Of the men who occupied places in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, no one was
more free from just criticism affecting unfavorably the value of his
public services than Secretary Stanton.
Of those who were nearest to him, no one ever received the impression
from his acts or his conversation that he thought of the Presidency
as a possibility under any circumstances. Seward, Chase and Bates had
been candidates at Chicago in 1860, and whatever may have been the
fact in regard to Seward and Bates, it is quite certain that ambition
for the Presidency never lost its hold upon Mr. Chase, even when he
became Chief Justice of the United States.
Coupled with the absence of ambition, or perhaps in a degree incident
to the absence of ambition, Mr. Stanton was the possessor of courage
for all the emergencies of the place that he occupied--a courage that
was always available, whether in its exercise the wishes of individuals
or the fortunes of the country were involved.
It was understood by those who frequented the War Office in the gloomy
days of 1862 and '63 that a card signed "A. L." would not always
command full respect from Secretary Stanton. He was a believer in the
rigid principles of the army, and although he was a humane man he
smothered or subdued his sympathy for heart-broken mothers whose sons
had deserted the cause of the country, in his determination to save
the country through the strictest enforcement of the rules and
regulations of the army. Mr. Lincoln, in his abounding good nature,
could not resist the appeals of disconsolate wives and heart-stricken
mothers, and it was often Mr. Stanton's fortune to resist such appeals
even when supported by the President's card in the form of a request
which in ordinary times and upon ordinary men would be treated as an
order.
Hence there may have been a foundation for the report that an
unsuccessful user of one of the President's cards returned to the
President for a reinforcement of the order. The President insisted
upon a full report of the Secretary's answer. The applicant repeated
the Secretary's remark, which was not complimentary to the President's
good sense. The President hesitated, and then declined to renew the
order, saying: "Stanton is generally right."
Mr. Stanton's testimony was taken February 11, 1867, and on subsequent
days. The record of the text and the accompanying documents cover more
than two hundred printed pages. The evidence was taken by the
Committee on the Judiciary, and it had special reference to the charges
that had been made against President Johnson. At that time, the
separation between Mr. Stanton and the President had become
irreconcilable, but there are no indications of hostility in the
answers given by the Secretary. Indeed, he assumed, without reserve,
full responsibility for acts that had been charged on the President by
others.
During the war the railroads that fell within our lines were
appropriated to the use of the United States, and heavy outlays had
been made upon some of them for repairs and improvements. In many
cases expenses had been incurred, that in the hands of the corporation
would not have been chargeable to a construction account. In a
majority of cases, if not in all, the roads had been surrendered
without compensation, and the rolling stock had been transferred for
very slight consideration.
Mr. Stanton assumed the responsibility of the policy, upon the ground
that it was important to the South and to the country that the channels
of commerce should be made available without delay and that the army
could not be used wisely in commercial traffic. As the President was
interested in one of the railroads that received a large benefit by the
restoration of its property much improved, he was relieved of all
responsibility for a policy that had been much condemned.
Through the testimony of Secretary Stanton the committee was enabled
to find the origin and to trace with a degree of accuracy the history
of President Johnson's plan of reconstruction. At a time not many days
prior to Mr. Lincoln's death, Secretary Stanton prepared an order which
contained a _projet_ for the government of the States that had been in
rebellion. The paper was submitted to President Lincoln and it was
considered by him in a cabinet meeting that was held during the day
preceding the night of the assassination.
As this paper became the basis for the proclamations for the government
of the States that had been in rebellion, its history, as given by
Mr. Stanton, is worthy of exact report in his own words:
"On the last day of Mr. Lincoln's life, there was a Cabinet meeting, at
which General Grant, and all the members of the Cabinet, except Mr.
Seward, were present. General Grant at that time made a report of the
condition of the country, as he conceived it to be, and as it would be
on the surrender of Johnston's army, which was regarded as absolutely
certain. The subject of reconstruction was talked of at considerable
length. Shortly previous to that time I had myself, with a view of
putting into a practicable form the means of overcoming what seemed to
be a difficulty in the mind of Mr. Lincoln, as to the mode of
reconstruction, prepared a rough draft of a form or mode by which the
authority and laws of the United States should be re-established, and
governments reorganized in the rebel States under the Federal
authority, without any necessity whatever for the intervention of
rebel organizations or rebel aid.
