My own conclusion necessarily is that it does involve such a change,
and for a long period of time I felt that such a change was justified
because of the adamant refusal of people in high places in government
to respond to the needs of the people. And that was particularly true
in the depression period, in the unemployed period.
Mr. VELDE. I take it from your testimony that you feel the
Communist Party of the United States never did teach the overthrow of
our form of government by force and violence.
Mr. DENNETT. I would have to say to that that they did not
emphasize that point.
I think it would be ridiculous to contend that that is the complete
statement of it.
They relied and fell back on Lenin’s explanation of the question of
force and violence. And Lenin’s explanation always was that force and
violence occurs because the employers start it.
In the case of strikes Lenin always contended that it was the employers
who started the violence by bringing in either strikebreakers or armed
guards or police or something of that sort, and that the violence is
started against the workers to begin with.
And then he taught that the workers must defend themselves.
Mr. VELDE. Did you have the feeling while you were in the
Communist Party that the ultimate goal in case all peaceful methods
fail was to use force and violence?
Mr. DENNETT. It is hard to give you a direct answer to the
question as you are posing it.
Let me say it this way and see if this answers you:
This is the most delicate question that is before everyone on the
subject, and I think that I would be unfaithful to myself if I were to
give you a snap answer because a snap answer, I think, is inappropriate.
I think we have to get at the facts as they exist. And my own feeling
and the thing that I was impressed with was, again, the teachings of
Lenin wherein he proclaimed that never did any autocracy willingly
yield up its power. Never did any tyranny willingly yield up its power,
and that necessarily any group who sought to obtain political power
under those circumstances would be confronted with solving a problem of
force and violence. They would be met with force and they would have to
answer it with force.
Mr. VELDE. That substantiates the testimony that Barbara
Hartle gave us here last June. I am satisfied.
Mr. DENNETT. I think that is fundamental teaching of the
Communist Party, and anyone who reads Lenin’s works very carefully will
find that is there.
The point that is germane to us is: Does the United States come in the
category that Lenin was speaking of?
Now the Communist Party went through a terrific amount of theoretical
argument on this question, and some resolved the question as meaning,
yes; the United States comes in that category.
Some questioned whether that were true, and I think that is why you
will find a divergence of testimony from different Communists.
Mr. VELDE. I take it then you feel that the methods used in
the United States were different than the methods used by the Comintern
in other parts of the world, in countries that are now Communist
countries.
Mr. DENNETT. I was referring in what I was discussing to the
difference between the form of government in the United States and the
form of government as exists in other countries, particularly comparing
it with old Czarist Russia.
Something most people don’t realize is the extent of the oppression
which existed under the old Czar. And it was only natural that people
who sought to accomplish a change, after finding that no amount of
effort could bring about a rational or reasonable change, finally came
to the conclusion the only thing they could do was to eliminate the
Czarist regime. That was an autocracy.
Now the question theoretically arises: Does such a situation obtain
in the United States? Or is it possible for the people, by legitimate
political organization, to bring about the changes that they consider
to be desirable?
There was a great dispute raging in the ranks of the Communist Party
over that question.
Mr. Jay Lovestone fell by the ax over it. He taught that America was an
exceptional situation and that exceptional tactics had to be used in
the United States. Because of that he suffered expulsion.
Mr. VELDE. Do you happen to know Jay Lovestone?
Mr. DENNETT. I did not know him. I have read some of his
works. Not very much; only what the party said he said.
Mr. VELDE. Of course, Mr. Dennett, you realize that we have
had, I think about 100 convictions under the Smith Act whereby various
Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating communism.
Mr. DENNETT. I didn’t know how many.
Mr. VELDE. It may be less or more than that.
Do you know, Mr. Tavenner?
Mr. TAVENNER. 86 or 87, according to my recollection.
Mr. VELDE. And, of course, those trials were held under our
American system of jurisprudence.
I am inclined to agree with all the juries involved and all the judges
involved that the Communist Party here in the United States of America
did advocate the overthrow of our form of government by force and
violence, if necessary. I don’t want to appear to be arguing with you.
Mr. DENNETT. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this
question with you because I think any general rule is a dangerous thing
to lay down. I think that it has to be on the merits of each individual
case. That is my own feeling. And I think that that is consistent with
our American tradition of jurisprudence, too.
Mr. VELDE. I certainly agree with you on that.
Mr. DENNETT. I have a feeling that it is unwise to make
sweeping, uniform applications of the rule. I think they have to be
judged on the merits of each particular case. I think that is one of
the things that we must fight with all our might and main to preserve.
Mr. TAVENNER. Did you state, with respect to Jay Lovestone,
that you thought his group insisted on viewing the aspects of this
problem under special circumstances?
Mr. DENNETT. It was known as the theory of exceptionalism.
Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state very briefly what the theory of
exceptionalism is?
Mr. DENNETT. The Communist Party taught that the theory and
tactics which Lenin taught were universally applicable, that they
applied to all countries, they applied to all situations.
Lovestone said, “Yes; except in the United States. Here we have got to
do something different.”
Mr. TAVENNER. I was discussing with you the purposes of the
Communist Party in infiltrating the unemployment councils which you
have described. I handed you, just a few moments ago, a document which
was one of those you turned over to the staff. That document discusses
the importance of Communist Party cell organizations. I believe it
discusses it in very much the same way that you have.
Mr. DENNETT. I think that is where I learned it.
Mr. TAVENNER. What was the source of that document?
Mr. DENNETT. Well, the title of it is: “How the Communist
International Formulates at Present the Problem of Organization.” And
the title or the subject was written by a person by the name of B.
Vassiliev. He was a high official in the Comintern and was responsible
for one of the committees in the executive committee of the Communist
International. I do not recall much else about him. And this document
doesn’t establish much more. But I believe that the document originally
came into my possession while I was an agitprop director, and it was in
a mimeographed form. It came from the central committee.
Mr. TAVENNER. Of the Communist Party?
Mr. DENNETT. Of the Communist Party.
It was sending forth to the districts direct information as to the
policy which had been laid down by the executive committee of the
Communist International, and it was detailed information because many
people had been complaining that nowhere was there anything in a
detailed form describing organizational methods and practices.
Vassiliev came forth with a document which outlines it, spells it out
in every detail. It spells out how to work under illegal conditions, it
spells out how to work under legal conditions. It also spells out how
to combine legal and illegal work.
This, by the way, for those who have been in the Army, you can readily
recognize a similarity of military training with party organization
because there is the method of the emphasis upon maintaining
communication lines between various parts of the organization at all
times, the necessity of having secondary lines of communication in
case the primary lines are destroyed. And there is also the question
of use of passwords. It is all described. The description of how to
use code is also contained here. And I think that some people attach
more significance to it than I do for the reason that I saw military
organization practice virtually the same things.
Of course, that brings up a subject which may be unpleasant to reflect
upon, and I suspect that the average member of the Communist Party
is quite unaware of the similarity of his position as a member of
the Communist Party to that of a person who is a member of the Armed
Forces. He is under discipline. His directions come from above. He has
to obey or suffer the consequences.
Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, this is a very unusual document.
I wish the committee had time right now to go into every phase of
Communist Party organization that is referred to in it.
I think all that we can do now is to offer it as an exhibit and have
it made a part of the record with the view of giving it more detailed
study later. So I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked
“Dennett Exhibit No. 1,” and that it be incorporated in the transcript
of the record.
Mr. MOULDER. The exhibit offered in evidence, marked “Dennett
Exhibit No. 1” for identification, will be admitted as a part of the
record.