak hereafter of the overtures made by the Administration since

the war.

The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of

terminating the contest. If our achievements upon the land have been

less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen, it is not because

the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization,

discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist on the

part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost every thing

is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation that our

country abounds with the richest materials, and that, in no instance,

when engaged in action, have our arms been tarnished. At Brownstown,

and at Queenstown, the valor of veterans was displayed, and acts of

the noblest heroism were performed. It is true, that the disgrace

of Detroit remains to be wiped off. That is a subject on which I

cannot trust my feelings, it is not fitting I should speak. But this

much I will say, it was an event which no human foresight could

have anticipated, and for which the Administration cannot be justly

censured. It was the parent of all the misfortunes we have experienced

on land. But for it the Indian war would have been in a great measure

prevented or terminated, the ascendency on Lake Erie acquired, and

the war pushed perhaps to Montreal. With the exception of that event,

the war, even upon the land, had been attended by a series of the

most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on

this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the

other. The expedition under the command of Governor Edwards and Colonel

Russell, to Lake Peoria, on the Illinois, was completely successful. So

was that of Captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that river still

higher. General Hopkins destroyed the Prophet's town. We have just

received intelligence of the gallant enterprise of Colonel Campbell.

In short, sir, the Indian towns have been swept from the mouth to the

source of the Wabash, and a hostile country has been penetrated far

beyond the most daring incursions of any campaign during the former

Indian war. Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed than

that by Newnan's party from Georgia. And the capture of the Detroit,

and the destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to our maritime

or land account,) for judgment, skill, and courage, on the part of

Lieutenant Elliott, has never been surpassed.

What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war has been

removed? We sought indemnity for the past and security for the future.

The Orders in Council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for

spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated,

now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly

persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration has given the

strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less

than ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary of State

writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon

two conditions only; and what are they? That the Orders in Council

should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen

cease, those already impressed being released. The proposition was for

nothing more than a real truce; that the war should in fact cease on

both sides. Again, on the 27th July, one month later, anticipating a

possible objection to these terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe

empowers Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms for an armistice,

having only an informal understanding on these points. In return, the

enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment of his seamen in

our service, thus removing entirely all pretext for the practice of

impressment. The very proposition which the gentleman from Connecticut

(Mr. PITKIN) contends ought to be made, has been made. How are these

pacific advances met by the other party? Rejected as absolutely

inadmissible; cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr. Russell's

powers, and the want of an act of Congress is intimated. And yet the

constant usage of nations I believe is, where the legislation of

one party is necessary to carry into effect a given stipulation, to

leave it to the contracting party to provide the requisite laws. If

he fails to do so, it is a breach of good faith, and a subject of

subsequent remonstrance by the injured party. When Mr. Russell renews

the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the

British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple

rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. Afterwards, in

conversation with Mr. Russell, the moderation of our Government is

misinterpreted and made the occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of

the war. The proposition of Admiral Warren is submitted in a spirit

not more pacific. He is instructed, he tells us, to propose that the

Government of the United States shall instantly recall their letters of

marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders and

instructions for any acts of hostility whatever against the territories

of His Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects. That small

affair being settled, he is further authorized to arrange as to the

revocation of the laws which interdict the commerce and ships of war

of His Majesty from the harbors and waters of the United States. This

messenger of peace comes with one qualified concession in his pocket,

not made to the justice of our demands, and is fully empowered to

receive our homage, the contrite retraction of all our measures adopted

against his master! And in default, he does not fail to assure us,

the Orders in Council are to be forthwith revived. Administration,

still anxious to terminate the war, suppresses the indignation which

such a proposal ought to have created, and in its answer concludes

by informing Admiral Warren, "that if there be no objection to an

accommodation of the difference relating to impressment, in the mode

proposed, other than the suspension of the British claim to impressment

during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding, without the

armistice, to an immediate discussion and arrangement of an article on

that subject." Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and

it remains to be seen if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered

to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PEARSON)

supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment

of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition

on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would

immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were passed,

with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord

Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration

has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its

error has been not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a

solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by

an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of

the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with

the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or

on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax. We

are told that England is a proud and lofty nation that, disdaining

to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once

triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity

and despair we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of

Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail,

let us fail like men--lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire

together in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's rights and free

trade."

