On motion of Mr. QUINCY, these papers were ordered to be printed--for
the motion 59, against it 40.
MONDAY, December 18.
Another member, to wit, from New York, HERMAN KNICKERBACKER, appeared,
and took his seat in the House.
THURSDAY, December 21.
_Conduct of the British Minister._
The House again went into Committee of the Whole on the resolution from
the Senate.
Mr. EMOTT concluded his speech against it, as given entire in preceding
pages.
Mr. GHOLSON said, that notwithstanding much had already been said on
the subject before the committee, he hoped he should be pardoned for
occupying a small portion of their attention. The resolution before
us seems to embrace several objects pre-eminently entitled to the
dispassionate consideration of Congress; objects altogether unconnected
with those factions and political dissensions which have unhappily too
long prevailed among brethren of the same common family, and which may
one day prove fatal to political liberty. The first question which
presents itself in the investigation of this subject, involves on the
one hand the veracity and dignity of the American Government, and, on
the other, the character and reputation of a British Envoy, and, in
some degree, of the British Ministry.
In my remarks on this subject, I consider it regular to commence with
the origin of the mission from Great Britain to the United States; out
of which has arisen the present unpropitious posture of the affairs
between the two countries. What, sir, were the circumstances under
which that mission was despatched here? In the month of May last,
it was known to the British Ministry that a commercial arrangement
had been made by their Envoy resident here, (Mr. Erskine,) with the
American Government, but under the allegation that it was made contrary
to instructions, it was no sooner known than it, and the Minister
making it, were disavowed. Mr. Jackson was then appointed to substitute
Mr. Erskine, the disavowed agent, and at the time he (Mr. Jackson)
was sent to this country, it was well known by the British Ministry
that the Government of the United States stood solemnly pledged to the
American people to maintain, and that they had inviolably and steadily
adhered, to certain points and principles in our differences with
England, a surrender of, or departure from which, would be a sacrifice
of the honor and best interests of this nation.
Yes, sir, when they well knew that, in the affair of the Chesapeake,
our Executive would not, and the voice of almost the whole nation
had pronounced that he ought not to make the first advance to a
reconciliation, Mr. Jackson was charged, not only to require the first
advance from us, to wit: that in the document which should contain
the adjustment of that affair, the revocation of the President's
proclamation of 1807, interdicting the British armed ships from
our own water, should be recited as an indispensable preliminary;
but to require from us also the violation of the principles of our
naturalization laws, by insisting on the surrender of foreigners who
had become naturalized. As to the Orders in Council, we know not what
specific propositions he was charged with in relation to them. As far
as we are able to deduce any thing from facts before us, it must be
understood that the British Government had determined to accept of no
conditions for the repeal of the Orders in Council except such as had
been previously declared on the part of the American Government to
be inadmissible. Notwithstanding what has been said by the gentleman
from New York, (Mr. EMOTT,) I think it is easily to be demonstrated
that the British Government did not intend to make any arrangement
different from that contemplated by the celebrated instructions of the
twenty-third of January, transmitted to Mr. Erskine. If the British
Government, so recently as May last, disavowed an arrangement, and
recalled its Minister, under an allegation that he violated his
instructions, was it to be supposed that they would, in two or three
months, so far change their policy as to authorize an arrangement on
the same principles that they had just rejected? Certainly not, sir.
It is evident that such an accommodation could not have been designed,
because Mr. Canning says that such measures must be adopted as should
secure the objects of the Orders in Council. That they did not by this
mean the mere continuance of the non-intercourse law as to France,
is manifest; for Mr. Canning says to Mr. Pinkney, that a repeal as
to Great Britain, would be a repeal as to the whole world, unless
the British Navy were to be permitted to enforce the law interdicting
intercourse with France by the seizure of such vessels as should be
found violating it.
These, sir, were the circumstances under which the mission commenced.
