The honorable gentleman who anticipates the destruction of the

constitution, unless we shall neglect one of the great interests which

it was intended to protect, considers the English Orders in Council as

leaving our institutions firm and untouched. Regulations, the effect

of which is to give to a foreign power the complete disposition of

the property of a large class of our people, are it seems in their

political result innocent. Although every citizen who has property

on the ocean become dependent on the English Ministry, become their

subject, our liberty and independence are (we are told) unimpaired.

But let a navy be raised--let the Government which expects obedience

provide protection, and the constitution perishes!

But we have been referred particularly by my honorable friend from

Pennsylvania to the experience of the world, as having already decided

the question which we are now discussing. It seems that Venice and

Genoa, and every other naval power which can be named, have all

furnished abundant proof of the ruinous effects which such a force is

calculated to produce. Sir, the assertion is new. I do not pretend

to an intimate acquaintance with the histories of those nations, but

I have hitherto believed that the first great shock which the power

of Venice received, was given by the League of Cambray--a league

formed to repress her ambition, not of maritime, but of territorial

aggrandizement. But, whilst Venice has lost her independence, after

maintaining it for five or six centuries, may I ask my honorable friend

whether the States of Italy, which were never oppressed by fleets,

had enjoyed a longer term of prosperity and freedom? As to Genoa--her

naval power, her independence and glory, rose and sunk with the same

man--Doria. But Holland, says the gentleman from Kentucky, affords an

example of a nation, whose commerce flourished greatly before it had a

navy, and decayed while her navy continued powerful. If there ever were

a people, whose naval power has been employed to protect and almost

to create their commerce, it is the Dutch. They fought their way at

the same time to trade in the East Indies and America, and to national

independence in Europe. The decay of their trade is to be attributed to

the development of the resources of other nations; to the navigation

act of England; and the similar measures adopted by other powers. As

to France--the period of her greatest financial prosperity probably

coincided with that of her greatest naval power; both were due to the

administration of Colbert. But the evils of a navy (gentlemen tell us)

have been concentrated in the case of England. With all her fleets she

is destined soon to lose her independence. The expense of those fleets

has crushed the industry of her subjects, and must soon reduce her to

national bankruptcy. Let us suppose that these gentlemen, who have been

so much mistaken in regard to the past, may be more accurate in their

narrative of the future. Still England will have owed to her fleets her

redemption from invasion for ages past. While every other considerable

nation of Europe has been bankrupt over and over again, she is not

yet bankrupt. While nearly every other Government of Europe has been

overset, hers yet rides out the storm. Should England fall to-morrow,

it should seem impossible to deny that her navy will have prolonged her

independence for at least two centuries.

My honorable colleague has calculated the expense of building and

maintaining a navy of 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates, and

has explained the principles on which his calculations have been

founded. The estimate of the gentleman from Pennsylvania can hardly

be considered, after the error which has been remarked, as impugning

those calculations. I have not myself attempted to estimate the

probable expense of maintaining 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates

with any precision, but I cannot doubt the fairness of the rule which

deduces it from the expense of such a force to England. This is the

rule which I understood my colleague to have employed. It has not

been disputed in debate; it has been in conversation. Many gentlemen

have objected to an estimate of the expenses of a navy during war,

in which (as they suppose) no allowance is made for the peculiar

expenses which war involves. To have all our ships safe at the end

of the contest is observed to be rather a sanguine expectation. But

if the rate of expense in the estimate of my colleague were deduced

from the rate of English expense during war, these objections must

be altogether groundless. Now, it _was_ deduced from the expense

which is found sufficient to maintain the English Navy in a state of

unimpaired strength during war. The English expense, from which it was

inferred, included the charge of docks and navy-yards, of the repair

of old ships and of the building of new ones. It included pensions to

their officers, and even the support of the prisoners taken from their

enemies. I have on my table a detailed account of the English naval

expenditure for a year of the last war. The whole amount was about

twelve millions and a half, and of this sum fully four millions and a

half were applied to what may be considered the contingent expenses

of the navy. Now, is there any reason to suppose that the contingent

expenses of our navy would be greater in proportion to its force than

this? And if not greater, has not an allowance been made for the

capture of some of our ships, or, in other words, for the building of

new ones? It is true, that from the superiority of English sailors to

their present enemies, England loses little by capture, and, it may be

supposed, that from the greater frequency and severity of our conflicts

when we shall be engaged in war against her, our contingent expenses

may be greater in proportion to the number of our ships then hers. But

there are many expenses to which she is necessarily subject, from which

we shall be exempt. I will instance that resulting from blockading

squadrons, and that from repairs in colonial and foreign ports. These

can appear inconsiderable to no man who has given his attention in any

degree to the subject. Naval men I believe would not contradict me, if

I were to state the expense of a ship employed in a strict blockade,

and particularly during the winter months, as fully double that of a

ship engaged in ordinary service. In fact, England finds the expense

too great for her finances, and has been obliged, in some measure, to

give up the practice. The other article of expenditure to which I have

referred, I shall not attempt to estimate with any precision. It must,

however, be obvious to every man, that the ships of war of England must

frequently be repaired and refitted in distant countries. In these

the most scrupulous fidelity and economy on the part of her officers

cannot prevent the expense from being frequently extravagant. The most

salutary regulations and most provident instructions on the part of the

Administration at home cannot prevent her officers from being sometimes

careless and fraudulent. I recollect an instance of the enormous

expense involved in the distant services required from the British

Navy, which I cannot pretend to state with accuracy, but in which I

hope not to be substantially wrong. Sir Home Popham (a distinguished

officer in the English Navy) had under his command in the last war two

or three frigates in the East Indies. They had left England in good

condition, and their repairs for two or three years, and the supply of

the different articles of equipment which they occasionally required,

exceeded, I believe, the prime cost of the vessels themselves. These

two items of expenditure, blockading squadrons, and repairs in distant

countries, (to neither of which an American Navy would be liable,)

will be acknowledged, I think, to justify the conclusion, that the

contingent expenses of the English Navy must be as great in proportion

to its force as ours would be in war--and therefore that the rule

employed in the calculations of my colleague was correct.

But our resources for the equipment of a navy appear to the honorable

gentlemen on the other side, as deficient in respect to men and money.

Sailors in this country cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers

without impressment. It is not necessary, sir, to inquire whether

for the defence of their peculiar rights the services of a marine

militia may not be required. There is no reason to doubt our being

able to procure the voluntary services of our seamen. If we shall at

any time be engaged in a war (like that with France in 1798) which

shall leave the greater part of our trade unaffected, the wages of

sailors will, indeed, be high, but the number required will be small

and the Government can afford high wages. In a war of a different

character--against a nation powerful at sea--your sailors will be

thrown out of employment and their wages will be necessarily low. But

gentlemen object to this reasoning on the supposition that in such a

case our sailors would all engage in privateers. The notion that in

any war there will be a demand in this country for more than thirty

thousand sailors for privateers is surely an extravagant one. But it

has been shown by my colleague that in a war which should diminish our

trade by one-half, (and a war requiring any great naval exertion would

necessarily do this,) thirty or forty thousand seamen may be employed

in privateers, and a sufficient number would remain for your public

ships. But are not your privateers as much a part of the naval force

of the nation as your ships of war? It has been said, indeed, that they

are the more useful part. Now, if the Government should believe (what

neither sober reflection nor the experience of other nations can permit

it to doubt) that this part of your force cannot be in any great degree

serviceable unless supported by a fleet--then surely a limitation

to its extent, which would be necessary even to the interest of its

owners, cannot fairly be objected to. The law just passed for raising

twenty-five thousand men, provides, I think, for only one regiment of

cavalry. Now, it is very possible that a much larger proportion of the

twenty-five thousand men that can be accommodated in this regiment, may

choose to go to Canada on horseback. They must be disappointed, and

either not go into the army at all, or go into the service which they

least desire. No man has hitherto denounced the act as on this account

tyrannical and oppressive. Yet this case seems to me a true parallel

to the other. In the naval, as in the military service, the interest

of the country requires the employment of different sorts of force;

and the object may be attained with equal fairness in both services by

limiting the amount of the favorite force.

Mr. LAW said: Being in favor of the bill now under consideration, I beg

leave to express my sentiments, and state the reasons in support of

my opinion; and the only pledge I shall offer to the House, for their

attention, is, that I shall not occupy much of their time.

