The resolution recommended by the report was negatived, 54 to 31: and

a resolution offered by Mr. GOLD, recommending a provision by law for

these claims, after some objections from Mr. ALSTON, was agreed to, 39

to 36.

WEDNESDAY, January 8.

_Battle of Tippecanoe._

Mr. MCKEE, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred

the Message of the President, transmitting two letters from Governor

Harrison, reporting the particulars and issue of the expedition under

his command against the hostile Indians on the Wabash River, and

the memorials of the Legislature of the Indiana Territory, and the

officers and soldiers who served in the said expedition, presented

the twenty-fourth ultimo, made a report thereon; which was read and

committed to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow. The report is as

follows:

The committee to whom was referred the Message of the President

of the United States, transmitting two letters from Governor

Harrison, of the Indiana Territory, reporting the particulars

and the issue of the expedition under his command against the

hostile Indians on the Wabash, and to whom was also referred

the memorial of the General Assembly of the Indiana Territory,

and the memorial of the officers and soldiers of the militia of

Knox county, in the Indiana Territory, who served in the late

campaign under the command of Governor Harrison, report:

That they have had the several matters to them referred under

their consideration, and have given to them that attention

which their importance seems to merit.

It appears to the committee, that the troops under the command

of Governor Harrison may very properly be termed _raw troops_:

very few of the officers, and almost none of the men, had

ever been in actual service; and a considerable portion of

them had been only a few weeks withdrawn from the pursuits of

civil life. The attack made on this quickly-assembled army by

the hostile Indians on the Wabash, when viewed, either as it

relates to the nature of the enemy, the time, or the violence

with which the attack was made, cannot but be considered of

such a character as would have severely tested the collected

firmness of the most able and experienced troops. This attack,

violent and unexpected as it seems to have been, was repelled

by the troops under the command of Governor Harrison, with a

gallantry and good conduct worthy of future imitation. The

whole transaction, in the opinion of the committee, presents to

the American people a new proof that the dauntless spirit of

our ancestors, by whom the war of the Revolution was so ably

and successfully maintained, has not been diminished by more

than thirty years of almost uninterrupted peace, but that it

has been handed down, unimpaired, to their posterity.

In estimating the claims of the army on the Government of the

United States, it is worthy of remark, that the nature of the

country, as well as of the enemy to be encountered, subjected

the army to many extreme hardships, and equal dangers, where

every thing was hazarded, and but little could be gained,

except the regard of their country.

The volunteers and militia (to whose claims the memorials

referred to the committee particularly relate) were in actual

service but a short time, for which alone they are entitled

to pay by law; the compensation, therefore, to which they are

entitled, is not at all commensurate to the services rendered,

and the dangers incurred. Besides, many of the officers and men

who fell, or were wounded, in the battle of the 7th November,

1811, were purchasers of the public lands, for which they were

indebted to the United States; which debt falls due in a short

time, and the penalty of forfeiture will be incurred if the

debt is not paid. It would be unjust to inflict a penalty so

severe on the disconsolate widows and orphans of those officers

and soldiers of the volunteers and militia, who, in common with

their brother officers and soldiers of the regular troops, fell

in their country's cause, in a manner so distinguished, that

nothing was wanting but a great occasion, interesting to the

feelings of the American people, to have crowned their names

with unfading laurels.

As an evidence, therefore, of the regard due to the bravery and

ability displayed by the troops under the command of Governor

Harrison, in the battle of the 7th November, 1811, as well as

to relieve the representatives of those who were killed in

the action, from the pecuniary losses incurred in consequence

thereof, the committee respectfully submit the following

resolutions:

1. _Resolved_, That one month's pay ought to be allowed, in

addition to the common allowance, to the officers, (according

to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers and

privates of the regulars, volunteers, and militia, and to the

legal representatives of those who were killed or have since

died of their wounds, composing the army under the command of

Gov. Harrison, in the late campaign on the Wabash.

2. _Resolved_, That five years' half-pay ought to be allowed

to the legal representatives of the officers, (according to

the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers, and

privates, of the volunteers and militia who were killed in the

battle of the 7th November, 1811, or who have since died of

their wounds.

3. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made by law to place

on the pension list the officers, (according to the rank which

they held,) the non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, of the

volunteers and militia who served in the late campaign on the

Wabash, under the command of Governor Harrison, and who have

been wounded or disabled in the said campaign.

4. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made by law to pay

for the horses and other property of individuals lost in, or in

consequence of, the said battle.

5. _Resolved_, That the further time of ---- years ought to be

allowed to the officers and soldiers who were wounded, and to

the legal representatives of those who were killed, in the said

battle, to complete the payments due or which may fall due to

the United States on any purchases of the public lands made by

them before the said battle.

THURSDAY, January 9.

_Ursuline Nuns at New Orleans._

The petition which the Speaker laid before the House yesterday, from

the Ursuline nuns at New Orleans, was enclosed to him and recommended

by Governor Claiborne. It prayed for an exchange of the military

hospital for some lots which they hold in that city better calculated

for a hospital. After the petition was read,

Mr. DAWSON observed that he had received a letter from Governor

Claiborne relative to that petition, and in confirmation of the facts

therein stated. This community of nuns is a most respectable and useful

member of society, the whole of their temporal cares being directed

to the education of female youth. They are that community which some

years ago presented a most elegant address to the then President of the

United States, and received from him an equally elegant answer.

I am well assured that the lots which they wish to exchange are more

valuable, and better suited for the erection of a hospital than those

on which the hospital now stands. I therefore move that the petition

and accompanying papers be referred to a select committee, who will no

doubt converse with the Secretary of War on the subject.

This was agreed to, and Mr. DAWSON, Mr. LOWNDES, and Mr. MACON, were

appointed the committee.

FRIDAY, January 17.

_Quartermaster's Department._

The bill from the Senate "for the establishment of a Quartermaster's

Department" came up on its third reading.

Mr. ALSTON said, if the House would pay attention to the duty of the

Purveyor of Public Supplies, and examine the powers given to the

Quartermaster General in this bill, it would appear evident that there

was no necessity for both offices, and it certainly was not the wish of

the House to erect two great departments to perform the same duties.

He could perceive no way in which one officer was to be a check upon

the other. He liked the bill as it came from the Senate better than as

amended, as he saw no necessity for retaining the office of Purveyor.

Mr. TALLMADGE observed, that the great object of this bill, and the

only one which made it necessary, was to provide for a Quartermaster

General's Department, instead of military agents, as employed at

present. There never was such an officer in the staff department in

the Revolutionary war. The late Secretary of War, as well as the

present, were in favor of this change. The military agents, without

much responsibility, had nearly controlled the whole War Department.

An attempt was made two years ago to effect this change, but it then

failed. The office of Purveyor of Public Supplies was instituted

long before that of Military Agent. The duties of the Quartermaster

General and Purveyor are very different. The former is a highly

respectable and confidential officer; he is next in consequence to

the Commander-in-chief, with whom he has frequent communication.

Every movement of the Army is first communicated to him. He ought to

be a military character. It is his duty to receive and deliver out

the necessary supplies for the Army, and to attend to its movements.

The duties of the Purveyor is to purchase, under the direction of the

Secretary of the Treasury, arms, clothing, hospital stores, and every

other article necessary for the Army. So that there is not the least

similarity between the two officers; one being the purchasing, the

other the distributing officer. If the office of Purveyor were to be

done away, the Quartermaster General would have to employ a deputy or

agent to make these purchases, which would be putting too much in the

power of a subordinate officer, and would do away that check which will

exist if the Purveyor be continued, as the purchaser and distributor

of the supplies would be in the same person. The Purveyor is also the

purchaser of goods for the Indian department.

Mr. WILLIAMS rose to prevent any person from falling into the mistake

which the gentleman from North Carolina appeared to have done, by

making remarks applicable to the printed bill (a part of which had been

struck out and other parts amended) instead of the bill read from the

Chair. He deemed it unnecessary to add any thing in reply to what had

been so well said by the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. ALSTON said he had attended to the bill as read, and not to the

printed bill; and insisted that, from the provisions of the bill,

the Secretary of War might direct the Purveyor and Quartermaster to

purchase the same articles. If the bill was what the gentleman from

Connecticut had stated it to be, he should not have objected to it; but

it was not.