What were those that characterized its progress and termination? I
think it very easy to show that the conduct of the Minister himself,
after he arrived, partook strictly of the same character as the conduct
of the Ministry who sent him. I think I have shown that the disposition
manifested by the Ministry in sending him here was insulting to this
country. Let us next inquire into the character disclosed, and the
conduct displayed by that Minister after his arrival. And, in this
inquiry, without wading through all the documents, which gentlemen can
as well understand by perusing them in their chambers as by hearing
them read here, I will merely advert to the offensive expressions used
by Mr. Jackson, and to the manner in which those expressions were met
by the Secretary of State. By doing this, it will be very discernible,
not only that the facts stated in the resolution are sustained by the
correspondence, but that the resolution does not go so far as facts
would warrant. In Mr. Jackson's letter of the 11th of October, he says,
that the arrangement with Mr. Erskine was made under such circumstances
as could only lead to a disavowal. If the circumstances were such as
could only lead to a disavowal, they must have been dishonorable, and
Mr. Jackson, by intimating that our Government had a knowledge of
these circumstances, charges it with being _particeps criminis_. Can
any thing be more palpable than this? He expresses this idea in still
stronger terms when he intimates that Mr. Smith had a principal agency
in the misconduct on this occasion. It certainly was not in Mr. Smith's
power to substitute conditions for those which he declined accepting,
but it must have been done by Mr. Erskine. But, notwithstanding this,
he charges Mr. Smith, not only with conniving at a conduct improper
in itself, because it could only lead to rejection of the arrangement
growing out of it, but insinuates that he was the principal actor
in the scene. In Mr. Smith's letter in answer to Mr. Jackson, the
animadversions are too clear in their object to be mistaken. Mr. J.
is informed of the displeasure of the American Government at such
insinuations; and, in the very first letter which was written by the
Secretary of State, he disclaims pointedly having had any knowledge
whatever of the deficiency of Mr. Erskine's instructions at the time
of making the arrangement. And what says Mr. Jackson in reply? He says
again, that Mr. Erskine's instructions were known to Mr. Smith. Sir,
I acknowledge very candidly, that on a superficial perusal of the
correspondence, the charge of falsehood, from the art and adroitness
with which it is wrapt up, does not appear so palpable as when it is
more closely examined. Yet, sir, notwithstanding all knowledge of the
instructions had been denied by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jackson reiterates
the assertion that they were known. Do gentlemen say that there is
no insult in this? That there is nothing wrong in the assertion of a
knowledge on the part of the Secretary of State which he had before
formally and solemnly disclaimed. In Mr. Smith's letter to Mr. Jackson,
of the first of November, he intimates to Mr. Jackson that a language
implying such a knowledge on the part of the American Government, was
altogether inadmissible. What is Mr. Jackson's reply in his letter of
the 4th of November, which is the last communication that a proper
self-respect on the part of the American Government would permit it
to receive from him? After again insinuating that our Government had
a knowledge of Mr. Erskine's instructions, he says: "That any thing
therein (in his former letter) contained may be irrelevant to the
subject, it is of course competent to you to endeavor to show; and as
far as you succeed in so doing, so far will my argument lose of its
validity; but, as to the propriety of my allusions, you must allow me
to acknowledge only the decision of my own Sovereign, whose commands I
obey, and to whom alone I can consider myself responsible." In speaking
of the propriety of his allusions, he acknowledges that he had made
them, and does not deny that they are of the character ascribed to
them. This insolent letter is concluded by expressions too plain for
any misconception whatever. He says: "I have carefully avoided drawing
conclusions which did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced
by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where
I was unable to substantiate a fact." He here, in fact, recognizes
the insinuation imputed to him, and says he would not have made it if
he could not have substantiated it. Collecting all his insinuations,
on the one hand, and the refutation of them, on the other, I draw the
conclusion that Mr. Jackson not only insulted the Government, but
charged it with one of the foulest crimes--with direct falsehood.
If the circumstances under which he was sent, and his conduct after
he arrived here, were such as I have described, I ask if the occasion
does not require that the American Government should take a firm and
dignified stand? That we should repel insults and respect ourselves?
Shall the authority to whom only is entrusted the most solemn act of
government which can be performed, the act of deciding on the last
appeal of nations, stand by and see the Executive insulted by an
emissary, such as Mr. Jackson was? I hope not, sir.
Sir, I consider the present no time for the causeless crimination
of our own Government, and much less is it a time to countenance
any other. We should discard domestic differences and party spirit,
which, at a juncture like this, may be disastrous to our country. If
we differ among ourselves, in the name of God let us unite against
foreign aggression and foreign insult. It is admitted by gentlemen on
the other side, that both Great Britain and France have done us wrong.
If so, why not unite against the one as well as against the other? A
conduct like this must produce the happiest consequences. If any thing
like union is discovered against insult and injury, I believe in God
that it would not be long ere we met on reciprocal terms of amity. Sir,
for my country, I only desire the rule of right; that we must obtain.
