In reply Emory said: "Order No. 17 of the Series of 1867."

The order was produced and read by the President, who said:

"This is not in conformity with the Constitution of the United States,

that makes me commander-in-chief, or with the terms of your commission."

General Emory said: "That is the order which you have approved and

issued to the army for our government."

The President then said: "Am I to understand that the President of the

United States cannot give an order except through the head of the army,

or General Grant?"

In the course of the conversation, General Emory informed the President

that eminent lawyers had been consulted, that he had consulted Robert

J. Walker, and that all of the lawyers consulted had expressed the

opinion that the officers of the army were bound by the order whether

the statute was constitutional or unconstitutional.

When General Grant was before the Judiciary Committee of the House of

Representatives during the impeachment investigation, this question

was put to him:

"Have you at any time heard the President make any remark in regard

to the admission of members of Congress from rebel States in either

House?"

"I cannot say positively what I have heard him say. I have heard him

say as much in his public speeches as anywhere else. I have heard him

say twice in his speeches that if the North carried the election by

members enough to give them, with the Southern members, the majority,

why should they not be the Congress of the United States? I have

heard him say that several times."

That answer was followed by this question:

"When you say the North, you mean the Democratic Party of the North,

or, in other words, the party advocating his policy?"

General Grant replied:

"I meant if the North carried enough members in favor of the admission

of the South. I did not hear him say that he would recognize them as

the Congress, I merely heard him ask the question, 'Why would they not

be the Congress?'"

At this point, and without further discussion of the purpose of Mr.

Johnson in regard to the reorganization of the Government, I think it

may be stated without injustice to him, that while he was opposed to

secession at the time the Confederate Government was organized, and

thenceforward and always without change of opinion, yet he was also

of opinion that the act of secession by the several States had not

disturbed their legal relations to the National Government. Acting

upon that opinion, he proceeded to reorganize the State governments,

and with the purpose of securing the admission of their Senators and

Representatives without seeking or accepting the judgment of Congress

upon the questions involved in the proceeding. On one vital point he

erred seriously and fundamentally as to the authority of the President

in the matter. From the nature of our Government there could be no

escape in a legal point of view from the conclusion that, whatever the

relations were of the seceding States to the General Government, the

method of restoration was to be ascertained and determined by Congress,

and not by the President acting as the chief executive authority of the

nation. In a legal and constitutional view, that act on his part,

although resting upon opinions which he had long entertained, and which

were entertained by many others, must be treated as an act of usurpation.

The facts embodied in the charges on which Mr. Johnson was impeached

by the House and arraigned before the Senate were not open to doubt,

but legal proof was wanting in regard to the exact language of his

speeches. The charges were in substance these: That he had attacked

the integrity and the lawful authority of the Congress of the United

States in public speeches made in the presence of the country. The

second charge was that he had attempted the removal of Mr. Stanton

from the office of Secretary of War, and that, without the concurrence

of the Senate, he had so removed him, contrary to the act of Congress,

known as the Tenure of Office Act. In the first investigation into

the conduct of Andrew Johnson, he was described in the resolution as

"Vice-President of the United States, discharging at present the duties

of President of the United States." The resolution was adopted by the

House of Representatives the seventh day of March, 1867. A large

amount of testimony was taken, and the report of the committee, in

three parts, by the different members, was submitted to the House the

fourth day of the following December. The majority of the committee,

consisting of George S. Boutwell, Francis Thomas, Thomas Williams,

William Lawrence, and John C. Churchill, reported a resolution

providing for the impeachment of the President of the United States,

in these words: "Resolved, that Andrew Johnson, President of the

United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors." It will

be observed that in the resolution for his impeachment he is described

as "President of the United States," while in the resolution

authorizing the inquiry into his conduct he is described as "Vice-

President, discharging at present the duties of the President of the

United States." This question received very careful consideration by

the committee, and the conclusion was reached that he was the President

of the United States, although he had been elected only to the office

of Vice-President. As that question was not raised at the trial by

demurrer or motion, it may now be accepted as the established doctrine

that the Vice-President, when he enters upon the duties of President,

becomes President of the United States. The extended report that was

made by the majority of the committee was written by Mr. Williams.