Mr. QUINCY had doubts whether both these officers were necessary.

There was no such officer as Purveyor of Public Supplies during the

Revolutionary war. If it were found hereafter that another besides

the Quartermaster General was necessary, he could be appointed. There

ought certainly to be a responsibility attached to the purchase of

supplies, and this might be placed in the Head of the War Department or

Quartermaster General. He had not sufficient light on the subject, to

say that both these officers are necessary. He was in favor of the bill

as it came from the Senate.

Mr. BLOUNT said, that though there was not a Purveyor of Public

Supplies during the Revolutionary war, there was a Clothier, who did

much the same business. If we are going to war, said Mr. B., he did not

see how we could do without a Quartermaster General; and it would be

improper for him to become the purchaser of supplies, which it is the

duty of the Purveyor to purchase, because, as had already been stated,

there would be no check in the business. There must be propriety in

keeping the offices distinct.

Mr. MACON observed, it was impossible to go to war without a

Quartermaster General; for there is no man has so much to do about an

army as this officer. There was always more difficulty in settling the

Quartermaster General's accounts than any other. The only instance

in which a Quartermaster General has to purchase supplies, is when,

by some miscarriage or accident, the supplies from the Commissary or

Purveyor do not arrive in season. It is necessary that such a power

should be vested in this officer, to be used on such extraordinary

occasions. As had been stated by his colleague, though there was no

Purveyor during the Revolution, there were clothiers or agents employed

in different situations, which answered the purpose. The qualifications

necessary for the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very

different; the one ought to be a soldier, the other a merchant.

The bill passed by a large majority.

_Naval Establishment._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill

concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. CHEVES, the Chairman of the Navy Committee, moved to fill the

blank in the first section of the bill with "four hundred and eighty

thousand dollars," and said he believed it to be his duty at this time,

to disclose to the Committee of the Whole the views and motives of the

select committee in reporting the bill. Mr. C. said, I consider this

subject as one of the most important that can be brought before this

House; as a great question, involving, to a considerable extent, the

fate of a species of national defence the most essential and necessary

to the interests of this country. I know, said Mr. C., how many and how

strong are the prejudices, how numerous and how deeply laid are the

errors which I have to encounter in the discussion of this question;

errors and prejudices the more formidable, as they come recommended

by the virtues, and shielded by the estimable motives of those who

indulged them. I have been told that this subject is unpopular, and it

has been not indistinctly hinted, that those who become the zealous

advocates of the bill will not advance by their exertions the personal

estimation in which they may be held by their political associates. I

will not do my political friends the injustice to believe that these

exertions will diminish their confidence; but, could I think otherwise,

I hope I shall never be diverted from a faithful discharge of my

duty by considerations of this kind. I wish to lead no man, and I am

determined not to be blindly led by any man. In acting with a party,

I do so, because I adopt their leading principles and politics as

the best, and because I believe, from the nature of free Government,

it is necessary so to act to give efficiency to the exertions of any

individual; but I do not feel myself, therefore, bound to renounce

my deliberate opinions on all the great interests of the nation, or

to take no independent part in the exertions of the party to which I

belong. I sincerely believe that, if this infant Naval Establishment

be either abandoned or put down, the party who now form the majority

in this House, and in the country, may run great risk of becoming the

minority, not only within these walls, but in the nation.

It has been said, by a strong and lively figure of rhetoric, that

this country is a great land animal, which should not venture into

the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleghanies,

and its great sides swelling to the east and to the west, where do

you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which

has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the

Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other. The figure

explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union

and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature

did not give to the United States a coast of two thousand miles in

extent, not to be used. No; it was intended by this bounty to make

us a great commercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject the

enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? No, it has not and will

not be neglected. A great portion of our people exist but upon the

ocean and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not less truly

than eloquently, said, that "the ocean is their farm," and it must

and will be protected. But how is this protection to be afforded? I

will endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done most cheaply and

effectually by a naval force; and if I succeed in this, I shall hope

for the concurrence of the committee. No proposition appears to me more

true or more obvious, than that it is only by a naval force that our

commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean can be protected. We are

now going to war for the protection of these rights; but in what way,

and under what circumstances? The mode is altogether accidental, and

not founded on the permanent relations or means of the country. It is

not my intention to condemn the course which has been taken. It has

had my hearty concurrence, and my zealous, though feeble, support. I

hope it may be altogether effectual; and I believe it will inflict a

wound which will be felt with poignancy. But it is, notwithstanding,

partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on

our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we

possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the

event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a

naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any

of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers

on the ocean. Does it not then result, inevitably, as the dictate of

common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our

naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has

been heretofore so much neglected, that it is at present in a state

of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whether we will

suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree

of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "if you had asked for no more

than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted

your request." But, for myself, I would not thank any gentleman for

this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to

bring the question fully before the House in the shape in which they

have exposed it. Not to ask merely what it would do to assist by naval

co-operation, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but

principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a

respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of

the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their

determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly to speak to the House,

and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its

fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other.

That a respectable Naval Establishment affords the only effectual means

of causing our commercial rights to be respected, will, as a general

proposition, be denied by few persons, if any. But its adoption by

us is deemed improper by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the

enormous expense which, it is said, the establishment will necessitate,

and the inability of the nation, by any force which it can provide,

to resist, with effect, the immense naval power of Great Britain. Is

it not surprising that so much prejudice should exist against this

establishment on account of its expensiveness, when it is ascertained

that, during the whole eighteen years of its existence, from 1794 to

1811, inclusive, it has cost the Government only $27,175,695? I am

afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in which I hope to

bring conviction home to the minds of the House, is by entering, with

minuteness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and statements;

but the necessity of the case must be my apology for the course which I

shall take. If the House shall have full confidence in my statements,

much will be gained to the argument; for it will be difficult, if not

impossible, for the hearer to follow me through an examination of these

details, as the argument proceeds. For this confidence, therefore, I

will venture to hope. I believe the statements on which I rely to be

accurate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will

state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them

into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them for their

own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of

this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident

management, has but little exceeded $1,500,000, which is not much

more than twice the amount of the usual annual appropriation for our

economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed that it has

been much more expensive than the Military Establishment, but I will

show that this is not really the case. The expense of the Military

Establishment, from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been $37,541,669,

giving an annual average of $1,700,000, or $200,000 per annum more

than that of the Navy. It thus appears that, in the gross amount, as

well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive

than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of

the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been

most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service

of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat

of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the

Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, were victorious

wherever it encountered an enemy, and probably laid the foundation of

the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean,

its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled,

in an unexampled manner, the piratical and barbarous foe, and crowned

itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism, which had not

been exceeded by the exploits of any nation, and which must go down

to a distant posterity. I mean not, by this comparison, to say any

thing injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference

to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled.

Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned

an expense not warranted by its force or its services; and I cannot

deny but that, from a variety of causes, the expense may have been

unnecessarily great; an argument cannot thence be fairly drawn against

its future use--the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors

lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest

orator, and one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity, reasoned. The

great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen, by his impetuous

eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on

their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he,

"were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the

honor of our State demanded, there were then no hope of recovery." So

may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been

the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be

hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskilful

expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of the abuse; to

effect this reform, is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been

less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee

have declared in their report, that "a naval force within due limits

and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence

of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between

the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier

and that of an adequate naval defence. The experience of modern naval

warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of

ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier,

though they are more numerous and better than they have been at

any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable

naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is

believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a

complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be

oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely

fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of

dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid

in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two

thousand miles to protect, the expense of which could not be borne by

the nation. A better defence would be furnished by such a naval force

as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less

expense.

