Mr. STANFORD said, so many were the objectionable features of the
present resolution before the House, he should vote for its indefinite
postponement, and with permission of the House he would give his
reasons for his vote. In the first place, he thought the language
and style of the resolution highly objectionable, and calculated to
render that which was already bad enough still worse; that it was, in
the second place, a strange innovation upon all former practice and
usage under our present Government; and lastly, that it was clearly
unconstitutional. Thus much he should endeavor to show, and trusted he
would be able to do it to the satisfaction of the House.
Mr. S. then premised that he had disapproved the introduction of the
resolution of approbation at the last session; that he considered
unnecessary; but the present he considered not only unnecessary, but
even pernicious. That was a pacific one; this belligerent in all its
aspects. He had suggested a mode to one or two gentlemen, of getting
rid of that one, if they had thought proper, and in which case he
would have contributed his vote to have got clear of it. But, had
the question been put in a direct form, he should have differed from
his colleague, (Mr. MACON,) inasmuch as he should have voted for it.
He could not have done honestly otherwise, as he had most cordially
approved the arrangement made by our Government with Mr. Erskine.
Further, that as respected the rejection of Mr. Jackson, he thought
entirely with his colleague, that he might well have been dismissed
on the receipt of his first letter. He tells us for what he had been
sent and commanded to do. In the case of the Chesapeake, to make
"declarations" and to receive counter "declarations" simultaneously. In
other words, for the arrogance, insults, and murders, we had borne and
suffered, he came to stipulate atonement, if we would stipulate a sort
of counter atonement at the same time. Stipulation for stipulation, at
any rate. It had "_not appeared to His Majesty_ necessary to command
him to propose to our Government any formal agreement" to take place
of the rejected one. For the matter, said Mr. S., of Mr. Jackson's
instructions, much rather than for the manner of his negotiation, might
the communication have been cut off with him. Both matter and manner
were, to be sure, objectionable, but the former, in his estimation,
formed much the most solid ground of dismissal. It was but too obvious
the mission of Mr. Jackson would end as the former one had done. That
he did not come to propitiate us was but too manifest.
While the resolution before us, sir, affects to support the Executive
Government against insult, and language "highly indecorous," it
descends into a style of expression, itself more culpable and
degrading; unworthy, indeed, of the country and the dignity of its
Government. It was a flattering truth to know that in the style of
diplomatic correspondence the American side of the question suffered
not in comparison with that of any other. In the late, as well as
former instances, the advantage has been calculated, as he presumed,
to inspire every American bosom with just sentiments of pride. Had it,
therefore, been recommitted, as his colleague (Mr. MACON) had advised,
he had no doubt it could have been amended, and rendered more worthy of
consideration as a State paper, than it is likely to be in its present
dress and form.
Besides, Mr. Speaker, if the measure be intended to have any effect, it
must be a bad one. It looks toward war. Already are our difficulties
with Great Britain critical enough, but if gentlemen wish war, the
thing is altogether appropriate to its end; well calculated not
to support, but to thwart the pacific views and intentions of the
Executive. We may, in this way, foreclose the door of amicable
negotiation which the Executive by his first Message showed us he had
kept open. If rudeness of expression had been resorted to on the part
of the British Minister, in his correspondence with our Government,
had it not been repelled on their part? Had they not amply redressed
the insult of the individual? It might well afford some consolation
to ourselves and the country, if other wrongs and insults have been
even as well repaired as this. Besides the murder of Pierce, the
more horrid murders on board the Chesapeake, the continuation of
impressments for years, we have had instances, more than one, it is
said, of other Ministers conspiring with your conspirators, menacing
you with war, and putting your Government at defiance, here in the ten
miles square, and the sensibility of Congress had never before been
awakened to a resolution of this kind in defence of the Executive. The
truth is, sir, it never needed it, nor does it now. We have, in very
deed, Mr. Speaker, refined upon the more substantial insults we have
suffered, till we have literally reduced it to a _war of words_. It
is the _expressions_ of the individual we are combating, and pledging
the whole force of the country to protect the President against the
consequences of, and not the more palpable injuries received. Would
to Heaven, sir, such a resolution had not been brought forward! It is
unworthy of us--unworthy of the political professions we heretofore
made, even those made at our last session.