The summary, which was in the nature of charges, was written by myself.

That summary set forth twenty-eight specifications of misconduct on the

part of the President, many of which, however, where abandoned when the

articles of impeachment were prepared in February, 1868.

In the discussion of the committee there were serious differences of

opinion upon provisions of law. The minority of the committee,

consisting of James F. Wilson, who was chairman of the Judiciary

Committee, Frederick E. Woodbridge, S. S. Marshall, and Charles R.

Eldridge, maintained the doctrine that a civil officer under the

Constitution of the United States was not liable to impeachment except

for the commission of an indictable offence. This doctrine had very

large support in the legal profession, resting on remarks found in

Blackstone. On the other hand, Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries,

had given support to the doctrine that a civil officer was liable to

impeachment who misdemeaned himself in office. The provision of the

Constitution is in these words:

"The President, Vice-President, and all Civil Officers of the United

States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction

of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

The majority of the Judiciary Committee, in the controversy which

arose in the committee and in the House of Representatives, maintained

that the word "misdemeanors" was used in a political sense, and not in

the sense in which it is used in criminal law. In support of this

view attention was called to the fact that the party convicted was

liable only to removal from office, and therefore that the object of

the process of impeachment was the purification and preservation of the

civil service. In the opinion of the majority, it was the necessity of

the situation that the power of impeachment should extend to acts and

offences that were not indictable by statute nor at common law. The

report of the Judiciary Committee, made the twenty-fifth day of

November, was rejected by the House of Representatives.

The attempt of the President to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of

Secretary for the Department of War revived the question of

impeachment, and on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of February, 1868,

the House of Representatives "resolved to impeach Andrew Johnson,

President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors." The

articles of impeachment were acted on by the House of Representatives

the second day of March, and on the fourth day of March they were

presented to the Senate through Mr. Bingham, chairman of the managers,

who was designated for that duty.

The articles were directed to the following points, namely: That the

President, by his speeches, had attempted "to set aside the rightful

authority and powers of Congress"; that he had attempted "to bring

into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of

the United States and the several branches thereof"; and "that he had

attempted to incite the odium and resentment of all the good people of

the United States against Congress and the laws by them duly and

constitutionally enacted." Further, it was alleged that he had

declared in speeches that the "Thirty-ninth Congress of the United

States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the

Constitution of the United States to exercise legislative power in the

same."

A further charge, and on which greater reliance was placed, was set

forth in these words: "That he had denied and intended to deny the

power of the Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the

Constitution of the United States." These articles were in substance

the articles that had been rejected by the House of Representatives in

1867. Finally, as the most important averment of all, the President

was charged with an "attempt to prevent the execution of the act

entitled 'An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices,'

passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving and

attempting to contrive means by which he could prevent Edwin M. Stanton

from forthwith resuming the function of the office of the Secretary for

the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to

concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of the

said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department

of War." In various forms of language these several charges were set

forth in the different articles of impeachment--eleven in all. The

eleventh article, which was prepared by Mr. Stevens, embodied the

summary of all the charges mentioned. It is to be observed that in the

eleventh article there is no allegation that the President had

committed an offence that was indictable under any statute of the

United States or that would have been indictable at common law. It

may be assumed, I think, that for this country, at least, the question

that was raised at the beginning and argued with great force, and by

which possibly the House of Representatives may have been influenced

in the year 1867, has been settled in accord with the report of the

majority of the Judiciary Committee. The House decided that the

President was impeachable for misdemeanors in office. With stronger

reason it may be said that every other civil officer is bound to

behave himself well in his office. He cannot do any act which impairs

his standing in the place which he holds, or which may bring discredit

upon the public, and especially he may not do any act in disregard of

his oath to obey the laws and to support the Constitution of the

country. The eleventh article was the chief article that was

submitted to a vote in the Senate. The question raised by that article

is this in substance: Is the President of the United States guilty in

manner and form as set forth in this article? On that question thirty-

five Senators voted that he was guilty, and nineteen Senators voted

that he was not guilty. Under the Constitution the President was found

not guilty of the offences charged, but the majority given may be

accepted, and probably will be accepted, as the judgment of the Senate

that the President of the United States is liable to impeachment and

removal from office for acts and conduct that do not subject him to the

process of indictment and trial in the criminal courts. At this point

I express the opinion that something has been gained, indeed that much

has been gained, by the decision of the House of Representatives,

supported by the opinions of a large majority in the Senate.

