He held up his hands, and in a tone of grief said: "You and Wilson
are the only ones who tell me that he has any chance."
Upon his return from Europe it was apparent that his feelings in
regard to the Republican Party, and especially in regard to General
Grant, had undergone a great change. Our conversations concerning
General Grant were resumed free from all restrictions, and without
any disturbance of feeling on my part. Not many months before his
death Mr. Sumner made a speech in executive session that was
conciliatory and just in a marked degree. I urged him to repeat it
in public session. He seemed to regard the suggestion with favor, but
the speech was not made.
For many years Mr. Sumner had been borne down under the resolutions of
censure passed by the State of Massachusetts in disapproval of his
position in regard to the return of Confederate flags. That resolution
was rescinded at the winter session of 1874. The act brought to Mr.
Sumner the highest degree of satisfaction that it was possible for him
to realize. Above all things else of a public nature, he cherished
the good name of the commonwealth, and for himself there was nothing
more precious than her approval. The blow was unexpected, its weight
was great, and its weight was never lessened until it was wholly
removed. The rescinding resolutions came to me the Saturday next
preceding the Wednesday when Mr. Sumner died. I was then in ill
health, so ill that my attendance at the Senate did not exceed one
half of each day's session through many weeks. Mr. Sumner called upon
me to inquire, and anxious to know, whether I could attend the session
of Monday and present the resolutions. I gave him the best assurance
that my condition permitted. When the resolutions had been presented,
and when I was leaving the chamber, Mr. Sumner came to me, and, putting
his arm over my shoulder, he walked with me into the lobby, where,
after many thanks by him, and with good wishes for my health, we
parted, without a thought by me that he had not before him many years
of rugged life. For several years previous to 1874, Mr. Sumner had
been accustomed to speak of himself as an old man, and on more than one
occasion he spoke of life as a burden. To these utterances I gave but
little heed.
The chief assurance for any considerable well-doing in the world is to
be found in good purposes and in fixedness of purpose when a purpose
has been formed. These characteristics were Mr. Sumner's possession,
but in him they were subject to very important limitations as powers in
practical affairs. He did not exhibit respect or deference for the
opinions of others even when the parties were upon a plane of equality,
as is the usual situation in legislative bodies. He could not concede
small points for the sake of a great result. Hence it was that
measures in which he had an interest took on a form at the end that
was not agreeable to him. Hence it is that he has left only one piece
of legislation that is distinctly the work of his hand. When the bill
was under consideration which denied to colored persons the privilege
of naturalization in the United States, he secured an amendment by
which the exclusion was limited to the Mongolian race. His
declaration as to the status of the States that had been in rebellion
was not far away from the policy that was adopted finally, but he did
not accept as wise and necessary measures the amendments to the
Constitution which were designed to make that policy permanent.
Indeed, it was his opinion, at one period of the controversy over the
question of negro suffrage, that a legislative declaration would be
sufficient. The field of his success is to be found in the
argumentative power that he possessed and in its use for the overthrow
of slavery. Of the anti-slavery advocates who entered the Senate
previous to the opening of the war, he was the best equipped in
learning, and his influence in the country was not surpassed by the
influence of any one of his associates. In his knowledge of diplomacy,
he had the first rank in the Senate for the larger part of his career.
His influence in the Senate was measured, however, by his influence in
the country. His speeches, especially in the period of national
controversy, were addressed _to_ the country. He relied upon
authorities and precedents. His powers as a debater were limited, and
it followed inevitably that in purely parliamentary contests he was
not a match for such masters as Fessenden and Conkling, who in learning
were his inferiors.
My means for information are so limited that I do not express an
opinion upon the question whether Mr. Sumner's ambitions in public life
were or were not gratified. On one or two occasions he let fall
remarks which indicated a willingness to be transferred to the
Department of State. Major Ben. Perley Poore had received the
impression that there was a time when Mr. Sumner looked to the
Presidency as a possibility. At an accidental meeting with Major
Poore, he said to me: "I have dined with Sumner, and he gave me an
account of the conversation he had with you this morning, in which you
consoled him for not gaining the Presidency."
I recalled the conversation. It was a Sunday-morning talk, and there
was no special purpose on my part, however my remarks may have been
received by Mr. Sumner. He spoke of the opportunity furnished to Mr.