That a resolution of approbation, Mr. Speaker, is against all example
for the last eight years; that it is an innovation upon all usage and
practice, reference need only be had to the speeches of gentlemen
during the last session. They afford the most ample proof. They were
then unwilling to pour out the oil of adulation upon the Executive
head. It was deemed unnecessary, anti-republican, to do so. He hoped
gentlemen understood him. He was using their own language upon
that occasion, and not his own. He borrowed it for its excellence
and fitness upon the present occasion. Such language conveyed his
sentiments _then_, and _still did_; and, for his part, he could not
comprehend how it could be correct then, and now the reverse of
correct. Some gentlemen on the floor perfectly remembered that when
Mr. Jefferson came into the Presidency, eight years ago, he changed
the mode of personal address into that of written message. "In doing
this," said he, in his first Message, "I have had a principal regard to
the convenience of the Legislature, to the economy of their time, to
their relief from the embarrassment of immediate answers on subjects
not yet fully before them, and to the benefits thence resulting to the
public affairs." All acquiesced in this new course, and from that time
to the late instance mentioned, no time had been wasted in pouring back
the oil of adulation or approbation, in any form, on the Executive
head. The only instance which could be cited during the last eight
years, was found incidentally incorporated in a resolution relating to
the navigation of the Mississippi. The words were, "and relying with,
perfect confidence on the vigilance and wisdom of the Executive." This,
then, was the only drop of this oil which the last Administration
produced, and has been called up at this first ordinary session of a
new Administration to form an example to follow; or rather, might we
not say, to resume the exploded practice of former times, and thus echo
back messages in this new form of joint resolution. But what was the
style in which gentlemen spoke at our last summer session, when the
subject of approbation was then before us? The language of one was,
if it were the object to bring before the House a discussion upon the
Message of the President, and to return an answer to his Excellency's
most gracious Message, he should certainly be opposed to it. If there
had ever been a particular part of the former Administration which
had met the approbation of the Republicans generally of this country,
it was the discontinuance of the practice. Another had told us that
he was "opposed to a deviation from what he conceived to be the duty,
and becoming the dignity of the House." He thought the House had
nobler duties to perform than passing abstract resolutions, out of
which no legislative act is contemplated, merely for the purpose of
pouring the oil of adulation upon the head of the Chief Magistrate.
And again, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. FINDLAY,) whose
opinions are always so much relied upon and respected in this House,
and he, Mr. S., trusted by few more sincerely than himself, had, upon
that occasion, with singular happiness and force, spoken thus: "Law,"
said the gentleman, "is the only language of a Legislature. It is
the only language that can command obedience and respect. Any equal
number of citizens met in a tavern, and there passing a resolution of
approbation, would have equal force with such a resolution passed in
this House, and would be more in character. They are acting without
authority from the constitution or the rules of the House." It would be
for that gentleman to tell us, to tell the House, and he would beg the
gentleman's pardon for the particular request--but he must request that
he would take the occasion to let us all know how his doctrine then is
now to be got over. For his own part, he could not comprehend how right
and wrong could change their respective sides in so short a time.
His colleague, (Mr. MACON,) in referring to former times, had expressed
some doubt whether the majority were the same party now they were
then. He felt no doubt himself they were the same; but there was no
room to doubt, from the present question itself, they had undergone
some strange modification since former times. The doctrines then must
be well remembered by him, yourself, Mr. Speaker, and a few others
on this floor. The advocates of this sort of adulation must go back
beyond the times of the late and last Administration, if they would
introduce the fashion again. At the opening of the fifth Congress, in
the answer of this House to the speech of the President, these words
are used: "We cannot omit to testify our approbation of the measure,
and to pledge ourselves that no considerations of private inconvenience
shall prevent, on our part, a faithful discharge of the duties to which
we are called." And again, this sentence: "Whilst we view with great
satisfaction, the wisdom, dignity, and moderation, which have marked
the measures of the Supreme Executive of our country in its attempt
to remove, by candid explanations, the complaints and jealousies of
France, we feel the full force of that indignity which has been offered
our country in the rejection of its Minister." This language was too
much in the style of adulation for us then to brook, and our names,
sir, stand recorded together against it. Let gentlemen compare for
themselves.