If it is thought I wish any disaster to befall the British nation, I
am misunderstood. I am willing that Great Britain should be great,
happy, and prosperous. I should view her downfall as an inauspicious
event; consequences might result from it which I will not undertake to
estimate; but I hope that the expectation never will be encouraged from
this Hall, that Great Britain can or will receive any terms from us
other than such as are fair, honorable, and reciprocal.
The terms which have been offered to us are not of that kind. I submit
it to gentlemen's own decision. We have long experienced injustice, and
if we are only capable of being firm to our purpose, and adhering to
the principles of neutrality which have hitherto guided the councils
of our country, and especially the enlightened policy of the Executive
department, we shall no doubt obtain justice.
In every view, therefore, it appears to me that the resolution from
the Senate not only is supported by the correspondence laid before us,
but is rendered peculiarly important by the occasion. The appeal made
by Mr. Jackson from the Executive, from the organ with which alone a
foreign Minister can have communication, to the people, to a tribunal
with which he cannot communicate, adds great force to the arguments in
favor of a firm stand on our part. I hope it will be made, and that it
never will be abandoned till we receive that justice which has been but
too long delayed.
Mr. Ross observed: I, for one, am an Administration man, if that
Administration act correctly, whether it shall, in a time of great
difficulty and doubt, insure a prospect of peace with Great Britain,
or whether it may find it necessary in asserting the rights and
independence of the Government to involve the nation in war. I think
the importance of the one course is as great as the other, and I will,
under such circumstances, equally support them when they are likely to
make war as to make peace, however other gentlemen may differ from me
on this head.
Before I proceed to state, sir, what I conceive necessary to
be understood, in order to come to a correct judgment on these
resolutions, permit me to premise that there is more than a presumption
that Mr. Erskine had a power to enter into the arrangement which
he made. 1st. Because he himself declared he had such power. 2dly.
Because he acted in conformity to that declaration; and, 3dly. Because
Mr. Jackson does not deny he had such power. Mr. Jackson does not
pretend to say that Mr. Erskine had not other despatches and other
instructions than those of the 23d of January, and that, in them, there
were not other conditions of a different grade and character from
those contained in that despatch. Hence, I think it is fairly to be
concluded, that Mr. Erskine had the power to enter into the agreement.
It has, however, been said by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr.
DANA,) that this is not so much a question of what our Government was
ignorant of, as of what they knew, or what they ought to have known;
and he has entered into a long examination of the mode of commissioning
diplomatic characters, whether by letters of credence or by full
powers, and has drawn a distinction between the two. In the first
place, I apprehend it is in nowise material, to enable the House to
decide on the resolution, whether the President did or did not know
the nature of Mr. Erskine's powers. But it is necessary to rescue him
from the imputation which those are disposed to cast on him who are
desirous to pull down the Administration. What was the amount of the
gentleman's showing on this occasion? That in all cases, in order to
complete a treaty, it is necessary there should be a commission or
full power. But has he shown that it is necessary in order to make a
preliminary arrangement similar to that entered into? I apprehend he
has not. On referring to the letter quoted by him from Mr. Jefferson,
then Secretary of State, to Mr. Hammond, we find the former calling
upon the latter to exhibit his powers to enter into a negotiation;
but Mr. Jefferson afterwards recedes from that demand, and receives
the word of Mr. Hammond that he is possessed of power to negotiate as
sufficient evidence of his being clothed with the proper power without
the exhibition thereof. But the ratification was not withheld, as has
been justly said, because there was an absence of a full power on this
occasion. Mr. Jackson himself states that this was not the ground on
which the ratification was withheld. It must first be proved that it
was obligatory on the Executive to call for Mr. Erskine's full power,
and it must then be proved that he did not, before his observations
can be brought to bear on the question. Where is the proof that the
Executive did not call for those powers? It is not pretended that
Mr. Erskine had not a power to make an arrangement, but that it was
not concluded in pursuance of his instructions. Therefore, if he had
produced ten thousand powers, unless his instructions had authorized
him to do what he did, the British Ministry would have rejected the
terms stipulated for them, as they have done. But why is it necessary
to know, on this occasion, whether the President did call for these
powers or not? The inquiry composes no part of the resolution; it is
neither expressly mentioned nor glanced at; and why this inquiry is
raised, I confess I am utterly at a loss to know, unless it was to
prove that the President of the United States had a knowledge of the
instructions, and that they restricted Mr. Erskine's powers. The
gentleman has not ventured to infer that the President of the United
States had this knowledge, but the course of his argument goes to show
that, in his opinion, he did possess this knowledge. He lays down the
position, that it was the duty of the President to have seen those
powers, and, I presume, supposes that the conclusion will be drawn
that the President performed his duty; and, of course, taking it for
granted that there were no other instructions than those of the 23d
of January, that the President must have seen those instructions, and
consequently have known that Mr. Erskine had not power to conclude the
arrangement. All his argument went to raise a structure to induce a
belief in this House, and in the public at large, that this knowledge
must have been in possession of the President. The gentleman, at the
same time, professes the utmost regard and respect for Mr. Madison.