The answer of the respondent, considered in connection with the

arguments that were made by his counsel, sets forth the ground upon

which the Republican members of the Senate may have voted that the

President was not guilty of the two principal offences charged, viz:

that in his speeches he had denounced and brought into contempt,

intentionally, the Congress of the United States; and, second, that his

attempted removal of Edwin M. Stanton was a violation of the Tenure

of Office Act. In the President's answer to article ten, which

contained the allegation that in his speech at St. Louis, in the year

1866, he had used certain language in derogation of the authority of

the Congress of the United States, it was averred that the extracts did

not present his speech or address accurately. Further than that, it

was claimed that the allegation under that article was not "cognizable

by the court as a high misdemeanor in office." Finally, it was claimed

that proof should be made of the "actual" speech and address of the

President on that occasion. The managers were not able to meet the

demand for proof in a technical sense. The speech was reported in the

ordinary way, and the proof was limited to the good faith of the

reporters and the general accuracy of the printed report in the

newspapers. In this situation as to the charges and the answer, it is

not difficult to reach the conclusion that members of the Senate had

ground for the vote of not guilty upon the several charges in regard

to the speeches that were imputed to the President.

Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to

the article in which the President was charged with the violation of

the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the

office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the

proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the

interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed

to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The

proviso of the statute was in these words: "Provided that the

Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their

offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have

been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal

by and with the advice of the Senate." The proviso contained

exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who

held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate

were secure in their places unless the Senate should assent to their

removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming

President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor.

The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal

to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers

that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming

President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty

days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference

whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during

his term.

There were incidents in the course of the proceedings that possess

historical value. By the Constitution the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court is made the presiding officer in the Senate when the

President is put upon trial on articles of impeachment. Chief Justice

Chase claimed that he was to be addressed as "Chief Justice." That

claim was recognized by the counsel for the President and by some

members of the Senate. The managers claimed that he was there as the

presiding officer, and not in his judiciary capacity. He was addressed

by the managers and some of the Senators as "Mr. President."

There was a difference of opinion in the Senate, and a difference

between the managers and the counsel for the respondent, as to the

right of the presiding officer to rule upon questions of law and

evidence arising in the course of the trial. Under the rule of the

Senate as adopted, the rulings of the President were to stand unless a

Senator should ask for the judgment of the Senate.

Other instances occurred which do not possess historical value, but

were incidents unusual in judicial proceedings. When the Judiciary

Committee of the House was entering upon the investigation of the

conduct of President Johnson, General Butler expressed the opinion that

upon the adoption of articles of impeachment by the House the President

would be suspended in his office until the verdict of the Senate. As

this view was not accepted by the committee, I made these remarks in

my opening speech to the House after a review of the arguments for and

against the proposition:

"I cannot doubt the soundness of the opinion that the President, even

when impeached by the House, is entitled to his office until he has

been convicted by the Senate."

This view was accepted.

At the first meeting of the managers I was elected chairman by the

votes of Mr. Stevens, General Logan, and General Butler. Mr. Bingham

received the votes of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Williams. Upon the

announcement of the vote, Mr. Bingham made remarks indicating serious

disappointment and a purpose to retire from the Board of Managers. I

accepted the election, and acted as chairman at the meeting. At the

next meeting, and without consultation with my associates, I resigned

the place and nominated Mr. Bingham. The nomination was not objected

to, and Mr. Bingham took the chair without comment by himself, nor was

there any comment by any other person. The gentlemen who had given

me their votes and support criticized my conduct with considerable

freedom, and were by no means reconciled by the statement which I made

to them. Having reference to the nature of the contest and the

condition of public sentiment, I thought it important that the

managers should avoid any controversy before the public, especially as

to a matter of premiership in the conduct of the trial. It seemed to

be important that the entire force of the House of Representatives

should be directed to one object, the conviction of the accused.