This bill, sir, embraces two objects--one relates to the repairs and

equipment of the ships of the United States now out of service--the

other contemplates the building of ten additional frigates, and

laying the foundation of a new Naval Establishment. The view which I

entertain of this subject, does not arise from its connection with

that system which grows out of what is called the present crisis, or

putting the nation in armor for war, as reported by the Committee

of Foreign Relations; but from a conviction, that, as an abstract

question or matter of general policy, I deem it for the interest and

security of the United States, to begin the establishment of a Navy,

to be perpetuated and extended hereafter--and, because I believe it

may be accomplished, to the extent at present proposed, from the

ordinary means we ought to possess, without adding any new burdens on

the citizens. In order to decide whether it is for the interest of the

United States we must examine and see how it is connected with the

great and essential interest of the country. The basis of our national

wealth is agriculture; the real substance of the nation is drawn from

the earth. This arises from the great and extensive territory which we

possess, thinly settled, low in price, of an excellent soil, capable,

from its fertility and variety of climes, of affording produce of

every kind, in the greatest abundance. The surplus of all is wanted in

other countries, where nature has been less bountiful; and it must

be a great while before the labor of our citizens can be diverted

extensively into other channels--I mean manufactures. This is a

condition in which we ought to rejoice for the causes, which bind us

in this necessity, are those which tend to preserve the morals, the

happiness, and the independence of the nation. And until our lands

are taken up, and population becomes redundant, the basis of our

national wealth must be the farming interest. But, sir, in a country

so blessed by nature; where the inhabitants have the greatest stimulus

to industry, the fruits of their labor secured by just and equal

laws; where the property cannot be taken from the owner without his

consent, there will be a vast surplus, beyond what the consumption of

the country requires. Hence, commerce springs up as the daughter and

handmaid of agriculture. Without commerce, agriculture would languish.

With it, wealth is consolidated, and industry promoted. It diffuses

its benign influence, discoverable in the splendid and delightful

improvements, which rejoice the eye of the traveller, throughout the

country. And it is as unnatural for the farming interest to oppress

the commercial, as it is for the parent to abandon its offspring. They

mutually cherish and support each other; and, by natural sympathy, must

be affected by the checks and disorders which each may receive. But

commerce must be protected. It cannot protect itself against force.

Being carried on abroad on the ocean, (for I am speaking of foreign

commerce,) it is subject to annoyance, interruption, and hazard. We

must pass the common highway of nations to get to a market; and in this

route, the weak and defenceless must, and always will be the sport and

prey of the strong and violent, whom they meet in the way. From the

wretched state of those nations with whom we have intercourse, we,

from weakness, must fall victims to their violence. This is an evil

which we shall always experience as a neutral, coming in collision

with belligerents. Shall we then abandon commerce, or shall we strive

to support it? It will be for the interest of the country to support

it, if possible; for if we abandon it, the evil will recoil on the

agricultural part, who, no longer than foreign commerce is supported,

can find a vent for their surplus; and without a vent for the surplus,

a bare competency might be endangered. Internal commerce would always

fail, for that, being but a stream from foreign commerce, must dry

when the fountain from whence it issues fails. Enterprise ceases, and

languor and poverty ensue. It is then for the interest of the nation

to cherish commerce. But how can this be done? Will a navy have this

effect? I think it will. Indeed, if the little navy which was commenced

some years ago, had been supported and increased as it might have been

without any difficulty, we might, and in all probability should, have

avoided our present calamities. We are now the defenceless prey of

both France and England; deprived of the common rights of nations and

citizens of the world. Will it then be asked, shall we not go to war

and fight our way? I have already recorded my negative on the several

questions preparatory to that step, and I am decidedly against going

to war. We have not the means necessary, and unsuccessful resistance

will only make our condition worse. I verily believe, if this nation

had fostered our infant navy, from the time it was commenced, and had

not, by a strange infatuation, abandoned and neglected it, it would now

have been too important to be despised, by either France or England.

Our prosperity would have continued. Our strength would have been

dreaded, and our friendship courted by both nations. While they have

been contending for the mastery, we, with such naval force as we ought

to have had, and a strict course of neutrality, might have pursued a

lawful and gainful trade. We might have had a perpetual revenue of

sixteen millions, instead of the pittance now received at the Treasury.

I believe, that with the navy we might have had, and a correct strict

neutral course, there would have been neither Berlin and Milan Decrees,

nor Orders in Council, to annoy our lawful commerce.

Mr. ROBERTS observed, that there appeared to be a disposition in the

committee to take the question on the filling the blank in the first

section without further debate. As he could not vote for appropriating

$480,000 for the repair of the vessels of war unfit for service,

it would perhaps be the most proper time to submit his opinions. I

have not, Mr. Chairman, said he been a listless hearer of the very

ingenious arguments advanced by gentlemen in favor of the report.

He had, however, been so unfortunate as to be more confirmed in his

inclination to vote against the bill, from attentively weighing these

arguments. The select committee in their report (for they had reported

specially as well as by bill) have said, with oracular confidence, that

this country is inevitably destined to become a naval power. He had

not, with them, become a fatalist. Though he was disposed to claim a

high destiny for his country, he did not believe that destiny was yet

immutably fixed. He, however, believed the question now to be decided

must have an influence on that destiny, that might at an early day,

if decided affirmatively, obliterate our happy civil institutions;

if negatively, preserve them long the best blessings of posterity.

Gentlemen who have advocated a naval establishment, have chosen to

consider this bill and report as the furtherance of a system already in

existence, and that, however short of their wishes the committee may be

disposed to go, they stand prepared to view whatever might be done to

augment the naval force as an evidence of assent to their system. Mr.

R. said at one time he had inclined to vote for the appropriation of a

sum to equip such of the vessels now out of service as might be found

worthy of refittal. But on discovering it would be considered as an

acknowledgment that a navy was proper in the sense it had been brought

into view by the committee, and doubting, on better consideration,

whether there was not great likelihood the money would be worse

applied in repairing old, than in building new vessels, and feeling a

conviction that if these vessels should be deemed worthy of repair,

they could not be brought into action in that exigence of war when they

could be useful, as in that case land defence must be resorted to, and

the consequent expense incurred, he should feel it his duty to vote

against this appropriation.

It has been observed that the constitution has invested Congress

with power to regulate commerce, to provide and maintain a navy, &c.

There is nothing, said Mr. R., imperative in this. It was necessary

in a general grant of powers to insert many items to be left to the

sound discretion of Congress, to use or not to use. Soon after the

Government came into operation, it became a favorite object with one

set of politicians to form a navy. On the occasion of our commerce

being depredated upon by the Barbary corsairs, the question first

came up. It became a matter of deliberation whether a peace should

be purchased of them with money and presents; whether some European

power should be subsidized to keep a few frigates on that station, or

whether a naval force should be equipped for the purpose (as alleged)

of enabling the President to negotiate to better effect. The party with

whom I have always found it my duty to act, said Mr. R., opposed, on

that occasion, the commencement of a navy system, when it was invited

under circumstances so specious. They were, however, in the minority.

The ships of war were voted--with what effect on the Algerines, he

did not stop to inquire. If this opposition to the commencement of a

Naval Establishment was wrong in the minority, their successors ought

not to follow them; but if it should be found that they were right,

the ground ought never to be quitted. The question of increasing

the navy was again discussed in the celebrated times of '98-9. The

collisions with France had raised the war fever very high. A navy was

vociferously contended for as the most efficient means of defence. It

was when things were in this state, that the President, in his reply

to the Marine Society of Boston, who had with much fervor tendered him

their approbation of his measures, hoped to see the wooden walls of

America considered as her best defence. Because Athens, when she was

invaded by the hosts of Xerxes, had chosen to interpret the oracle that

promised her safety in wooden walls, rationally, America must take

the same course, however dissimilarly situated. The people of Attica,

inhabiting a circumscribed territory, found safety in their fleet, and

they could have found it nowhere else. But such cannot be the case with

America. Even the hosts of Xerxes could not make it necessary for the

American people to quit their territory--the figure would not hold. On

this occasion, too, the Republican party consistently opposed a navy;

strange blindness and obstinacy, if they were not sustained by reason

as well as principle. On this occasion, the supporters of a navy system

were a majority in council. For a moment they succeeded with their

measures. But the public councils were soon filled by the people with

men of other minds, and the question was put to rest.