Jefferson for the exposition of his views in his first inaugural
address. I then proceeded to say that, omitting the incumbent of the
office, of whom nothing could then be said, not more than three or four
men had gained in standing by their elevation to the Presidency, beyond
the fact that their names were upon the roll. The exceptions were,
first of all, Lincoln, who had gained most. Then Jackson, who had
gained something--indeed, a good deal by his defence of the Union when
compared with what he might have lost by neglect of duty in the days of
nullification. Washington had gained much by demonstrating his
capacity for civil affairs, by the legacy of his farewell address,
and by the shaping of the new government under the Constitution in a
manner calculated to strengthen the quality of perpetuity. At the end,
I claimed that the other occupants of the Presidential office had not
gained appreciably by their promotion.
In two important particulars, Samuel Adams and Charles Sumner are
parallel characters in American history. Mr. Adams was a leader in
the contest that the colonies carried on against Great Britain. Our
legal standing in the controversy with the mother country has never
elsewhere been presented as forcibly and logically as it was stated by
Mr. Adams in his letters to the royal governors in the name of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, between the years 1764 and
1775. When the contest of words and of arms was over he was not
only not an aid in the organization of the new Government, but he was
an obstacle to its success. He accepted the Constitution with
hesitation and under constraint. After the overthrow of slavery and
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Mr.
Sumner gave no wise aid to the work of reconstructing the government
upon the basis of the new conditions that had been created by the war
and by the abolition of slavery. As every guarantee for freedom
contains some element of enslavement over or against some who are not
within the guarantee, men sometimes hesitate as to the wisdom of
accepting guarantees of rights in one direction which work a limitation
of rights or privileges in other directions. The Constitution of the
United States, while it gave power to the body of States and guaranteed
security to each yet deprived the individual States of many of the
privileges and powers that they had enjoyed as colonies. Every
amendment to the Constitution, from the first to the last, has limited
the application of the doctrine of home rule in government.
Upon the election of Mr. Wilson to the office of Vice-President, I was
chosen by the Legislature of Massachusetts as his successor in the
Senate. I left the Treasury and General Grant's Cabinet with
reluctance, but my experience in both branches of the government had
led me to prefer the legislative branch, where there is at least more
freedom of action than can be had in the executive department. This
opinion is in no sense due to the nature of my relations with General
Grant. His military habits led him to put responsibility upon
subordinates and this habit he carried into civil affairs.
Moreover, in my own case, he recognized that fact that I had accepted
the place upon his urgent request, command indeed, and not to gratify
any ambition of my own. And further, I think I may assume, that his
confidence was such that he was content to leave the department in my
hands. During my time he put only one person--General Pleasanton--
into the department, and he never commanded or required the removal of
any one. On a few occasions he named persons whom he said he would be
glad to have employed if places could be found. They were always
soldiers, or widows or children of soldiers, and he never forgot his
suggestions, nor allowed the passage of time to diminish his interest
in such cases.
The important places in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, New
Orleans and Philadelphia were filled by him, usually upon consultation,
but upon his judgment. He gave very little attention to others beyond
signing the commissions. I often called his attention to the more
important ones, but it was his practice to send applicants and their
friends to me with the remark that the business was in my hands.
By this course the President avoided much labor, and escaped some
responsibility. The disappointed ones charged their misfortunes to
the Secretary, and the President was able to say that he knew nothing
of the case, etc., etc.
I have reason to believe that the President did not exhibit equal
confidence in my successors, especially in Mr. Bristow. The President
received the impression very early, that Bristow was engaged in a
scheme to secure the nomination by an alliance with the enemies of
General Grant. In my time three Secretaries of the Treasury attempted
in turn to secure a nomination for the Presidency through the influence
and patronage of that department. All were failures, and failures well
deserved.
Such a policy breeds corruption inevitably. Venal men aspiring to
place, avow themselves the friends of the Secretary, and if through
such avowals they secure appointments, the offices will be used for
improper purposes.
My successor, Judge Richardson, had been Assistant Secretary for three
years and more, and no one could have surpassed him in industry,
fidelity and knowledge of the business. I recommended his appointment.
The President hesitated, but he finally nominated him to the Senate,
and the nomination was confirmed.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL GRANT UPON MY RESIGNATION OF THE OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON,
_March_ 17, 1873.
SIR:
Having been elected to the Senate of the United States by the
Legislature of Massachusetts, I tender my resignation of the office of
Secretary of the Treasury.
In severing my official relations with you it is a great satisfaction
to me that on all occasions you have given me full confidence and
support in the discharge of my public duties.