In the course of that consultation Mr. Lincoln alluded to the paper,
went into his room, brought it out, and asked me to read it, which I
did, and explained my ideas in regard to it. There was one point which
I had left open; that was as to who should constitute the electors in
the respective States . . . I left a blank upon that subject to be
considered. There was at that time nothing adopted about it, and no
opinions expressed; it was only a _projet_."
At the request of Mr. Lincoln and the Cabinet, the order was printed
and a copy was given to each member, and a copy was given to Mr.
Johnson when he had become President.
The plan was further considered in Mr. Johnson's Cabinet, and some
alterations were made. The point of chief difference related to the
elective franchise--whether it should be extended to the negro race.
Mr. Stanton said: "There was a difference of opinion upon that
subject. The President expressed his views very clearly and
distinctly. I expressed my views, and other members of the Cabinet
expressed their views. The objection of the President to throwing
the franchise open to the colored people appeared to be fixed, and I
think every member of the Cabinet assented to the arrangement as it
was specified in the proclamation relative to North Carolina. After
that I do not remember that the subject was ever again discussed in
the Cabinet."
Thus from Mr. Stanton's testimony we gather the important facts as to
the origin of a measure which became the subject of bitter controversy
between President Johnson and the Republican Party. The framework of
the North Carolina proclamation was furnished by Mr. Stanton. When
alterations had been made the proclamation was agreed to by the
Cabinet but without a declaration or even an understanding upon the
point which, without much delay, became the vital point: was the
policy of government that was announced in the proclamation a permanent
policy or was it a temporary expedient, a substitute for military
government, and subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress?
General Grant was of the opinion that the organizations which the
President set up in the States were temporary and that they were
subject to the action of Congress.
Mr. Stanton's opinion is expressed carefully, in his own words: "My
opinion is, that the whole subject of reconstruction and the relation
of the State to the Federal Government is subject to the controlling
power of Congress; and while I believe that the President and his
Cabinet were not violating any law, but were faithfully performing
their duty in endeavoring to organize provisional governments in
those States, I supposed then, and still suppose, that the final
validity of such organizations would rest with the law-making power of
the government."
In an official letter, dated January 8, 1866, Secretary Stanton gave
his reasons for the payment of the salaries of the provisional
governors: "The payments were made from the appropriation of army
contingencies because the duties performed by the parties were regarded
of a temporary character ancillary to the withdrawal of military force,
and to take the place of the armed forces in the respective States."
On the other hand the President chose to treat the governments that had
been set up as permanent governments and beyond the control of
Congress. On this point, the contest between President Johnson and the
Republican Party was made up. It ended in an appeal to the people, who
rendered a judgment against _the President_ by a two-thirds majority.
The testimony of Secretary Seward, and official papers that were issued
by the Department of State in the year 1865, may warrant the conclusion
that President Johnson was not then prepared to treat the new state
organizations as final and binding upon Congress and the country.
Under date of July 8, 1865, Secretary Seward said, in an official
letter to Governor Holden of North Carolina: "It is understood here
that besides cotton which has been taken by the Secretary of the
Treasury under Act of Congress there were quantities of resin, and
other articles, as well as funds, lying about in different places in
the State and not reduced into possession by United States officers as
insurgent property. The President is of the opinion that you can
appropriate these for the inevitable and indispensable expenses of the
civil government of the State during the continuance of the provisional
government."
On the 14th day of November, 1865, Mr. McCulloch authorized Mr. Worth,
acting as treasurer in North Carolina, to use the fragments of rebel
property that might be gathered to defray the expenses of the
provisional government of the State.
In answer to a question put to Secretary Seward, he said: "I do not
remember that any provisional governor held a military office, except
Mr. Johnson."
In the further examination of Mr. Seward, May 16, 1867, he indicated
his concurrence with President Johnson in this remark: "The object was
to proceed with the work of the restoration of the Union as speedily
and effectively and wisely as possible, having no reference as to
whether Congress would be in session or not."
This question was put to Mr. Seward:
"Did not he (the President) urge these parties to be prepared to be at
the doors of Congress by the time of its next meeting?"
The answer was: "Very likely he did. I do not know of the fact. I
know that I was very anxious that these States should be represented
in Congress, and that he was equally so, that they should be provided
with representatives who could be admitted."