This, I confess, is following the direction of the poet, who says:
"Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer;
And, without sneering, teach the rest to sneer."
But let us inquire if the President had any knowledge that Mr. Erskine
had no full power; for if I show, beyond all doubt, that the President
did not know it, all this insidious fabric, which is designed to
produce so many delusions, will vanish at once. I think it is to be
presumed that the President had no knowledge that Mr. Erskine had not
full powers, because he entered into the arrangement. What object could
he have in view which should induce him to conclude an arrangement,
except with full confidence of its being carried into effect? Not
to get rid of the embargo--that had long before been interred by
its fathers with a truly Christian spirit. Not to get rid of the
non-intercourse--because the moment the arrangement was disavowed, the
President breathed life and spirit into that act, and gave it renewed
existence. It was not from any hostile disposition to England, because
he could have no reason to wish for a war. And because, if he had
desired a war with that country, he had no occasion to seek a pretext
therefor, inasmuch as long antecedents, and up to the very time of
making the arrangement, the causes for war against Great Britain were
great and numerous, as has been agreed by all parties. If not to get
rid of the embargo, nor of the non-intercourse, nor for war, what
object could he have, with such knowledge as has been imputed to him,
not expressly, but by inference, in making the arrangement of April?
Will gentlemen be good enough to condescend so far as to assign some
object that the Executive could have had in view from such conduct? For
it is not to be presumed that men, in or out of office, act without
motive and without object. Therefore, hearing no reason assigned why
the President should act thus preposterously, as it is attempted to be
insinuated he did, by those in opposition, it would be reasonable to
conclude that he had no such knowledge. But, in opposition to this
insinuation, also, you have the solemn declaration of the President of
the United States, through the Secretary of State. Humiliating in the
extreme must it be to hear this solemn asseveration questioned, even in
a side-way, in order to support the insolence of a British Minister!
Was it not enough that the country has been enabled to endure, in
order to secure the great object of remaining in peace, insult after
insult, outrage after outrage, and even that the Government should
be insulted by foreign diplomatic characters, without doubts and
suspicions being insinuated by members of this House? Pray, sir, let me
ask this House, or the whole of the United States, what the President
of the United States has ever done in any official character, among
the many which he has filled with honor to himself and reputation to
his country, that the correctness of his declarations, made through
his Minister of State, should be disputed? But I might suffer the
humiliation of going still further into the subject. We have the
word of the recalled Minister, if that be considered more conclusive
by gentlemen than that of the President of the United States, that
he did not communicate his instructions to Mr. Smith. We have, 1st.
The presumption that the Executive had no knowledge of Mr. Erskine's
instructions, because he could have no object in view in concluding an
arrangement with that knowledge; 2d. We have his declaration to that
effect through the Secretary of State; 3d. We have the declaration of
the Minister, whose act was disavowed, to the same effect. What have
we to destroy this proof? The deceptive, poisonous insinuations of Mr.
Jackson. Mr. Erskine repeatedly declared that he had ample powers.
On the news being received during the last session of the issuing of
the order of the 26th April, he declared that he had no doubt his
arrangement would be carried into effect. He, to the last moment,
declared that he acted in the spirit, if not in the letter, of his
several letters of instructions. How, therefore, was it possible for
the President to receive information from Mr. Erskine that he was not
invested with competent power, when Mr. Erskine himself declared and
believed he was, and acted accordingly.
From these considerations I apprehend it most clearly appears that the
President of the United States had not a knowledge, neither was it his
duty to have had a knowledge that Mr. Erskine did not possess powers to
make the arrangement which he did.
TUESDAY, December 26.
Two other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, BENJAMIN PICKMAN, jr.;
and from Virginia, WILLIAM A. BURWELL, appeared, and took their seats
in the House.
THURSDAY, December 28.
_Conduct of the British Minister._
The House again resumed the consideration of the report of the
Committee of the Whole on the resolution from the Senate approving
the conduct of the Executive in refusing to receive any further
communications from Francis J. Jackson.