Gentlemen have considered this subject on its general principles and

remote consequences. In this point of view, said Mr. R., it presents

a wide field for reflection. The Chairman (Mr. CHEVES) has complained

he has had to meet this subject encumbered with much error and many

prejudices; among which is the idea that a naval system is prejudicial

to civil liberty. The opposers of a navy, with an air of no small

triumph, are called upon to show how a system of maritime power would

endanger the freedom of our country. It has been said, a military

chieftain, by an easy transition, may become a civil ruler, and that

the commander of an army has often become a despot, while no such event

could happen from a naval commander, as such an office gave no power

on _terra firma_. If we look a little deeper into the subject, we

shall find we have as much to fear, and even more, from a naval than

a military power. The latter can only be kept in time of war, and for

comparatively but short periods; at a time too, when the public spirit

is awakened and ready to oppose encroachment. The chair of rule may

possibly be gained by a military chief; but an attempt on the public

liberty has a much greater chance to fail. Evils of this sort can

only take place on very rare contingency; but the ruin of the public

liberty can hardly fail to be a consequence of the establishment of

a naval power. History proves to us that maritime power has always

excited national ambition to a spirit of conquest and plunder. A naval

power will seek colonies and ports in distant places. The chance, nay,

the certainty, of collisions with other nations, is multiplied, and a

corruption of morals is produced, that cannot fail to make the first

Government on earth a tyranny, by a course of events that the patriot

can neither prevent nor divert to other consequences. A short time

after Athens had found safety in her wooden walls, one of her statesmen

proposed she should burn the fleets of her neighbors, that she might

thereby be rendered mistress of Greece. This project the virtue of the

people resisted; but that virtue soon gave way in the expedition to the

Cyclades, where her navy committed acts of violence that must indelibly

fix the stain of the blackest perfidy and cruelty on the Athenian

character. What could be a more unprovoked act of aggression than her

crusade against Syracuse, a crime that visited her with a declension

of power from which she never recovered? For a nation to believe her

destinies fixed, is in a great measure to fix them. Nothing, perhaps,

contributed more to make Rome the mistress of the world, than the

oracles that promised it. Her heroes and statesmen were stimulated

thereby to fulfil her destiny. The maritime supremacy of Britain is,

perhaps, owing as much to the belief that she is the destined Queen of

the waters, as to any other cause. Though such operations be calculated

to bring about astonishing effects, how unfortunate is it when a

nation's eyes are thus directed to improper attainments--it becomes a

source of incalculable evil. Athens and Rome were the victims of such

a policy, as Britain is at this time. I fervently hope, said Mr. R.,

for a better destiny for our beloved country. Rome and Carthage were

both great maritime powers; it was not in Lybia and Italy they began

to contend for superiority, but in Sicily and Iberia. The conflicts

thence arising brought terror to the gates of Rome, and laid Carthage

in ashes. The abuse of maritime power in both those States changed

the free features of the government, and left a dreary despotism in

their stead. A naval victory secured to the second Cæsar the rule of

the mistress of the world. In later times, we have been told, said Mr.

R., the declension of maritime States has been due to other causes

than their Naval Establishments. In some instances it may have been

so. When the strength and power of a State has arisen entirely from

the profits of commerce, when that commerce has taken another course,

the transitory splendor it has built up has vanished. Venice was an

example of this. The commerce of the East caused her to rise out of

the circumscribed and marshy Islands at the bottom of the Adriatic,

the proud Mistress of the Waves. When the Cape of Good Hope had been

doubled by the Portuguese, her commercial advantages failed. She sunk

from the conqueror of the Eastern Empire, to a mere city of Italy and

Portugal; a narrow territory, by the same commerce, assumed the first

rank among the nations of the world. A naval power may serve sometimes

to extend commerce to wider limits; but it can by no means control it

with certainty to channels through which nature, and often the policy

of other nations, bid it to flow. What is the state of British commerce

at this time? The rupture of the peace of Amiens did not arise from

Britain having received injuries from France after the cessation of

hostilities. The new war was a commercial one. The British Cabinet saw,

in a state of peace, France would not be unmindful of her commercial

interests. The intelligence, the enterprise, and population, and the

resources of France, all indicated that she would at least divide

successfully the profits of commerce with her rival. The naval power of

Britain giving her the command of the sea, she could oppose only with

effect the growing commerce of her neighbor in a state of war. This

step of British policy imposed on the ruler of France the necessity

of changing the channels of commerce. In this way he has aimed a

blow at the vitals of her strength, which her tremendous naval power

neither enables her to avert nor lessen its force. Her marine puts the

trident into her hands, but she can no longer shake the earth. Her

monopolizing spirit has sealed the Continent of Europe against her,

and interdicted her commerce with America. She has reduced the ocean

almost to a desert; and she seems hastening to that destiny which has

generally attended her predecessors in naval power through her ambition

to rule the waves.

Gentlemen propose to protect commerce on this side the Gulf Stream, yet

admit if our vessels are despoiled on the Indian Ocean, we must apply

retaliation in the West Indies. The Gulf Stream limitation is at once

given up; a new expedition to the Cyclades is in that case to take

place. Begin your conquest in the West Indies, and you must increase

your navy to acquire and defend them. It is at once an admission that

naval power must be used more for ambition than the protection of

commerce and our territorial waters. But, what is worse, as you acquire

colonies and ships you must create armies. The hands of the Executive,

restricted and elective as it is, in the United States, became thence

armed with a sceptre formidable indeed, and the more so as it acquires

this strength without producing the shock to public feeling which

the seizure of power by a military leader will always excite. It has

been said, (said Mr. R.,) that the existence of Great Britain hung

upon her navy in the contest in which she is now engaged. If her fate

hangs suspended by her naval power, she owes her peril to that source.

Without her maritime strength, would she have aspired to balance the

scales of power on the Continent? Would she have become a party to the

infamous conspiracy of Pilnitz? Would she have wantonly plotted the

dismemberment of France? Would she have broken the peace of Amiens

whence her present dangers arise? Certainly not.

On the article of cost, said Mr. R., it is of little importance whether

the army or navy of Great Britain is most burdensome on her finances,

though it has been dwelt upon with particular emphasis, nor whether

an army be more expensive in every case, than a navy. Armies are a

necessary consequence of navies. Has not the British army increased

with equal pace with her navy?

The humane mind, said Mr. R., cannot contemplate without pain, that

from naval power have flown the most copious streams of human misery.

The plunder of half the world, with immense advantages in addition, has

not sustained the British navy. A debt has been accumulated that almost

baffles the power of figures to estimate. But debt, and a prospect

of Government insolvency at home, are of much less account than the

wrongs this navy has wrought on the society of nations. And yet it is

this Government that is held up to Republican America as a model for

imitation.

Need I remind you, said Mr. R., of the millions of victims sacrificed

to commercial cupidity on the plains of Hindostan, by means of this

navy? A population, thrice as great as that of the British Isles, has

been exterminated in this devoted region, within comparatively but a

few years, by mercantile rapacity. Colonel Dowe informs us, that the

wealth of one of the cities of this wretched country had whetted the

avarice of Clive and his associates, and that an offer was made to the

Government to pay the public debt for permission to sack it. It was

too gross an act of infamy to assent to, and the adventurers obtained

their end by other means. A famine and pestilence was substituted for

the bayonet, and the spoils of the devoted city glutted the hands

of rapine. In this exploit, a shoe-black divided his £200,000. Need

I remind you, said Mr. R., that the population of Africa has been

drained, to groan out a wretched existence in the West India colonies,

to prop up this naval and commercial power, or that the remotest

corners of every sea have been visited with the scourge of blood and

desolation for the same purpose? On general principles, does not past

experience afford sufficient warning to these States to avoid those

shoals on which so many nations have been wrecked?

Mr. Chairman, under no view which I have been able to take of this

subject, considering it either as the furtherance of a system of

naval power, to be expanded with the growing strength of the Union to

gigantic size, or that it is a proper time for providing a temporary

increase of naval force, can I agree, said Mr. R., to the bill on your

table.