In these four years my earlier acquaintance with you has ripened into
earnest personal friendship, which, I am confident, will remain
unbroken. I am
Yours very truly,
GEO. S. BOUTWELL.
TO THE PRESIDENT.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, _March_ 17, 1873.
HON. GEO. S. BOUTWELL,
_Dear Sir:_--
In accepting your resignation of the office of Secretary of the
Treasury, an office which you have filled for four years with such
satisfaction to the country, allow me to express the regret I feel at
severing official relations which have been at all times so agreeable
to me, and,--as I am assured by your letter of resignation,--to you
also. Your administration of the important trust confided to you
four years since, has been so admirably conducted as to give the
greatest satisfaction to me because as I read public judgment and
opinion it has been satisfactory to the country. The policy pursued in
the office of Secretary of the Treasury by your successor I hope may
be as successful as yours has been, and that no departure from it
will be made except such as experience and change of circumstances
may make necessary.
Among your new official associates I trust you will find the same warm
friends and co-workers that you leave in the Executive branch of the
government.
You take with you my most sincere well wishes for your success as a
legislator and as a citizen, and the assurance of my desire to continue
the warm personal relations that have existed between us during the
whole of our official connection.
Very truly yours,
U. S. GRANT.
XXXVIII
GENERAL GRANT AS A STATESMAN*
General Grant's father was a Whig and an admirer and supporter of Mr.
Clay. The public policy of Mr. Clay embraced three great measures:
First, a national bank, or a fiscal agency as an aid to the Treasury
in the collection and disbursement of the public revenues; secondly,
a system of internal improvements to be created at the public expense
and controlled by the National Government; and, thirdly, a tariff
system which should protect the American laborer against the active
competition of the laborers of other countries who were compelled to
work for smaller compensation.
From the year 1834 to the year 1836 the country was engaged in an
active controversy over the policy of the Whig Party, of which Mr.
Clay was then the recognized head. Indeed, the controversy began as
early as the year 1824, and it contributed, more than all other causes,
to the new organization of parties under the leadership, respectively,
of Mr. Clay and General Jackson.
General Grant was educated under these influences, and in the belief
that the policy of the Whig Party would best promote the prosperity
of the country. Those early impressions ripened into opinions, which
he held and on which he acted during his public life. It happened
by the force of circumstances that the Republican Party was compelled
to adopt the policy of Mr. Clay--not in measures, but in the ideas on
which his policy was based. It is not now necessary to inquire
whether the weight of argument was with Mr. Clay or with his opponents.
The war made inevitable the adoption of a policy which Mr. Clay had
advocated as expedient and wise.
The Pacific Railways were built by the aid of the Government and under
the pressure of a general public opinion that the East must be brought
into a more intimate connection with our possessions on the Pacific
Ocean, for mutual support and for the common defence.
The national banking system was established for the purpose of securing
the aid of the banks as purchasers and negotiators of the bonds of the
Government, at a time when the public credit was so impaired that it
seemed impossible to command the funds necessary for the prosecution
of the war.
The same exigency compelled Congress to enact, and the country to
accept, a tariff system more protective in its provisions than any
scheme ever suggested by Mr. Clay. The necessities of the times
compelled free-traders, even, to accept the revenue system with its
protective features; but General Grant accepted it as a system in
harmony alike with his early impressions and with his matured opinions.
It has happened, by the force of events, that the policy of the old
Whig Party has been revived in the national banking system, while the
Independent Treasury, the leading measure of the old Democratic Party,
has been preserved in all its features as the guide of the Treasury
Department in its financial operations.
When General Grant became President, these three measures had been
incorporated into the policy of the Republican Party. Their full
acceptance by him did not require any change of opinion on his part.
It was true that he had voted for Mr. Buchanan in 1856; but his vote
was given in obedience to an impression that he had received touching
the qualifications of General Fremont. The fact that he had voted
for Mr. Buchanan excited suspicions in the minds of some Republicans,
and it engendered hopes in the bosoms of some Democrats that he might
act in harmony with the Democratic Party. The suspicions and the
hopes were alike groundless.
As early as the month of August, 1863, in a letter to Mr. E. B.
Washburne, he said: "It became patent to my mind early in the
rebellion that the North and South could never live at peace with
each other except as one nation, and that without slavery. As anxious
as I am to see peace established, I would not, therefore, be willing
to see any settlement until this question is forever settled."
Thus was General Grant, at an early moment, and upon his own judgment,
brought into full accord with the Republican Party upon the two
debatable and most earnestly debated questions during Mr. Lincoln's
administration--the prosecution of the war and the abolition of
slavery.