Mr. MCKEE moved an amendment to the bill, going to place the

appointment of the other field officers of each regiment, as well as

the Colonels, in the President and Senate. The motion was agreed to.

MONDAY, January 11.

_Additional Military Force._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the

bill for raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men

for one year.

Mr. SHEFFEY said he felt grateful for the opportunity which had been

afforded him, to deliver his sentiments on the subject before the

committee. It was now about a year ago, when he had stated his reasons

at length on the question of the war then meditated against Great

Britain. Since that time, he had been generally a silent, though not an

inattentive spectator. Conscious that there had fallen to his share a

full portion of the frailty common to man, he felt disposed to distrust

his own opinion. He had even hoped he might be mistaken, he had hoped

that experience would prove the fallacy of his apprehensions; that the

predictions of gentlemen, who differed from him in sentiment, would be

realized; that the rights of the country would be secured by arms, to

which the majority had resorted; and that the evils anticipated would

vanish before us. On a review, however, of the reasons which had then

influenced him, aided by the experience of the last year, he found his

opinions, not only unshaken, but strongly confirmed.

The bill before us, said Mr. S., contemplates an addition of twenty

thousand men to the army heretofore authorized to be raised. By the

measures preparatory to the war, upwards of thirty-six thousand men

were directed to be enlisted; with the addition now contemplated,

our regular army will amount to more than fifty-six thousand men.

The question which at once presents itself to every mind disposed to

inquire, is, what is the object of this vast military force? We are

here not left to conjecture; this inquiry has been anticipated, and

we have been directly told by the chairman of the Military Committee,

(Mr. WILLIAMS,) that it is intended for offensive purposes; that the

conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, is to be achieved.

If I have any right to deliberate on this subject, and to express the

opinion which my view of the real interests of the country dictates,

I at once say, that I cannot give my assent to raise such a force for

such a purpose. Was an augmentation of the army required to defend

us against any enemy, either on the maritime or inland frontier, no

member of this House would more readily accord the means of defence and

protection than myself. In such event, I shall not inquire how we got

into the situation, or by whose temerity the enemy has been brought

on our borders. I shall consider _defence_ as a matter of imperious

necessity, forbidding all calculation as to means and consequences.

But, as it is admitted by all, that the force already authorized is

more than sufficient for every defensive purpose; as it is expressly

avowed that it is required for offensive operations in the territories

of the enemy, the question assumes a different shape; it is stripped

of the overruling influence which attends necessity; it becomes a mere

question of expediency, controlled by the various considerations which

reason and policy may dictate. So far as my conduct is concerned,

before I can consent to the prosecution of the war, in the manner

contemplated, I must be convinced that the objects in controversy are

not only just, but of sufficient importance in their practical effect

on the community to justify such an experiment, and not attainable in

any other way; that there is a reasonable probability that such a war

will secure to us those objects; and that we are not endangering the

greater good, to obtain an exemption from the lesser evil; hazarding

certain great rights, to secure others of far inferior importance.

I regret that I cannot, consistently with my sense of duty, yield the

unlimited confidence in their measures, which the majority demand. My

reason must be convinced, before my confidence can be bestowed. There

are, indeed, cases where superior virtue and wisdom, tested by long

and successful experience, have a strong claim to our confidence.

But this, in my opinion, is not the case here. A retrospect of the

transactions of the last eight years, will show how much gentlemen have

been mistaken and disappointed in their views of our foreign policy;

particularly that part which is connected with the difficulties in

which we now find ourselves, and which may be said to be the groundwork

of them. In making this declaration, and in leading your attention to

the facts, it is not my object to give offence to any one. I believe

gentlemen are actuated by the purest motives, and sincerely disposed

to render essential service to the country. I speak of facts only,

intending to show a mistaken, not a corrupt or vicious course.