When Mr. ROBERTS had concluded, the committee rose, and had leave to

sit again.

WEDNESDAY, January 22.

Another member, to wit, WILLIAM M. RICHARDSON, from Massachusetts,

appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

_Naval Establishment._

The House again went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill

concerning the Navy. The question on filling up the blank in the

section which provides for repairing the vessels on hand, with four

hundred and eighty thousand dollars, was carried by a large majority.

The next section provides for the building of ---- additional frigates.

Mr. CLAY (the Speaker) rose to present his views on the bill before the

committee. He said that as he did not precisely agree in opinion with

any gentleman who had spoken, he should take the liberty of detaining

the committee a few moments while he offered to their attention some

observations. He was highly gratified with the temper and ability with

which the discussion had been hitherto conducted. It was honorable to

the House, and, he trusted, would continue to be manifested on many

future occasions.

On this interesting topic a diversity of opinion has existed almost

ever since the adoption of the present Government. On the one hand

there appeared to him to have been attempts made to precipitate the

nation into all the evils of naval extravagance, which had been

productive of so much mischief in other countries; and, on the other,

strongly feeling this mischief, there has existed an unreasonable

prejudice against providing such a competent naval protection for our

commercial and maritime rights as is demanded by their importance, and

as the increased resources of the country amply justify.

The attention of Congress has been invited to this subject by the

President in his Message delivered at the opening of the session.

Indeed, had it been wholly neglected by the Chief Magistrate, from the

critical situation of the country, and nature of the rights proposed

to be vindicated, it must have pressed itself upon our attention. But,

said Mr. C., the President, in his Message, observes: "Your attention

will, of course, be drawn to such provisions on the subject of our

naval force as may be required for the service to which it is best

adapted. I submit to Congress the seasonableness also of an authority

to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their

nature, or may not at once be attainable." The President, by this

recommendation, clearly intimates an opinion that the naval force of

this country is capable of producing some effect; and the propriety of

laying up imperishable materials was no doubt suggested for the purpose

of making additions to the navy, as convenience and exigencies might

direct.

It appeared to Mr. C. a little extraordinary that so much, as it

seemed to him, unreasonable jealousy should exist against the Naval

Establishment. If, said he, we look back to the period of the formation

of the constitution, it will be found that no such jealousy was then

excited. In placing the physical force of the nation at the disposal of

Congress, the Convention manifested much greater apprehension of abuse

in the power given to raise armies than in that to provide a navy. In

reference to the Navy, Congress is put under no restrictions; but with

respect to the Army--that description of force which has been so often

employed to subvert the liberties of mankind--they are subjected to

limitations, designed to prevent the abuse of this dangerous power.

But it was not his intention to detain the committee by a discussion

on the comparative utility and safety of these two kinds of force. He

would, however, be indulged in saying, that he thought gentlemen had

wholly failed in maintaining the position they had assumed, that the

fall of maritime powers was attributable to their navies. They have

told you, indeed, that Carthage, Genoa, Venice, and other nations,

had navies, and, notwithstanding, were finally destroyed. But have

they shown, by a train of argument, that their overthrow was, in any

degree, ascribable to their maritime greatness? Have they attempted

even to show that there exists in the nature of this power a necessary

tendency to destroy the nation using it? Assertion is substituted for

argument; inferences not authorized by historical facts are arbitrarily

drawn; things wholly unconnected with each other are associated

together--a very logical mode of reasoning! In the same way he could

demonstrate how idle and absurd our attachments are to freedom itself.

He might say, for example, that Greece and Rome had forms of free

government, and that they no longer exist; and deducing their fall

from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion in favor of despotism

would very satisfactorily follow! He demanded what there is in the

nature and construction of maritime power to excite the fears that have

been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend that a body of seamen

will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an

aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign

to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their

apprehensions?

But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear that

if we provide a marine it will produce collisions with foreign

nations--plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution

of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision you had

better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all

your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of

protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision,

collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism.

Would the counsels be deemed wise, of that statesman who should

recommend that the nation should be unarmed--that the art of war, the

martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited--and that

the great body of the people should be taught that national happiness

was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet every

argument in favor of a power of protection on land applies, in some

degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce

void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded

commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or

enaction of new unjust edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon

that element where they operate, and where, in the end, they must be

resisted.

For his part, Mr. C. said, he did not allow himself to be alarmed

by those apprehensions of maritime power which appeared to agitate

other gentlemen. In the nature of our Government he beheld abundant

security against abuse. He would be unwilling to tax the land to

support the rights of the sea, and was for drawing from the sea itself

the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times

be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be

no danger of running into the folly and extravagance which so much

alarms gentlemen; and whenever it is abandoned--whenever Congress

shall lay burdensome taxes to augment the Navy beyond what may be

authorized by the increased wealth, and demanded by the exigencies of

the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy

representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. Mr. C. could not,

then, see any just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It

was, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing

armies. And, the genius of our institutions--the great representative

principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently

distinguished--afforded the best guarantee against the ambition and

wasteful extravagance of Government.

What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United

States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval

power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be

capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring

on the ocean--a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge

to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was

impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable for this

country to establish so extensive a Navy. Indeed, he should consider

it as madness in the extreme in this Government to attempt to provide

a Navy capable to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they

might be met.

The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that

which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally

in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off

any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed

in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. CHEVES and

LOWNDES) had satisfactorily shown that, to effect this object, a

force equivalent only to one-third of that which the maintenance of

such squadron must require would be sufficient. That if, for example,

England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a

squadron of twelve ships-of-the-line, it would require for this service

thirty-six ships-of-the line, one-third in port repairing, one-third on

the passage, and one-third on the station. But that is a force which

it has been shown that even England, with her boasted Navy, could not

spare for the American service whilst she is engaged in the present

contest. Mr. C. said he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had

described, that is, about twelve ships-of-the-line and fifteen or

twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but, he admitted that

it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the

country. He contended, however, that it was such as Congress ought to

set about providing, and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it

actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power

of Great Britain with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen

beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at the prospect

even of her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and

a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and

to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness

from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron

would be exposed, stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt

that the force to which he referred would insure the command of our own

seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive seaboard and

numerous harbors, everywhere affording asylums to which it could retire

for safety from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue for the

purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague, (Mr. MCKEE,)

who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle

on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished

connexion, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe.

[Here Mr. C. read certain parts of a work written by Colonel Daviess,

in which the author attempts to show that, as the aggressions upon our

commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they

could in the same manner be best retaliated; that a force of about

twenty or thirty frigates would be capable of inflicting great injury

on English commerce by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and

seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with

our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would

be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, as

the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and

the Roman army in Parthia.][26]

The third description of force worthy of consideration is, that which

would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from

endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, or

laying under contribution our cities; a force competent to punish the

insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our

own jurisdiction the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force

of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means at this time.

Is there a reflecting man in the nation who would not charge Congress

with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force,

a single ship were to bombard one of our cities? Would not every

honorable member of this committee inflict on himself the bitterest

reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our

gallant little Navy, a single British vessel should place New York

under contribution? Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched

inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect in not providing engines

and water buckets. If, said Mr. C, we are not able to meet the wolves

of the forest, shall we put up with the barking of every petty fox that

trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible

danger, shall we provide against none? He hoped not. He had hardly

expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson was so soon to be

forgotten which was taught us in the murder of Pierce; the attack on

the Chesapeake; and the insult offered in the harbor of Charleston,

which the brave old fellow that commanded the fort in vain endeavored

to chastise.

It was a rule with Mr. C., when acting either in a public or private

character, to attempt nothing more than what there existed a prospect

of accomplishing. He was, therefore, not in favor of entering into

any mad projects on this subject; but for deliberately and resolutely

pursuing what he believed to be within the power of Government.

Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the

principles maintained by the opposition at that time. He had no doubt

of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day

were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were

contemplated for an unnecessary war into which the nation was about to

be plunged. He always admired and approved the zeal and ability with

which that opposition was conducted by the distinguished gentleman

now at the head of the Treasury. But the state of things is totally

altered. What was folly in 1798 may be wisdom now. At that time, we

had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a

supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions.