Beyond this, Mr. Bingham and Mr. Wilson had been opposed to the

impeachment of Mr. Johnson when the attempt was first made in the

House of Representatives. I thought it important to combine the

strength that they represented in support of the proceeding in which

we were then engaged. If Mr. Stevens had been in good health, he

would have received my support and the support of General Butler and

General Logan. At that time his health was much impaired, but his

intellectual faculties were free from any cloud.

Another incident occurred which does not require explanation, and which

may not be open to any explanation. After the report of the Judiciary

Committee, and its rejection by the House of Representatives, I was

surprised to receive an invitation from the President to dine with him

at what is known as a State dinner. I assumed that arrangements had

been made for a series of such dinners, and that the invitation had

been sent out by a clerk upon a prearranged plan as to the order of

invitations. When the matter had passed out of my mind, but before

the day named for the dinner, I received a call on the floor of the

House from Mr. Cooper, son-in-law of the President and secretary in

the Executive Mansion. He asked me if I had received an invitation to

dine with the President. I said I had. Next he said, "Have you

answered it?" I said, "No, I have not." That was followed by the

further question, "Will you answer it?" I said, "No, I shall not."

That ended the conversation.

After the decision in the Senate had been made, the managers proceeded

under the order of the House to investigate the truthfulness of rumors

that were afloat, that money and other valuable considerations had been

used to secure the acquittal of the President. That investigation

established the fact that money had been in the possession of persons

who had been engaged in efforts to secure the acquittal of the

President. Those persons, with perhaps a single exception, were

persons who had no official connection with the Government, and none

of them were connected with the Government at Washington. As to most

of them, it appeared that they had no reasons, indeed no good cause,

why they should have taken part either for the conviction of the

President or in behalf of his acquittal. The sources from which funds

were obtained did not appear, nor was there evidence indicating the

amount that had been used, nor the objects to which the money had

been applied. It should be said as to Senators, that there was no

evidence implicating them in the receipt of money or other valuable

considerations. One very important fact not then known to the managers

appeared afterwards in the report of the Treasury Department, showing

a very large loss by the Government during the last eighteen months of

Mr. Johnson's administration. In that period the total receipts from

the duties on spirits amounted to $41,678,684.34. During the first

eighteen months of General Grant's administration, when the rates of

duties and taxation remained the same, the total receipts of revenue

from spirits amounted to $82,417,419.85, showing a difference of

$40,738,735.51. It is not easy to explain in full this money loss in

one branch of the public service. Something may be attributed to the

fact that persons obtained nominations for office by representations to

the President that they were his friends and supporters, and would

continue to be so, under all circumstances. When their nominations

came to the Senate, they made representations of an opposite character.

When they had received their appointments, they very naturally allied

themselves with the President's policy, inasmuch as they could not be

easily removed except upon an initiative taken by him. This deficiency

occurred in the states and districts in which the money should have

been collected and through the agents employed there. It other words,

no part of the deficiency ever passed into the Treasury of the United

States.

It is not improbable that a majority of the people now entertain the

opinion that the action of the House of Representatives in the attempt

that was made to impeach President Johnson was an error.

It is not for me to engage in a discussion on that point. I end by

the expression of the opinion that the vote of the House and the vote

of the Senate, by which the doctrine was established that a civil

officer is liable to impeachment for misdemeanor in office, is a gain

to the public that is full compensation for the undertaking, and that

these proceedings against Mr. Johnson were free from any element or

quality of injustice.