The policy of the administration, July 24, 1865, is set forth in a
despatch from Secretary Seward to Governor Sharkey, of Mississippi (he
is addressed as Provisional Governor): "The President sees no occasion
to interfere with General Slocum's proceedings. The government of the
State will be provisional only until the civil authorities shall be
restored with the approval of Congress."
Upon the united testimony of General Grant, Secretary Stanton and
Secretary Seward, it may be claimed fairly that the governments that
were set up under proclamations of the President were treated in the
beginning as provisional governments and subject to the final judgment
of Congress.
In 1866, when the rupture between Congress and the President had taken
form, the President with the support of Mr. Seward announced the
doctrine that the governments which had been set up were valid
governments, and that claimants for seats in Congress from those who
could prove their loyalty were entitled to admission.
Thus was a foundation laid for the impeachment of President Johnson by
the House of Representatives, and his trial by the Senate.
XXXII
IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON
The nomination of Andrew Johnson to the Vice-Presidency in 1864, by the
Republican Party, was a repetition of the error committed by the Whig
Party in 1840, in the nomination of John Tyler for the same office.
In each case the nomination was due to an attempt to secure the support
of a body of men who were not in accord in all essential particulars
with the party making the nomination.
John Tyler was opposed to the administration of Mr. Van Buren, but he
was opposed also to a national bank, which was then an accepted idea
and an assured public policy of the Whig Party. Hence, it happened
that when Mr. Tyler came to the Presidency, he resisted the attempt of
Congress to establish a national bank, and by the exercise of the veto-
power, on two occasions, he defeated the measure. This controversy
caused the overthrow of the Whig Party, and it ended the contest in
behalf of a United States bank.
In the case of John Tyler and in the case of Andrew Johnson there was
an application, in dangerous excess, of a policy that prevails in all
national conventions. When the nomination of a candidate for the
Presidency has been secured, the dominant wing of the party turns to
the minority with a tender of the Vice-Presidency. In 1880, when the
nomination of General Garfield had been made, the selection of a
candidate for the Vice-Presidency was tendered to the supporters of
General Grant, and it was declined by more than one person.
Mr. Johnson never identified himself with the Republican Party; and
neither in June, 1864, nor at any other period of his life, had the
Republican Party a right to treat him as an associate member. He was,
in fact, what he often proclaimed himself to be--a Jacksonian Democrat.
He was a Southern Union Democrat. He was an opponent, and a bitter
opponent, of the project for the dissolution of the Union, and a
vindictive enemy of those who threatened its destruction.
His speeches in the Senate in the Thirty-sixth and the Thirty-seventh
Congress were read and much approved throughout the North, and they
prepared the way for the acceptance of his nomination as a candidate
of the Republican Party in 1864.
Mr. Johnson was an earnest supporter of the Crittenden Compromise.
That measure originated in the House of Representatives. It was
defeated in the Senate by seven votes and six votes of the seven came
from the South. The provisions of the bill were far away from the
ideals of Republicans generally, although the measure was sustained
by members of the party. By that scheme the Fugitive Slave Law was
made less offensive in two particulars, but the United States was to
pay for fugitives from slavery whenever a marshal failed to perform his
duty. As an important limitation of the powers of Congress, the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia was to be dependent
upon the consent of the States of Maryland and Virginia.
Mr. Johnson gave voice to his indignation when he spoke of the Southern
men whose votes contributed to the defeat of the Crittenden Compromise.
"Who, then," said he, "has brought these evils upon the country? Whose
fault is it? Who is responsible for it? With the help we had from the
other side of the chamber, if all those on this side had been true to
the Constitution and faithful to their constituents, and had acted with
fidelity to the country, the amendment of the Senator from New
Hampshire could have been voted down. Whose fault was it? Who did it?
Southern traitors, as was said in the speech of the Senator from
California. They did it. They wanted no compromise."
These extracts show the style of speech in which Mr. Johnson indulged,
and they prove beyond question that in the winter of 1861 he had no
sympathy with the Republican Party of 1856 and 1860. These facts
explain, and in some measure they palliate, the peculiarities of his
career, which provoked criticism and an adverse popular judgment when
he came to the Presidency. Nor is there evidence within my knowledge
that he ever denied the right of secession. However that may have
been, he disapproved of the exercise of the right at all stages of the
contest.