The population of the country, too, is greatly increased--nearly

doubled--and the wealth of the nation is, perhaps, tripled. While

our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessity for

maritime protection is proportionately augmented. Independent of

the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798, we have had an

addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of

Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine--a weak and defenceless accession,

requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the

protecting arm of Government.

FRIDAY, January 24.

_Naval Establishment._

The blank in the section for providing a dock yard, was filled with one

hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. RHEA moved so to amend the bill as to fix the dock yard in the

navy-yard at Washington City; but this motion was negatived by a large

majority.

On motion of Mr. CHEVES, the words "central and," were struck out, so

as to leave the site of the dock yard to be determined by the Executive.

The committee having gone through the bill, rose and reported it to

the House with the amendments. The House took up the bill, and on the

question of filling up the blank for repairing the vessels on hand with

"four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," it was carried--yeas 90,

nays 23.

The question was next put upon agreeing to the report of the committee

to strike out the second section of the bill, which contemplated the

building of new frigates; when

Mr. WILLIAMS rose and spoke at considerable length. He said the time

was very inauspicious for commencing an undertaking of such magnitude

as the building a navy, which could be of no use in the approaching

contest. He doubted the policy of engaging in the business at all;

for navies, he said, had deceived the hopes of every country which

had relied upon them; that we could never expect to be able to meet

Great Britain on the ocean; that we had fought through the Revolution

without a navy; for in that contest, a single privateer had done more

than the few ships of war which were in possession of the old Congress;

that except we are able to build and equip a navy equal to meet the

British at sea, we were better without one, as our ships would probably

fall a prey to their superior force; that his greatest objection

against a navy was, that it must be kept up in time of peace as well

as in war; that when the gentlemen spoke of a navy as cheaper than an

army, they could not mean to say that if we had a navy the army could

be dispensed with--they could not, for instance, take possession of

Canada by a navy; that the building of a navy would burden the people

with oppressive taxes; that such an establishment would serve only to

increase Executive patronage; that with respect to commerce, the people

were willing to give it all the protection in their power, but they

could not provide a navy for that purpose.

SATURDAY January 25.

_Naval Establishment._

Mr. QUINCY.--Mr. Speaker, I rise to address you, on this occasion,

with no affected diffidence, and with many doubts concerning the

expediency of taking any part in this debate. On the one hand, the

subject has been discussed with a zeal, industry, and talent, which

leave but little scope for novelty, either in topic or illustration.

On the other hand, arguments from this side of the House, in favor of

this question, are received with so natural a jealousy, that I know not

whether more may not be lost than gained by so unpropitious a support.

Indeed, sir, if this subject had been discussed on narrow or temporary

or party principles, I should have been silent. On such ground, I could

not condescend to debate--I could not hope to influence. But, the

scale of discussion has been enlarged and liberal--relative rather to

the general system, than to the particular exigency. In almost every

respect, it has been honorable to the House, and auspicious to the

prospects of the nation. In such a state of feeling and sentiment, I

could not refrain from indulging the hope that suggestions, even from

so favorite a quarter, would be received with candor--perhaps with

attention. And, when I consider the deep interest which the State from

which I have the honor to be a Representative has, according to my

apprehension, in the event, I cannot permit the opportunity entirely to

pass, without bringing my small tribute of reflection to the general

stock of the House.

The object I shall chiefly attempt to enforce, is, the necessity and

duty of a systematic protection of our maritime rights, by maritime

means. I would call the thoughtful and intelligent men of this House

and nation to the contemplation of the essential connection between a

naval force, proportionate to the circumstances of our seacoast, the

extent of our commerce, and the inherent enterprise of our people;

I say, sir, I would call them to the contemplation of the essential

connection between such a naval force and the safety, prosperity, and

existence, of our Union. In the course of my observations, and as

a subsidiary argument, I shall also attempt to show the connection

between the adoption of the principle of a systematic maintenance of

our maritime rights, by maritime means, and relief from our present

national embarrassments.

I confess to you, Mr. Speaker, I never can look--indeed, in my opinion,

no American statesman ought ever to look--on any question touching

the vital interests of this nation, or of any of its component

parts, without keeping at all times in distinct view the nature of

our political association, and the character of the independent

sovereignties which compose it. Among States, the only sure and

permanent bond of union is _interest_. And the vital interests of

States, although they may be sometimes obscured, can never, for a

very long time, be misapprehended. The natural protection which the

essential interests of the great component parts of our political

association require will be sooner or later understood by the States

concerned in those interests. If a protection, upon system, be not

provided, it is impossible that discontent should not result. And

need I tell statesmen, that, when great local discontent is combined

in those sections with great physical power, and with acknowledged

portions of sovereignty, the inbred ties of nature will be too strong

for the artificial ties of parchment compact. Hence it results

that the essential interests of the great component parts of our

association ought to be the polar lights of all our statesmen--by

them they should guide their course. According to the bearings and

variations of those lights, should the statesmen of such a country

adjust their policy--always bearing in mind two assurances, as

fundamental principles of action, which the nature of things teaches,

that, although temporary circumstances--party spirit, local rivalries,

personal jealousies, suggestions of subordinate interests--may weaken,

or even destroy, for a time, the influence of the leading and permanent

interests of any great section of the country, yet those interests

must ultimately and necessarily predominate, and swallow up all these

local, and temporary, and personal, and subordinate considerations;

in other words, the minor interests will soon begin to realize the

essential connection which exists between their prosperity and the

prosperity of those great interests which, in such sections of the

country, nature has made predominant; and that no political connection

among free States can be lasting, or ought to be, which systematically

oppresses, or systematically refuses to protect, the vital interests of

any of the sovereignties which compose it.

I have recurred to these general considerations, to introduce and

elucidate this principle, which is the basis of my argument, that,

as it is the incumbent duty of every nation to protect its essential

interests, so it is the most impressive and critical duty of a

nation, composed of a voluntary association of vast, powerful, and

independent States, to protect the essential interests of all its great

component parts. And I add, that this protection must not be formal or

fictitious, but that it must be proportionate to the greatness of those

interests, and of a nature to give content to the States concerned in

their protection.

In reference to this principle, the course of my reflections will

be guided by two general inquiries--the nature of the interest to

be protected, and the nature of the protection to be extended. In

pursuing these inquiries, I shall touch very slightly, if at all, on

the abstract duty of protection, which is the very end of all political

associations, and, without the attainment of which, they are burdens

and no blessings. But I shall keep it mainly in my purpose to establish

the connection between a naval force and commercial prosperity; and to

show the nature of the necessity, and the degree of our capacity, to

give to our maritime rights a maritime protection.

In contemplating the nature of the interest to be protected, three

prominent features strike the eye, and direct the course of reflection,

viz: its locality, its greatness, and its permanency.

The locality of any great interest, in an association of States such

as compose this Union, will be a circumstance of primary importance,

in the estimation of every wise statesman. When a great interest

is equally diffused over the whole mass, it may be neglected or

oppressed or even abandoned, with less hazard of internal dissension.

The equality of the pressure lightens the burden. The common nature

of the interest removes the causes of jealousy. A concern equally

affecting the happiness of every part of the nation, it is natural to

suppose, is equally dear to all, and equally understood by all. Hence

results acquiescence in any artificial or political embarrassment of

it. Sectional fears and suspicions, in such case, have no food for

support, and no stimulant for activity. But it is far otherwise when

a great interest is, from its nature, either wholly, or in a very

great proportion, local. In relation to such a local interest, it is

impossible that jealousies and suspicions should not arise, whenever

it is obstructed by any artificial or political embarrassment; and

it is also impossible that they should not be, in a greater or less

degree, just. It is true, of the wisest and the best and the most

thoughtful of our species, that they are so constituted as not deeply

to realize the importance of interests which affect them not at all, or

very remotely. Every local circle of States, as well as of individuals,

has a set of interests, in the prosperity of which, the happiness of

the section to which they belong is identified; in relation to which

interests, the hopes and the fears, the reasonings and the schemes,

of the inhabitants of such sections are necessarily fashioned and

conducted. It is morally impossible that those concerned in such

sectional interests, should not look with some degree of jealousy on

schemes adopted in relation to those interests, and prosecuted by men,

a majority of whom have a very remote or very small stake in them.