Johnson's case ought to be borne in mind in all agitation for a longer

Presidential term. Whenever the country is engaged in a Presidential

contest there are complains by business men accompanied by a demand for

an extension of the term of office to six or in some instances to ten

years. The disturbance of business is due to the importance of the

election, and the importance of an election is due to the amount of

power that is to be secured by the successful party. An extension of

the term would add to the importance of the election, and a term of

six or ten years would intensify the contest and the injury to business

would be intensified, proportionately. It is doubtful whether in a

period of twenty or fifty years any appreciable relief to business

would be furnished by an extension of the term of the Presidential

office.

It is by no means certain that the total of business is not as great

as it would be in the same four years if the term were ten years

instead of four. The total of production and consumption cannot be

affected seriously by a political controversy that does not extend

usually, over a period of more than three months. If business is

diminished during those months there will be a corresponding gain in

the months that are to follow.

In a popular government there must be elections, and in all such

governments business interests must be subordinated to the general

welfare. The changes that have taken place since the Government was

organized would justify the shortening rather than the lengthening

of the Presidential term. The means of communication are such that

two years may give the mass of the people better means for judging

men and measures than could be had in four years at the opening of this

century.

There is no form of education that more fully justifies its cost than

the education that is gained in a Presidential canvass. The

newspapers, the magazines, and more than all the speakers--"stump

orators" as they are called--communicate information and stimulate

thought. The voters are converted into a great jury, and after full

allowance is made for weakness, corruption and coercion, they are

advanced at each quadrennial contest in their knowledge of men, in

their ability to deal with measures of policy, and in comprehension

of the principles of government. If the losses in business were as

great as is ever represented, the educational advantages of a

Presidential canvass are an adequate set-off. The people have an

opportunity to see and hear the men who are engaged in public affairs

and questions are discussed upon their intrinsic merits. In the sixty

years of my experience there has been a great advance in the quality

of the speeches to which the people have listened. The speeches of

1840 would not be tolerated in 1900.

When great questions are under debate appeals are made to the

principles of government and proportionately the education of the

people is of a higher grade.

A serious objection to a long term in the Presidential office is the

fact that a spirit of discontent, that always exists, will develop into

insubordination or even revolution. We have an example in the history

of the Republic of Hayti. The term is seven years and in many cases

the President has been superseded by the leader of a revolutionary

party. The most recent instance was the overthrow of President

Legitime and the instalment of Hyppolite. The peace and prosperity of

Hayti would be promoted by reducing the term of the Presidential office

to two years. The contests that are sure to arise among a mercurial

people would thus be transferred from the battle-field to the ballot-

box. Who could have answered for the peace of the United States in

1868 if President Johnson's term had been six years instead of eight

months?

[* This was a race riot, which occurred July 30, 1866, and in which

many negroes were killed.--EDITOR.]

XXXIII

THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT IN 1869

In March, 1869, I was appointed Secretary of the Treasury by President

Grant. Soon after my appointment Mr. McCulloch, the retiring

Secretary, said to me that I should find the department in excellent

order, and that in his opinion the financial difficulties of the

Government had been overcome. The first of these statements was true

in part, and in part it was very erroneous.

The accounting branch of the service was properly administered

practically, but there were about one hundred persons on the pay rolls

who had no desks in the department, and who performed but little work

at their homes, where some of them ostensibly were employed in

copying.

Several heads of bureaus were notoriously intemperate. This condition

of things was due in part to the war and to the exigencies of the

department consequent upon the war; and in part it was due to the

constitutional infirmities of Mr. Chase and Mr. McCulloch. In some

respects they resembled each other. They were phlegmatic in

temperament, lacking in versatility, and lacking in facility for labor

and business.

Mr. McCulloch was diligent, industrious and conscientiously devoted to

his duties. He had been crippled in his administration by the conflict

between Congress and the President. The head of the Treasury needs

the confidence of the President, and the confidence and the support of

Congress. The latter Mr. McCulloch did not enjoy, and there were

indications that in some respects he differed with the President. He

was hampered by the fact that any change in the personnel of his

department would be followed by inquiries from one party or the other,

coupled oftentimes with complaints and criticisms.