It is the peculiar misfortune, sir, of this system, if again to be
revived, that the right of approbation fully implies the right of
disapprobation and censure; and during the same Administration of which
we are speaking this right of disapproving and censuring was also
attempted to be exercised. The resolution was introduced at the first
session of the sixth Congress, by a gentleman then from the city of
New York, (Mr. LIVINGSTON,) in the case of Jonathan Robbins. The same
gentleman is occasionally present here at this time, and seems yet to
be a stickler for judicial decision, and still thinks the Executive,
against an individual, matchless odds. The part of the resolution
alluded to, runs thus: "that the decision of those questions by the
President of the United States against the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States, in a case where those courts had already assumed
and exercised jurisdiction, and his advice and request to the judge of
the district court, that the person thus charged should be delivered
up, provided, only, such evidence of his criminality should be produced
as would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, _is a
dangerous interference of the Executive with judicial decisions_."
Hence, then, sir, it might be easily seen from a practice of this sort,
that a whole session might be wasted without doing any part of the
public business. The thing would be endless.
In the fourth Congress, on a subject of a call for papers in relation
to the British Treaty, an unhappy difference arose between this House
and the Executive. General WASHINGTON was the President. His reply to
the House was, "that a just regard to the constitution, and to the duty
of his office, forbid a compliance with their request." The House,
again by resolution, asserted their right, disclaiming, however, at the
same time, any agency in making treaties. Notwithstanding the violence
and passion of the moment, this House did not then think they had any
right to meddle with the making of treaties; but now it would seem
the present House were disposed to join the Senate in this sort of
interference in the negotiations of the Executive to form a treaty.
In all the cases alluded to, sir, it should be distinctly kept in view,
that each House had acted for itself in voting their approbation and
homage to Executive speeches and proclamations. He had reference to the
proclamation of neutrality by General WASHINGTON. This was the first
time Congress ever legislated approbation before.
Mr. QUINCY.--It is not my intention, Mr. Speaker, to offer any
common-place apology for the few observations I shall submit to the
House on the subject now under consideration. Such is the character,
and such the consequences of these resolutions, that no man, who had
at heart the honor and happiness of this country, ought to continue
silent, so long as any topic of illustration is unexhausted, or any
important point of view unoccupied.
It is proposed, sir, that this solemn assembly, the representative
of the American people, the depositary of their power, and in a
constitutional light, the image of their wisdom, should descend from
the dignity of its legislative duties, to the task of uttering against
an individual the mingled language of indignation and reproach. Not
satisfied with seeing that individual prohibited the exercise of his
official character, we are invited to pursue him with the joint terrors
of legislative wrath, couched in terms selected to convey opprobrium
and infix a stigma. "Indecorum," "insolence," "affront," "more
insolence," "more affront," "direct, premeditated insult and affront,"
"disguises, fallacious and false:" these are the stains we are called
upon to cast; these the wounds we are about to inflict. It is scarcely
possible to comprise, within the same compass, more of the spirit of
whatever is bitter in invective, and humiliating in aspersion. This
heaped up measure of legislative contumely is prepared; for whom? For a
private, unassisted, insulated, unallied individual? No, sir. For the
accredited Minister of a great and powerful Sovereign, whose character
he in this country represents, whose confidence he shares; of a
Sovereign who is not bound, and perhaps will not be disposed to uphold
him, in misconduct; but who is bound, by the highest moral obligations,
and by the most impressive political considerations, to vindicate his
wrongs, whether they affect his person or reputation, and to take
care that whatever treatment he shall receive shall not exceed the
measure of justice, and above all, that it does not amount to national
indignity.
Important as is this view of these resolutions, it is not their most
serious aspect. This bull of anathemas, scarcely less than Papal, is
to be fulminated, in the name of the American people, from the high
tower of their authority, under the pretence of asserting their rights
and vindicating their wrongs. What will that people say, if, after
the passions and excitements of this day shall have subsided, they
shall find--and find I fear they will--that this resolution is false,
in fact; that a falsehood is the basis of these aspersions upon the
character of a public Minister? What will be their just indignation,
when they find national embarrassments multiplied, perhaps their peace
gone, their character disgraced, for no better reason than that you,
their representatives, following headlong a temporary current, insist
on making assertions, as they may then, and I believe will, realize
to be not authorized by truth, under circumstances, and in terms, not
warranted by wisdom?
