PARIS, December 20, 1787.
DEAR SIR,--My last to you was of October the 8th, by the Count de
Moustier. Yours of July the 18th, September the 6th and October the
24th, were successively received, yesterday, the day before, and three
or four days before that. I have only had time to read the letters; the
printed papers communicated with them, however interesting, being
obliged to lie over till I finish my despatches for the packet, which
despatches must go from hence the day after to-morrow. I have much to
thank you for; first and most for the cyphered paragraph respecting
myself. These little informations are very material towards forming my
own decisions. I would be glad even to know, when any individual member
thinks I have gone wrong in any instance. If I know myself, it would
not excite ill blood in me, while it would assist to guide my conduct,
perhaps to justify it, and to keep me to my duty, alert. I must thank
you, too, for the information in Thomas Burke's case; though you will
have found by a subsequent letter, that I have asked of you a further
investigation of that matter. It is to gratify the lady who is at the
head of the convent wherein my daughters are, and who, by her
attachment and attention to them, lays me under great obligations. I
shall hope, therefore, still to receive from you the result of all the
further inquiries my second letter had asked. The parcel of rice which
you informed me had miscarried, accompanied my letter to the Delegates
of South Carolina. Mr. Bourgoin was to be the bearer of both, and both
were delivered together into the hands of his relation here, who
introduced him to me, and who, at a subsequent moment, undertook to
convey them to Mr. Bourgoin. This person was an engraver, particularly
recommended to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Hopkinson. Perhaps he may have
mislaid the little parcel of rice among his baggage. I am much pleased
that the sale of western lands is so successful. I hope they will
absorb all the certificates of our domestic debt speedily, in the first
place, and that then, offered for cash, they will do the same by our
foreign ones.
The season admitting only of operations in the cabinet, and these being
in a great measure secret, I have little to fill a letter. I will,
therefore, make up the deficiency, by adding a few words on the
Constitution proposed by our convention.
I like much the general idea of framing a government, which should go
on of itself, peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the
State legislatures. I like the organization of the government into
legislative, judiciary and executive. I like the power given the
legislature to levy taxes, and for that reason solely, I approve of the
greater House being chosen by the people directly. For though I think a
House so chosen, will be very far inferior to the present Congress,
will be very illy qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign
nations, etc., yet this evil does not weigh against the good, of
preserving inviolate the fundamental principle, that the people are not
to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves. I
am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great and
little States, of the latter to equal, and the former to proportional
influence. I am much pleased, too, with the substitution of the method
of voting by person, instead of that of voting by States; and I like
the negative given to the Executive, conjointly with a third of either
House; though I should have liked it better, had the judiciary been
associated for that purpose, or invested separately with a similar
power. There are other good things of less moment. I will now tell you
what I do not like. First, the omission of a bill of rights, providing
clearly, and without the aid of sophism, for freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction
of monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus
laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of
the land, and not by the laws of nations. To say, as Mr. Wilson does,
that a bill of rights was not necessary, because all is reserved in the
case of the general government which is not given, while in the
particular ones, all is given which is not reserved, might do for the
audience to which it was addressed; but it is surely a _gratis dictum_,
the reverse of which might just as well be said; and it is opposed by
strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the
omission of the cause of our present Confederation, which had made the
reservation in express terms. It was hard to conclude, because there
has been a want of uniformity among the States as to the cases triable
by jury, because some have been so incautious as to dispense with this
mode of trial in certain cases, therefore, the more prudent States
shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much
more just and wise to have concluded the other way, that as most of the
States had preserved with jealousy this sacred palladium of liberty,
those who had wandered, should be brought back to it; and to have
established general right rather than general wrong. For I consider all
the ill as established, which may be established. I have a right to
nothing, which another has a right to take away; and Congress will have
a right to take away trials by jury in all civil cases. Let me add,
that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every
government on earth, general or particular; and what no just government
should refuse, or rest on inference.