And this jealousy must rise to an extreme height, when the course of

measures adopted, whether they have relation to the management or the

protection of such interests, wholly contravene the opinions and the

practical experience of the persons immediately concerned in them. This

course of reflection has a tendency to illustrate this idea--that,

as in every political association it is of primary importance that

the great interests of each local section should be skilfully and

honestly managed and protected, so, in selecting the mode and means

of management and protection, an especial regard should be had to the

content and rational satisfaction of those most deeply concerned in

such sectional interests. Theories and speculations of the closet,

however abundant in a show of wisdom, are never to be admitted to take

the place of those principles of conduct in which experience has shown

the prosperity and safety of such interests to consist. Practical

knowledge, and that sagacity which results from long attention to great

interests, never fail to inspire a just self-confidence in relation

to those interests--a confidence not to be browbeaten by authority,

nor circumvented by any general reasoning. And, in a national point of

view, it is scarcely of more importance that the course adopted should

be wise, than that content and rational satisfaction should be given.

On this topic of locality, I shall confine myself to one or two very

plain statements. It seems sufficient to observe, that commerce is,

from the nature of things, the leading interest of more than one-half,

and that it is the predominant interest of more than one-third, of

the people of the United States. The States north of the Potomac

contain nearly four millions of souls; and surely it needs no proof

to convince the most casual observer, that the proportion which the

commercial interest bears to the other interests of that great section

of the Union, is such as entitles it to the denomination of _leading

interest_. The States north of the Hudson contain nearly two and a

half millions of souls; and surely there is as little need of proof

to show that the proportion the commercial interest bears to the other

interests of that Northern section of the Union, is such as entitles

it there to the denomination of _predominating interest_. In all the

country between the Potomac and the Hudson the interest of commerce is

so great, in proportion to the other interests, that its embarrassment

clogs and weakens the energy of every other description of industry.

Yet, the agricultural and manufacturing interests of this section are

of a nature and a magnitude, both in respect of the staples of the one

and the objects of the other, as to render them, in a very considerable

degree, independent of the commercial. And, although they feel the

effect of the obstruction of commerce, the feeling may be borne

for a long time, without much individual suffering, or any general

distress. But, in the country north of the Hudson, the proportion and

connection of these great interests are different. Both agriculture

and manufactures have there grown up in more intimate relation to

commerce. The industry of that section has its shape and energy from

commercial prosperity. To the construction, the supply, and the support

of navigation, its manufactures have a direct or indirect reference;

and it is not very different with its agriculture. A country divided

into small farms, among a population great compared with its extent,

requires quick circulation and easy processes in the exchange of its

commodities. This can only be obtained by an active and prosperous

commerce.

But, perhaps, the greatness of this interest, and our pecuniary ability

to protect it, may be made more strikingly apparent by a comparison

of our commerce with that of Britain, in the single particular of

export. I state, then, as a fact, of which any man may satisfy himself

by a reference to McPherson's Annals of Commerce, where the tables

of British export may be found, that, taking the nine years prior to

the war of our Revolution--from 1766 to 1774 inclusive--the total

average export of Great Britain was £16,000,000 sterling; equal to

$71,000,000--an amount less, by $10,000,000, than the present total

average export of the United States. And again, taking the nine years

beginning with 1789, and ending with 1797, inclusive, the total annual

average export of Great Britain was £24,000,000 sterling--equal to

$106,000,000--which is less, by $2,000,000, than the total export of

the United States in 1807. It is true, that this is the _official

value_ of the British export, and that the _real value_ is somewhat

higher--perhaps thirty per cent. This circumstance, although it in a

degree diminishes the approximation of the American to the British

commerce, in point of amount does not materially affect the argument.

Upon the basis of her commerce, Great Britain maintains a maritime

force of 800 or 1,000 vessels of war. And will it be seriously

contended, that, upon the basis of a commerce like ours, thus treading

upon the heels of British greatness, we are absolutely without the

ability of maintaining the security of our seaboard, the safety of our

cities, and the unobstructed course of our coasting trade?

By recurring to the permanency of this interest, the folly and madness

of this negligence and misplaced meanness--for it does not deserve

the name of economy--will be still more distinctly exhibited. If this

commerce were the mushroom growth of a night--if it had its vigor

from the temporary excitement and the accumulated nutriment which

warring elements in Europe had swept from the places of their natural

deposit--then, indeed, there might be some excuse for a temporizing

policy touching so transitory an interest. But commerce in the Eastern

States is of no foreign growth, and of no adventitious seed; its root

is of a fibre which almost two centuries have nourished; and the

perpetuity of its destiny is written in legible characters, as well in

the nature of the country, as in the disposition of its inhabitants.

Indeed, sir, look along your whole coast, from Passamaquoddy to Capes

Henry and Charles, and behold the deep and far-winding creeks and

inlets, the noble basins, the projecting headlands, the majestic

rivers; and those sounds and bays, which are more like inland seas,

than any thing called by those names in other quarters of the globe!

Can any man do this, and not realize that the destiny of the people

inhabiting such a country is essentially maritime? Can any man do this,

without being impressed by the conviction, that, although the poor

projects of politicians may embarrass, for a time, the dispositions

growing out of the condition of such a country, yet that nature will be

too strong for cobweb regulations, and will vindicate her rights with

certain effect--perhaps with awful perils? No nation ever did or ever

ought to resist such allurements and invitations to a particular mode

of industry. The purposes of Providence relative to the destination of

men are to be gathered from the circumstances in which his beneficence

has placed them; and to refuse to make use of the means of prosperity

which his goodness has put into our hands, what is it but spurning

at his bounty, and rejecting the blessings which his infinite wisdom

has designated for us, by the very nature of his allotments? The

employments of industry, connected with navigation and commercial

enterprise, are precious to the people of that quarter of the country,

by ancient prejudice, not less than recent profit. The occupation is

rendered dear and venerable, by all the cherished associations of our

infancy, and all the sage and prudential maxims of our ancestors. And,

as to the lessons of encouragement derived from recent experience, what

nation, within a similar period, ever received so many that were sweet

and salutary? What nation, in so short a time, ever before ascended to

such a height of commercial greatness?

Having concluded what I intended to suggest, in relation to the nature

of the interest to be protected, I proceed to consider the nature of

the protection which it is our duty to extend. And here, Mr. Speaker,

I am necessitated to make an observation which is so simple and so

obvious, that were it not for the arguments urged against the principle

of maritime protection, I should have deemed the mere mention of it to

require an apology. The remark is this: that rights, in their nature

local, can only be maintained where they exist, and not where they do

not exist. If you had a field to defend in Georgia, it would be very

strange to put up a fence in Massachusetts. And yet, how does this

differ from invading Canada, for the purpose of defending our maritime

rights? I beg not to be understood, Mr. Speaker, by this remark, as

intending to chill the ardor for the Canada expedition. It is very

true, that, to possess ourselves of the Canadas, and Nova Scotia, and

their dependencies, it would cost these United States, at the least

estimate, $50,000,000; and that Great Britain's national pride, and

her pledge of protection to the people of that country, being put

out of the question, she would sell you the whole territory for half

the money. I make no objection, however, on this account. On the

contrary, for the purposes of the present argument, I may admit that

pecuniary calculation ought to be put out of the field, when spirit

is to be shown, or honor vindicated. I only design to inquire how our

maritime rights are protected by such invasion. Suppose that in every

land-project you are successful--suppose both the Canadas, Quebec,

Halifax, every thing to the North pole, yours by fair conquest--are

your rights on the ocean, therefore, secure? Does your flag float

afterwards in honor? Are your seamen safe from impressment? Is your

course along the highway of nations unobstructed? No one pretends

it. No one has or can show, by any logical deduction, or any detail

of facts, that the loss of those countries would so compress Great

Britain as to induce her to abandon for one hour any of her maritime

pretensions. What then results? Why, sir--what is palpable as the

day--that maritime rights are only to be maintained by maritime means.

This species of protection must be given, or all clamor about maritime

rights will be understood, by the people interested in them, to be

hollow or false; or (what is worse) an intention to co-operate with the

enemies of our commerce in a still further embarrassment of it.