Let us not be deceived. It is no slight responsibility which this House
is about to assume. This is not one of those holiday resolutions, which
frets and fumes its hour upon the stage and is forgotten forever. Very
different is its character and consequences. It attempts to stamp
dishonor and falsehood upon the forehead of a foreign Minister. If the
allegation itself be false, it will turn to plague the accuser. In
its train will follow severe retribution, perhaps in war; certainly
in additional embarrassments, and most certainly, in worse than all,
the loss of that sentiment of self-esteem, which to nations, as well
as individuals, is "the pearl of great price;" which power cannot
purchase, nor gold measure.
In this point of view, all the other questions which have been agitated
in the course of this debate dwindle into utter insignificance. The
attack or defence of administration, the detection of fault, or
even the exposure of crime, are of no importance when brought into
competition with the duty of rescuing this House and nation from the
guilt of asserting what is false, and making that falsehood the basis
of outrage and virulence. I avoid, therefore, all questions of censure
or reproach on either the British Minister or the American Secretary
of State. I confine myself to an examination of this resolution,
particularly of the first branch of it. This is the foundation of
all that follows. I shall submit it to a rigid analysis, not for the
purpose of discovering how others have performed their duties, but of
learning how we shall perform ours. The obligation to truth is the
highest of moral and social duties.
It is remarkable, Mr. Speaker, that of all the gentlemen who have
spoken, no one has taken the precise terms of the resolution as the
basis of his argument, and followed that course of investigation which
those terms naturally prescribe. Yet the obvious and only safe course,
in a case of such high responsibility, is first to form a distinct idea
of the assertion we are about to make, and then carefully to examine
how that assertion is supported, if supported at all, by the evidence.
With this view I recur to the resolution, in the form in which it is
proposed for our adoption, and make it the basis of my inquiries.
[The Resolution.]
This part of the resolution, it will not be denied, is the foundation
of the whole. For if no such "idea was conveyed" in the letter of the
23d of October, then there could be no "repetition" of that idea,
in the letter of the 4th of November; and if in the former part of
his correspondence Mr. Jackson had made no such "insinuation," then
the assertion in this letter that he had made none, was perfectly
harmless and justifiable. This part, therefore, includes the pith of
the resolution. If we analyze it, we shall find that it contains two
distinct assertions. First, that the expressions alluded to convey
a certain idea. Second, that this idea, so conveyed, is indecorous
and insolent. Here again we are enabled to limit the field of our
investigation. For, if no such idea, as is asserted, was conveyed,
then the inquiry, whether such idea is indecorous and insolent, is
wholly superseded. The true and only question, therefore, is _whether
the expressions alluded to, do convey the asserted idea_. I place the
subject in this abstract form before the House to the end that, if
possible, we may exclude all those prejudices and partialities which so
naturally and imperceptibly bias the judgment. In the light in which
it now stands, it must be apparent to every one who will reflect, that
the question has, so far as it respects the principles on which our
decision ought to proceed, no more to do with the relations between
Great Britain and the United States, than it has with those between the
United States and China, and has no more connection with Mr. Francis J.
Jackson and Mr. Robert Smith, than with the late Charles of Sweden, and
the old Duke of Sudermania. It is a simple philological disquisition,
which is to be decided by known rules of construction. The only
investigation is, touching the power or capacity of certain terms to
convey an alleged idea. However illy suited a question like this may be
for the discussion of an assembly like the present, yet if we would be
just to ourselves and the people, we must submit to an examination of
it, in that form in which alone certainty can be attained. It is only
by stripping the subject of all adventitious circumstances, that we
can arrive at that perfect view of its nature which can satisfy minds
scrupulous of truth, and anxious concerning duty. It is only by such
a rigorous scrutiny that we shall be able to form that judgment which
will stand the test of time, and do honor to us and our country when
the passions of the day are passed away and forgotten.
The natural course of inquiry now is, into the idea which is asserted
to be conveyed, and the expressions which are said to convey it.
Concerning the first there is no difficulty. The idea asserted to be
conveyed is, "that the arrangement made between Mr. Erskine and Mr.
