So soon as this decision was declared--

Mr. FINDLAY rose.--It is my melancholy duty, said he, to announce to

this House that my venerable colleague and old friend and associate,

JOHN SMILIE, is no more. He departed this life at two o'clock this

afternoon.

A committee was then appointed to superintend the funeral of the

deceased, consisting of Messrs. FINDLAY, LYLE, BROWN, ROBERTS, DAVIS,

LACOCK, and HYNEMAN.

A resolution was unanimously adopted, requesting each member of the

House, in testimony of their respect to the memory of JOHN SMILIE, to

wear crape on the left arm for one month.

And, on motion of Mr. FITCH, the House then adjourned.

THURSDAY, December 31.

On motion of Mr. FINDLAY,

_Resolved, unanimously_, That the members of this House will attend the

funeral of the late JOHN SMILIE, this day, at two o'clock.

_Resolved_, That a message be sent to the Senate to notify them of the

death of John Smilie, late a member of this House, and that his funeral

will take place at two o'clock, this day.

And then the House adjourned.

SATURDAY, January 2, 1813.

_Additional Military Force._

The House resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee of

the Whole on the bill in addition to the act for raising an additional

military force.

The amendments made by the House having been agreed to, the question

was stated, Shall the bill be engrossed, and read a third time?

Mr. MOSELY said that, in stating concisely some of the reasons which

would induce him to vote against the present bill, he should not

attempt to enter into a consideration of the justice or expediency

of the war, nor the policy of continuing it. War is declared, and

it appears to be the determination of those who have the control of

our public concerns to prosecute it with the utmost vigor; yes, sir,

with a vigor that, within twelve months from the enlistment of the

twenty thousand men to be raised by this bill, we are told must bring

it to a successful termination. Really, Mr. Speaker, when I listened

to the confident assurance of the honorable Chairman of the Military

Committee, that with these twenty thousand men, in addition to the

troops already raised, and voted to be raised, we should in a single

campaign be able to conquer Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick,

and that the object of all these conquests was to procure an honorable

peace, I almost felt myself persuaded as a peace man to join the

honorable gentleman in his project of fighting for peace one year, with

such a certainty of obtaining it at the expiration of that period; but

unfortunately I could not but recollect the fate of similar assurances

made on former occasions. When we were about declaring war, I very

well remember that we were told with equal confidence by gentlemen

anxious to engage in it (and who would listen to no arguments, even

for delay, against the measure) that we had only to declare war, and

Canada would, in the course of a few months, at most, be ours; that the

militia alone, with the aid of a very few regulars, would be competent

to the conquest of the whole country, except the fortress of Quebec;

and that that must very soon fall of course. An honorable gentleman

from Vermont (Mr. FISK) informed us that the people of those Provinces

would almost conquer themselves; that they were at least pre-disposed

to be conquered--to use his own expression, that they were "panting" to

participate in our liberty.

Experience has now proved the fallacy of these predictions. Gentlemen

must now be convinced that Canada is not to be conquered quite so

easily as they had imagined--that it is not to be subdued with a

few thousand militia, regulars, or volunteers, though aided by

proclamations. I mention proclamations, because they seem to be

considered as an indispensable auxiliary on all great emergencies. What

can be done by proclamation, I will readily concede we are competent to

do. No nation, I believe, ever arrived at greater perfection in the art

of proclamation-making than we have done; and if history is faithful to

record them, we shall in this particular at least bear the palm from

all the world.

Sir, it can afford pleasure to no man, who feels as he ought for the

honor and interest of his country, to dwell unnecessarily upon the

disasters and disgrace which have everywhere attended our military

operations from the commencement of the war to the present time. I mean

upon land; for to our little Navy too much praise cannot be given. Our

gallant seamen have not only afforded to their countrymen examples of

valor worthy of imitation, but they have also taught us a lesson of

wisdom, by which I am happy to find we have manifested a disposition to

profit. But, sir, while gentlemen must feel mortified at the miserable

termination of all our boasted military exploits thus far, and might

wish to draw a veil over the disgraceful scenes which have taken place,

it cannot be done; it would be unwise to attempt it. We ought rather to

look at the causes which have produced our misfortunes, and pursue a

course in future which may not expose us to similar evils.

Mr. GOLD said the annals of this Government, the last six months,

commencing with the declaration of war, would be found the most

interesting, the most deplorable.

In that period, we have seen a war declared, precipitately and

prematurely; for, notwithstanding all the arguments urged on that

occasion, with so much zeal and eloquence, time has dissipated all;

the illusion has vanished; your army, so confidently expected, did

not, under the magic of that declaration, spring into existence; the

condition of your enlistments would not, I apprehend, at this hour,

justify the declaration of war. We have seen, sir, that war conducted

in a manner well to comport with the spirit in which it was declared;

disaster upon disaster in rapid succession have followed; the tone and

heart of the country broken; universal disgust at the past, and deep

concern and anxiety for the future, prevail everywhere.

And what, Mr. Speaker, is now proposed for the future--what is to

retrieve our affairs--on what are our hopes to rest? An army of

twelve-months' men! A broken reed! An army and term of service, which

well nigh lost the country in the Revolutionary war; an army which in

every step and stage of that war received the uniform and reiterated

censure and condemnation of Washington, and every intelligent officer

of that period; an army that stands recorded by every historian of

that war with deep reproach and reprobation. Such is the foundation of

our future hopes; shutting our eyes upon the lessons of experience, we

live but to repeat former errors and renew our sufferings. Shall we

never learn, that a soldier is not the creature of an hour; that he

must be seasoned to the hardships of war; that to remove your recruit

from his fireside, from his plentiful board, and all the comforts with

which he is surrounded, to the theatre of service, there to sleep on

the ground in tents, with two or three articles of subsistence only,

is to give him up a victim to disease, to consign him to the grave?

This precise result is presented to the mind by the melancholy review

of the last campaign; disease and death have walked abroad in our

armies on the frontier; they have been swept to the grave as by the

besom of destruction. It has not stopped with your army; the frontier

inhabitants, infected by the diseases of the camp, fly from the deadly

theatre as from a destroying angel! Shall we never learn the difference

between our situation, and that of nations who have a competent

military establishment, sufficient at all times for both offensive and

defensive operations?

The slender Military Establishment of the United States, whilst it

consults economy, and favors the genius of the Government, forbids

a hasty resort to war, especially extra-territorial and offensive

war; time for preparation, after the measure is resolved on, is

indispensable; and a disregard of our situation in this respect cannot

fail to induce defeat and disaster--to produce such a campaign as has

just now closed.

But, Mr. Speaker, wherefore change the term of enlistment, from five

years, or during the war, to one year? The sole avowed object of the

war by land was the conquest of the Canadas. Are you at this hour

nearer your object than on the day you declared war, or has that

object, with a steady and sure pace, constantly receded from you as you

have advanced in the war? Is Canada so far conquered that you can now

reduce the term of enlistment? It is impossible to shut our eyes on the

past; while all is disgust and despondency with our own citizens--sick

of the past, and concerned for the future; while every post brings

to the Cabinet fearful and alarming changes in the sentiments of the

people under this ill-fated war; your enemy, the Canadians, take

courage, their wavering sentiments have become resolved, and union

in defence of their firesides, the land that gives them bread, is

spreading and cementing all in the patriotic vow.

There was a time, sir, when you had friends in the Upper Province;

there were many who wished well to your arms, and would have greeted

your approach, but that ill-fated policy which precipitated every

thing, which in zeal for the end overlooked the means, has blasted

all our hopes from that quarter. The Canadian, while he knows your

power, distrusts your wisdom and your capacity to conduct the war;

he dares not commit himself, his all, to such auspices. Hence, sir,

difficulties thicken on every side, and at least three times the force

is now necessary to effect the conquest, which would have been required

at the commencement of the war. Have we made an impression on the

Prince Regent and his Ministry? are they now more disposed to succumb

and accept your terms than before the war? How stand the people of

the British Empire? Instead of their coercing the Government into our

terms, which we fondly anticipated, the late election to Parliament

shows them disposed to go hand in hand with the Government in resisting

our claims and inflicting on us all the evils of war. "Maritime Rights"

are echoed and re-echoed with applause throughout the Empire. Such,

sir, are the bitter fruits of your policy, and to what farther point

the same hand shall conduct the destinies of the country, remains to be

seen.