And thus it is apparent that in 1868 he was in a condition, as to all
matters of opinion, to accept a nomination at the hands of the
Republican Party; and it is equally apparent that he was separated
from the Democratic Party by a chasm wide, deep, and impassable. It
is, however, true that General Grant's feelings were not intense, and
in the expression of his opinions his tone was mild and his manner
gentle. It often happened, also, that he did not undertake to
controvert opinions and expressions with which he had no sympathy.
This peculiarity may at times have led to a misunderstanding, or to
a misinterpretation of his views. Upon this basis of his early
impressions, and matured opinions his administrative policy was
constructed.
When he became President, there was a body of American citizens, not
inconsiderable in numbers, who doubted the ability of the Government
to pay the war debt; there were others who advocated payment in
greenbacks, or the substitution of a note not bearing interest for a
bond that bore interest; and there were yet others who denied the
validity of the existing obligations. All these classes, whether they
were dishonest or only misled, were alike rebuked in his inaugural
address. These were his words: "A great debt has been contracted
in securing to us and to our posterity the Union. The payment of this
debt, principal and interest, as well as the return to a specie basis,
as soon as it can be accomplished without material detriment to the
debtor class, or to the country at large, must be provided for. . . .
To protect the national honor, every dollar of Government indebtedness
should be paid in gold, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the
contract. . . .
"Let it be understood that no repudiator of one farthing of our public
debt will be trusted in public place, and it will go far toward
strengthening a credit which ought to be the best in the world, and
will ultimately enable us to replace the debt with bonds bearing less
interest than we now pay."
In the same address he asserted the ability of the country to pay the
debt within the period of twenty-five years, and he also declared his
purpose to secure a faithful collection of the public revenues. At
the close of his administration of eight years one fifth part of the
public debt had been paid, and if the system of taxation that existed
in 1869 had been continued the debt would have been extinguished in
less than a quarter of a century from the year 1869. In his
administration, however, the crisis was passed. The ability and the
disposition of the country were made so conspicuous that all honest
doubts were removed, and the repudiators were shamed into silence.
The redemption of the debt by the purchase of bonds in the open market
strengthened the public credit, and laid a foundation for the
resumption of specie payments.
General Grant's inaugural address was followed by the passage of the
act of March 18, 1869, entitled "An act to strengthen the public
credit." This act was a pledge to the world that the debts of the
United States, unless there were in the obligations express
stipulations to the contrary, would be paid in coin.
In accordance with the report of the Secretary of the Treasury,
President Grant, in his annual message of December, 1869, recommended
the passage of an act authorizing the funding of the public debt at a
lower rate of interest.
Following this recommendation, the bill for refunding the public debt,
prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury, was enacted and approved
July 14, 1870.
By this act the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue bonds
to the amount of $200,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 5 per
cent, $300,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4˝ per cent, and
$1,000,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 per cent.
Under this act, and the amendments thereto, the debt has been refunded
from time to time until the average rate of interest does not now
exceed 3˝ per cent. Although these two important measures of
administration were not prepared by General Grant, they were but the
execution of his policy set forth in his inaugural address.
In respect to the rights of the negro race, General Grant must be
ranked with the advanced portion of the Republican Party. Upon the
capture of Fort Donelson, a number of slaves fell into the hands of the
Union army. General Grant issued an order, dated Feb. 26, 1862, in
which he authorized their employment for the benefit of the Government,
and at the close he said that under no circumstances would he permit
their return to their masters.
In his inaugural address he urged the States to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment, and its ratification was due, probably, to his advice. At
that moment his influence was very great. It may well be doubted
whether any other President ever enjoyed the confidence of the country
in as high a degree. He gave to that measure the weight of his opinion
and the official influence of his administration. The amendment was
opposed by the Democratic Party generally, and a considerable body of
Republicans questioned its wisdom. General Grant was responsible for
the ratification of the amendment. Had he advised its rejection, or
had he been indifferent to its fate, the amendment would have failed,
and the country would have been left to a succession of bitter
controversies arising from the application of the second section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that the representation of a State
should be based upon the number of male citizens over twenty-one years
of age entitled to vote.