Smith was entered into by the American Government, with a knowledge
that the powers of Mr. Erskine were incompetent for that purpose." It
would save a world of trouble if the expressions in which this idea is
said to be conveyed were equally easy of ascertainment. But on this
point, those gentlemen who maintain this result are far from being
agreed. Some being of opinion that it is to be found in one place,
some in another, and others again assert that it is to be found in the
whole correspondence taken together. Never was an argument of this
nature before so strangely conducted. Gentlemen seem wholly to lay out
of sight that this resolution pledges this House to the assertion of
a particular fact, and expresses no general sentiment concerning the
conduct of Jackson, or the conduct of his Government. Yet, as if the
whole subject of British relations was under discussion, they have
deemed themselves at liberty to course through these documents, collect
every thing which seems to them indecorous, insolent or unsuitable
in Mr. Jackson's language, and add to the heap thus made the whole
list of injuries received from Great Britain--impressments, affair
of the Chesapeake, murder of Pierce--and all this, for what purpose?
Why, truly, to justify this House in making a solemn asseveration of
a _particular fact_! As if any injury in the world could be even an
apology for the deliberate utterance of a falsehood. Let the conduct of
Mr. Jackson, or of Great Britain, be as atrocious as it will, if the
fact which we assert do not exist, we and this nation are disgraced. It
is evident, then, that irksome as such a task is, it is necessary that
we should submit to a precise inquiry into the truth of that to which
we are about to pledge our reputation and that of this people.
In our investigation, let us follow the natural course that is pointed
out in the resolution. This alleges that the obnoxious expressions
are contained in a letter of the 23d of October, and to this limits
our assertion. In this letter, therefore, either directly, or by way
of reference to some other, this obnoxious idea or insinuation must
be found. For if it be not in this, even if it should be contained in
other parts of the correspondence, which is not, however, pretended,
still our assertion would be false. Concerning this letter of the 23d
of October, I confidently assert, without fear of contradiction, that
the obnoxious idea, if contained in that letter, is conveyed in the
paragraph I am now about to quote. No man has pretended to cite any
part of this letter, as evidence of the asserted insult, except the
ensuing, and although there is not a perfect coincidence in opinion as
to the particular part in which it resides, yet all agree that it lurks
somewhere in this paragraph, if it have any dwelling-place in this
letter.
[The paragraph.]
I have quoted the whole paragraph because, in that obscure and general
mode of argument in which gentlemen have indulged, it has been read as
that entire portion in which the insult is conveyed. It is difficult to
conceive how some parts of this paragraph can be thought to convey any
insult. However, in prosecution of my plan, I shall first exclude all
those parts in which the obnoxious idea cannot be pretended to exist,
and then limit my investigation to that part in which it must exist,
if, in the letter of the 23d of October, it be conveyed at all.
With respect to the first sentence in this paragraph, I say confidently
that the insult is not contained there. It is simply a declaration
of the causes of the disavowal, so far from including the obnoxious
idea of a knowledge in our Government of the incompetency of Erskine's
powers, that in a manner it excludes that idea, by enumerating
violation of instructions and want of authority as the only causes of
the disavowal. In the first sentence, then, the insult is not. I pass
by the second, as it will be the subject of a distinct examination
hereafter. The third and fourth sentences it will not even be pretended
convey this obnoxious idea. They simply acknowledge the frequency of
graduated instructions, and assert the fact that Mr. Erskine's were
not of that character. In this there is no insult. As little can it be
pretended to exist in the fifth sentence. It merely asserts that Mr.
Smith "_already_," that is, at or before the time Mr. Jackson was then
writing, is acquainted with the instructions, (a fact not denied, and
not suggested to be an insult,) and that the fact of these instructions
being the only ones, Mr. Smith knows _from the information of Mr.
Jackson_--an assertion, which so far from intimating the obnoxious
idea of a knowledge in Mr. Smith at the time of the arrangement with
Mr. Erskine, that it conveys a contrary idea, by declaring that he was
indebted for it to his (Mr. Jackson's) information. Here, then, the
insult is not. With respect to the last sentence in this paragraph,
the only assertions it contains, are the fact that the terms accepted
were not contained in the instructions, and the evidence of this fact
derived from the statement of Erskine that those acceded to were
substituted by Mr. Smith in lieu of those originally proposed. In all
this, the knowledge of Mr. Smith of the incompetency of Mr. Erskine's
powers is not so much as intimated. Indeed, no one has pretended
directly to assert that they have found it in the parts of this
paragraph, from which I have thus excluded the obnoxious idea. Yet, as
the whole has been cited, and made the basis of desultory declamation,
I thought it not time lost to clear out of the way all irrelevant
matter, and to leave for distinct examination the only sentence of
this paragraph in which the insult lurks, if it has any existence in
this letter. This point we have now attained. And as little inclined
as gentlemen may be to precise investigation, they must yield to it.