Great evils existed in the revenue system. The controversy between

Congress and the President led to many removals of collectors of

customs and of internal revenue. Their places were supplied by persons

who could accommodate themselves to both parties. The President was

made to believe that the applicants were his friends, but that their

relations with Republican Senators were such that they could secure

confirmation. When nominated these men represented themselves as good

Republicans and friendly to the Congressional policy. From such

persons an honest performance of duty could not have been expected.

Hence gross frauds upon the revenue were perpetrated and in most

instances by the connivance of those in office.

The returns for the last year of Johnson's administration, and the

first years of Grant's administration, showed that the loss on whisky

in the first named period was not less than thirty million dollars.

That there were other great losses was proved by the facts that the

payments on the public debt were less than thirty million dollars

during the last year of Johnson's administration and that the payments

were one hundred million dollars during the first year of Grant's

administration, and that without any additional sources of revenue.

If Mr. McCulloch's first statement had been true in the most important

particulars, his second claim would not have been open to debate. It

was true that the department had passed the point where there was any

exigency for money. The Government was no longer a borrower. Payments

on the public debt had been made, but otherwise nothing had been done

to relieve the country of the interest account, nor was the credit of

the Government such that any practicable movement in that direction

could have been made.

The six per cent bonds were worth only 83 or 84, and no step had been

taken to redeem the pledge of the Government in regard to the Sinking

Fund made in the act of February 25, 1862. The interest account

exceeded two hundred and thirty-three million dollars.

Mr. S. M. Clark was the chief of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving

and everything was confided to him. It is to be said after the lapse

of thirty years for examination, that not a tittle of evidence has

been found warranting any imputation upon his integrity. It is true

that in one instance a dishonest plate printer took an impression of

a bond upon a sheet of lead for use in counterfeiting. The possibility

of such an act was due to a lack of system and not to any want of

fidelity in Mr. Clark. One of my first acts was to remove Mr. Clark,

and then to open a new set of books. The printing of the old issues

was suspended permanently, and new plates were prepared. Mr. Clark had

had control of the manufacture of the paper, the control of the

engravers, the control of the plates, the control of the printers, of

the counters, and he had had the custody of the red seal. The postal

currency was printed under his direction. The pieces were not

numbered, they were due bills only. At the end of twenty years the

books showed an issue of about fifteen million dollars in excess of the

redemptions.

His power was unlimited as there were no checks upon him. He once said

to me when a committee of Congress was investigating his bureau, during

Mr. McCulloch's administration:

"They will never find a five cent piece out of the way."

After the discharge of Clark, I ordered an account of stock to be

taken. I appointed a custodian of the plates after a full inventory

had been made, whose duty it was to deliver the plates each morning

to the printers, to charge them to the printers, to receive them at the

close of the day, and to settle the account of each man. A special

paper was designated and public notice was given under the statute by

which it was made a crime for any person to make, use or have in his

possession any paper so designated. The paper was manufactured under

the supervision of an agent of the department, who was authorized to

count and receive all the paper at the mills and to answer the orders

for its delivery to the printers. The paper making machine was

equipped with a register which numbered the sheets of paper. That

record was compared daily with the number of sheets received by the

agent, and thus the Government was protected against any fraudulent or

erroneous issue of paper. Registers were also placed upon each

printing press. Each morning one thousand sheets of paper were

delivered to each plate printer, and at the close of work his printed

sheets were counted and the number compared with the register before

the printer was allowed to leave the office. In like manner there was

an accounting with each counter. The same system was extended to the

managers of the machines used for numbering bonds and bank notes. The

registering machine was made by an employee, under my direction, and

at the cost of the Government.

Books of account were opened upon the new system. During my

administration, as far as I know, there was never the loss of a sheet

of paper nor was there a fraud committed in connection with the

business of the bureau. For further security, I made arrangements by

which two bank note companies in the City of New York prepared sets

of plates for a single printing on each security, the red seal being

imprinted in the Treasury Bureau. By this arrangement collusion was

impossible. The expense of printing was increased by this arrangement,

but it seemed to be more important to attain absolute security against

fraud than to save money. My successors have thought otherwise and the

printing is now done in the Treasury.