The second feature I dislike, and strongly dislike, is the abandonment,
in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office, and most
particularly in the case of the President. Reason and experience tell
us, that the first magistrate will always be reelected if he may be
re-elected. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it
becomes of so much consequence to certain nations, to have a friend or
a foe at the head of our affairs, that they will interfere with money
and with arms. A Galloman, or an Angloman, will be supported by the
nation he befriends. If once elected, and at a second or third election
outvoted by one or two votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play,
hold possession of the reins of government, be supported by the States
voting for him, especially if they be the central ones, lying in a
compact body themselves, and separating their opponents; and they will
be aided by one nation in Europe, while the majority are aided by
another. The election of a President of America, some years hence, will
be much more interesting to certain nations of Europe, than ever the
election of a King of Poland was. Reflect on all the instances in
history, ancient and modern, of elective monarchies, and say if they do
not give foundation for my fears; the Roman Emperors, the Popes while
they were of any importance, the German Emperors till they became
hereditary in practice, the Kings of Poland, the Deys of the Ottoman
dependencies. It may be said, that if elections are to be attended with
these disorders, the less frequently they are repeated the better. But
experience says, that to free them from disorder, they must be rendered
less interesting by a necessity of change. No foreign power, nor
domestic party, will waste their blood and money to elect a person, who
must go out at the end of a short period. The power of removing every
fourth year by the vote of the people, is a power which they will not
exercise, and if they were disposed to exercise it, they would not be
permitted. The King of Poland is removable every day by the diet. But
they never remove him. Nor would Russia, the Emperor, etc., permit them
to do it. Smaller objections are, the appeals on matters of fact as
well as laws; and the binding all persons, legislative, executive, and
judiciary by oath, to maintain that constitution. I do not pretend to
decide, what would be the best method of procuring the establishment of
the manifold good things in this constitution, and of getting rid of
the bad. Whether by adopting it, in hopes of future amendment; or after
it shall have been duly weighed and canvassed by the people, after
seeing the parts they generally dislike, and those they generally
approve, to say to them, "We see now what you wish. You are willing to
give to your federal government such and such powers; but you wish, at
the same time, to have such and such fundamental rights secured to you,
and certain sources of convulsion taken away. Be it so. Send together
deputies again. Let them establish your fundamental rights by a
sacrosanct declaration, and let them pass the parts of the Constitution
you have approved. These will give powers to your federal government
sufficient for your happiness."
This is what might be said, and would probably produce a speedy, more
perfect and more permanent form of government. At all events, I hope
you will not be discouraged from making other trials, if the present
one should fail. We are never permitted to despair of the commonwealth.
I have thus told you freely what I like, and what I dislike, merely as
a matter of curiosity; for I know it is not in my power to offer matter
of information to your judgment, which has been formed after hearing
and weighing everything which the wisdom of man could offer on these
subjects. I own, I am not a friend to a very energetic government. It
is always oppressive. It places the governors indeed more at their
ease, at the expense of the people. The late rebellion in Massachusetts
has given more alarm, than I think it should have done. Calculate that
one rebellion in thirteen States in the course of eleven years, is but
one for each State in a century and a half. No country should be so
long without one. Nor will any degree of power in the hands of
government, prevent insurrections. In England, where the hand of power
is heavier than with us, there are seldom half a dozen years without an
insurrection. In France, where it is still heavier, but less despotic,
as Montesquieu supposes, than in some other countries, and where there
are always two or three hundred thousand men ready to crush
insurrections, there have been three in the course of the three years I
have been here, in every one of which greater numbers were engaged than
in Massachusetts, and a great deal more blood was spilt. In Turkey,
where the sole nod of the despot is death, insurrections are the events
of every day. Compare again the ferocious depredations of their
insurgents, with the order, the moderation and the almost
self-extinguishment of ours. And say, finally, whether peace is best
preserved by giving energy to the government, or information to the
people. This last is the most certain, and the most legitimate engine
of government. Educate and inform the whole mass of the people. Enable
them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and
they will preserve them. And it requires no very high degree of
education to convince them of this. They are the only sure reliance for
the preservation of our liberty. After all, it is my principle that the
will of the majority should prevail. If they approve the proposed
constitution in all its parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in
hopes they will amend it, whenever they shall find it works wrong. This
reliance cannot deceive us, as long as we remain virtuous; and I think
we shall be so, as long as agriculture is our principal object, which
will be the case, while there remains vacant lands in any part of
America. When we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in
Europe, we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one
another as they do there. I have tired you by this time with
disquisitions which you have already heard repeated by others a
thousand and a thousand times; and therefore, shall only add assurances
of the esteem and attachment with which I have the honor to be, dear
Sir, your affectionate friend and servant.
P. S. The instability of our laws is really an immense evil. I think it
would be well to provide in our constitutions, that there shall always
be a twelvemonth between the engrossing a bill and passing it; that it
should then be offered to its passage without changing a word; and that
if circumstances should be thought to require a speedier passage, it
should take two-thirds of both Houses, instead of a bare majority.