I say, therefore, confidently, and without fear of contradiction,
that if the assertion contained in this resolution be capable of
justification by any part of the letter of the 23d of October, it is
by the following, the only remaining sentence of the cited paragraph
which I have not yet examined: "These instructions I now understand by
your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the
liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were, at the time, in
substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can
be given of the deviation from them which occurred than by a reference
to the terms of your agreement." The latter part of this sentence being
merely a conclusion from the preceding part, and having no relation
to the knowledge of our Government at the time of the arrangement,
will be laid out of consideration as being obviously wholly without
the possibility of any agency in conveying the obnoxious idea. There
remains only the preceding part of this sentence for the residence
of the insult. Here, if anywhere, it must exist. Accordingly this is
usually shown as the spot where the ghost of insinuation first appeared
before the eyes of our astonished Administration. Here we shall again
find it; unless, indeed, it were in fact a mere delusion of the fancy,
formed of "such stuff as dreams are made." Let us examine by way of
analysis.
[Here Mr. QUINCY analyzed the paragraph.]
I have thus far proceeded by way of a strict analysis of every part
of the correspondence, in which the insulting idea, asserted in this
resolution, has been said to be conveyed. I have omitted no part
which has been cited in support of this first resolution, and think
that I have shown that it exists nowhere in the letter of the 23d
of October, either in direct assertion, or by way of reference. And
it is concerning what is contained in that letter alone, that the
resolution under consideration makes assertion. The House will observe
that, according to all rules of fair reasoning, it would have been
sufficient for me to have limited myself to show the fallacy of the
arguments of the advocates of this insult; it being always incumbent on
those who assert the existence of any thing to prove it. I have not,
however, thought my duty on so important an occasion fulfilled, unless
I undertook to prove what the lawyers call "a negative," and to show,
with as much strength of reasoning as I had, the non-existence of the
idea asserted in this resolution; with what success, I cheerfully leave
to the decision of such thoughtful men in the nation who will take the
trouble to understand the argument. There is, however, a corroborative
view of this subject, which ought not to be omitted.
The insulting idea said to be conveyed is, that Mr. Smith had a
knowledge, at the time of the arrangement, of the incompetency of
Erskine's powers, and this because such a knowledge was one of the
essential circumstances which could only lead to a disavowal. Now, it
does happen that neither Mr. Erskine nor his Government enumerate this
knowledge of our Government as one of those essential circumstances.
On the contrary, they constantly omit it, when formally enumerating
those circumstances. Mr. Canning places the disavowal, solely, on the
footing of Mr. Erskine's having "acted not only not in conformity,
but in direct contradiction to his instructions." Mr. Jackson, also,
in his letter of the 23d, when formally enumerating the causes of
the disavowal, says expressly, that the disavowal was "because the
agreement was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions,
and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it."
Now, is it not most extraordinary, that after such formal statements,
not including the knowledge of our Government among the essential
circumstances, that it is on this knowledge the British Government
intend to rely for the justification of their disavowal? I simply ask
this question, if the British did intend thus to rely on the previous
knowledge of our Government, why do they always omit it in their formal
enumerations? And if they do not intend thus to rely, in what possible
way could it serve that Government thus darkly to insinuate it? But
as if it were intended to leave this House wholly without excuse in
passing this resolution, Mr. Jackson expressly asserts, in this very
letter of the 23d of October, that the information of that fact was
derived from him, the knowledge of which, this resolution asserts, he
intended to intimate was known at the time of the arrangement with
Erskine. For he specifically says: "I have had the honor of informing
you that it (Mr. Erskine's instruction) was the only one by which
the conditions on which he was to conclude were prescribed." Now, if
Mr. Jackson had remotely intended to intimate that Mr. Smith had a
previous knowledge of that fact, would he have asserted that he was
indebted to him (Mr. Jackson) for the information? Conclusive as this
argument is, there is yet another in reserve, which is a clincher. And
that is, that this very knowledge which we propose solemnly to affirm
Mr. Jackson intimated our Government possessed at the time of the
arrangement, it is, from the nature of things, impossible they should
have possessed. The idea asserted to be intended to be conveyed is,
a knowledge in our Government that the arrangement was entered into
without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine. Now, the fact
that Mr. Erskine's powers were incompetent, it was impossible for our
Government to know, except from the confession of Mr. Erskine. But Mr.