General Grant accepted the plan of Congress in regard to the
reconstruction of the Union. There were three opinions that had
obtained a lodgment in the public mind. President Johnson and his
supporters claimed that the President held the power by virtue of his
office to convene the people of the respective States, and that under
his direction constitutions might be framed, and that Senators and
Representatives might be chosen who would be entitled to seats in
Congress, as though they represented States that had not been engaged
in secession and war. Others maintained that neither by the ordinances
of secession nor by the war had the States of the Confederacy been
disturbed in their legal relations to the Union.
It was the theory of the Republican Party in Congress that the eleven
States by their own acts had destroyed their legal relations to the
Union; that the jurisdiction of the National Government over the
territory of the seceding States was full and complete; and that, as
a result of the war, the National Government could hold them in a
Territorial condition and subject to military rule. Upon this theory
the re-appearance of a seceded State as a member of the Union was made
to depend upon the assent of Congress, with the approval of the
President, or upon an act of Congress by a two-thirds vote over a
Presidential veto.
General Grant sustained the policy of Congress during the long and
bitter contest with President Johnson, and when he became President
he accepted that policy without reserve in the case of the restoration
of the States of Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi. Upon this
statement it appears that General Grant was a Republican, and that he
became a Republican by processes that preclude the suggestion that his
nomination for the Presidency wrought any change in his position upon
questions of principle or policy in the affairs of government. Indeed,
his nomination in 1868 was distasteful to him, as he then preferred to
remain at the head of the army. It was in the nature of things,
however, that he should have wished for re-election. He was re-
elected, and at the end of his second term he accepted a return to
private life as a relief from the cares and duties of office. The
support which he received for the nomination in 1880 was not due to
any effort on his part. Not even to his warmest supporters did he
express a wish, or dictate or advise an act. His only utterance was
a message to four of his friends at the Chicago Convention, that
whatever they might do in the premises would be acceptable to him.
His political career was marked by the same abstention from personal
effort for personal advancement that distinguished him as an officer
of the army. But he did not bring into civil affairs the habits of
command that were the necessity of military life. Although by virtue
of his position he was the recognized head of the Republican Party,
he made no effort to control its action. Wherever he placed power,
there he reposed trust.
There was not in General Grant's nature any element of suspicion, and
his confidence in his friends was free and full. Hence it happened
that he had many occasions for regret.
On no man in public life in this generation were there more frequent
charges and insinuations of wrong-doing, and in this generation there
has been no man in public life who was freer from all occasion for
such insinuations and charges.
When he heard that the Treasury Department was purchasing bullion of
a company in which he was a stockholder, he sold his shares without
delay, and without reference to the market price or to their real value.
General Grant had no disposition to usurp power. He had no policy to
impose upon the country against the popular will. This was shown in
the treatment of the Santo Domingo question. General Grant was not
indisposed to see the territories of the Republic extended, but his
love of justice and fair dealing was such that he would have used
only honorable means in his intercourse with other nations. Santo
Domingo was a free offering, and he thought that its possession would
be advantageous to the country.
Yet he never made it an issue, even in his Cabinet, where, as he well
knew, very serious doubts existed as to the expediency of the measure.
He was deeply pained by the unjust attacks and groundless criticism
of which he was the subject, but he accepted the adverse judgment of
the Senate as a constitutional binding decision of the question, and
of that decision he never complained.
In a message to the Senate of the 31st of May, 1870, he urged the
annexation of Santo Domingo. He said, "I feel an unusual anxiety for
the ratification of this treaty, because I believe it will redound
greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization,
and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery." He claimed for
the scheme great commercial advantages, that it was in harmony with the
Monroe doctrine, and that the consummation of the measure would be
notice to the states of Europe that no acquisitions of territory on
this continent would be permitted. In his second inaugural address
General Grant referred to the subject in these words: "In the first
year of the past administration the proposition came up for the
admission of Santo Domingo as a Territory of the Union. . . . I believe
now, as I did then, that it was for the best interests of this country,
for the people of Santo Domingo, and all concerned, that the
proposition should be received favorably. It was, however, rejected
constitutionally, and therefore the subject was never brought up
again by me." General Grant considered the failure of the treaty as
a national misfortune, but he never criticised the action of its
opponents.
General Grant's firmness was shown in his veto of the Senate currency
bill of 1874. It is known that unusual effort was made to convince
him that the measure was wise in a financial view, and highly expedient
upon political grounds. The President wrote a message in explanation
of his act of approval, but upon its completion he was so much
dissatisfied with his own argument that he resolved to veto the bill.
Hence the veto message of April 22, 1874.