The superior cheapness of naval defence seems to me to be

satisfactorily established, and I am next to prove that the force

proposed--I mean twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates--are

sufficient to protect us in our own seas, and defend our ports and

harbors against the naval power of Great Britain. The first evidence

that is offered in support of this proposition, is the opinion of

naval men; and if the representations of any man may be relied upon

with confidence, so far, at least, as that they are not founded in

deception, I believe those of a sailor may be. By naval men, I have

been assured that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It

is impossible for me to state with accuracy, or in a manner calculated

to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in

support of their opinion, but among them are those detailed in the

report of the select committee. Indeed, they advance the opinion, and

support it with reasons, the error of which, if they be erroneous, I am

unable to discover, that it will require the enemy to employ a triple

force to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United

States. Their reasons are, as nearly as I can state them, these: there

must be stationed on our coast, at any given time, an equal force;

this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the

service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew,

for much more than three months' service. An equal force must be put

in requisition and kept in readiness to relieve that on the station.

But, as all the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the

force destined to relieve the first must be despatched by the time the

first may be supposed to have arrived on our coast, because it will

be necessary, at a period as early as the arrival of the second, for

the first to return; but the first could not proceed to Europe, be

equipped, and return to relieve the second in time; and therefore a

third equivalent force is necessary, and thus three times the force

of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself

on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to, with

confidence, to prove that neither Great Britain, nor any other nation,

has ever been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas,

a force equal to that which, in the opinion of naval men, is sufficient

to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee--the dominion of

the American seas, and the defence of our ports and harbors. There

is one fact which, above all others, shows the inability of Great

Britain to keep a large fleet on our coast. From the frozen regions

of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for

naval equipment or repair, except Halifax; and if, as the opponents

of the Navy seem to think certain, and I hope their opinions may be

realized, we shall, in the event of war, deprive her of that, she will

be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas. Under

such circumstances, any thing but temporary service would be utterly

impracticable.

But, said Mr. C., on the subject of the British naval force, there

is great misconception. The high-sounding number of a thousand ships

appals the mind, and an examination of its actual force, and the

numerous requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as

an idle labor. Let this examination be made, and at least some part

of the terror which it excites will vanish. Of the eight hundred and

thirty-three ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801,

and she never had more, it is believed there were only three hundred

and eighty-three that exceeded the size and capacity of the large

privateers that will probably be fitted out by the citizens of the

United States, in the event of war. Of this last number, there were

one hundred and forty-two of sixty-four guns, and above; twenty-two

between fifty and sixty guns; one hundred and fifty-six between

thirty-two and forty-four; and sixty-three between twenty and thirty

guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission consisted of one

hundred and seventy-four sloops, one hundred and forty-one gun-vessels,

and one hundred and thirty hired vessels. These hired vessels are

small vessels, of from four to ten guns, which, it is believed, are

only employed for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration, I

have no doubt, proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain,

however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression

almost universally received, from the high-sounding boast of her

thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more

misconceived than the application of it. The common impression is,

that the Government can direct to any given point almost an unlimited

number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be

found that, notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to

which it must be destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it

all in requisition. This I will prove by reference to the distribution

of her fleets in 1801. [Here Mr. C. read a statement of the force

and distribution of the British fleet at that time.] From which of

these stations, said Mr. C., could she have spared, with safety and

prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she, from all, have

stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been

equal, under the disadvantages which have been pointed out, to twelve

seventy-fours and twenty frigates? How much less would she have been

able to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval

armament whose expense should equal that of the military preparations

of the present year? But it may be said, that the ships which Great

Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which

any circumstances would require. This might be true, were her seamen

unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible; but

both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out vessels

which she has in ordinary, would require, within a few thousand, all

the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual

expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could bear. The true

object of inquiry to ascertain her efficient power is, what number

of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the

answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument,

yet confirmatory of it, in the example of 1801, the year which I

have selected for illustration, when it is confidently believed her

equipment was greater, combining force and numbers, than at any other

period of her history.

But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power

of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others

who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval power. They

fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and seeking victory on all

the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive

expenses, and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly

not contemplated by the report of the committee; nor can such events

possibly happen, as long as we remain a free people. The committee have

recommended such a navy as will give to the United States an ascendency

in the American seas, and protect their ports and harbors. The people

will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects

require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European

power, to station large fleets on our seas, will equally forbid us

to cross the Atlantic, or go into distant seas, for the purpose of

frequent or habitual wars.

But a navy is said to be anti-republican, because it was opposed by the

Republicans in 1798. I apprehend, however, that it was then objected

to, not because it was anti-republican in itself, but because the

Republicans of that time believed it was to be employed for improper

objects; because, while it was unnecessary at the time, it was of

such a nature as only fitted it for the time, because it was part of

a system which embraced unnecessary armies and unnecessary taxes and

loans, to continue a war beyond the just objects of war--a war which,

to use the language of the day, was to be waged by every man, woman,

and child, in the nation, to which we are opposed.

We are told, also, that navies have ruined every nation that has

employed them; and England, and Holland, and Venice, and other nations,

have been mentioned as examples. The vast debt of Great Britain is

declared to be among the pernicious fruits of her Naval Establishment.

This I deny. Her debt has grown out of her profuse subsidies, and her

absurd wars on the land. Though the ruin, which is supposed to threaten

England, is attributed to her navy, it is obvious that her navy alone

has saved and still saves her from ruin. Without it she must, long

since, have yielded to the power of France her independence and her

liberties. We are told that the same wealth which she has expended in

supporting her navies would have been employed more profitably for the

nation in the improvement of its agriculture and manufactures, and in

the establishment of canals and roads, and other internal improvements.

But experience is better than theory. Let us compare England with

nations which have no navies, or comparatively inconsiderable navies.

The nations of the Continent of Europe are without such overgrown

and ruinous Naval Establishments, but do you there find the highest

improvements in agriculture, the most flourishing manufactures, or the

best roads and canals? No, it is in this nation, that has been ruined

by her navy, that you find all these improvements most perfect and

most extended. I mean not either to be the panegyrist of England; but

these truths may be declared for our instruction, without suppressing

the feelings excited by the wrongs she has done us. England has not,

then, I conclude, been destroyed or impoverished, but preserved and

enriched, by her navy. Was Holland ruined by her navy? No; surrounded

by the great powers of the continent, with a population not exceeding

2,000,000 of souls, she protected and secured her independence for

more than a century, against her powerful neighbors, by means of her

commercial riches, which were cherished and defended by her naval

power. Did Venice owe her decline, or fall, to her navy? While the

neighboring Italian States were subdued, year after year changing their

masters and their tyrants, she long continued to ride triumphantly

amidst the storm, independent, and, in a great degree, free. It was her

naval and commercial power which made her rich and great, and secured

her existence as a State so long. Look even at the little Republic of

Genoa, whose inhabitants, but for its commerce and its navy, would

scarcely ever have possessed "a local habitation," or "a name!" But

I must have exhausted the patience of the House, I will therefore

conclude the observations which I proposed to make on the general

merits of the question.

SATURDAY, January 18.

_Naval Establishment._

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the

Navy bill; when Mr. CHEVES finished his speech in favor of the bill, as

given in full in preceding pages.

Mr. SEYBERT.--I rise under a pressure of more than ordinary

embarrassment--prudence on one hand bids me shrink from the task which

I am about to undertake; whilst on the other hand, a conscious duty

impels me to engage in the consideration of the question now before

the honorable committee. My friend from South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES)

says this question is all important to this nation; in this I perfectly

coincide with him, and therefore cannot rest satisfied with a mere vote

on this occasion. Sir, it is not my intention to follow the gentleman

from South Carolina through all the windings of the labyrinth into

which he has ventured to penetrate. I will not pretend to chase reason

on the wing.

I will not particularly follow the gentleman in his comparison of the

Army and Naval Establishments of the United States. He has stated to

us that the Army has cost this nation much more than the Navy; he

concludes we ought to be equally liberal in our appropriations for

both these purposes. Sir, I perceive no reason in this assertion. Some

gentlemen on the other side of the House may say, that we have been

lavish in our appropriations for an army; even admitting that in this

respect we have been liberal to extravagance, it surely cannot be

inferred that we should make ourselves doubly guilty of this charge.