I seek not to aggravate the misconduct of the war, nor to commend our

enemies, but only wish, sir, that we may see things as they are, our

actual situation, and thus look danger in the face. Do you persevere

in the conquest of Canada? Pass not the barrier with an army of less

than forty-five or fifty thousand men: if you do, in my apprehension,

the defeats and disasters of the past campaign will be visited upon

you; another army will be made to pass under the yoke, and at the

end of the year, you will find yourself still further removed from

your object. The tug of war is now placed fairly before us, we cannot

advance without meeting it. Such, Mr. Speaker, are the grounds on

which I object to this twelve-months' army; it is not adapted to the

professed object of the war, the conquest of Canada. Is there, sir,

any other object in contemplation of the Government; any other land of

leeks and onions, which Heaven has given us, or to which our destinies

lead? Is the South of easier access than the North, and is the circle

of hostility to be extended to that quarter? We profess a pacific

policy; moderation and justice are our boast; let us beware how we

commit to the hazard this high and enviable character; how we yield, on

specious grounds, to the mad and destructive policy which we reprobate

in others; a policy which has in all periods overwhelmed nations with

calamity, and swelled the tide of human misery.

I fear there are points in our neutral course, in our relative conduct

towards Great Britain and France which will not bear examination. You

proclaimed the Berlin and Milan decrees revoked, and put upon Great

Britain the threatened alternative of non-intercourse. Was the fact

so? You took a promise for the fact; you proclaimed the fact, while

France herself, the author of the deed and party to be benefited,

denies and disowns it as done at the time. Here was a fatal error, a

departure from the straight line of justice; and when our error in this

was palpable to all the world, we gave no explanation, no excuse, but

persevered in a measure which led to war. It is this course, sir, this

departure from even-handed neutrality between Great Britain and France,

that has lost you the support of your own citizens to a great and

alarming extent, and at this moment sustains the British Ministry in

the hearts of Englishmen. It is this belief of our Government's leaning

to France, that has carried that Ministry so triumphantly through the

late elections to Parliament.

If any thing could add to the gloom and sicken the mind under the

prospect before us, it is the inauspicious conjunction of events.

America and France both making war at the same time on Great Britain;

we making the enemy of France our enemy, and this at the ill-fated

moment when the all-grasping Emperor of that country is rolling a

baleful cloud, charged with destruction, north upon the Russian Empire;

upon a power always just to America; upon our truest and best friend in

the European theatre. Against such a friend, at such a period, we have

beheld the march of the Corsican through rivers of blood; his footsteps

are traced over the ashes of the proudest cities, and he sits himself

down, at length, at Moscow, like Marius over the ruins of Carthage.

The question was then taken on Mr. CLAY'S motion, and negatived.

Mr. MACON moved to strike out one, and insert five years as the

term of enlistment. He regretted as much as any one the disasters

which had befallen the country; and there was but one way to obviate

their effects, and that was by rising superior to them, as a part

of the nation had already done--he meant the Western country, where

a patriotism had been exhibited equal to that which might have

distinguished Rome in its best days. Their zeal was equal to their

bravery--and the only drawback on their enterprise was the difficulty

of finding something to eat in the wilderness. We must rise after

reverses. What, sir, said Mr. M., would have become of Rome, had she

desponded when Hannibal defeated her armies? She rose upon it and

became the mistress of the world. What would have been the situation

of our cause in the Revolution, if, after the British successes in

Jersey, we had desponded? But the men of Pennsylvania and New Jersey

rose on it, and victory and triumph followed. Our object now ought

to be to recover the ground we have lost, and meet the enemy with

troops that will insure success. We are told, sir, this war has united

England to a man. Sir, I never expected aid from our enemies. Let us

follow so good an example, and unite to a man; let us remember the old

Continental maxim--"United we stand, divided we fall." If we were as

united in defence of our rights, as England is in her usurpations,

this war would not last a single campaign--and I hope in this respect

we shall, at least, learn wisdom from an enemy. The calculations about

one or two campaigns, however, in present circumstances, are visionary.

We have engaged an enemy not in the habit of yielding very soon. But,

if we were to unite, the question would soon be settled. The cause

and object of this war has been more concisely stated by one of those

actively engaged in it, than by any other person--I mean Captain

Porter's motto--"Free trade and sailors' rights;" no man could have

given a better definition of it. It appears to me that one part of this

continent ought to be zealous for the rights of seamen--another part

for a free export trade; and, if we were, as we ought to be, united,

the war would be carried on with energy and with success. I agree with

the gentleman from New Jersey, that this thing is not to be done by

paper men. My opinion is, that the best thing we can do, is to raise

men for five years. Let the Legislature of the country do its duty. If

the thirty-five thousand men, now authorized, be not enough, let us

get as many as will be adequate to the end we propose. Gentlemen have

thought proper to review former transactions. I would be willing to

pass them over. I believe almost every measure adopted by the General

Government would have had its destined effect if adhered to. You have

always got the better of the argument; you have better proclamations;

but what avails all this? Britain has impressed your seamen, and given

you blows for good words. You have been heretofore told your paper

measures were worth nothing: now that it is proposed to give blow for

blow, what is said? That you are departing from the pacific system,

which the same persons before reprobated, and to which they have become

friendly only after every attempt at pacification has failed. Sir, we

are now engaged in war, and we must succeed or we must yield the rights

of sailors and free trade. Does any man doubt that the war is justly

undertaken? Is there a man in the nation--I care not of what political

sect, many as there are--who believes that the war is not undertaken

on just grounds--that we had not borne with their indignities till we

could have borne them no longer? After plundering your property and

impressing your seamen on the ocean, their agents have been sent into

this nation to sow divisions among us, who ought to be but one family.

What crime has been left undone? what injury have we not suffered?

Could one be added to the catalogue? It seems to me not. No man loves

peace more than I do, and if it had not been for Great Britain sending

her agents to our firesides, I do not know but I should have voted

against the war. It seemed to me like an attempt on a man's daughter.

Not content with vexing and harassing you whenever you went from home,

they came here to put strife into your family. You have been told that

the Prince Regent and his Ministers are firm. Sir, we never calculated

on their receding, but on the energies and force of the nation to

obtain redress, and if we had been united, we should have equalled

our most sanguine expectations. Let us follow their example, and

determine to maintain our national rights, as they do to maintain their

usurpations on them.

Mr. M. CLAY seconded the motion of Mr. MACON to strike out "one year"

and insert "five," as the term of enlistment. He said an army ought to

be seasoned before it was carried into the field. We have heard much

said, observed he, about sickness in your army; much of the sickness,

some time ago, at New Orleans, and much lately of the sickness at

Plattsburg. Have you ever heard of an army on earth that was carried

into the field before it had been seasoned in the camp? It must, to be

good for any thing, be first disciplined in camp, and become inured to

the mode of living and the fare of soldiers. It will take some time to

season men to the change in their mode of living which must take place

on going into camp. It will take a year to prepare them for the field.

Without discipline they will be useless. Your seamen are brave and

successful because they know what they go to sea for. Take a landsman

on board a ship, and what sort of a sailor will he make? Such as the

French have on board their vessels. We take no man into the Navy but

who understands his business and the purpose for which he goes there,

and we see the effects of it. I do not wish it understood, sir, if I

vote against the bill, that I am opposed to the war. No, sir. It is a

righteous war, into which I go with hand and heart. We may differ about

the mode, but that is all. I speak from experience more than from any

thing else. Let us raise a sufficient army to serve during the war, be

it long or short. It is absurd to suppose that we shall not succeed in

our enterprise against the enemy's provinces. We have the Canadas as

much under our command as she has the ocean; and the way to conquer

her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping

at Quebec or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from

them, and ask them no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at

Halifax as now, and having no place of resort in the North, cannot

infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer

them on the land as their whole navy could conquer ours on the ocean.

As to coping with them at sea, we cannot do it. We can annoy them,

but not meet them on the open sea. I would meet them and hurt them,

however, where we can. We must take the continent from them. I wish

never to see a peace till we do. God has given us the power and the

means; we are to blame if we do not use them. If we get the continent,

she must allow us the freedom of the sea. I hope, sir, the amendment of

my friend from North Carolina, going to make this army more efficient,

may be adopted.

Mr. PLEASANTS said, before the question was taken, he wished to

submit a few of the reasons why he was opposed to the amendment. The

question before the House, if he correctly understood it, was not,

what were the best materials of which to make an army; whether men for

the war, for five years, or for twelve months; but the question was,

what is the kind of force, and for what length of time can you raise

an army to take the field at the earliest period? I hesitate not a

moment, Mr. P. said, to declare, that if it were within the compass

of our ability to raise an army for five years by voting it, I would

authorize it. Not a moment should I doubt on the subject. The history

of the world is strongly in favor of such an army. But we perfectly

know, from the progress of the recruiting service, that we have already

authorized as many men of that description as we shall probably be able

to raise. This force is wanted to render the next campaign efficient.

I consider the bill merely as a substitute for the volunteer system

heretofore pursued. Of what materials will this army be composed?