In the Thirty-sixth Congress Mr. Johnson proposed amendments to the
Constitution which gave him consideration in the North. By his
proposition the Fugitive Slave Law was to be repealed, and in its place
the respective States were to return fugitives or to pay the value of
those that might be retained.
Slavery was to be abolished in the District of Columbia with the
consent of Maryland and upon payment of the full value of the slaves
emancipated. The Territories were to be divided between freedom and
slavery. His scheme contemplated other changes not connected
necessarily with the system of slavery. Of these I mention the
election of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Judges of the
Supreme Court by the people, coupled with a limitation of the terms of
judges to twelve years.
The Crittenden Resolution contained these declarations of facts and
policy:
1. The present deplorable war has been forced upon the country by the
disunionists of the Southern States.
2. Congress has no purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of
overthrowing or interfering with the established rights of those States.
Upon a motion to include disunionists in the North under the first
charge, Mr. Johnson voted in the negative with Sumner, Wilson, Wade,
and other Republicans.
This brief survey of Mr. Johnson's Congressional career at the opening
of the war may indicate the characteristics of his mind in controversy
and debate, and furnish means for comprehending his actions in the
troublous period of his administration.
Some conclusions are deducible from this survey. First of all it is
to be said that he never assumed to be a member of the Republican
Party. Next, I do not find evidence which will justify the statement
that he was a disbeliever in the right of a State to secede from the
Union. It is manifest that he was not an advocate of the doctrine of
political equality as it came to be taught by the leaders of the
Republican Party. When he became President, he was an opponent of
negro suffrage.
This record, though not concealed, was not understood by the members
of the convention that placed him in nomination for the second office
in the country.
This analysis prepares the way for an extract from the testimony of Mr.
Stanley Matthews, who was afterwards a justice of the Supreme Court,
and who was examined by the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives when engaged in investigating the doings of the
President previous to his impeachment. Mr. Johnson was appointed
Military Governor of Tennessee the third day of March, 1862. Colonel
Matthews was provost-marshal at Nashville, where Johnson resided during
his term as Governor. In that term Matthews and Johnson became
acquainted. When Johnson was on his way to Washington to take the oath
of office, he stopped at the Burnet House in Cincinnati. Matthews
called upon him. Matthews had been a Democrat until the troubles in
Kansas. In the conversation at the Burnet House Mr. Johnson made these
remarks, after some personal matters had been disposed of. I quote
from the testimony of Judge Matthews:
"I inquired as to the state of public feeling on political matters in
Tennessee at that time. He remarked that very great changes had
taken place since I had been there, that many of those who at first
were the best Union men had turned to be the worst rebels, and that
many of those who had originally been the worst rebels were now the
best Union men. I expressed surprise and regret at what he said in
reference to the matter.
"We were sitting near each other on the sofa. He then turned to me and
said, 'You and I were old Democrats.' I said, 'Yes.' He then said,
_'I will tell you what it is, if the country is ever to be saved, it is
to be done through the old Democratic Party.'_
"I do not know whether I made any reply to that, or, if I did, what it
was; and immediately afterwards I took my leave."
The larger part of this quotation is only important as leading up to
the phrase that is emphasized, and which may throw light upon Mr.
Johnson's policy and conduct when he came to the Presidency.
This conversation occurred in the month of February, 1865, and it must
be accepted as evidence, quite conclusive, that Mr. Johnson was then
opposed to the policy of the Republican Party, whose honors he had
accepted. In a party sense Mr. Johnson was not a Republican: he was a
Union Democrat. He was opposed to the dissolution of the Union, but
not necessarily upon the ground that the Union had a supreme right to
exist in defiance of what is called "State sovereignty." This with
the Republican Party was a fundamental principle. Under the influence
of the principles of the old Democratic Party Mr. Johnson advanced to
the Vice-Presidency, and while under the influence of the same idea he
became President.
When the Republican Party came to power, the State of Maryland, that
portion of Virginia now known as West Virginia, the State of Kentucky,
and the State of Missouri were largely under the influence of
sympathizers with the eleven seceding States of the South. It was
necessary in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri to maintain the
ascendency of the National Government by the exhibition of physical
force, and in some instances by its actual exercise. Mr. Lincoln's
policy in regard to the question of slavery was controlled, up to the
month of July, 1862, by the purpose to conciliate Union slave-holders
in the States mentioned. Of his measures I refer to the proposition
to transfer the free negroes to Central America, for which an
appropriation of $25,000 was made by Congress. Next, Congress passed
an act for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia upon
the payment of three hundred dollars for each slave emancipated.