I will agree to make appropriations for the establishing a navy for

the United States. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that

when the war which we are about to wage, shall be over, our Army will

leave us. Sir, I am happy to hear that on such an event the military

will be readily disbanded--a dread of the contrary gave much uneasiness

to many a few days since--this is just what we wish should take place.

On the other hand, said he, "your proud Navy," will remain. It is for

this, with many other reasons, why I am opposed to a navy. I wish he

could have proved to us, that with the end of the war the Navy would

also leave us; perhaps I should then agree with him in favor of its

establishment: though the "proud Navy" will remain with us, he has

neglected to tell us at what rate of expense.

Sir, the gentleman from South Carolina says many oppose a navy, because

they deem it an anti-republican institution. On this head, I shall

remark but little: I will only ask if it is to remain with us in times

of peace with its numerous train of officers, may it not become a

powerful engine in the hands of an ambitious Executive?

Sir, it was thought proper to make the foregoing remarks as preliminary

to the subject. The question of a Naval Establishment for the United

States more especially concerns those who inhabit commercial districts.

As one of these I am much interested. Many persons maintain, that a

naval system of defence is indispensably necessary to a nation, whose

seaboard extends more than 1,500 miles, with a shipping interest

amounting to 1,300,000 tons--in this respect, ranking the second of

modern nations. The argument is as specious as it is plausible; it

is liable to many, and in my opinion, to insuperable objections. The

proposition before us will be considered as leading to a _permanent_

Naval Establishment. This course is warranted by the report of the

Secretary of the Navy as well as by the mode which was pursued by my

friend from South Carolina. I shall not hesitate to declare my decided

opposition to such an establishment, and will proceed to state the

objections whereon my opinion is grounded. Sir, I deem it inexpedient

to commence a permanent Naval Establishment at this time. We are quite

unprepared for it--we are in want of all the necessary materials;

though we have been told that our forests abound in all the necessary

timber, it was said little of this material was to be found in our

dockyards. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that a

sufficiency of seasoned timber, to build four seventy-fours, was now

on hand, and that the proper authority deemed it advisable to be used

for frigates. Sir, this timber is a portion of that which was purchased

some years since, for the purpose of building six seventy-fours.

It now appears, that of this timber as much as was sufficient for

two of these vessels, has been employed to build smaller vessels or

gunboats, I presume. This is all a piece with our pretended economy.

This mode of proceeding will not answer, sir. We are in the wrong from

the commencement of our Navy. I do not wish it to be understood that

I have decided a navy will never be a proper mode of defence for this

nation--but whenever it shall be determined on, we should begin right;

this can only be done by following those nations who have had most

experience on the subject. Our first step should be to store away the

proper timber. This should be done in times when we can best afford

it--in times when our market is glutted--in times when labor can be

commanded at fair prices--at a period when we enjoy peace, and surely

not when we are about to engage in a war. We have heretofore paid the

highest price for every article; we have given double wages for labor;

and instances might be mentioned, when the workmen were transported in

stage coaches, at an enormous expense, from our large seaport towns to

the navy yard of this city. Contracts for timber were made in haste

and at a very advanced price. As soon as it was obtained, it was put

together, and in a few months we saw it floating in the form of a ship

of war--_rotten_ ships, I may say, sir, for I believe without exception

in the frigates which were built by the United States, the more

important parts decayed and were rotten in two, three, or four years.

In many instances the expense for repairs was equal to the original

cost. A single frigate, the Constitution, has cost for repairs, from

October, 1802, to March, 1809, the enormous sum of $302,582 21, or

upwards of $43,000 per annum for seven years in succession.

Let us view this subject in a more extended sense--I mean as regards

our commerce generally--we shall still have cause to entertain the

opinion which we first adopted. We cannot protect our commerce on

the ocean. Our ships have vexed every sea--we trade to all parts of

the world; of course, to protect our commerce, our ships of war must

abandon our coasts and encounter all the force of the enemy or those

of Europe. The ports we have in view are European. If your frigates,

for convenience and safety, are to cruise only on your coasts, what

will be the fate of the millions which are embarked beyond the Cape of

Good Hope? By this management surely you cannot afford it protection.

France, Spain, and Holland, when combined and backed by an armed

neutrality in the north of Europe, could not secure their commerce.

The fleets of Great Britain now sail triumphant over every wave of

the deep. The Russians have a navy far superior to that which it is

proposed we shall establish, and they cannot protect their trade

in the confined limits of the Baltic. They count fifty or sixty

sail-of-the-line, besides many frigates and smaller vessels.

Sir, the expenses which are incurred by a Naval Establishment, far

exceed the profits which arise from the commerce which it is intended

to protect. This proposition is warranted by the experience of Great

Britain, the most commercial nation of modern times. In the year 1798,

the total imports and exports of Great Britain amounted to £94,952,000.

For the same year the expenditure for her navy amounted to £13,654,013,

or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports, or fourteen per

cent. on the total capital employed in commerce. What regular trade can

yield such profits on the outward and inward cargoes? To me this is a

secret. In the year 1799 Mr. Pitt computed the profits on the commerce

of Great Britain at £12,000,000, or one and a half millions less than

the expenses for her navy the preceding year!

Sir, the expenses which are necessarily connected with a Naval

Establishment, constitute a very serious objection to it. At this

time, the annual expenditures for the British navy amount to nearly

£17,000,000, or $80,000,000. Every succeeding year brings with it an

increase of expenditures. This has been the result year after year

since the commencement of the institution. Our prospects will be the

more evident when we take a view of the expenses which have been

already incurred for the infantile establishment of our country; we

shall be led to the same conclusions. The American navy was commenced

in the year 1794, and by the end of the year 1811, the expenditures

amounted to $27,456,979--a sum much greater than the one-half of

the public debt on the 1st of January, 1812. This would have been

much better applied, had it been placed with the Commissioners of

the Sinking Fund. I will ask the gentleman from South Carolina, what

has the nation benefited for this enormous expenditure? What would

have been the amount expended, had this engine been Herculean, with

Admirals of the Red, White and Blue squadrons, with numerous dock

and navy-yards, placemen, &c.? For we shall gradually advance to all

this, if we do not stop short at this time. For the benefits of such

appendages, I will refer you to a statement made to this House, the

last session, concerning the navy-yards belonging to the United States;

especially to the details of the expenditures of that connected with

this city. The document I refer to, was laid before this House on

the 25th February, 1811. It will inform you, sir, that the value of

the work done from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1810,

was $73,947 52. The commandant confesses, in his returns made to the

Secretary, that this work, in many instances, is rated twenty per cent.

above the prices paid in other places. The salaries in this same yard,

for the same year, (1810,) amounted to $95,637 64-1/4. So that the pay

for the salaries and the wages at this navy-yard, exceeded the value of

the articles manufactured, even when rated far above the fair prices,

in amount $21,790 12-1/4! This establishment is under the immediate

eye of the Government; we might suppose every attention was paid to

economy; if so, who will desire further proofs of the advantages of a

navy!

Sir, I further object to a navy, because it will be the means of

exciting many wars, which, without the establishment, may be honorably

avoided. It is said, nations are involved in war, in proportion to the

extent of their navies; and some assert (Brougham) that a perpetual

war is one of the two modes which are necessary to support a powerful

naval establishment. Sir, a naval establishment will create a new and

a dangerous interest in our country. Nothing is more common than to be

told, that such are the wishes of the naval interest of Great Britain,

and that this or that war must be entered into to gratify them. For my

part, sir, I shall be very sorry indeed, if ever the period arrives

in the United States, when any particular interest or community

shall direct the Government, whether it be naval, agricultural,

manufacturing, or commercial--the general welfare should be the sole

great ruling principle in the National Councils.