In foreign policy, the principal measure of General Grant's
administration was the treaty with Great Britain of May, 1871. The
specific and leading purpose of the negotiations was the adjustment
of the claim made by the United States that Great Britain was liable
in damages for the destruction of American vessels, and the consequent
loss of commercial power and prestige, by the depredations of
Confederate cruisers that were fitted out or had obtained supplies in
British ports. Neither the treaty of peace of 1783, nor the subsequent
treaties with Great Britain, made a full and final settlement of the
fishery question or of our northern boundary-line at its junction
with the Pacific Ocean. These outlying questions were considered in
the negotiations, and they were adjusted by the terms of the treaty.
The jurisdiction of the island of San Juan on the Pacific coast, then
in controversy, was referred to the Emperor of Germany as arbitrator,
with full and final power in the premises. By his award the claim of
the United States was sustained.
The fishery question was referred to arbitrators, but it was a
misfortune that the award was not satisfactory to the United States,
and the dispute is reopened with capacity to vex the two governments
for an indefinite period of time.
The claims against Great Britain growing out of the operations of the
Confederate cruisers, known as the Alabama claims, were referred to
arbitrators, by whose award the Government of the United States
received the sum of $15,500,000. But the value of the treaty of 1871
was not in the award made. The people of the United States were
embittered against the Government of Great Britain, and had General
Grant chosen to seek redress by arms he would have been sustained
throughout the North with substantial unanimity. But General Grant
was destitute of the war spirit, and he chose to exhaust all the powers
of negotiation before he would advise a resort to force. A passage
in his inaugural address may have had an influence upon the policy of
the British Government: "In regard to foreign policy, I would deal
with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each
other. . . . I would respect the rights of all nations, demanding
equal respect for our own. _If others depart from this rule in their
dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent."_
The reference of the question at issue to the tribunal at Geneva was
a conspicuous instance of the adjustment of a grave international
dispute by peaceful methods.
By the sixth article of the treaty of 1871, three new rules were made
for the government of neutral nations. These rules are binding upon
the United States and Great Britain, and the contracting parties
agreed to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and
to invite such powers to accede to the rules.
In those rules it is stipulated that a neutral nation should not
permit a belligerent to fit out, arm, or equip in its ports any vessel
which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or
carry on war against a power with which it is at peace. It was further
agreed, as between the parties to the treaty, that neither would
suffer a belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a base of
operations against the other. Finally, the parties agreed to use due
diligence to prevent any infraction of the rules so established.
Mr. Fish was then Secretary of State, and to him was General Grant and
the country largely indebted for the settlement of the Alabama
controversy; but the settlement was in harmony with General Grant's
inaugural address.
Before the final adjustment of the controversy, by the decision of the
tribunal at Geneva, General Grant had occasion to consider whether
the allegation against Great Britain, growing out of her recognition,
in May, 1861, of the belligerent character of the Confederacy, could
be maintained upon the principles of public law. Upon his own judgment
he reached the conclusion that the act was an act of sovereignty within
the discretion of the ruler, for which a claim in money could not be
made. This opinion was accepted, finally, by his advisers, by the
negotiators, and by the country.
General Grant was not a trained statesman. His methods of action were
direct and clear. His conduct was free from duplicity, and artifice of
every sort was foreign to his nature. In the first years of his
administration he relied upon his Cabinet in all minor matters relating
to the departments. Acting upon military ideas, he held the head of a
department to his full responsibility, and he waited, consequently,
until his opinion was sought or his instructions were solicited.
In his conferences with the members of his Cabinet he expressed his
opinions with the greatest freedom, and, upon discussion, he often
yielded to the suggestions or arguments of others. He was so great
that it was not a humiliation to acknowledge a change in opinion, or
to admit an error in policy or purpose.
In his intercourse with members of Congress upon the business of the
Government, he gave his opinions without reserve when he had reached
definite conclusions, but he often remained a silent listener to the
discussion of topics which he had not considered maturely.
His politics were not narrow nor exclusive. He believed in the growth
of the country, and in the power of republican ideas. He was free from
race prejudice, and free from national jealousy, but he believed in the
enlargement of our territory by peaceful means, in the spread of
republican institutions, and in the predominance of the English-
speaking race in the affairs of the world.
The spirit of philanthropy animated his politics, and the doctrines of
peace controlled his public policy.
[* This article was printed in Appleton's Cyclopedia for the year 1885.
Copyright, 1886, by D. Appleton & Co.]
XXXIX
REMINISCENCES OF PUBLIC MEN