Our difficulties with Great Britain commenced soon after the treaty of

1794 (generally called "Jay's Treaty") expired by its own limitation,

in consequence of the peace of Amiens. About that time the British

Government offered to our Minister, then resident in London, a renewal

of the treaty. That instrument had been negotiated under the auspices,

and received the sanction of WASHINGTON, the father and benefactor of

his country. It is true, that its stipulations did not embrace every

subject which we could have wished; and those that were embraced, were

not so advantageously settled as might have been done, had we had

it in our power to have dictated the terms. But it is equally true,

that experience refuted all the speculations, and dissipated all the

apprehensions, with which the country was filled at the time of its

ratification. During its operation we enjoyed a degree of prosperity

unexampled in this or any other country. Our leading interests

flourished in a manner unknown before, and unexperienced since; our

agriculture was encouraged by high prices and ready markets for its

products; the freedom of navigation, and the enterprise of our people,

carried our commerce to every part of the globe. I ask this House

and this nation, whether their hopes or wishes extend beyond what we

then enjoyed? If they do, they hope for that which is opposed by all

human probability, and they wish for that which has scarcely ever

fallen to the lot of man. We were, indeed, not exempt from every evil,

or gratified by every possible good. What nation or individual ever

reached that state? But the great essentials of national prosperity

were in our possession. Our Government, however, was not satisfied. The

overture of the British Government was rejected, under the impression,

no doubt, that better terms could be obtained; that the situation

of Great Britain would compel her to yield to our demands, however

extensive.

Soon after the rejection of this overture, Great Britain assumed

the right to interdict the trade in the products of her enemies'

colonies, when taken directly from those colonies to the mother

country, conformably, as she asserted, to the principles adopted in

the war of 1756. In consequence of which, our Government, with a

view to coerce her into a relinquishment of her pretensions, passed

the partial non-importation act of 1806. It had not the intended and

promised effect. They again resorted to negotiation, and repealed the

restriction. About this time, a change happened in the British Cabinet,

highly auspicious to our interests. "Our friends," yes, our old

friends, who had espoused our cause in time of peril and danger, who

had defended our rights during all the vicissitudes of the Revolution,

and who had manifested their friendship for us on every occasion

since, got into power. With these men, a negotiation was opened by our

Government through the instrumentality of our Ministers, Messrs. Monroe

and Pinkney, which resulted in a treaty, as our own Ministers declared,

"both honorable and advantageous to the United States," and the best

that could be obtained. It was not only "advantageous" as it respected

our commerce, but the informal understanding which accompanied it,

would have secured us against the abuses of impressments; so our own

Ministers believed. But it was rejected without being even submitted

to the Senate. The reasons have never been disclosed to the nation. I

presume, however, that it was confidently expected that such was the

situation of Great Britain, that any terms that we should dictate would

be granted.

The terms which our Government demanded not being accorded on the part

of Great Britain, a new policy was resorted to by our Government,

which was held up to the nation as a sovereign remedy for all our

difficulties, which were daily increasing. An embargo, not limited in

its duration, was laid on our shipping. The prominent virtues of this

remedy were supposed to be--that it would coerce the belligerents, but

particularly Great Britain, into an abandonment of their injurious

measures; and above all, that it would save us from being involved in

war. The experience of one year, however, manifested how little its

supporters understood of the means and resources of other nations, and

of the character of our own. The privations to which a great portion of

our people were subjected in consequence of this measure coerced our

Government into a repeal, long before any sensible impression could be

made on Great Britain. The embargo was abandoned, because the people

would bear it no longer, and the non-intercourse system was adopted

in its stead. This also had its day--but this, like the embargo,

experience condemned as injurious and ruinous policy; and the public

voice called for its repeal. It was succeeded by the act of the first

of May, 1810, the source of our present difficulties.