Sir, I am deterred, when I consider the fate of all those nations who

at different periods have been famous for their navies. The naval

strength of the Hanseatic League was such, two centuries past, as

to excite terror on the part of England. These, sir, distant free

cities, are now the appendages of mighty France, and have no political

existence. Who has not heard of the once formidable fleets of Venice

and Genoa? At one time England was indebted to the latter for officers

to command her ships of war--alas! these republics are now consigned

to oblivion. Denmark was at one time the mistress of the ocean; by

means of her fleets she often invaded England, and held her in a state

of subjection. The Danes heretofore burned London, Paris, and other

great cities--they are now controlled by France, and they have had

their Copenhagen defeat. Holland, with her Van Tromps, and De Ruyters,

occupied the British Channel at pleasure; this power defeated the

navies of England and France. Where is Holland now? Incorporated as

a part of the French empire. Spain boasted her invincible armadas;

Elizabeth of England, by nature haughty, proud, and ambitious, trembled

at the very mention of them, until they were dispersed and destroyed by

storms at sea; Spain is now the vassal of France. Not very long since

the navy of France sailed triumphant along the British coast, looked

into Portsmouth harbor, and taunted British spirit. I ask you, sir,

where is the strength of which these nations formerly boasted? All are

inoperative, and dread the gigantic power of the British navy--they are

in part sick in dry docks, or are blockaded in their ports.

Mr. Chairman, Great Britain, though at this time triumphant in every

sea, if she persists in her expensive naval establishment, with her

present debt of £800,000,000, which was chiefly created for her

navy--Great Britain, sir, I say, with all this, must sink under the

heavy pressure. She will hereafter derive very little satisfaction

from her brilliant victories on the 1st of June off Cape St. Vincent,

Camperdown, Aboukir, and Trafalgar.

Shall I be pardoned, sir, when I fear our vessels will only tend to

swell the present catalogue of the British navy? Of the 1,042 vessels

which she possessed in July, 1811, one hundred and nine were captured

from the French, forty-six from the Danes, twenty-five from the

Spaniards, twenty-four from the Dutch, and three from the Italians;

making a total of two hundred and seven captured ships, or one-fifth of

her whole navy.

Small ships are proper for the service of the United States--by

their agency we shall be able to annoy the convoys of an enemy. The

privateers which were fitted out in every port during our Revolutionary

war, destroyed much of the British commerce, even in the British and

Irish Channels, whilst the frigates which were built by the Government

did little or nothing--but two of them remained at the conclusion of

the contest. The enemy will not watch your small vessels; they may

enter all your small inlets, where heavy vessels cannot venture to

approach them; and, at the conclusion of the war, they may be sold for

the merchant service. I shall not follow the gentleman in his remarks

on the bill before the committee; I shall vote against it, though it

is my present intention to appropriate the sums requisite for the

repairing and equipping our present ships of war. I will go no further.

I tell you, sir, naval victories in the end would prove fatal to the

United States; the consequences which have uniformly followed in other

countries must take place here. If the United States shall determine

to augment their navy, so as to rival those of Europe, the public debt

will become permanent; direct taxes will be perpetual; the paupers of

the country will be increased; the nation will be bankrupt; and, I

fear, the tragedy will end in a revolution.

Mr. MCKEE rose, with deference, to perform a duty which he owed to

his constituents, by delivering his sentiments on the very important

subject before the committee, though he confessed himself very

inadequate to do justice to it. He deemed the question of great

magnitude; as he feared, if we were to proceed to build up a large

naval establishment, it would affect the destinies of this nation to

the latest posterity.

The gentleman from South Carolina has said, that he has great

prejudices to encounter. Mr. MCKEE would have thought that the

deliberate opinion of a majority of Congress, expressed upon more than

one occasion, was entitled to a more respectful term than _prejudices_.

Those decisions proceeded from the honest convictions of some of the

best friends of the country.

Mr. McK. denied this doctrine, that "it is demonstrably clear that

this nation is inevitably destined to be a naval power;" and he

believed that, if the attempt were made to make it such, it would

prove the destruction of our happy constitution. He would proceed to

show on what ground he supported the opinion that the maintenance of

a permanent naval establishment would prove ruinous to this country.

For this purpose, he should be under the necessity of submitting some

calculations to the House; for, though he had heard a course of this

kind condemned, as fit only for the counting-house of the merchant,

he considered it as the most conducive to correct legislation. It is

certainly a matter of just calculation, when we are called upon to

establish a permanent navy, to show that such an institution would cost

more than any advantages to be derived from it would compensate.

[Here the Speaker went into detailed statements, taken from the

authentic reports of the Navy Department, showing the enormous

expense of building our ships, and the enormous expense of

repairs; the great expense of manning and equipping them, and

the pay of officers idle at home while the ship was rotting

which cost so much, and which, at the time it was built, it was

morally certain would have nothing to do until it rotted.]

Mr. McK. had said, this nation was not destined, under the present

constitution, to be a great naval power; and he maintained that the

statements which he had exhibited--and which he believed, for the

purposes of argument, would be found substantially correct, when

tested by experience--went conclusively to show that the expenses

of the naval establishment of ten frigates and twelve seventy-four

gun ships, now proposed to be built, could not be supported without

permanent internal taxes, and a constant increase of the public debt

and annual expenditure. And if the system was gone into, to the extent

contemplated by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES,) of

building forty frigates and twenty-five seventy-four gunships, which

he admitted would be necessary to relieve the naval establishment from

comparative inefficiency, the annual expenses of the Government with

such a system (as already shown) would be more than $25,000,000, which

would rapidly increase the public burdens, and entail on this country

that fatal system which has almost ruined the British Empire.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES) takes it for granted

that our commerce can be effectually protected by a navy; and assuming

this fact, he proceeds to show that every portion of the American

people are equally interested in the building a navy, because all are

more or less interested in protecting commerce.

But, the fact is, that navies have never been considered as adequate to

the complete protection of commerce. Look, said he, at the situation

of the Old World, in times, to them, more prosperous than the present!

What is the fact? Holland, with almost no navy, possessed an extensive

and profitable commerce; and Spain, about the same period, with a large

and powerful fleet, had no commerce.

But the situation of Europe is, in all respects, different from ours.

The Governments of Europe are surrounded by rival powers, who are

mostly engaged in war with each other, while we are happily far removed

from them all, and have no neighbors to annoy us. Therefore, arguments

drawn from the Old World are wholly inapplicable to this country,

because their situation and form of Government are altogether unlike

ours. And when we turn our eyes from foreign Governments to our own,

we find that no people since _Adam_ were ever more prosperous or more

happy than the American people have been for the eight or ten years

previous to the year 1808. Private fortunes have been accumulated with

unequalled ease and rapidity; commerce has prospered beyond example;

agriculture has flourished; and the revenue abundant, beyond the

wants of the Government. And did this state of prosperity exist at a

time when your commerce was protected by vessels of war? No; but at a

time when your navy was out of use; and in proportion to the increase

of your naval expenditure, in the same proportion has your commerce

decreased. The protection of commerce is the only ostensible object

for which navies are created, while power and conquest are the main

objects. Show me, said Mr. McK., a nation possessed of a large navy,

and I will show you a nation always at war. When has England been at

peace with all the world, since she became a great naval power? Such

instances in British history were so rare, and of such short duration,

(if they existed at all,) that he could not answer the question; and he

believed it would be difficult for the ingenuity of the gentleman from

South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES) to answer it. It is true, that England, the

greatest naval power in the world, is also the most commercial; and it

was not to be doubted that her commerce received aid from her navy,

though it owed its extent principally to the industry and consequent

wealth of the nation. But England has other and far more important

objects to effect by her navy than that of protecting commerce. Her

insular situation renders it necessary for her protection, and she

keeps it up for the purposes of war and dominion. England would destroy

her navy to-morrow, if the protection of commerce was her only object;

because it cannot be denied that the expense of keeping up her navy

exceeds the profits of that commerce which it is said to protect.

Navies, therefore, must be considered as instruments of power, rather

than as the means of protecting commerce. They are the vile offspring

of those nations where the power and grandeur of the Government is

every thing, and the people are nothing but slaves!