In considering this subject of maritime protection, I shall recur to

the nature and degree of it, and to our capacity to extend it. And

there we are always met, at the very threshold, with this objection:

"A naval force requires much time to get it into readiness, and the

exigency will be past before the preparation can be completed." This

want of foresight in times past, is made an apology for want of

foresight in the time present. We were unwise in the beginning, and

unwise we resolve to continue until the end of the chapter. We refuse

to do any thing until the moment of exigency, and then it is too late.

Thus our improvidence is made sponsor for our disinclination. But what

is the law of nature and the dictate of wisdom, on this subject? The

casualties of life, the accidents to which man is exposed, are the

modes established by Providence for his instruction. This is the law

of our nature. Hence it is that adversity is said to keep a school for

certain people who will learn in no other. Hence, too, the poet likens

it to "a toad, ugly and venomous, which bears a precious jewel in his

head." And, in another place, but with the same general relation, "out

of this thorn danger, we pluck the flower safety." This law is just as

relative to nations, as it is to individuals. For, notwithstanding all

the vaunting of statesmen, their whole business is to apply an enlarged

common sense to the affairs intrusted to their management.

Touching the nature and degree of that maritime protection, which

it may be wise in this nation to extend to its maritime interests,

it seems to me that our exertions should rather be excited than

graduated, by the present exigency; that our duty is to inquire, upon

a general scale, what our commercial citizens have, in this respect,

a right to claim; and what is the unquestionable obligation of a

commercial nation, to so great a class of its interests. For this

purpose, my observations will have reference rather to the principles

of the system, than to the provisions of the bill now under debate.

Undoubtedly, an appropriation for the building of ten, or any other

additional number of frigates, would be so distinct a manifestation of

the intention of the National Legislature to extend to commerce its

natural protection, as in itself to outweigh any theoretic preference

for a maritime force of higher character. I cannot, therefore, but

cordially support an appropriation for a species of protection so

important and desirable. Yet in an argument, having relation to

the system, rather than to the occasion, I trust I shall have the

indulgence of the House, if my course of reflections should take a

wider range than the propositions on the table, and embrace, within the

scope of remark, the general principles by which the nature and degree

of systematical naval protection should in my judgment be regulated.

Touching that branch of interest which is most precious to commercial

men, it is impossible that there can be any mistake. For however dear

the interests of property or of life, exposed upon the ocean, may be

to their owners or their friends; yet the safety of our altars and of

our firesides, of our cities and of our seaboard, must, from the nature

of things, be entwined into the affections by ties incomparably more

strong and tender. And it happens that both national pride and honor

are peculiarly identified with the support of these primary objects of

commercial interest.

With respect to the nature and extent of this naval force, some

difference of opinion may arise, according to the view taken of the

primary objects of protection. For myself, I consider that those

objects are first to be protected, in the safety of which the national

character and happiness are most deeply interested. And these are

chiefly concerned, beyond all question, in the preservation of our

maritime settlements from pillage and our coast from violence. For

this purpose it is requisite that there should be a ship of war for

the harbor of every great city of the United States, equal, in point

of force, to the usual grade of ships-of-the-line of the maritime

belligerents. These ships might be so instructed as to act singly or

together, as circumstances might require. My reason for the selection

of this species of force is, that it puts every city and great harbor

of the United States in a state of security from the insults, and the

inhabitants of your seacoast from the depredation, of any single ship

of war of any nation. To these should be added a number of frigates

and smaller vessels of war. By such means our coasting trade might

be protected, the mouths of our harbors secured (in particular that

of the Mississippi) from the buccaneers of the West Indies, and,

hereafter perhaps, from those of South America. A system of protection,

graduated upon a scale so conformable to the nature of the country,

and to the greatness of the commercial interest, would tend to quiet

that spirit of jealousy which so naturally and so justly begins to

spring up among the States. Those interested in commerce would care

little what local influences predominated, or how the ball of power

vibrated among our factions, provided an efficient protection of their

essential interests, upon systematic principles, was not only secured

by the letter of the constitution, but assured by a spirit pervading

every description of their rulers. But it is said that "we have not

capacity to maintain such a naval force." Is it want of pecuniary or

want of physical capacity? In relation to our pecuniary capacity, I

will not condescend to add any proof to that plain statement already

exhibited, showing that we have an annual commercial exposure, equal to

six hundred millions of dollars, and that two-thirds of one per cent.

upon this amount of value, or four millions of dollars, is more than is

necessary, if annually and systematically appropriated, for this great

object; so anxiously and rightfully desired by your seaboard, and so

essential to the honor and obligations of the nation. I will only make

a single other statement, by way of illustrating the smallness of the

annual appropriations necessary for the attainment of this important

purpose. The annual appropriation of one-sixth of one per cent. on

the amount of the value of the whole annual commercial exposure,

(one million of dollars,) is sufficient to build, in two years, six

seventy-four gun ships; and taking the average expense in peace and

war, the annual appropriation of the same sum is sufficient to maintain

them afterwards, in a condition for efficient service. This objection

of pecuniary inability may be believed in the interior country, where

the greatness of the commercial property and all the tender obligations

connected with its preservation, are not realized. But, in the cities

and in the commercial States, the extent of the national resources is

more truly estimated. They know the magnitude of the interests at stake

and their essential claim to protection. Why, sir, were we seriously

to urge this objection of pecuniary incapacity to the commercial men

of Massachusetts, they would laugh us to scorn. Let me state a single

fact. In the year 1745, the State, then the colony of Massachusetts

Bay, included a population of 220,000 souls, and yet, in that infant

state of the country, it owned a fleet consisting of three ships,

one of which carried twenty guns, three snows, one brig, and three

sloops; being an aggregate of ten vessels of war. These partook of the

dangers, and shared in the glory, of that expedition which terminated

with the surrender of Louisburg. Comparing the population, the extent

of territory, the capital, and all the other resources of this great

nation, with the narrow means of the colony of Massachusetts at that

period of its history, it is not extravagant to assert that the fleet

it then possessed, in proportion to its pecuniary resources, was

greater than would be, in proportion to the resources of the United

States, a fleet of fifty sail-of-the-line and one hundred frigates.

The general effect of the policy I advocate, is to produce confidence

at home and respect abroad. These are twin shoots from the same stock,

and never fail to flourish or fade together. Confidence is a plant of

no mushroom growth and of no artificial texture. It springs only from

sage counsels and generous endeavors. The protection you extend must

be efficient and suited to the nature of the object you profess to

maintain. If it be neither adequate nor appropriate, your wisdom may

be doubted, your motives may be distrusted, but in vain you expect

confidence. The inhabitants of the seaboard will inquire of their

own senses and not of your logic, concerning the reality of their

protection.

As to respect abroad, what course can be more certain to insure it?

What object more honorable, what more dignified than to behold a

great nation pursuing wise ends by appropriate means; rising to adopt

a series of systematic exertions, suited to her power, and adequate

to her purposes? What object more consolatory to the friends--what

more paralyzing to the enemies of our Union--than to behold the

natural jealousies and rivalries, which are the acknowledged dangers

of our political condition, subsiding or sacrificing? What sight

more exhilarating than to see this great nation once more walking

forth among the nations of the earth, under the protection of no

foreign shield? Peaceful because powerful--powerful because united in

interests, and amalgamated by concentration of those interests in the

national affections.

But, let the opposite policy prevail; let the essential interests of

the great component parts of this Union find no protection under the

national arm--instead of safety let them realize oppression, and the

seeds of discord and dissolution are inevitably sown in a soil the

best fitted for their root, and affording the richest nourishment for

their expansion. It may be a long time before they ripen. But, sooner

or later, they will assuredly burst forth in all their destructive

energies. In the intermediate period, what aspect does a Union, thus

destitute of cement, present? Is it that of a nation keen to discern,

and strong to resist, violations of its sovereignty? It has rather

the appearance of a casual collection of semi-barbarous clans, with

the forms of civilization, and with the rude and rending passions of

the savage state. In truth, powerful--yet, as to any foreign effect,

imbecile--rich, in the goods of fortune, yet wanting that inherent

spirit without which a nation is poor indeed; their strength exhausted

by struggles for local power; their moral sense debased by low

intrigues for personal popularity, or temporary pre-eminence; all their

thoughts turned not to the safety of the State, but to the elevation

of a chieftain. A people presenting such an aspect, what have they to

expect abroad? What but pillage, insult, and scorn?