When this act passed this House, we were told that its provisions held

out the strongest inducement to each of the great belligerents, to

precede its rival in the abrogation of the injurious edicts affecting

the commerce of this country, and that whoever might lead the other

would unquestionably follow. It required very little sagacity to

penetrate this subject. It was easily foreseen that this measure would

be employed to detach us from our neutral situation, which it was so

much our interest, and had been so much our desire, to maintain. This

apprehension experience has realized. We now feel the consequences in

their fullest extent.

After we had become the dupes of French perfidy, by putting in force

the non-importation system against Great Britain, under the belief,

that on the first day of November, 1810, the decrees of Berlin and

Milan were repealed, the falsehood of which has since been placed

beyond all rational doubt, it happened as had been anticipated, that

finding the inefficiency of the restrictive system against Great

Britain, the nation was called on, about the commencement of last

session, to assume a threatening attitude towards that power. We were

then told by the supporters of our foreign policy, that war would not

be necessary. That justice was withheld from us by the Government

of that nation under the impression that force would not be used to

maintain our rights, which impression it was only necessary to remove

by manifesting a determined spirit in making warlike preparations. This

prevailed with many, and the army was voted. But it did not intimidate

our enemy. We were then told, that it was necessary to declare war, as

affording conclusive evidence of our sincerity: but that it would not

be necessary to continue it beyond a few weeks, when our objects would

be attained by a just and honorable peace. We were also told, at the

same time, that in six weeks after the declaration of war, we should

be in possession of a great portion of the enemy's colonies. All these

promises have been disappointed. We have effected nothing by commercial

restrictions, nothing by arms, and nothing by negotiation; and, if

there is not a change in our policy, the war promises to be perpetual.

Having detained you thus long with these preliminary topics, permit

me to draw your attention to those that grow directly out of the bill

before the committee. I have said, that the causes ought not only to

be just, but important in their effect on the community, to justify a

resort to arms. I will say more. A nation situated as this is, who has

so much to lose, and so little to gain, ought not to relinquish its

peaceful state but in the last extremity. Are the causes which existed

at the time when this war was declared, of that character which,

according to this idea, justified its commencement; and are those now

remaining sufficient to sanction its continuance?

I exclude all consideration of the abstract justice of our complaints

against Great Britain. Upon that subject I never had but one opinion. I

always did believe that her conduct towards this country was not only

unjust as it affected us, but impolitic as it affected herself.

Before the war commenced last Summer, the Orders in Council formed

the principal ground of complaint against Great Britain. I venture

to assert, without the dread of contradiction, that if the repeal

which has since taken place had happened and been known here before

we resorted to the sword, we should have remained at peace. I make

this declaration on (what I deem) the most unquestionable authority.

The proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the

United States, through our Minister in London, proposed to the British

Government to relinquish the embargo as to her, on condition the

Orders in Council were revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into the

arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made the same condition the sole

foundation for restoring amicable intercourse between the two nations.

In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between our Government and that of

Great Britain were confined almost exclusively to that subject. And in

1812, preceding the declaration of war, the Secretary of State informed

the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council were revoked, the

non-importation act would cease immediately. During the whole of this

period, our complaints were directed to the Orders in Council, and our

measures, (I speak of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected

Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye to their repeal. Until

the war was declared, I did not suppose that it would be waged for any

other object.

The Orders in Council, though a violation of our maritime rights in

point of principle, were practically of very little injury to our

commerce at the commencement of the war in which we are now engaged.

The reasons are obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland, Italy,

&c., never was of great importance. And the effect of the French

"municipal regulations" had caused it to dwindle into insignificance.

The exclusions, restrictions, impositions, and confiscations, so

permanent in the commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon, had

inspired our merchants with a due portion of caution, how they ventured

their property into the power of a Government actuated by no liberal

principle, and bound by no faith. From this state of things, it was not

difficult to conjecture that the period was not distant when Great

Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency of the Orders in

Council, so far as respected their retaliatory object on her enemy. How

could France be distressed by the British interdiction of her foreign

commerce, when France herself was hostile to that commerce--when she

adopted every measure to narrow, to shackle, and ultimately to exclude

it? We had even strong evidence that British statesmen began to waver

on the subject. The vote in the House of Commons, during the last

Winter, showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated most clearly

that before long the Orders in Council were doomed to perish. But, with

this information before our eyes, we hurried on to war without waiting

for the event, or even without waiting for preparation.