Mr. McK. having stated that a navy was an instrument of power,

rather than a means of protecting commerce, in order to show that

this opinion was not a mere vagary of his own imagination, but the

deliberate opinion of some of the wisest men of this country, most

solemnly pronounced, he would beg leave to read a document, which he

hoped would have weight with some gentlemen of the committee. It is

taken from the celebrated instructions of the Virginia Legislature,

of 1801, to their Senators in Congress, and is said to have come from

the pen of the present Chief Magistrate of the United States; and he

believed he could venture to say, that no Legislature ever possessed

more talents than were drawn together into the Virginia Assembly on

that occasion. After having noticed other subjects, in speaking of the

navy, they say:

"With respect to the Navy, it may be proper to remind you,

that, whatever may be the proposed object of its establishment,

or whatever may be the prospect of temporary advantages

resulting therefrom, it is demonstrated by the experience of

all nations who have ventured far into naval policy, that such

prospect is ultimately delusive; and that a navy has ever, in

practice, been known more as an instrument of power, a source

of expense, and an occasion of collisions and wars with other

nations, than as an instrument of defence, of economy, or

of protection to commerce. Nor is there any nation, in the

judgment of the General Assembly, to whose circumstances this

remark is more applicable than to the United States."

#/ These opinions may, now, however, be considered as

old-fashioned; but being himself an old-fashioned man, he

confessed he was more pleased with them than with the new

political doctrines preached by the gentleman from South

Carolina, (Mr. CHEVES) to the House and the nation. It might,

however, possibly be the fact, that he (Mr. McK.) was wrong,

and only indulged ancient _prejudices_, and the gentleman from

South Carolina right; and if such were the case, he could

only say, in his own defence, that, under the influence of

those old doctrines, the American people had enjoyed a state

of prosperity and happiness unparalleled in the history of

man--a state of prosperity which he feared he would never see

equalled. He looked back on those days of happy prosperity with

the same feelings of mournful regret with which he looked back

to the days of his youth, fearing that they, like the days of

his youth, would never again return--especially if the Navy

mania should prevail.

Establish a navy, said Mr. McK. and this country may bid farewell

to peace; because you thereby organize a class of society who are

interested in creating and keeping up wars and contention. Officers in

the Navy and Army are mere cyphers in society in times of peace, and

are only respectable in time of war, when wealth and fame may await

their exertions. They are, therefore, interested in keeping up a state

of war; and being invested with the management of an instrument of war,

it is to be expected that it will be used in some degree to answer

their own purposes? No man who will reflect for a moment, but must

be satisfied that the disgraceful and lawless conduct of the British

naval officers on our coast originated in a desire on their part to

bring on a war with this country, in which they looked forward to

large dividends of prize money; and these acts were contrary to the

wish and expectation of Great Britain; in one instance the act was

disavowed; and it may be asked why were the officers not punished who

acted contrary to the wishes of the Government? The answer is obvious;

because the influence of the Navy in England is so predominant that

the Government are afraid to touch the subject, and the consequence

is, that the Government are compelled to bear the odium of acts which

they disapprove; and the same cause which has produced this effect in

England, if permitted to operate, will produce a similar effect in this

country.

Our little Navy has already contributed much towards the irritation

which exists between this country and England; and under any other

President than Mr. Jefferson, it would have brought on a war in 1807.

And what real benefit has resulted from it to the Government? Has a

picaroon or a buccaneer ever been chastised by them? If they have,

he had no recollection of the case; he had seen indeed paragraphs in

the newspapers mentioning that the frigate President, or some one of

the vessels, had sailed from the navy-yard to Norfolk, from thence to

New York, and finally arrived safe at Boston; but for what purpose he

was totally ignorant, unless, indeed, it was to sail back again, and

furnish the materials for a new article for the newspapers; and for

these eminent services, the American people have already paid about

$30,000,000.

TUESDAY, January 21.

_Naval Establishment._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the

bill concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. JOHNSON said: I do not know, sir, why I should regret the

discussion of any subject in this place, when I recollect that each

member is under the same obligations of duty and responsibility. It

has been said that no member would be thanked for his vote in favor

of this bill--and, fearless of censure, I shall oppose this attempt

to lay the foundation, and to pledge the property of the people for

naval systems, as ruinous to the finances of the country, as it will

be destructive to the peace of the nation. After every effort in my

power, I could not suppress the sensation of sorrow, that Congress

should be distracted with a subject that would justly excite alarm

throughout the nation, even in the hours of profound tranquillity.

I have looked to the Treasury reports, and I see a national debt of

about fifty millions of dollars. I look to the aggressions of England,

and I find we have been driven to the necessity of creating a great

and expensive military force to avenge our wrongs and to expel the

enemy from her North American colonies. I look to the arguments of the

advocates of this pernicious system, and they acknowledge that we are

driven to the brink of a war that will require loans and taxes, and end

in a new debt of at least fifty millions of dollars--and under these

circumstances, when we are upon the heels of a second revolution, when

the people are likely to be most pressed for the ways and means to

carry on the war with vigor and certain success, the ruinous system of

a great navy is pressed upon us. Upon the return of a second peace,

when the British possessions shall be incorporated into the Union, and

our army disbanded--when commerce shall be restored, and a surplus of

revenue in the Treasury--after meeting the demands of the Government,

with more propriety might the question be presented for consideration.

I believe, sir, since the political reformation in 1801, the question

of building a navy had never been before presented directly to the

consideration of Congress. When Mr. Jefferson, that illustrious

character, presided over the destinies of the United States, why was

not this navy-building proposed? Then we had a revenue of fifteen

millions of dollars annually, and a surplus in the Treasury. No, sir,

such a system had been put down too recently--the struggles against a

navy in '98-9 were not forgotten. I deny the capacity of the United

States to maintain a navy without oppression to the great mass of the

community in the persons of tax-gatherers; and if a great navy could

be maintained, it would be more than useless--it would be dangerous to

the peace and tranquillity of this nation. I was in favor of repairing

and putting into service the whole of our naval force, consisting of

one hundred and sixty-two gunboats and upwards of fifteen frigates

and smaller war vessels; because this naval force, united with our

fortifications, would give security to our coasts and harbors, protect

our coasting trade, and would be important in the present crisis to

co-operate with privateers and individual enterprise against the

commerce and plunder of Great Britain. But this is not the object of

the bill. It contemplates and embraces a navy to protect our commerce

in distant seas as well as at home, and which cannot cost less than

twenty or thirty millions to accomplish; and, when built, would entail

upon the Government of the United States the annual expense of fifteen

millions of dollars,[25] equal to the amount of our whole revenue in

the most prosperous years of commerce under the administration of Mr.

Jefferson, and double the amount of our present financial income. It

is the system, as well as the expense, that I object to; and while I

am ready as any man to keep a small naval force, to be confined to the

protection of our maritime frontiers, as well as I am to keep up a

small land force, to protect our territorial frontiers, I will not vote

one cent for a system of naval force which is destined to keep foreign

nations in check in distant seas, and destined to entail upon this

happy Government perpetual taxes and a perpetually-increasing national

debt. The people will not support such a Naval Establishment--they

have the corrective in their hands; and build this fleet of twenty

seventy-fours and forty frigates, and the people will in their turn

put them down. But, sir, we are told that we are a commercial people,

and that you cannot restrain a spirit of enterprise in our citizens

which is limited only by the polar snows to the North and the icy

mountains to the South. No person has attempted to damp that gallant

spirit, that mercantile enterprise--such adventurous voyages have been

fostered and cherished by every means in the power of the Government.

But, sir, has this unparalleled enterprise, this gallant spirit,

been carried on by a navy? Such a thing has never been thought of,

which proves that this question of a navy has no connection with this

commercial enterprise; and the existence of one without the other, is

positive proof of the fact. But it is also said, that agriculture and

commerce are twin sisters, and the learned gentleman from New York

(Mr. MITCHILL) will not allow a more distant connection. I have no

objection to such a union, and I did expect that it would have been

demonstrated what was the real relationship between these twin sisters

and a permanent navy; whether it is that of cousin-german, brother

or husband. As these subjects have not been identified, I must be

permitted to say that there is no connection--unless under the disguise

of protection, the navy would be the destroyer both of commerce and

agriculture--by taxes upon the one and constant war upon the theatre

of the other. The advocates of a navy need not expect to cover the

deformity and danger of the system by telling the people they are

friends to the protection of commerce--and that those who oppose it are

ready to relinquish our rights upon the ocean. No, sir, this will not

do. They will ask if our commerce, as great as it has been, was ever

protected by a navy. They will look at the expenditure of the public

money--they will see twenty-nine millions of dollars expended upon

our present Naval Establishment; and though they may not complain of

that prodigal waste of public money upon so small a naval force, they

will look to the effects produced by this power, and they will refuse

to augment it, until, indeed, the Peace Establishment shall require

augmentation. The people will look to the votes of this House, and they

will see the opposers of a navy willing at this moment to avenge the

depredation upon our commerce and neutral rights by actual hostility. I

am not prepared to give up our rights, whether upon the ocean or upon

land, whether commercial or personal; but I may differ in the means of

avenging these wrongs, and vindicating those rights, and I shall ever

differ from those who wish a navy to ride triumphant in distant seas,

and, under a pretext of protection to commerce, doom the nation to

galling burdens too intolerable to be borne. But we are told, sir, that

this question partakes of the character of a self-evident proposition.