The choice is before us. Persist in refusing efficient maritime

protection; persist in the system of commercial restrictions; what now

is, perhaps, anticipation, will hereafter be history.

Mr. FISK said that, when this subject was first presented to the

House, he felt inclined to vote for a small increase of the Naval

Establishment; but it now appears that, what is asked for is considered

only as laying a foundation for a great system--a system which, he

feared, if carried into execution, might change the Government.

Mr. F. contended that the Navy never had, and never could protect our

commerce. Like standing armies, he considered navies as dangerous to

liberty. As to the constitutional provision, with respect to a navy,

it is nothing more than a mere grant of power, which Congress is at

liberty to use or not, as they may deem it necessary or expedient.

Though he had listened with candor to all the arguments which had been

used in favor of an increase of this Establishment at the present time,

he was far from being convinced that such an increase, at present,

is either necessary or expedient. It appeared to him that every

nation which has embarked, to any extent, in Navy Establishments,

has been eventually crushed by them. Whether you go back to ancient,

or look upon modern Europe, you will find navies have not afforded

that protection which gentlemen are desirous of persuading the House

they are capable of affording. Has the navy of Russia protected her

commerce? There are in the Russian dominions from twenty-five to thirty

millions of people; but, by every account we have of them, their

situation is not very enviable; nor have they any great degree of

commerce to protect. Where are the navies of Sweden and Denmark? The

latter, it is well known, were swept away and destroyed by the British

fleet; and the fleet of Sweden serves only to keep the country in

poverty to maintain it. A navy looks pretty well in theory; but look

into the experience of nations, and it will be found to have been the

bane of every country which has had any thing to do with it. We should

want wisdom, therefore, to pursue a system which has proved so ruinous

to others.

With respect to Great Britain herself, it had been said that her navy

had been the basis of her wealth and prosperity. Mr. F. said he did

not envy the situation of that country. The glory and honor which such

nations are in the habit of acquiring, prove a curse to them in the end

by enslaving them with expense.

As to the protection and encouragement of commerce, he believed

commerce would always flourish best when left to itself unshackled by

regulations. It will then be carried to every part of the globe. In

the course of the debate, it had been said that the exports of Great

Britain, in 1797, were not greater than ours before our commerce was

restricted, though that nation had possessed a navy which had triumphed

on the ocean for half a century. How did this happen? It was owing,

said Mr. F., to the freedom of our commerce.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINCY) had spoken of the naval

force formerly possessed by Massachusetts. But, what security did those

ships afford? They were of no use, as he believed; they were nothing

but a heavy expense to the State; and he believed the merchants had

found their commerce in a much better state since, than it was when

they were in being.

Gentlemen speak of the embarrassments of our commerce, as if they were

owing to our not having a navy; but, if they will look around, they

will find that those countries which have navies have not escaped; our

embarrassments have arisen from the wrongs committed against us by

other nations, which we had no power of preventing.

It had been shown that the Navy Establishment proposed could not be

supported but by an expense which would prove ruinous to this country.

Rather than incur this expense, he was willing to dispense with the

honor supposed to be attached to such an Establishment. Mr. F. was

opposed to this system, too, because it could not be supported without

having recourse to a force similar to impressment to obtain a number of

seamen sufficient to man such a fleet. He was anxious to protect every

part of the Union; but he could not consent to support any scheme so

pregnant with mischief to the country, as he considered this large Navy

Establishment to be.

The question on agreeing to strike out the section for building the

frigates was carried--yeas 62, nays 59.

The next question was, on agreeing with the Committee of the Whole

to fill the blank for providing ship timber and other imperishable

materials, with the words two hundred thousand dollars, which was

carried--yeas 82, nays 37.

Another question was on agreeing with the Committee of the Whole to

make the above appropriation for three years, viz: for the years 1812,

1813, and 1814. This motion was carried--yeas 67, nays 52.

The next question was on agreeing with the Committee of the Whole to

appropriate one hundred thousand dollars for providing a dock yard.

Mr. RHEA moved to strike out the section; but this motion being decided

to be out of order, Mr. D. R. WILLIAMS spoke against the propriety of

appropriating money, without estimate, for an object not wanted until

we went about building seventy-fours. The House adjourned, on motion of

Mr. SMILIE, without taking the question.

TUESDAY, January 28.

_Naval Establishment._

The order of the day, viz: the bill concerning the Naval Establishment,

was then taken up, and the question on agreeing to the report of

the Committee of the Whole, to fill up the blank in the section

providing a dock yard, with one hundred thousand dollars, being under

consideration, Mr. CHEVES stated the grounds upon which the committee

had recommended this provision of the bill, and replied to some remarks

of his colleague (Mr. WILLIAMS) made yesterday.

Mr. RHEA then moved to strike out the whole section in relation to the

dock yard; which, after some little debate, was carried--yeas 56, nays

52.

Mr. BLACKLEDGE moved a new section to the bill, providing for the

building of four seventy-four gunships. As an inducement to the House

to adopt this new section, he stated there were sufficient timber and

guns on hand; that the whole expense would not exceed $1,300,000,

and the guns and timber being already provided, an appropriation of

$824,000 only, would be necessary to complete them.

The question was negatived--yeas 33, nays 76.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.

MONDAY, March 2.

_Divorces in the District._

Mr. LEWIS, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, made the

following report:

The Committee for the District of Columbia, to whom were

referred the petitions of Jane Deakins, praying for a divorce

from William Deakins, and of David Beck, praying for a divorce

from Ellen, his wife, submit the following report:

The only object which the petitioners can have in view is

to be enabled, respectively, to enter into new contracts of

marriage. Were marriages only a _civil institution_, the courts

of law would be open to all parties seeking the redress now

prayed for, for alleged breach of the marriage contract: but

it is something more; it is a _divine ordinance_, and has been

pronounced such by the highest legal as well as spiritual

authority. The competency of any human tribunal to dissolve

its sacred obligations may well be doubted. The justice or

policy, under any circumstances, of weakening the matrimonial

institution, upon the purity of which depends the very fabric

of society itself, may be boldly denied. Divorces are not

merely the effect of corruption of manners; they are the cause

also. They hold out temptations to crime which human infirmity

cannot at all times resist. They hold out incentives to that

adultery which they are called in to remedy. Extreme cases may

indeed be put, but they are rare; both parties are generally

in fault. Shall a very few individuals, who present themselves

in a questionable shape, be debarred from contracting a second

marriage, or shall the foundations of society be loosened

for their special accommodation? Shall the heaviest public

injury be encountered for the convenience of those, who, for

the most part, have shown how little reliance is to be placed

upon their virtue or discretion? Shall incentives to nuptial

infidelity be presented to the great body of society for the

personal gratification of a few unfortunate members, diffusing

dissatisfaction and discontent, where, but for the deceitful

hope of divorce, they had never been known?

The frequency of divorces may be taken as an unerring criterion

of the depravity of morals. A respectable authority has

declared, that "from the Reformation to the commencement of

the eighteenth century, there had occurred only four instances

of Parliamentary divorce; but, in the present reign, they

had increased to the enormous number of one hundred and

ninety-three." It is notorious that the crime which is made

the groundwork of the divorce, is frequently committed with

the most "deliberate and unblushing indifference," for the

purpose of enabling the adulterer and adultress thereafter

to intermarry. Your committee will not attempt to pursue the

subject further. It is calculated to inspire the most solemn

reflections. They are opposed to divorce upon principle, as

tending to excite family discord; as bearing hard upon the

weaker sex, whom it is especially incumbent upon us to protect

and to cherish; above all, as weakening the matrimonial tie,

upon the sanctity of which depend "all the charities of father,

son, and brother." The committee will not enter into the

question how far it may be wise or politic to hold forth to the

world this District as an asylum for those who wish to obtain

absolution from the marriage vow. They will content themselves

with submitting the following resolution:

_Resolved_, That the prayer of the petitioners ought not to be

granted.

Referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next.

WEDNESDAY, March 4.

_Constitution of Orleans._

The following message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES:

_To the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States_:

At the request of the convention assembled in the Territory of

Orleans on the 22d day of November last, I transmit to Congress

the proceedings of that body in pursuance of the act, entitled

"An act to enable the people of the Territory of Orleans to

form a constitution and State government, and for the admission

of the said State into the Union on an equal footing with the

original States, and for other purposes."