Of young men ready to volunteer their services for one year in the

form of regulars; and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, men will

enlist in this corps who would not enlist for five years, or for the

war. I am sanguine in the opinion, that this measure, if now adopted,

will do away the defects of the present volunteer system, and I am

fully of opinion, that under it, a force may be drawn into the field

ready to act efficiently in the next campaign. I am not one of those,

sir, notwithstanding the accounts we have heard of our disasters, who

despair of the Republic. If we turn to history we shall find that we

have never engaged in any war in which we have come out better in the

first campaign than we have in this. Look at the war undertaken under

the auspices of Gen. Washington against the Indians. What was the

history of it? We all recollect the campaign under Harmar, and its

bloody scenes. The campaign under St. Clair cannot be forgotten. We

then suffered defeat upon defeat, disaster upon disaster, in the course

of the war, which was not terminated till the treaty of Greenville, in

1795, though it may be said to have virtually terminated by the defeat

of the Indians by General Wayne, which occurred previous to the treaty.

If this country be willing to go into the contest heart and hand, we

shall in a very short time demonstrate to the enemy all we want to

convince her of, that it is in reality her interest to be at peace

with this country. I hope, sir, the motion to amend the bill will not

prevail. I am perfectly convinced that the bill as it is will enable us

to call a valuable force into service, and I am sanguine in the hope,

that, with its aid, together with the other force we shall have, we may

clear the continent of the enemy's dominion in one campaign, though I

do not undertake to predict that we shall.

The question was then taken on Mr. MACON'S proposed amendment, and

lost.

The question recurred on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. PEARSON said, not unfrequently it happens, Mr. Speaker, both in

private and political life, that men of the clearest perceptions and

most correct motives, experience much difficulty and embarrassment

in determining on the course best to be pursued, or the application

of means best calculated to produce a given object. The object most

devoutly wished for by myself, and, no doubt, equally desired by every

honest and honorable man in this community, is, that my country should

once more be restored to the enjoyment of peace. Under the pressure of

existing circumstances, involved in a war with a powerful nation--a

war now prosecuted for a doubtful, or, at least, strongly controverted

question of national right--a war, the prosecution of which, so far

as relates to our military operations, has everywhere, and on all

occasions, been attended with disgrace, defeat, or disaster; under

such circumstances, I confess, sir, I am not free from embarrassment

in determining on the course demanded by genuine patriotism, or best

calculated to restore the blessings of peace to the country. I rejoiced

to hear the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee (Mr. D. R.

WILLIAMS) declare, the other day, that his object was also peace. It

must be a source of gratification to the country to learn that some of

the strongest advocates for the declaration of war begin now to think

and talk of peace.

The honorable gentleman, however, urges the passage of the bill

under consideration, (which authorizes the enlistment of twenty

thousand additional regular troops for one year; and provides for the

appointment of proportionally an unusual number of officers, with

all the accompanying paraphernalia of an army,) as the means best

calculated to produce the end in view. Did I believe, sir, that the

passage of this bill, or (what is more difficult and less likely to

happen) the actual enlistment of the proposed additional force would

secure to us our object, I would not only consent to give this force,

but ten times the number, if it were by force alone to be obtained; but

when I reflect on the special and sole cause for which it is avowed

the war is now prosecuted; when I consider the relative strength,

situation, and disposable force, by sea and land, of the two nations,

and especially when my recollection is assailed (for we cannot, nor

ought we to close our senses against such damning facts) with the

heretofore scanty enlistments; the confusion and insubordination which

has pervaded many parts of your army; the extraordinary expense already

incurred, and the uniform disasters which have marked all your military

operations, I cannot bring my mind to the belief that the force now

proposed can produce any desirable effect.

Mr. Speaker: As much as I was opposed to the declaration of war, and as

much as subsequent events have convinced me of the correctness of the

vote I gave on that momentous question, it is not my purpose on this

occasion to question the policy of that unfortunate act. My mind is

bent on peace; to that object my efforts are directed. The impression

is strongly fixed on my understanding, that this war can be terminated

with honor and advantage to this nation, without the further effusion

of human blood. If so, surely no Christian will deny but justice,

humanity, and sound policy demand that nothing should remain undone,

on our part, to stop this career of carnage and bloodshed. I have

said, sir, that it is my impression that this war can be terminated

with honor and advantage to this nation, without a further appeal

to arms. In stating this opinion, I do not mean to be understood as

identifying the honor of the nation with the honor of those by whom the

war was declared; or, in other words, I do not admit that the national

honor rests solely in the hands of those who may happen to be in the

Administration, or who may happen to constitute a majority in Congress.

No, sir, this is an elective Government--the power and ultimate

responsibility rest with the people; they cannot be dishonored unless

they pertinaciously approve of unwise or wicked measures, and continue

to support the authors of such measures. It is, therefore, not with me

a primary consideration, in the suggestions I am about to make, how far

the honor or reputation, for political wisdom, of any individuals may

be affected by the adoption of the plan for peace which has occurred to

my mind. I do not know that any honorable gentleman will be affected

by it, should it be adopted. I hope he will not; to me it is perfectly

indifferent who are in power, so that the affairs of the nation are

well conducted.

Mr. Speaker: Whatever may have been the original causes for the

declaration of this war, we are now taught to believe that the question

in contest is reduced to a single point. The British Orders in Council

were repealed on the 21st of June, three days after our declaration of

war; and, of course, without a knowledge of that event, the blockade of

May, 1806, had long ceased to exist. The sole avowed cause, therefore,

remaining, and for which the war is now carried on, is the practice

of impressment from on board our merchant vessels. This subject has

for many years engaged the attention of both nations; it has been a

fruitful theme of execration and declamation for almost every editor

and orator of the age. Great as our cause of complaint may have been,

(and I am not disposed to palliate it,) it must be admitted by all who

understand the nature and true bearing of the question, that it had

been subjected to much exaggeration. Permit me, sir, to remark, that

notwithstanding the importance, the difficulty, and delicacy which

have been justly attributed to this subject, and the unwillingness at

all times manifested on the part of the British Government to abandon

or derogate from the _abstract_ right of impressing her own seamen

from on board neutral merchant vessels, it is very far from being

certain that she has not been willing to enter into such arrangement

with this Government, as would place the question of impressment on

a basis both safe and honorable to this nation. By a reference to

the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with the British

Commissioners, which preceded the treaty concluded by those gentlemen

in the year 1806, but which was unfortunately rejected by the then

President, it is evident that the interest of impressment was, in the

opinion of those gentlemen, placed on a footing well calculated to

secure our own seamen from the abuse against which we had complained,

and against which it was our duty to protect them. This opinion was

not only expressed in forcible and decisive language at the time of

entering into the arrangement, but repeated by Mr. Monroe more than a

year after, in a formal letter to the Secretary of State. The language

of that gentleman, now your Secretary of State, is peculiarly emphatic,

and must be within the recollection of every gentleman in this House.

Without troubling the House with the reading of the documents referred

to, it is sufficient for me to state, that your present Secretary of

State did, in a letter addressed to Mr. Madison, dated February 28,

1808, declare "that he always believed, and did still believe, that the

ground on which the interest of impressment was placed by the paper

of the British Commissioners of the 8th of November, 1806, and the

explanations which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous

to the United States."

Thus, sir, as we have conclusive evidence of a disposition on the

part of the British Government, at one period at least, to advance

considerable length towards an adjustment of this long-contested

question; and as we have no evidence that different principles and

claims are now asserted from those then advanced; I think it fair

to conclude, that it is still in our power to put an end to this

controversy with safety to our seamen, and advantage to the nation.

Instead, then, of passing this bill, and spending the blood and

treasure of our countrymen in the prosecution of this war, I conceive

it our duty to make an effort for the sanction of our just rights, and

the restoration of peace, without a further appeal to force. It is my

decided opinion that such an effort, if fairly and liberally made by

this House, and the Executive branch of the Government, would not fail

in producing the desired effect.

The peculiar nature of the question, which now constitutes the sole

object for continuing the war; the intimation given by the Executive in

the correspondence with the British Government, since the declaration

of war, together with the opinions stated by Mr. Monroe and Mr.

Pinkney, in their letter to the Secretary of State of January 3, 1807,

all tend to confirm me in the belief, that it is the duty of Congress

to pass a law which would not only check desertions from the British

service, by excluding persons of that description from employ in our

service, but also deprive the British Government of the apology alleged

for impressing American seamen, by excluding British subjects from the

commercial and public service of the United States. Having alluded to

the letter of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney of the 3d of January, 1807, I

will take the liberty of reading from it a short extract. After stating

the opinion they had formerly expressed, that although the British

Government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish formally, by

treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen,

its practice would nevertheless be essentially, if not completely,

abandoned, they observe: "That opinion has since been confirmed by

frequent conferences on the subject with the British Commissioners,

who have repeatedly assured us that, in their judgment, we were made

as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which

their Government had adopted, in regard to that very delicate and

important question, as we could have been made by treaty. It is proper

to observe, however, that the good effect of this disposition, and its

continuance, may depend, in a great measure, on the means which may be

taken hereafter by the Congress to check desertions from the British

service. If the treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding

is produced by it between the two countries, it will be easy for their

Governments, by friendly communications, to state to each other what

they respectively desire, and in that mode to arrange the business as

satisfactorily as it could be done by treaty."

Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified and a good

understanding been produced between the two countries, Congress were

warned, even in that event, that it was their duty to lend their aid

in rendering effectual and perpetual any arrangement which might be

made on this subject of impressment. As to the late communications

from the Executive department, made to the British Government, since

the declaration of war, it is not my intention at this time to enter

into a particular examination of their merit or demerit. I will barely

remark, that to me they present a novelty in the history of war and

diplomacy. Propositions, alleged to be of a pacific nature, made in six

days after the declaration of war! Such a procedure (much as I desire

peace and much as I was opposed to the war) is to my mind, to say the

least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy incomprehensible. It

is the more so from the circumstance of a British Minister being on

the spot at the moment of declaring the war and keeping up a continued

correspondence with the Secretary of State to the last moment of the

existence of peace. Under such circumstances I should conceive each

nation ought to have known the _ultimatum_ of the other and not waited

for the form of a declaration of war, to resume the negotiation

and give a new shape to their proposition. I confess that I am not

surprised at the result of this war negotiation--every thing was

demanded to be yielded by our enemy, for which the war was declared,

even as a preliminary in the first instance to an armistice, and in the

second instance as preliminary to a negotiation. The equivalent offered

on our part was of a nature which it was not within the province of

the Executive to confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress

might or might not do on the subject. In addition to this, our agent

in London, through whom those propositions were made, did not possess

regular and competent powers, and was considered by the British

Government as incompetent to act with them on such a subject on equal

terms of obligation and responsibility. Whatever, therefore, may be

my opinion in relation to those late propositions, and however illy

calculated they may have been to produce any desirable result, I am far

from considering them unworthy the particular attention of this House.

I allude particularly to the equivalent proposed as an inducement for

the discontinuance of the practice of impressment. Here, for the first

time in the whole history of the long-protracted discussion on this

subject, it is intimated that something effectual will be done on our

part to prevent the cause of the abuse of which we complain--a promise

is given, in the event of obtaining the concessions demanded, that a

law would be passed by Congress to prohibit the employment of British

seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States. This,

then, is what I ask you now to do--pass a law effectually to exclude

all British subjects from the public and private maritime service of

the United States; let the law be well guarded against the possibility

of violation or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to enforce

it; place this law in the hands of your Executive; let him immediately

appoint one or more honest, able, independent commissioners; men who

neither have nor expect an office; men in whom the nation, without

regard to party, would be willing to confide; give them ample powers to

form a treaty or arrange the sole question which is now the pivot on

which this war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and I venture

to predict you will obtain a peace, and secure your just rights more

speedily, more effectually, and more satisfactorily to the people of

this country, than by all the military operations in the compass of

your power.

MONDAY, January 4.

EDWARD HEMPSTEAD, returned to serve as the Delegate in this House from

the Territory of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials, was

qualified, and took his seat.

_Additional Military Force._

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for raising for one

year an additional military force of twenty thousand men.

The question was stated on the engrossment of the bill for a third

reading.

Mr. BRIGHAM.--Mr. Speaker, the bill under consideration, if passed into

a law, will deeply affect my constituents and the public in general.

It provides for prosecuting this war on a more extensive scale--it

is a kind of second declaration of war. The objects of conquest are

multiplied; the field of operation is enlarged; the Army must be

increased with the addition of 20,000 regular troops; and enlistments

encouraged by additional bounty and wages. Sir, this is the system of

arrangement to prosecute the scheme of foreign invasion. One error

frequently prepares the way for another; we are now unhappily involved

in the calamities of war, and the question is, how we shall prosecute

and support it.

Mr. B. said he had been uniformly, and in principle, opposed to this

war, and of course opposed to all the measures connected with it;

that, in his opinion, this war was both politically and morally wrong;

that it was declared without suitable preparation, without necessity,

without an army, without adequate resources, and without unanimity;

it has been prosecuted without success; we have also gained nothing

but loss, defeat, and disgrace; the people are alarmed at the loss of

their peace, distressed with the fruits of the war, and have serious

apprehensions of what may be the future measures of Congress on this

subject.

Sir, continued Mr. B., this war is of an offensive character; it is a

war of conquest, totally inconsistent with the spirit and genius of

our constitution, and, if prosecuted in the present divided state of

the country, I fear it may be fatal to our most valuable institutions.

Republics, sir, ought never to be engaged in a foreign, offensive war;

they are calculated only for defensive war.

Sir, there is something unaccountable, that the disposition to

prosecute this war should increase, as the causes of the war decrease,

and the means and ability to carry it on lessen. The war which we

now have on hand is predicated principally on the Orders in Council.

The impressment of seamen, during the last session of Congress, was

considered of minor importance and as a proper subject of negotiation

between the two nations, and was so considered in the days of General

Washington, in those of Mr. Jefferson, and why not now by Mr. Madison?

Sir, the Orders in Council which interfered with our neutral rights

are revoked. The President, in his Message at the commencement of this

session, declared the fact, and the war now rests solely on the subject

of impressment. I do not believe that the prosecuting of this war will

have a tendency to bring about an amicable and satisfactory adjustment

on this subject, and at the end of the war, if it ever ceases, this

question of impressment must be settled by treaty.

Sir, at this time, and under these circumstances, we are called on to

augment our standing army to the number of 55,000 regular troops, to

prosecute the war with vigor, and, as some say, for glory.

Sir, if this system of warfare is carried into effect, we shall

unavoidably create an annual expense of forty millions of dollars; and

where is your money to defray this expense? Why, you must take it from

the pockets of our constituents, and from those who are opposed to this

war; and if you fail of obtaining the necessary loans, you must stop

payment; the nation will become bankrupt, and future generations will

be loaded with an enormous debt.

Sir, can this be for the honor and interest of the American people; can

it be for the satisfaction of our constituents; are they in love with

this war? Are they prepared to barter away their property and their

peace for the hazards and fatigue of a foreign war, which promises

nothing but poverty and distress? It is impossible. Sir, it is said

that we are now about to make one sublime military effort, which shall

do honor to this nation; that with these troops we are to take, not

only the Canadas, but Halifax and Nova Scotia, and, for aught I know,

East Florida, follow up the Tippecanoe expedition, and exterminate the

Indians. Mr. B. said that he never had known the incipient cause nor by

what authority General Harrison made his incursion into the wilderness,

beyond where the United States had extinguished the Indian titles, and

destroyed the Prophet's town, but said that he hoped the time would

come when he should know the merits of that enterprise.

Mr. B. said if the friends of this bill and of the war could accomplish

their darling object, subdue and take possession of the Canadas, and

all the other British provinces in North America, in his opinion it

would be a great public misfortune--fatal to the civil liberties of the

country, and change the character of our Government.

Sir, said Mr. B., with these impressions I deprecate the taking of the

Canadas, or the other British provinces, as I do the loss of liberty

and the ruin of this country. This war cannot be perpetuated and

prosecuted without violating the laws of humanity and justice, the laws

of religion and morality--and these laws are to be respected as well by

nations as by individuals; and we have not only reason to believe, but

do believe, that the God of Armies, who superintends the concerns of

men, will give success to our arms, or blast our enterprise, according

to its moral character. If the Canadas are subdued and conquered, it

must be done by force of arms; and what have the inhabitants of those

provinces been guilty of, which warrant this Government in putting them

to the sword?

Sir, they are now inoffensive, and quietly pursuing their own business;

they are content under their own Administration; they are protected by

their own Government, and are not panting for the liberties of this

country, as was vainly supposed the last season, nor do they ask us to

relieve them from the oppression of their own Government, which General

Hull, in his tender mercy, promised them in his pompous proclamation,

on the condition that they would revolt from their rightful Sovereign,

and put themselves under _his_ gracious protection; nor were they

terrified by the threat of extermination, if found fighting in their

own defence by the side of an Indian; nor were they to be seduced from

their allegiance by promises which could not be performed. No, sir,

nor do they ask any favor but that you cease from troubling. Sir, they

will not submit, and they have told you, by their actual resistance,

that they will defend themselves, their councils, their firesides,

their wives, and their children, their rights and their property; and

they are not to be subdued but at the price of blood. And where is your

authority, where is your right to go home, invade, and break into a

foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter-house for the brave

sons of America; there spill your blood, and expend your treasure,

destroy cities, and demolish houses, plunder the inhabitants, and waste

the substance of the industrious and the innocent? Sir, there is no

right but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and not that which

reason approves.

Mr. B. said that the war was becoming more and more unpopular in

the Eastern States, especially in the State which he had the honor

to represent; and they had, in their late elections, come forth and

declared it in a voice and language which cannot be misunderstood. And

whether there will be a majority in the next Congress in favor of this

war was uncertain--he hoped not.