Erskine before, at the time, and ever since, has uniformly asserted
the reverse. So that, besides all the other absurdities growing out of
this resolution, there is this additional, that it accuses Mr. Jackson
of the senseless stupidity of insinuating as a fact, a knowledge in
our Government, which from the undeniable state of things it is not
possible they should have possessed. Mr. Speaker, can any argument be
more conclusive? 1. The idea is not conveyed by the form of expression.
2. Mr. Jackson, though expressly enumerating the only causes which led
to a disavowal, does not suggest this. 3. Mr. Jackson expressly asserts
the knowledge that these were the only instructions derived from him;
of course it could not have been known previous to the arrangement.
4. Had he been absurd enough to attempt to convey such an idea, the
very nature of things shows that it could not exist. I confess I am
ignorant by what reasoning the non-existence of an insinuation can be
demonstrated, if it be not by this concurrence of arguments.
Before I conclude this part of the subject, it will be necessary to
make a single observation or two, on the following passage in Mr.
Jackson's letter of the 4th of November, for although our assertion
has relation, in the part of the resolution under consideration, only
to the letter of the 23d of October, yet this subsequent passage has
been adduced as a sort of accessory after the fact. "You will find
that, in my correspondence with you, I have carefully avoided drawing
conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced
by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation,
where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, as I have become
acquainted with them, I have scrupulously adhered." This the subsequent
part of the resolution under debate denominates, "the repetition of
the same intimation." But if the argument I have offered be correct,
there was no such "intimation" in the preceding letters, and of course
no repetition of it here. For if he had, as I think I have proved, in
his former letters uttered no such insinuation as is asserted, then all
the allegations in this paragraph are wholly harmless and decorous,
neither disrespectful nor improper. "But this," says the gentleman
from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MILNOR) "is conclusive to my mind, that Mr.
Jackson did intend to insult, for if he had not would he have refrained
from giving an explanation when it was asked?" That gentleman will
recollect that the assertion of this House is as to the idea which Mr.
Jackson has conveyed in the letter of the 23d, not as to the idea which
he intended to convey. Suppose he intended it, and has not done it, our
assertion is still false. But will that gentleman seriously conclude,
contrary to so obvious a course of argument, that he has asserted,
or even intended to assert, this particular idea, merely because he
does not choose to explain it? Are there not a thousand reasons which
might have induced Mr. Jackson not to explain, consistent with being
perfectly innocent of the intention originally to convey it? Perhaps he
thought that he had already been explicit enough. Perhaps he thought
the explanation was asked in terms which did not entitle Mr. Smith to
receive it. Perhaps he did not choose to give this satisfaction. Well
that now is "very ungentlemanly," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
(Mr. MILNOR.) I agree, if he pleases, so it was. But does that justify
this resolution? Because he is not a gentleman, shall we assert a
falsehood?
I briefly recapitulate the leading points of my argument. When Mr.
Jackson asserts "that the substance of the instructions was known to
our Government," the expression cannot convey the obnoxious idea,
because it is not pretended that, in those instructions, the existence
of other powers was excluded. When he says, "you must have thought it
unreasonable to complain of disavowal," the time of knowledge implied
is confined by the structure of the sentence to the time of a disavowal
known, and cannot be limited backwards to the time of arrangement
made. It is also absurd to suppose that Mr. Jackson would intimate by
implication the knowledge of our Government of Erskine's incompetency
of powers at the time of arrangement, as an essential circumstance on
which the King's right of disavowal was founded, and yet omit that
circumstance in a formal enumeration; and lastly, it is still more
absurd to suppose that he would undertake to insinuate a knowledge,
which, from the nature of things, could not possibly exist.
I have thus, Mr. Speaker, submitted to a strict and minute scrutiny all
the parts of this correspondence which have been adduced by any one in
support of the fact asserted in this resolution. This course, however
irksome, I thought it my duty to adopt, to the end that no exertion of
mine might be wanting to prevent this House from passing a resolution,
which, in my apprehension, is pregnant with national disgrace, and
other innumerable evils.
FRIDAY, December 29.
Another member, to wit, from North Carolina, JAMES HOLLAND, appeared
and took his seat.