The Orders in Council have since been repealed. The manner has indeed

been objected to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. CLAY,) because the

right to secure them in certain events is reserved. But surely this

cannot be and has not been considered by our Government a serious

objection; for without such reservation the power to revive them

existed to every possible extent. The only question is, do they cease

to violate our neutral commerce? This is not doubted. The remaining

obstacle, therefore, to a good understanding between the two nations,

and the sole ostensible cause for persevering in the war, is the

subject of impressments.

This is, indeed, a difficult and unquestionably an interesting subject.

Not that I place entire confidence in the sympathetic descriptions

of the magnitude of the evil, which we have so often heard and daily

heard in this House. I am inclined to believe fancy has colored the

picture too highly. There is one reason, above all others, which leads

me to that conclusion. It is this: In that section of the United

States of which two-thirds of our seamen are natives, there is a

strong, overwhelming current of opinion against this war. Can it be

possible that the country where dwells the kindred of those who are

said to be incarcerated in great numbers in the "floating dungeons" of

Great Britain is not only indifferent about the fate of its children,

but opposes, as ruinous, the war waged for their protection? It is

certainly a curious spectacle to see the defenders of seamen's rights

come from those portions of the Union that have little commerce, and

few, if any, seamen. I do not mean to insinuate that those gentlemen

do wrong in espousing the cause of the oppressed, to whatever quarter

they may belong; but I state the fact to show that their sympathies

may possibly have magnified the evil--and to infer from it, that the

opposition of those most immediately interested is to be ascribed,

not to their insensibility, but to their apprehensions that this war,

instead of securing seamen's rights, will banish their seamen into

foreign service.

The controversy between this country and Great Britain seems to

have been brought to a single point. She claims the service of her

seafaring subjects in time of danger. Our Government admits this

right. To give effect to the right thus claimed and admitted, she

insists that her officers may go on board our merchant ships on the

high seas, or in her ports--search for and take her subjects. This our

Government deny, and claim the immunity of the flag so far as persons

are concerned; because, under the pretext of taking British subjects,

American citizens are frequently taken. It does, indeed, not distinctly

appear in the late communication from our Executive to the British

Government, that they mean by the terms American citizens, whether

it includes naturalized persons as well as natives. With respect to

those of the first description, I confess I feel no great interest

for their immunity abroad or on the high seas; I am one of those who

think that we act sufficiently liberal when we offer them any asylum

from the oppression or poverty of their own country, receive them

into our bosom, and extend to them all the advantages belonging to

us; and so long as they remain within our territorial limits, they

shall, with my consent, have the full benefit of the protection which

our laws afford to all. But I cannot consent that the native blood

of this country shall be profusely wasted to protect aliens born,

wherever they may ramble. We all profess a deep solicitude for the

interest of seamen. To describe their distresses and to eulogize

their valor and patriotism, is one of the topics of the day. And yet

we are contending for principles which, if successful, will bring

a host of foreigners in competition with them to elbow them out of

employment. But it is said that Great Britain does the same--that by

the act passed during the reign of George II., foreign seamen are

naturalized who have been in the King's service for two years, and

that she has no right to object if we imitate her conduct. It is true

she has adopted such a regulation. But I have never heard of any

instance where she has contended that such a person is absolved from

his natural allegiance, if he comes within the power of his original

sovereign. I have understood that act to mean that such persons should

become entitled to certain rights--not absolved from any duties towards

others, should they leave the country. That they should have the right

to hold lands--be admitted under the regulations of the navigation

act as British seamen on board merchant ships, and participate in the

pension and hospital provisions. Should I be mistaken, however, I am

not inclined to relinquish my opinion, merely because the practice of

Great Britain is opposed to it.