Mr. RIDGELY said he claimed the patience of the House while he assigned

the reasons that would influence him to vote against the bill now

under consideration. He considered the force contemplated to be raised

by the bill as unnecessary. The present Military Establishment of

the United States consisted of various descriptions of troops; they

were the regular army, the rangers, the volunteers, and the militia.

The regular army was made up of the Peace Establishment, authorized

by the acts of the 16th of March, 1802, and the 12th of April, 1808,

containing about 10,000 men, including officers, and of the "additional

military force," which was directed to be raised by the act of the 11th

January, 1812; these different establishments were incorporated by

an act passed on the 26th of June last; and the present regular army

of the United States, as authorized by law, consisted of twenty-five

regiments of infantry, three regiments of artillery, two of light

dragoons, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery, containing in

all about thirty-six thousand men, including company officers and

privates; of these the President might have not exceeding fifteen

thousand enlisted for eighteen months, and the residue enlisted for

five years, unless sooner discharged. Of the rangers, there were

seven companies by the acts of 27th January, and 1st July, 1812, and

about four or five hundred men. By the act of the 6th February last,

the President was authorized to accept of any company or companies of

volunteers, either of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who might offer

their services to the number of fifty thousand men; their commissioned

officers were to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the

several States and Territories to which they might respectively belong,

and they could only, according to the fair construction of this act, be

considered as militia, liable to be called on to do military duty at

any time within two years after they were accepted by the President,

and bound to continue in service one year after arriving at the place

of rendezvous. By the law of the 6th of July last, the President was

empowered to appoint and commission the officers of the volunteers who

had or should offer their services, and to form them into battalions,

squadrons, &c., and they were thus converted from militia into a

species of regular force. By the act of the 10th of April last, the

President was authorized to call on the several States and Territories

for their respective proportions of a detachment of one hundred

thousand militia; and the call has been made, I believe, on every State

and Territory. The present military force, then, of the United States,

as authorized by existing laws, consists of upward of one hundred and

eighty-six thousand men, all of whom, when in service, are subject to

the rules and articles of war. Of these, the militia can only be used

in the prosecution of this war for defensive purposes; the regulars and

the volunteers may be ordered to act offensively against the enemy.

They may amount, as we have seen, to eighty-six thousand men; and if

Canada be as weak and badly defended as gentlemen seem to suppose, and

the Administration should persist in their determination to conquer

it, they should, I think, be satisfied with such a force to obtain

an object so easily attainable. But, sir, said Mr. R., our present

Military Establishment is certainly sufficient for all purposes of

defence; and I wish to see no land forces raised for any other purpose.

I have no hesitation in declaring that I should lament to see Canada or

any of the British provinces on this continent in our possession, or

forming a part of the American Republic. They will never be worth, to

this nation, in any point of view, the blood and treasure that their

acquisition will cost us. It has been said by the honorable chairman of

the Committee on Military Affairs, that there are now in Canada twelve

thousand regular troops, and that the militia amount to six thousand.

To any thing that gentleman should say, as matter of fact within his

own knowledge, I should give the most implicit credit. But his estimate

of the militia of Canada must be too low. His sources of information

on this point must have been incorrect. The population of Canada (and

when I speak of Canada, I mean both Upper and Lower Canada) has been

variously stated, from three to five hundred thousand souls; according

to no account, I believe, can it be less than three hundred thousand;

and, I presume, no gentleman on this floor will say that estimate is

too high. Take, then, the population of Canada to be 300,000 souls;

what number of militia should this population furnish? We will take

the State of New Jersey as a guide for our calculation; according to

the census of 1810, the population of that State is 245,255, and its

militia, by the return for the same year, 33,740, and the militia bears

about the same proportion to the population in the States, generally,

as it does in this State. If, then, the militia of Jersey, with its

population, amounts to near thirty-four thousand, we may, I think,

without danger of contradiction, estimate the militia of Canada (with a

larger population) at between thirty and forty thousand; to these add

the twelve thousand regular troops, and, in all probability, before we

can act offensively against them in the Spring, the number of these

troops will be greatly increased, and they may have an efficient force

of about fifty thousand men to oppose an invading army. It ought to

be recollected, also, that a generous people, contending in their own

defence, are actuated by far different and more worthy motives than an

army of soldiers can be who attempt their subjugation. The Canadians

will contend for their homes, their wives, their children; for every

thing that can or that ought to be dear to the human heart. They will

be excited in such a cause to the boldest deeds. Instead of traitors,

we shall find them true to their country and themselves, and able and

ready to exert all their energies in their own defence. If we conquer

them, it must be by great exertions, and with immense loss. To subdue a

people acting under the impulse of such considerations as will operate

on them, will require a force at least double to that which they can

oppose to us. But can any man imagine that, if we invade the British

colonies, the war will be there? Will the pride of Britain, powerful

as she is at sea, and ready at any moment to meet every emergency,

permit her tamely to look on and see her provinces wrested from her,

without exerting herself with all her energies for their security? Will

she make no diversions in their favor? Will she suffer us to carry the

war into her territories, and not retort upon us? Does an unprotected

seacoast of two thousand miles afford her no opportunities of attacking

us? Do our rich and flourishing cities, exposed without defence on

the seaboard, to the cannon of her ships of war, furnish her with

no objects worthy her attention? Will the city of New York, laid in

ashes, atone for the invasion of Canada; or, will the acquisition of

Canada compensate to us for the loss of New York? Sir, said Mr. R., ten

Canadas, ten times told, would not be worth to this nation that single

city.

But of what value would these provinces be to us, if they could be

easily acquired? Shall we, by their conquest, obtain the objects for

which this war is waged? Shall we thereby secure our commercial rights?

Not at all, sir. On the other hand, if the British Government would

offer them to us, it would be our true policy to refuse to accept

them. It is known to everybody that the population of several of the

Eastern States is now full, and that great numbers of their citizens

are constantly emigrating. The direction this emigration takes, it is

also well known, is South and West. This surplus of population of the

Eastern States settles on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, and

carries with it its Eastern habits, and, if you please, its Eastern

prejudices. They become connected and united with the people of the

South and West. This union and intercourse will tend to render as

the brothers of one family the citizens of this extended Empire. The

prejudices of the South against the North, and the North against the

South, are weakened daily and will be destroyed. The course this

emigration takes is just as it should be. The currents flow from the

extremities into the centre of the country. The operation is most

beneficial to the nation, and tends constantly to strengthen and

cement the union of the States. But if the British provinces should be

conquered and become incorporated into the Republic, the direction of

the emigration from the Northern and Eastern States will be at once

changed. It will take a North instead of a South course. It will go

just where it ought not to go. The strength of the nation, already too

much scattered, will be still more weakened by a further expansion

of its territory and population. The Northern and Eastern States,

at present possessing more than their proper proportion of wealth,

population, and strength, and having different habits, pursuits, and

interests, from the Middle and Southern States, will, by the addition

of these provinces, and the settlement of their surplus of population

in them, acquire a weight and influence that this Union cannot control.

It will exist only at their pleasure, and, in a few years, the

destruction of this Government and a separation of the States will be

the inevitable consequence.

Mr. PITKIN rose and said:--Before, Mr. Speaker, we give our sanction

to this bill; before we agree to add so large a force to our present

army, making the whole number fifty-five thousand men, is it not a

duty we owe to ourselves and to our constituents, seriously to inquire

into the policy, into the necessity of the measure, as well as into

the present state of our relations with that nation against which we

have declared war? Almost at the very instant when Congress declared

war against Great Britain, the Orders in Council, and the blockade of

May, 1806, the most prominent causes of the war, were removed. I have

always, sir, considered the Orders in Council as the greatest obstacle

to the restoration of harmony and free intercourse between the two

countries. Had this obstacle been removed before the declaration of

war, no one can believe that the Executive would have recommended,

or that a majority in either House of Congress would have adopted

a measure always fraught with evils in all governments, and which,

in a Government like ours, ought never to be resorted to but in the

last extremity. I cannot believe that the President, in that case,

would have recommended it, when, on the 26th of July, 1811, through

the Secretary of State, he informed the British Minister that, on the

revocation of the Orders in Council, the non-importation law would be

removed, and, of consequence, commercial intercourse would be restored

between the two nations. It would be strange, indeed, if the President

should, in one moment, restore a free intercourse between the two

countries, and, in the next, recommend to Congress a declaration of

war, solely on account of another topic remaining in dispute. And,

in case such recommendation had been made, if any confidence is to

be placed in the declared opinions of gentlemen, many who voted for

the war would not, under such circumstances, have given it their

support. Unfortunately for the country, the President did not embrace

the opportunity, presented by the repeal of the Orders in Council,

to remove the non-importation law, and thereby smooth the way for a

complete restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the United

States. Sir, this would have been done, and the remaining subject of

dispute been left in the same situation as before the declaration of

war, to be adjusted by amicable arrangements. But, sir, as this was

not done, it remains for us, it remains for the people of the United

States, to determine whether they will encounter all the evils, all the

calamities of war; whether they will sacrifice the fairest prospects,

and the best interests of this rising country, on the point now in

dispute with Great Britain.