During my term I ascertained that a man in New York who had once been

employed to print certain securities, had in his possession the plates

which he had used and which he claimed as his property. The printing

had been done in Mr. Chase's administration and there was no agreement

that the plates were to be delivered to the Government. The plates

were obtained, finally, by the payment of a sum of money. The person

who had the plates was an old man, and there was danger that they might

fall into the hands of dishonest parties.

When I was in charge of the Treasury I had an understanding with

Colonel Whiteley, the Chief of the Secret Service that I should have an

interview with any expert professional criminals who might fall into

his hands. I recall an interview with one such criminal. A man of

forty years and a gentleman in appearance, and a professional

gentleman, as well as a criminal by profession.

Upon the suggestion of Colonel Whiteley I gave the prisoner a fresh

one dollar green-back note. He took a phial of liquid from his

pocket, wet one half of the paper with the liquid and in my presence

the colors disappeared from the paper. Time and exposure have given

a dark tinge to the paper which was a pure white when the experiment

was ended. By the use of the liquid the counterfeiter was able to

obtain a piece of fibre paper on which a bill of large denomination

might be printed, given only the engraving.

The revenue marine service was impaired by the incompetency of many of

the officers, and its efficiency was also impaired by the size and

quality of the ships. Some of them were sailing vessels, most of them

were of wood, and the modern ones were unnecessarily large in size. I

created a commission and all the officers except a few who were too old

for active service were subjected to an examination and those who were

found incompetent were discharged from the service. Their places were

filled by young, active and well qualified men.

A commission was appointed to consider and report upon the size of the

vessels that were best adapted to the service. Three reports from

successive commissions were made before a satisfactory result was

reached. Finally, a report was made by Captain Carlisle Patterson,

that was approved by me and by a committee of Congress. The

recommendations of that report have been followed, as far as I know.

At that time the Mint Service was without organization. Each mint and

assay office was in charge of an officer called superintendent, but

there was no head unless the Secretary of the Treasury could be so

considered, as all the business came to him. Upon my recommendation

Congress authorized the appointment of a Director of the Mint, and

upon my recommendation the President appointed Dr. Linderman, a

Philadelphia Democrat, but a gentleman familiar with the service.

Under him the service was organized and made systematic.

When I took charge of the Treasury Department there was no system of

bookkeeping and accounting, that was uniform in the various customs

houses of the country. Each port had a plan or mode of its own, and

there was no one that was so perfect that it could be accepted as a

model in all the ports. The books and forms were made and prepared at

the several ports and often at inordinate rates of cost.

I appointed a commission of Treasury experts to prepare forms and books

for every branch of business. Their report was accepted and since that

time the modes of accounting have been the same at all the ports. The

stationery prepared is furnished through the Government printing

office, at a considerable saving in cost, and clerks in the accounting

branch of the Treasury are relieved of much labor in the preparation

of statements.

Upon the transfer of Mr. Columbus Delano from the office of

commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Secretaryship of the Interior

Department, the question of the appointment of a successor was

considered. The President named General Alfred Pleasanton, who was

then a collector of internal revenue in the city of New York. He had

been a good cavalry officer, a graduate of West Point, and the

President was attached to him. My acquaintance with Pleasanton was

limited, but I was quite doubtful of his fitness for the place. My

opposition gave rise to some delay, but at the end the appointment

was made, the President saying in reply to my doubts that if he did

not succeed he had only to say so to the General and he would leave

at once. The appointment of Pleasanton was urged by Mr. Delano and

General Horace Porter as I understood, both of whom were very near

the President.

Pleasanton had been informed of my position, and although I was his

immediate superior he did not call upon me, nor did he ever, except

upon one occasion, come into my office, unless I sent for him. On

my part I resolved to avoid any criticism upon his official conduct

unless compelled to do so. He entered upon his duties the first of

January, 1871, and although in several instances I had occasion to

control his purposes in regard to contracts and to the refund of

taxes, I did not feel called upon to mention the facts to the

President. In May the President said:

"I have come to the conclusion that Pleasanton is not succeeding in

his office."

Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. 2 · 第 19 / 54 题