Without representing in his history or in his person the slave-holding
interests of the South, Mr. Johnson was yet a Southern man with Union
sentiments. The impression was received therefrom that his influence
would be considerable in restraining, if not in conciliating slave-
holders in what were called the "border States." These facts tended
to his nomination for the Vice-Presidency. I have no means for
forming an opinion that is trustworthy as to the position of Mr.
Lincoln in reference to the nomination of Mr. Johnson. His nomination
may justify the impression that the Republican Party was in doubt as to
its ability to re-elect Mr. Lincoln in 1864. From the month of July,
1862, to the nomination in 1864, I had frequent interviews with Mr.
Lincoln, and I can only say that, during the period when the result of
the election was a subject of thought, he gave no intimation in the
conversations that I had with him that the element of doubt as to the
result existed in his mind.
From what has been said, the inference may be drawn that Mr. Johnson
came to the Vice-Presidency in the absence of any considerable degree
of confidence on the part of the Republican Party, although there were
no manifestations of serious doubt as to his fitness for the place, or
as to his fidelity to the principles of the party.
The incidents of the inauguration of Mr. Johnson in the Senate Chamber,
and especially his speech on the occasion, which was directed,
apparently, to the diplomatic corps, excited apprehensions in those
who were present, and the confidence of the country was diminished
materially concerning his qualifications for the office to which he had
been elected. Without delay these apprehensions circulated widely, and
they were deepened in the public mind by the assassination of Mr.
Lincoln and the elevation of Mr. Johnson to the Presidency.
The public confidence received a further serious shock by his
proclamation of May 29, 1865, for the organization of a State
government in North Carolina. That proclamation contained provisions
in harmony with what has been set forth in this paper concerning the
political principles of Mr. Johnson. First of all, he limited the
franchise to persons "qualified as prescribed by the constitution and
laws of the State of North Carolina in force immediately before the
20th day of May, 1861, the date of the so-called Ordinance of
Secession." This provision was a limitation of the suffrage, and it
excluded necessarily the negro population of the State. It was also a
recognition of the right of the State to reappear as a State in the
Union. It was, indeed, an early assertion of the phrase which
afterwards became controlling with many persons--"Once a State, always
a State." He further recognized the right of the State to reappear as
a State in the organization and powers of the convention which was to
be called under the proclamation. As to that he said: "The convention
when convened, or the legislature which may be thereafter assembled,
will prescribe the qualification of electors and the eligibility of
persons to hold office under the constitution and laws of the State,
a power the people of the several States composing the Union have
rightfully exercised from the origin of the Government to the present
time." There were further instructions given in the proclamation as to
the duties of various officers of the United States to aid Governor
Holden, who, by the same proclamation, was appointed "Provisional
Governor of the State of North Carolina."
Upon the publication of this proclamation I was so much disturbed that
I proceeded at once to Washington, but without any definite idea as to
what could be done to arrest the step which seemed to me a dangerous
step towards the re-organization of the Government upon an unsound
basis. At that time I had had no conversation with Mr. Johnson, either
before or after he came to the Presidency, upon any subject whatever.
The interview which I secured upon that visit was the sole personal
interview that ever occurred between us. I called upon Senator Morrill
of Vermont, and together we made a visit to the President. I spoke of
the features of the proclamation that seemed to be objectionable. He
said that "the measure was tentative" only, and that until the
experiment had been tried no other proclamation would be issued. Upon
that I said in substance that the Republican Party might accept the
proclamation as an experiment, but that it was contrary to the ideas
of the party, and that a continuance of the policy would work a
disruption of the party. He assured us that nothing further would be
done until the experiment had been tested. With that assurance we left
the Executive Mansion.
On the 13th day of June, 1865, a similar proclamation was issued in
reference to the State of Mississippi, and on the 17th of June,
corresponding proclamations were issued in reference to the States of
Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Florida. In each State a
person was named as Provisional Governor. This action led to a
division of the party and to its subsequent reorganization against the
President's policy.