In the few remarks I shall submit to you, sir, and to the House, it

is not my intention to go into the consideration of all the original

avowed causes of the war; but to confine myself to the new aspect of

affairs, presented to us since the declaration of war by the removal of

the Orders in Council and blockades.

On the subject of impressments, for which alone the war is now to be

continued, what, let me ask, is the principle for which our Government

contends? It is this, sir: that the flag of the merchant vessel shall

cover all who sail under it; or, in other words, that our flag shall

protect all the foreigners our merchants may think proper to employ

in their service, whether naturalized or not. Before we raise immense

armies, before we sacrifice any more of the lives of American citizens,

let us inquire--

1st. Whether the principle, if yielded to us to-morrow, would benefit

our native seamen, or would promote the real permanent interests of

their country.

2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining a recognition of this

principle by a continuance of the war.

The foreigners employed in our service are those who have not been

naturalized, and those who have taken the benefit of our naturalization

laws. The former constitute nearly the whole: the latter class is very

inconsiderable. The foreigners of the first description, of course,

were in competition with our native seamen, and either exclude them

from employment, or lessen the rate of their wages. In this way, then,

the employment of foreign seamen is an injury to our native seamen;

and, in a national point of view, it may well be questioned, whether

their employment subserves the permanent and solid interest of the

country.

Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as a commercial and

maritime nation, especially when it may be engaged in a war with a

great naval power, to be able to have a sufficient number of native

seamen employed in our service? Seamen, who shall be attached by every

tie to this country, and on whom we can depend for its defence in time

of danger?

This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied. If so, is it not the

dictate of wisdom and of sound policy for us to give encouragement to

our native seamen in preference to those of any foreign country?

The situation in which we now are proves the correctness, as well as

the importance, of the position. We are now at war with Great Britain.

And, at the very time when this war was declared, thousands of British

seamen who had not been naturalized in this country, were, and they

still continue in our employment. These seamen (I am speaking, sir,

of those not naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects, and,

indeed, by our own laws, are now considered as alien enemies. Will

gentlemen suffer me to turn their attention to this last fact?

By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is enacted, that "whenever

there shall be a declared war between the United States and any

foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives, citizens, denizens, or

subjects, of the hostile nation or Government, being males of the age

of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States,

_and not actually naturalized_, shall be liable to be apprehended,

restrained, secured, and removed, _as alien enemies_." Ought we, sir,

to depend upon these men to man our fleets, or to defend our ports and

harbors? So far as foreigners of this description are concerned, I do

not hesitate to say that it is not for the interest of this country

that our flag should protect them, and that I will never consent to

continue this war for the maintenance of this principle on their

account. It is well known, sir, that not only Great Britain, but that

France, and all the nations of Europe, claim a right to the services of

all their subjects in time of war. In the exercise of this right, the

history of Europe shows that, at the commencement of almost all wars,

proclamations have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling

their subjects to aid in the defence of their respective countries.

During the present war in Europe, this has been done by Great Britain,

by France, and the other belligerent powers. With respect to this claim

of allegiance, it is not my intention to enter into the discussion

whether, in the abstract, it is well or ill founded. This would lead

me too far, and would tend to no practical good. I will, however,

observe, that it is a right, a claim, which has been long exercised in

Europe, and has been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most able and

distinguished European writers on public law.

With respect to foreigners, who have been naturalized under our laws,

the question is of a more distinct nature, and presents greater

difficulties. We ought, undoubtedly, to fulfill all our obligations

towards them. What these obligations are, and how far they extend, are

questions about which a diversity of sentiment may prevail.--While they

remain within our territories, and within our exclusive jurisdiction,

they are shielded by the general principle, that all within our

dominion and exclusive jurisdiction, are, of course, protected against

all claims whatever, and never to be molested in any way without our

consent. But, sir, when they go without our territories, and beyond

our exclusive jurisdiction, and come within the sphere of the claim

of their former Government, the opinion of the best writers on public

law seems to be, that the obligation of the country, under whose laws

they have been naturalized, does not extend to guaranty them against

such claims, unless their allegiance was changed with the consent of

their former Government. But, sir, whatever speculative opinions may

be entertained on this subject, the number of naturalized seamen is

so small, that few, if any, can be of opinion that we ought to have

declared war, or that we ought to continue it on their account alone.

The whole number of seamen naturalized from 1796 to 1810, as appears by

the returns made to the Department of State, is 1,332. This includes

those of all nations. What proportion of these were British, or how

many of them are now in our service, it is impossible to determine. I

presume, however, the number of naturalized British seamen now in our

employ does not exceed two or three hundred. Shall we, sir, continue

the war for these men?

I am aware, sir, that with respect to impressment from our merchant

vessels, abuses have happened, that although the right of taking

American citizens is not claimed, the British commanders have not been

scrupulous whether they took British subjects or American citizens.

Sir, these abuses I never can, and I never will justify. I am

satisfied, however, that they have been exaggerated.

But, sir, let me ask, if we have not really intended to protect foreign

seamen under our flag, if we have not been guilty of gross negligence,

to say the least of it, towards our native seamen? whether, by our

laws, and the practice under them, we have afforded them all that

protection and security to which they are entitled?

In 1796, Congress passed an act for the relief and protection of

American seamen. By this act, the collectors of the several ports were

directed, on application, to enter the names of seamen, being citizens

of the United States, to grant them certificates, in a form given in

the act. In this certificate, the collector is to describe the person

of the applicant: also, to declare that, on proof produced to him

agreeable to the act, the seaman is a citizen of the United States of

America.

It is not a little singular that, although the proof of citizenship to

be produced to the collector must be agreeable to the directions of

the act, the act itself nowhere directs what that proof must be. Every

collector, therefore, has, under this act, used his own discretion, or

has pursued such directions as he may have received from the Government

as to the kind of proof. What, sir, has been the practice under this

law? Have those certificates, or protections, as they are commonly

called, been confined to _bona fide_ American citizens? No, sir; we

cannot, we ought not, to shut our eyes against facts too notorious

to be concealed or denied. Under this act, made expressly for the

protection of American seamen, every foreign seaman, almost, at the

moment of setting his feet on our shores, has obtained a certificate

from some collector, that he is a citizen of the United States; and,

with this certificate in his pocket, although perhaps a deserter

from his own Government, he enters a public or private vessel, as an

American seaman. The mode of obtaining proof of citizenship is well

understood. Among other modes, some of which are too disgraceful to

be mentioned in this place, those foreign seamen will go before a

magistrate, and, although hardly able to speak the English language

intelligibly, will swear, for each other, that they were born within

the United States, and are American citizens. On such proof, a proof of

this sort, the collector issues his certificate.

It will be recollected, sir, that this subject was brought before this

House during the last session, in a case from Philadelphia, when a

certificate of this kind was obtained by the most flagrant and avowed

act of perjury on the part of a foreigner who had just arrived in this

country. It was found, on inquiry, that there was no law, either of

Pennsylvania or of the United States, to punish the man for this act

of false swearing. Not only have these protections been thus obtained

by fraud and perjury, but they have also, long since, been an object

of barter; they have been bought and sold, and transferred from one to

another, not only in this country, but in foreign countries.

To show the extent of this traffic in seamen's protections, permit me

to state some facts, of which I have no doubt, knowing the source

from whence I have derived them. An American captain having a ship in

Bristol, in England, without a crew, he applied to a man who kept a

boarding-house for sailors, to procure a crew of American sailors in

port; he showed him a great number of American protections, which he

agreed to sell him for two guineas each, and with the aid of these to

procure him a crew. By high wages, and by suiting these protections to

the description of British sailors, he procured this captain his ship's

crew; not only so, but when the ship was about to sail, and it was

doubtful whether those who had engaged for the voyage would actually go

on board, this man actually procured some of a press gang to take them

as American sailors, who had deserted from their ships, and put them

on board. When we ourselves place no confidence in these certificates,

when we know that they are thus obtained by fraud and perjury, can we

expect that foreign nations will give credit to them? Instead of being

a shield and protection to the real American sailor, they have become a

dangerous weapon of offence.

If, sir, it is not for the permanent interest of the United States

to employ so many transient foreign seamen, we ought long since, not

only to have refused these false protections, but to have passed laws

for the encouragement of our native seamen, similar to those which

have been adopted in commercial countries, and are commonly called

navigation acts. This would, in some measure, have relieved us from the

evils which we now experience, in consequence of the employment of so

many foreign seamen.

TUESDAY, January 5.