Indeed, sir, and in what respect is it entitled to this definition of

self-evident? Unless, indeed, from every consideration of history,

experience and reason, it is evident that a navy is an engine of power

and ambition, calculated to embroil a nation in quarrels and wars, and

to fix permanent wretchedness upon the industrious class of the people.

When we look to the delegation from each State, we find a difference in

sentiment upon this subject, whether lying on the seaboard or distant

from it.

The chairman of the Naval Committee has attempted to make us believe

that a navy is the anchor of our hopes, and I dare venture to say,

his eloquent colleague (Mr. WILLIAMS) will in due time denounce it as

the most abominable system--always employed in the fell purposes of

outrage, plunder, war, and death. The same division of sentiment exists

in Massachusetts as to this destructive and expensive establishment.

And, sir, let me not omit to mention, the sentiments of the Republicans

of '98-9 were not only entitled to the love and confidence of the

people, but worthy of our imitation. Nor will I omit the resolutions

of the Virginia Legislature in opposition to a navy, when they

remonstrated against measures which they considered ruinous to the

freedom of the United States--nor is my respect for those opinions

lessened, although many Republicans in Congress at this time, and men

of talents, have become great advocates for a navy, and I will put it

to the people whose opinions are entitled to their approbation, whether

a navy beyond the peace establishment is ruinous, or the rock of our

safety.

Leaving the division of sentiment in our country, let us advert to

ancient and modern history, and search for examples upon this important

subject. And here, sir, I will take this position, and defy history

for an example, that no great naval power ever confined their naval

strength to the legitimate object of protecting commerce in distant

seas. I will refer to Tyre and Sidon, Crete and Rhodes, to Athens and

to Carthage. No sooner had these nations ceased to confine their naval

strength to their maritime defence at home, to the protection of their

seacoast, than they were engaged in plunder, piracy, depredations upon

other nations, or involved in wars, which certainly accelerated, if it

did not produce, the downfall and destruction of those governments.

Peace and tranquillity is not the natural state of a great naval power.

A disregard of public law, sacred treaties, and bloodshed, would suit

it better; and it has been and ever will be, the consequences of such

force. These nations furnish another example and instructive lesson to

the present generation--that while their commerce and navy furnished

a small part of the people with the luxuries of every country at

that time known, the great mass of citizens at home were miserable

and oppressed. Their rights neglected, their burdens increased, and

their happiness destroyed, while their fleets and external grandeur

carried astonishment and terror to distant nations. When a nation puts

forth her strength upon the ocean, the interior of the country will be

neglected and oppressed with contributions. Ancient history does not

furnish a solitary instance of any permanent good, or long continuance

of peace arising from a great naval supremacy; such overgrown power,

such unnatural strength, must feed upon plunder, at home and abroad.

When we come to modern nations we have proof before us of the positions

I have taken. We have been told of Holland, as a people existing in a

most flourishing state of prosperous commerce without a navy to protect

it, and we have been told of Spain as a naval power without commerce to

protect. But leaving these examples, let us look at France and Great

Britain; we here have examples before our eyes; we need no history; the

facts are before us.

Admit that Great Britain, with her thousand vessels, could protect her

lawful commerce, let me ask, if her navy has ever been confined to that

object; whether it is confined to that object at this time; whether

her navy has not fattened upon the spoils of Europe, Asia, Africa, and

America, and the commerce of neutral nations, making war equally upon

friends and enemies. Her navy, triumphant in every sea, is employed

in a system of plunder against the world, and, notwithstanding this

supremacy, we see her citizens groaning under a national debt of eight

hundred millions of pounds sterling, more than all the nations of the

universe could pay. We see her upon the precipice of bankruptcy--we

see her people, her numerous subjects, loaded with taxes, that would

astonish any man who did not know the fact--notwithstanding this, the

public debt is daily increasing, and it is now acknowledged by all the

world that she is fighting for her existence--victorious at sea and

safe at home from invasion, and still her very existence is at stake.

Sir, I never wish to see the liberties of my country afloat upon the

ocean and staked upon the strength of a navy. Look at France, separated

from her enemy by a narrow channel, without vessels to meet the fleets

of England on the water, and still she is unable to burn the seaport

towns of France or invade the French territories, or in any way to

make an impression upon her. Populous and powerful upon land, nothing

but the imperial despotism that exists throughout that vast empire,

prevents the country from being the most enviable residence upon

the globe, except our own favored land. Let not the Congress of the

United States therefore stake their existence upon navies, let us not

withdraw the protecting hand of Government from the soil; let us not

increase the burdens of the people, and weigh them down with a public

debt to support external grandeur. Do not by this system destroy

the affections and attachments of the solid and honest part of the

community, who support the government of the country.

Sir, the report of the Naval Committee has assumed principles as

erroneous as they are novel--that the protection of maritime commerce

was, above all other objects, the first and the greatest consideration

which laid the foundation for the present constitution. There is

nothing to warrant such a position; and no reason does exist why

our commercial rights should have been better secured than the

other various rights and interests embraced by that charter of our

independence. In the specific grants of powers, Congress has the

authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with the several

States, and with the Indian tribes; not giving preference in language

to foreign over State and domestic commerce. I will admit, sir, that

our commercial rights formed one of the primary considerations--not

more primary than the rights of agriculture and manufactures, nor the

rights of property, the rights of persons, protection from foreign

invasion and aggression, or from internal foes. These rights were

equally important, and not less the considerations which strengthened

the bonds of the Union. And if any consideration had a preference, it

arose from considerations of peace and war.

When I look into the preamble of the constitution, which to be sure is

no specific grant of power, but is an interpretation of the objects of

that great charter of our Union, I find it was to establish justice,

insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence and

general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty, that the

constitution was adopted; and although maritime commerce has only a

co-equal right with all others, still, the greatest means and resources

of the Government have been directed to its protection. And still

it would seem, if we do not ruin the nation by the establishment of

a navy, we wish to make encroachments upon commerce, to damp the

commercial spirit. And this we are told in the face of facts which

appear upon record, and in the face of every expensive war measure now

taken and adopted. Sir, in a colonial state, it was a duty upon tea

that was the immediate cause of a war, which was bloody indeed, and

continued upwards of seven years; a conflict which has no parallel

in history as to its beginning and termination. And at this moment,

violations of our neutral rights upon the ocean is a primary cause why

we are about to wage a second war with Great Britain; and still we are

gravely told that we are unwilling to protect commerce, and that we

are ready to abandon it, because we will not vote away the substance

of the people upon a system of policy which must ruin the nation if

not crushed in its infancy. The constitution says, Congress shall have

the power to provide and maintain a navy. And this has been read. So

has it authorized Congress to raise and support armies, to lay and

collect taxes, and declare war; but the constitution does not fix the

limit of these powers, and all are liable to abuse. And the convention

did not suppose that any Congress would so far abuse these powers as

to keep either a standing army in time of peace, which must endanger

the liberties of the people, or a permanent navy, that would involve

us in continual wars with other nations, and permanent taxes upon the

people. A reasonable peace establishment to protect our maritime and

territorial frontier, consistent with strict economy, must have been

contemplated; and this force, naval and military, we have maintained;

and we are as secure as a nation can expect to be from savages or a

maritime foe. There would be as much reason why we should keep in pay

five hundred thousand regular troops in time of peace, as your twenty

vessels of seventy-four guns and your forty frigates, in addition to

our present naval force. In every point of view, therefore, a permanent

navy is as injurious to the country as a standing army. One will

endanger your liberties by conquest, and the other by wars with foreign

nations.