In his letter of acceptance of the nomination made by the Union
Convention, Mr. Johnson endorsed, without reserve, the platform that
had been adopted. The declarations of the platform did not contain a
reference to the reorganization of the Government in the event of the
success of the Union arms. The declarations were enumerated in this
order: the Union was to be maintained; the war was to be prosecuted
upon the basis of an unconditional surrender of the rebels; and
slavery, as the cause of the war, was to be abolished. The added
resolutions related to the services of the soldiers and sailors, and to
the policy of Abraham Lincoln as President. It was further declared
that the public credit should be maintained, that there should be a
vigorous and just system of taxes, and that the people would view with
"extreme jealousy," and as enemies to the peace and independence of
the country, the efforts of any power to obtain new footholds for
monarchical government on this continent. Such being the character of
the platform, it cannot be said that Mr. Johnson challenged its
declarations in the policy on which he entered for the reorganization
of the Government. In Mr. Johnson's letter of acceptance he preserved
his relations to the Democrats by the use of this phrase: "I cannot
forego the opportunity of saying to my old friends of the Democratic
Party proper, with whom I have so long and pleasantly been associated,
that the hour has come when that great party can justly indicate its
devotion to the Democratic policy in measures of expediency."
The controversy with Mr. Johnson had its origin in the difference of
opinion as to the nature of the Government. That difference led him to
the conclusion that the rebellion had not worked any change in the
legal relations of the seceding States to the National Government. His
motto was this: "Once a State, always a State," whatever might be its
conduct either of peace or war. There were, however, differences of
opinion among those who adhered to the Republican Party. Mr. Stevens,
who was a recognized, if not the recognized, leader of the Republican
Party, advocated the doctrine that the eleven States were to be treated
as enemy's territory, and to be governed upon whatever system might be
acceptable to the States that had remained true to the Union. Mr.
Sumner maintained the doctrine that the eleven States were Territories,
and that they were to be subject to the General Government until
Congress should admit the several Territories as State organizations.
The fourth day of May, 1864, I presented a series of resolutions in
the House of Representatives, in which I asserted this doctrine: The
communities that have been in rebellion can be organized into States
only by the will of the loyal people expressed freely and in the
absence of all coercion; that States so organized can become States of
the American Union only when they shall have applied for admission and
their admission shall have been authorized by the existing National
Government. A small number of persons who were identified with the
Republican Party sustained the policy of Mr. Johnson. Others were of
the opinion that the eleven States were out of their proper relation to
the Union, as was declared by Mr. Lincoln in his last speech, and that
they could become members of the American Union only by the organized
action of each, and the concurrent action of the existing National
Government. The Government was reorganized without any distinct
declaration upon the question whether the States that had been in
rebellion were to be treated as enemy's territory, or as Territories
according to the usage of former times. The difference of opinion was
a vital one with Mr. Johnson. Whatever view may be taken of his moral
qualities, it is to be said that he was not deficient in intellectual
ability, that his courage passed far beyond the line of obstinacy, and
that from the first to last he was prepared to resist the claims of
the large majority of the Republican Party. The issue began with his
proclamation of May, 1865, and the contest continued to the end of his
term. The nature of the issue explains the character and violence of
his speeches, especially that of the twenty-second day of February,
1866, when he spoke of Congress as a "body hanging on the verge of the
Government."
In the many speeches which he delivered in his trip through the West,
he made distinct charges against Congress. He was accompanied by Mr.
Seward, General Grant, Admiral Farragut, and some others. In a speech
at Cleveland, Ohio, he said, among other things, "I have called upon
your Congress, which has tried to break up the Government." Again, in
the same speech he said, "I tell you my countrymen, that although the
powers of Thad Stevens and his gang were by, they could not turn me
from my purpose. There is no power that can turn me, except you and
the God who put me into existence." He charged, also, that Congress
had taken great pains to poison their constituents against him. "What
had Congress done? Had they done anything to restore the Union in
those States? No; on the contrary, they had done everything to prevent
it."
In a speech made at St. Louis, Missouri, September 8, 1866, Mr. Johnson
discussed the riot at New Orleans.* In that speech he said, "If you
will take up the riot in New Orleans, and trace it back to its source,
or its immediate cause, you will find out who was responsible for the
blood that was shed there. If you will take up the riot at New
Orleans and trace it back to the radical Congress, you will find that
the riot at New Orleans was substantially planned." After some
further observations, he says: "Yes, you will find that another
rebellion was commenced, having its origin in the radical Congress."