_Additional Military Force._

The House resumed the order of the day on the bill for raising an

additional military force of 20,000 men for one year, the question

being on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. BOYD.--Mr. Speaker: It is with great diffidence that I address

the Chair. When the bill now before the House was under discussion on

Saturday last; that is, the then proposed amendment to insert eighteen

months, instead of one year, I was offering my reasons why I thought

that that amendment ought to prevail; when, unfortunately for me, I

was considered as taking too great a latitude, and prevented from

connecting my remarks. As there is little difference, in point of

principle, as the bill then was and now is, I embrace this opportunity

to make up that deficiency, and will now take care to stick as close as

possible to the text.

Sir, I am opposed to passing the bill to a third reading, because I

believe it to be altogether inadequate to the purpose intended to be

accomplished by it. Sir, when I last addressed the Chair, I then took a

retrospective view of our past expectations, plans, and propositions,

from which we expected to derive great advantages. Such were the

expectations of that time, that I did not accord with them. Those

expectations have not been realized; but, instead thereof, we have met

with disappointments and misfortunes. I thought that viewing the errors

of the past was the most certain way to avoid the future; and I am not

at this time sensible of that being erroneous.

Mr. Speaker, I am an old man, and not in the habit of public speaking;

and if I have not the faculty of composing my arguments in so connected

a form as a lawyer's special pleadings, I hope the House will excuse

me, and grant me their indulgence to do it in such form as my capacity

will admit of.

[The SPEAKER observed that it was unpleasant to the Chair that the

gentleman should indulge in such remarks; he had certainly no wish not

to give full latitude to debate. Mr. B. said he stood corrected, and

was allowed to proceed.]

Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my opinion, it is not

calculated to produce the desired effect, or that which is intended

by it: that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest of the

Canadas in the given time. I will ask how many regiments you have

in your present establishment? Say thirty-five, and you add twenty,

making together fifty-five: what use is there in multiplying regiments

without men? The Chairman did state that from prudential motives, he

had thought it inexpedient to give the number now actually in service,

or enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it is not my wish to go

into a strict inquiry; the regard I have for the honor of my country

forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand, and, I believe,

that is large; then there is left officers for eighteen thousand

men. Are these not sufficient for the recruiting service? to engage

every man who is willing to serve his country? to place a recruiting

officer in almost every town and village in the United States? They

are; and, therefore, you ought not to create an unnecessary addition.

If the present establishment is not full, what is the reason? Either

that the pay and bounty are not sufficient inducements, or there is a

dislike to the service; your creating more regiments will not remove

that difficulty. I am against the bill, because the term of service

is too short to answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them intended to

operate as a force against Canada. Let us see how that will answer the

purpose: You send out your warrants to commence the enlistment of the

proposed troops at this time; how long a time, is it contemplated,

will be necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is, that you will

not have them half full in four months; it is then time to take the

field, and they are then raw troops. The honorable Chairman (Mr. D. R.

WILLIAMS) states to you the number of troops necessary for defensive

operations, according to his calculation, to be ten thousand; deducting

that number from the present establishment, supposing it to be full.

It is not for me to say how far the present establishment is short

of the whole number, or will be at that time; but we know that it is

far short; we do not know that it can be filled, and if it cannot,

then those calculations are fictitious. He also states to you that

the regular force in the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than

twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax, besides their militia.

According to this, and my views, you cannot enter Canada the next

campaign with man for man; and surely that is not sufficient for

conquest in an enemy's country. But I will suppose that you conquer

a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned if you will keep

it. In a year from the time of enlistment their term expires, and what

becomes of your conquest, without force to keep it, supposing it to be

made? Say that the officers will be called into service in four months,

and there is some of the men enlisted six or eight months hence; the

officers must serve until the expiration of the term of the last man

engaged, or a derangement must take place--always a disagreeable

occurrence in an army.

Sir, if you have not numbers sufficient to bear down all opposition,

invade it not: act on the defensive until you have engaged your men,

and for a term of time sufficient to answer your purpose; then may

you count upon success and honor. I do not say that I believe land

conquests will produce an acknowledgment of our rights on the ocean. I

believe it will not; but unless you act with great regularity, system,

and economy, you cannot avoid it; you must meet with nothing but

disappointments and disgrace.

Mr. LAW said as he was originally opposed to the war, and the

preparatory steps which led to it, he could not admit the principle,

_that because war was declared_ he was bound to acquiesce, and lend

his aid to promote every plan for prosecuting the war which might be

proposed, however wild and extravagant the same might appear. He said

he felt it a duty, and he claimed it as a right, (although he was not

ambitious very often to exercise the right,) to offer objections to

any measures which might be introduced, if he supposed they were not

calculated to produce the effect intended, although he might not be

in favor of the object itself; or if he believed the measure proposed

would be productive of real evil. Now, sir, on this important occasion

it would be wise for a moment to look back, and if we can bear the pain

of retrospection, consider what this nation once was, what it might be,

and what it in fact is. Time was, and that within the recollection of

us all, when industry, commerce, prosperity, and peace, gladdened the

hearts of this once happy people, and the use of arms was known only

as a pacific pastime. The nation, like some individuals, could not

bear the intoxicating influence of prosperity. It might have preserved

its enviable condition, but it labored and groaned under the weight

of national blessings; it submitted to regard the sinister views and

malign influence of foreign powers; it listened--fatally listened--to

a serpent more fell than the serpent of old. And now how sad is the

reverse, let a dejected and impoverished nation answer; in the past,

we see departed comforts; before us, we behold ruin and distress.

The unhappy crisis to which we have arrived has been progressive.

Had the transition been sudden, the nation would have been driven to

desperation. We have been often admonished by those who foresaw the

present evils; and had we been wise, might have avoided the calamities

in which the country is now involved, and from which there is at

present no prospect of speedy relief.

Sir, we will no longer dwell on times past; we will now briefly notice

the causes which were alleged in the manifestoes which immediately

preceded the declaration of war, and what was said to be the object,

and attempt to show that the bill now under consideration is

unnecessary for the attainment of the original object; that it will be

injurious to the militia, and may endanger the liberties of the country.

As to the causes of the war, without admitting or denying their justice

on national principles to justify the act at the time it was declared,

he might say that some of the pretended causes have never been

seriously relied on by our own Government. The principal one has been

wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious catalogue now remains,

and that might easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both

nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten, that the act declaring

war was carried with great labor and much reluctance; and such was the

majority in each branch of Congress that it might well have justified

a doubt as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides, a large

proportion of the United States were then, and even since have been

opposed to the act. And this opposition was not confined to those who

have been slanderously reported to be in the interest of Great Britain.

The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some of the best patriots and

purest bosoms in the country. Experience has also proved that the

public sentiment was against the war; witness the feeble ranks of your

volunteers, the slow and reluctant march of the militia, and the tardy

progress in the recruiting service. Sir, the disgrace and disasters

which have hitherto attended the army, have resulted more from a want

of confidence in the justice and propriety of the war, than from the

lack of talents in those who have conducted the battles, incompetent

as they have been represented to command. A nation like this cannot

be driven to war. They must feel the justice and necessity of it, and

the justice must be so strong as to pierce every heart. This would be

felt in a necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the nation would

smite with one arm. Before such a people, roused in such a cause, the

veteran legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite the dust. Such,

alas! is not our case. We have a war, without the spirit or unanimity

which springs from these causes, and without the pecuniary means of

supporting it. Such a war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the

honor of this nation now suspended? On the Navy! that little navy which

was despised, neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself into

notice, and rescued the sinking honor of the country.

What, sir, was the avowed object of this war? It has ever been said

that conquest, with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging

our dominion, was not the wish of this Government. The idea of this

Republic following the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations, was so

repugnant to the genius of the American people, and the constitution

under which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest advocates of the

war dare avow it.

The pretence was to take, or rather to receive Canada; for it was

vainly supposed the inhabitants of that province would readily join

our standard, on the first invitation. But we must go through the

form of conquest to protect them from the charge of treason to their

own Government. We were to hold Canada until peace should return, and

then it was to be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights. And

this it was supposed would be a powerful weapon in our hands in the

negotiation. With this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising the

volunteers, and transferring the militia, passed. By the present bill,

and the project connected with it, the original plan is abandoned with

the volunteers and militia, and we are now presented with a compound

system of conquest, extermination, and defence. It would seem with the

force of fifty-five thousand regular troops, we are to conquer all the

residue of North America; exterminate every tawny infidel this side

of the Isthmus of Darien, and defend a seacoast many hundred miles

in extent from the incursions of the enemy! This is truly a gigantic

project. He said he could not give it his aid; and he thought some

honorable gentlemen who voted for the war would, when they reflected

on the magnitude of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion to

retire, unwilling to entail on themselves and posterity the expense and

ruin which would flow from the project, if carried into execution.