But I am asked, how will you contend with a maritime nation, without

a navy? Sir, that question is as easily answered as the first. I will

ask, how we succeeded in the Revolutionary war? We were without any

security upon our seacoast, and still we succeeded. But to be more

specific--I would grant letters of marque and reprisal, and authorize

privateering. Give scope to individual enterprise, to destroy the

commerce of the enemy--which can be done effectually. I would fortify

our seaport towns; station our gunboats and frigates along our coast,

to protect us at home. And in this way I would in war avenge the

infractions of our neutral rights.

Mr. LOWNDES.--Mr. Speaker, in one opinion expressed by the honorable

gentleman last up, (Mr. JOHNSON,) I can concur. The constitution

was not formed for the exclusive protection of commerce, but for

the defence of all the interests of the United States. These are to

be protected by the whole force of the nation. If he had adhered

throughout his speech to this opinion, the question would have been

narrowed to the inquiry, by what means shall commerce be protected? He

has asserted the adequacy to this purpose of the naval force which we

now possess. This is, indeed, a different view of the subject from that

which was taken by his honorable colleague. We were told but yesterday,

that the undivided exertions of the United States could not give them a

navy large enough to be useful. To-day the five frigates which we have

in commission are thought sufficient if properly employed, to redress

all our injuries. The death of Pierce might have been revenged, and the

disgrace of the Chesapeake obliterated, if these five frigates had been

sent a cruising. We did not want force, but spirit to employ it. Can it

be necessary gravely to answer these assertions? May I not trust their

confutation to that general knowledge of the subject which every member

of the House possesses? Must we inquire what number of British vessels

have been lately stationed near our coast, or what greater number it is

in the power of England to station there?

But, although the honorable gentleman from Kentucky is determined

to defend commerce by some method which he will not fully disclose,

his arguments like those of my honorable friend from Pennsylvania,

appeared designed to show that commerce was not worth defending. After

the full discussion of this subject, produced by the report of the

Committee of Foreign Relations, and the debates at every stage of the

bill for raising an additional army, the House might have supposed

that this question was at last dismissed. I hope, however, to be

excused for remarking that both these gentlemen have considered the

profits of commerce as confined to the merchant. They have forgotten

that commerce implies a change of commodities, in which the merchant

is only an intermediate agent. He derives, indeed, a profit from the

transaction--but so must the seller and the buyer, the grower and the

consumer, or they would not engage in it. So must all those who are

supported by their own industry in commercial cities--the clerk, the

artisan, the common laborer. But my honorable friend from Pennsylvania

says that Mr. Pitt estimated the profits of commerce in England at only

twelve millions for a year, in which the naval expense was fourteen

or sixteen millions. I suppose this estimate to have been made in

relation to the income tax, and it obviously must have referred only

to the profits of merchants. The profits of merchants may be computed,

but no sober financier would attempt to compute the entire profits of

commerce. If it be desirable to form, not, indeed, an estimate, but

some conception of its importance, let my honorable friend compute the

value of New York, where a few square feet of land are an estate, and

then compare it with the value of the same extent of ground for the

purposes of the plough. But, is it in this nation, and at this time,

that it can be supposed that the profits of commerce are confined

to the merchant? Your trade was, a few years ago, unrestrained and

flourishing--did it not enrich the most distant parts of your country?

It has since been plundered and confined. Does not the industry of the

country languish? Is not the income of every man impaired? If commerce

were destroyed, the mercantile class, indeed, could exist no longer;

but the merchant, the rich capitalist, at least, would individually

suffer less than any other part of the community, because, while their

property would become unproductive, the value of money would rise

rather than fall.

The value of commerce, then, has been strangely misunderstood by these

gentlemen, who suppose that they have calculated it so very accurately.

But whatever may be its value, you have already determined to defend

it. Considerations of expense are not, indeed, to be neglected. We

must employ, in the prosecution of the war, the cheapest and most

efficacious instruments of hostility which we can obtain. But the

arguments of the honorable gentlemen on the other side, are almost

all of them directed against the war rather than the navy. It would

be absurd, say they, to protect commerce by a navy, which should

cost more than that commerce is worth. It must yet be more absurd,

then, to protect it by an army which costs much more than the navy.

In the comparison of the expenses and of the efficiency of an army

and navy, instituted by my colleague, there is nothing invidious.

The army is acknowledged to be necessary. It has had our votes. But,

from the acknowledged propriety of raising the army, was fairly

inferred the propriety of employing a navy, if it should be proved to

be less expensive in proportion to its probable efficacy. War, and

all its operations and all its instruments, must be expensive. It is

difficult to determine upon the expediency of employing any of these

instruments, except by comparing it with some other. To compute the

result of this comparison, the honorable gentlemen on the other side

must show, not that it is more expensive to maintain a navy than to

be without one--not that it is more expensive to go to war than to

remain at peace, (these propositions they, perhaps, have proved,) but

that the objects proposed to be attained by the navy may be better

or more cheaply attained in some other way. My honorable friend from

Pennsylvania, then, in determining not to follow my colleague in the

investigation of the comparative expense of different kinds of force,

must have determined to avoid the best, and, indeed, the only method of

examination from which a just conclusion could be deduced.

The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, however, who spoke yesterday,

offered objections to a navy, which, if they were well founded, would

supersede all further reasoning and calculation. He opposes a navy

now--he will oppose it for ever. It would produce no possible good and

all possible evil. It would infallibly destroy the constitution. Will

the honorable gentleman tell us why? how? He sees the danger clearly?

Will he explain it? An ambitious General might corrupt his army, and

seize the Capitol--but will an Admiral reduce us to subjection by

bringing his ships up the Potomac? The strongest recommendation of a

navy in free Governments has hitherto been supposed to be that it was

capable of defending but not of enslaving its country. The honorable

gentleman has discovered that this is a vulgar error. A navy is really

much more dangerous than an army to public liberty. He voted for the

army and expressed no fears for the constitution. But a navy would

infallibly terminate in aristocracy and monarchy. All this may be very

true. But are we unreasonable in expecting, before we give up the old

opinion, to hear some argument in favor of the new one? The honorable

gentleman has asserted his propositions very distinctly. We complain

only that he has not proved them.

Yet there is a view in which this question of a navy is, indeed,

closely connected with the constitution. That constitution was formed

by the union of independent States, that the strength of the whole

might be employed for the protection of every part. The States were

not ignorant of the value of those rights which they surrendered to

the General Government, but they expected a compensation for their

relinquishment in the increased power which would be employed for

their defence. Suppose this expectation disappointed--suppose the

harbor of New York blockaded by two seventy-fours? The commerce of

that city, which exists only by commerce, destroyed? The protection

of the General Government claimed? Your whole navy could not drive

these English seventy-fours from their station. Would the brave and

enterprising people of New York consent to see their capital emptied of

its inhabitants, and their whole country beggared by so contemptible a

force? Their own exertions would raise a fleet which would drive off

the enemy and restore their city to its owners. But, when a single

State shall find herself able to raise a greater fleet than the General

Government can or will employ for her defence, can it be expected that

she shall consider that Government as essential to her safety--as

entitled to her obedience? I repeat that the Federal Constitution was

instituted by the States, that the strength of the whole might be

combined for the protection of any part which should be attacked. But

what is the nature of the defence which one of our large States may

be supposed interested to obtain from the General Government? Is it a

land force? We can scarcely expect an attack on land, to repel which

the militia of New York or Massachusetts would be unequal. Were either

of these States attacked, the General Government would protect her by

ordering out her own militia. To render the Union permanent, you must

render it the interest of all the States, the large as well as the

small, to maintain it; you must show them that it will provide, not an

army which they can have without it, but what without it they cannot

have--an adequate navy.