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I fear that the state of my health may

prevent my doing justice to my sentiments concerning this bill. I will,

however, make the attempt though I should fail in it.

The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be added to the existing

Military Establishment. This, at present, consists of 35,000 men.

So that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal of the

Executive, an army of 55,000. It is not pretended that this addition

is wanted either for defence or for the relief of the Indian frontier.

On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged that the present

establishment is sufficient for both of those objects. But the purpose

for which these 20,000 men are demanded is, the invasion of Canada.

This is unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the Committee of

Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS,) the organ, as is admitted, of

the will and the wishes of the American Cabinet.

The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into deliberation, the

conquest of Canada, either as an object, in itself desirable, or

consequentially advantageous, by its effect, in producing an early and

honorable peace.[31]

Before I enter upon the discussion of those topics, which naturally

arise from this state of the subject, I will ask your indulgence,

for one moment, while I make a few remarks upon this intention of

the American Cabinet thus unequivocally avowed. I am induced to this

from the knowledge, which I have, that this design is not deemed to

be serious by some men of both political parties; as well within this

House as out of it. I know that some of the friends of the present

Administration do consider the proposition as a mere feint, made for

the purpose of putting a good face upon things, and of strengthening

the hope of a successful negotiation, by exciting the apprehensions of

the British Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I know, also, that

some of those who are opposed in political sentiment to the men who

are now at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes of invasion;

and deem them hardly worth controversy, on account of their opinion of

the imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the embarrassment of its

resources.

I am anxious that no doubt should exist upon this subject either in the

House or in the nation. Whosoever considers the object of this bill to

be any other than that which has been avowed, is mistaken. Whosoever

believes this bill to be a means of peace, or any thing else than an

instrument of vigorous and long-protracted war, is grievously deceived.

And whoever acts under such mistake, or such deception, will have to

lament one of the grossest, and perhaps one of the most critical errors

of his political life. I warn, therefore, my political opponents; those

honest men, of whom I know there are some, who, paying only a general

attention to the course of public affairs, submit the guidance of their

opinions to the men who stand at the helm, not to vote for this bill

under any belief that its object is to aid negotiation for peace. Let

such gentlemen recur to their past experience on similar occasions.

They will find that it has been always the case, whenever any obnoxious

measure is about to be passed, that its passage is assisted by the

aid of some such collateral suggestions. No sooner do the Cabinet

perceive that any potion, which they intend to administer, is loathed

by a considerable part of the majority, and that their apprehensions

are alive lest it should have a scouring effect upon their popularity,

than certain under-operators are set to work, whose business it is to

amuse the minds, and beguile the attention of the patients while the

dose is swallowing. The language always is: "Trust the Cabinet doctors.

The medicine will not operate as you imagine, but quite another way."

After this manner the fears of the men are allayed, and the purposes of

the Administration are attained under suggestions very different from

the true motives. Thus, the embargo, which has since been unequivocally

acknowledged to have been intended to coerce Great Britain, was

adopted, as the Executive asserted, "to save our essential resources."

So, also, when the present war was declared against Great Britain,

members of the House were known to state that they voted for it under

the suggestion that it would not be a war of ten days: that it was

known that Mr. Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements,

in his pocket; and that the United States had only to advance to the

point of war, and the whole business would be settled. And now an army,

which, in point of numbers, Cromwell might envy, greater than that with

which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped through a reluctant

Congress, under the suggestion of its being only a parade force, to

make negotiation successful; that it is the incipient state of a

project for a grand pacification!

I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen are apt to place

great reliance on their own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these

will tell you that the invasion of Canada is impossible. They ask where

are the men--where is the money to be obtained? And they talk very

wisely concerning common sense and common prudence, and will show, with

much learning, how this attempt is an offence against both the one

and the other. But, sir, it has been my lot to be an observer of the

character and conduct of the men now in power for these eight years

past. And I state, without hesitation, that no scheme ever was, or ever

will be, rejected by them, merely on account of its running counter

to the ordinary dictates of common sense and common prudence. On the

contrary, on that very account, I believe it more likely to be both

suggested and adopted by them. And, what may appear a paradox, for that

very reason, the chance is rather increased that it will be successful.

I could illustrate this position twenty ways. I shall content myself

with remarking only upon two instances, and those recent; the present

war, and the late invasion of Canada. When war against Great Britain

was proposed at the last session, there were thousands in these

United States, and I confess to you I was myself among the number,

who believed not one word of the matter. I put my trust in the old

fashioned notions of common sense, and common prudence. That a people,

which had been more than twenty years at peace, should enter upon

hostilities against a people which had been twenty years at war; that

a nation, whose army and navy were little more than nominal, should

engage in a war with a nation possessing one of the best appointed

armies and the most powerful marine on the globe; that a country, to

which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest, should throw that great

blessing away for a controversy in which nothing was to be gained, and

every thing valuable put in jeopardy; from these, and innumerable like

considerations, the idea seemed so absurd that I never once entertained

it as possible. And now, after war has been declared, the whole affair

seems so extraordinary and so utterly irreconcilable to any previous

suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I know not what to make of it

or how to believe it. Even at this moment my mind is very much in

the state of certain Pennsylvania Germans, of whom I have heard it

asserted that they are taught to believe, by their political leaders,

and do at this moment consider the allegation, that war is at present

existing between the United States and Great Britain, to be a "federal

falsehood."

It was just so with respect to the invasion of Canada. I heard of it

last June. I laughed at the idea, as did multitudes of others, as

an attempt too absurd for serious examination. I was in this case

again beset by common sense and common prudence. That the United

States should precipitate itself upon the unoffending people of that

neighboring colony, unmindful of all previously subsisting amities,

because the parent State, three thousand miles distant, had violated

some of our commercial rights; that we should march inland, to defend

our ships, and seamen; that with raw troops, hastily collected,

miserably appointed, and destitute of discipline, we should invade

a country defended by veteran forces, at least equal, in point of

numbers, to the invading army; that bounty should be offered and

proclamations issued, inviting the subjects of a foreign power to

treason and rebellion, under the influences of a quarter of the country

upon which a retort of the same nature was so obvious, so easy, and,

in its consequences, so awful; in every aspect, the design seemed

so fraught with danger and disgrace, that it appeared absolutely

impossible that it should be seriously entertained. Those, however, who

reasoned after this manner were, as the event proved, mistaken. The war

was declared. Canada was invaded. We were in haste to plunge into these

great difficulties, and we have now reason, as well as leisure enough,

for regret and repentance.

The great mistake of all those, who reasoned concerning the war and

the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it was impossible that

either should be seriously intended, resulted from this, that they

never took into consideration the connection of both those events with

the great election for the Chief Magistracy which was then pending.

It never was sufficiently considered by them, that plunging into war

with Great Britain was among the conditions on which the support for

the Presidency was made dependent. They did not understand, that an

invasion of Canada was to be in truth only a mode of carrying on an

electioneering campaign. But since events have explained political

purposes, there is no difficulty in seeing the connections between

projects and interests. It is now apparent to the most mole-sighted how

a nation may be disgraced, and yet a Cabinet attain its desired honors.

All is clear. A country may be ruined, in making an Administration

happy.

I said, Mr. Speaker, that such strange schemes, apparently

irreconcilable to common sense and common prudence, were, on that very

account, more likely to be successful. Sir, there is an audacity,

which sometimes stands men instead both of genius and strength. And

most assuredly, he is most likely to perform that which no man ever

did before, and will never be likely to do again, who has the boldness

to undertake that which no man ever thought of attempting in time

past, and no man will ever think of attempting in time future. I would

not, however, be understood as intimating that this Cabinet project

of invasion is impracticable, either as it respects the collection of

means and instruments, or in the ultimate result. On the contrary,

sir, I deem both very feasible. Men may be obtained. For if forty

dollars bounty cannot obtain them, a hundred dollars bounty may, and

the intention is explicitly avowed not to suffer the attainment of the

desired army to be prevented by any vulgar notions of economy. Money

may be obtained. What by means of the increased popularity derived from

the augmentation of the navy, what by opening subscription offices

in the interior of the country, what by large premiums, the cupidity

of the moneyed interest may be tempted beyond the point of patriotic

resistance, and all the attained means being diverted to the use of

the army, pecuniary resources may be obtained, ample at least for the

first year. And, sir, let an army of thirty thousand men be collected,

let them be put under the command of a popular leader, let them be

officered to suit his purposes, let them be flushed with victories,

and see the fascinating career of military glory opening upon them,

and they will not thereafter ever be deficient in resources. If

they cannot obtain their pay by your votes, they will collect it by

their own bayonets; and they will not rigidly observe any air-lines

or water-lines in enforcing their necessary levies; nor be stayed

by abstract speculation concerning right, or learned constitutional

difficulties.

I will now proceed to discuss those topics which naturally arise out

of the bill under consideration, and examine the proposed invasion of

Canada, at three different points of view.