These extracts from Mr. Johnson's speeches should be considered in
connection with his proclamations of May, June, and July, 1865. They
are conclusive to this point: that he had determined to reconstruct
the Government upon the basis of the return of the States that had been
engaged in the rebellion without the imposition of any conditions
whatsoever, except such as he had imposed upon them in his
proclamations. In fine, that the Government was to be re-established
without the authority or even the assent of the Congress of the United
States. In his proclamations he made provision for the framing of
constitutions in the respective States, their ratification by the
people, excluding all those who were not voters in April, 1861, and for
the election of Senators and Representatives to the Congress of the
United States without the assent of the Representatives of the existing
States.
When I arrived in Washington to attend the meeting of Congress at the
December session, 1866, I received a note from Mr. Stanton asking me to
meet him at the War Office with as little delay as might be
practicable. When I called at the War Office, he beckoned me to retire
to his private room, where he soon met me. He then said that he had
been more disturbed by the condition of affairs in the preceding weeks
and months than he had been at any time during the war. He gave me to
understand that orders had been issued to the army of which neither he
nor General Grant had any knowledge. He further gave me to understand
also that he apprehended an attempt by the President to re-organize the
Government by the assembling of a Congress in which the members from
the seceding States and the Democratic members from the North might
obtain control through the aid of the Executive. He then said that he
thought it necessary that some act should be passed by which the power
of the President might be limited. Under his dictation, and after such
consultation as seemed to be required, I drafted amendments to the
Appropriation Bill for the Support of the Army, which contained the
following provisions: The headquarters of the General of the Army were
fixed at Washington, where he was to remain unless transferred to duty
elsewhere by his own consent or by the consent of the Senate. Next, it
was made a misdemeanor for the President to transmit orders to any
officer of the army except through the General of the Army. It was
also made a misdemeanor for any officer to obey orders issued in any
other way than through the General of the Army, knowing that the same
had been so issued. These provisions were taken by me to Mr. Stevens,
the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. After some
explanation, the measure was accepted by the committee and incorporated
in the Army Appropriation Bill. The bill was approved by the President
the second day of March, 1867. His approval was accompanied by a
protest on his part that the provision was unconstitutional, and by the
statement that he approved the bill only because it was necessary for
the support of the army.
At the time of my interview with Mr. Stanton, I was not informed fully
as to the events that had transpired in the preceding months, nor can
I say now that everything which had transpired of importance was then
known to Mr. Stanton. The statement that I am now to make was derived
from conversations with General Grant. At a time previous to the
December session of 1866, the President said to General Grant, "I may
wish to send you on a mission to Mexico." General Grant replied, "It
may not be convenient for me to go to Mexico." Little, if anything,
further was said between the President and General Grant. At a
subsequent time General Grant was invited to a Cabinet meeting. At
that meeting Mr. Seward read a paper of instruction to General Grant
as Minister of some degree to Mexico. The contents of the paper did
not impress General Grant very seriously, for in the communication that
he made to me he said that "the instructions came out very near where
they went in." At the end of the reading General Grant said, "You
recollect, Mr. President, I said it would not be convenient for me to
go to Mexico." Upon that a conversation followed, when the President
became heated, and rising from his seat, and striking the table with
some force, he said "Is there an officer of the army who will not
obey my instructions?" General Grant took his hat in his hand, and
said, "I am an officer of the army, but I am a citizen also; and this
is a civil service that you require of me. I decline it." He then
left the meeting. It happened also that previous to this conversation
the President had ordered General Sherman, who was in command at Fort
Leavenworth, to report at Washington. General Sherman obeyed the
order, came to Washington, and had a conference with General Grant
before he reported to the President. In that situation of affairs
General Sherman was sent to Mexico upon the mission which had been
prepared for General Grant.
The suggestion that Mr. Johnson contemplated the re-organization of the
Government by the admission of the States that had been in rebellion,
and by the recognition of Senators and Representatives that might be
assigned from those States, received support from the testimony given
by Major-General William H. Emory, and also from the testimony of
General Grant. In the latter part of the year 1867 and the first part
of the year 1868, General Emory was in command of the Department of
Washington. When he entered upon the command, he called upon the
President. A conversation, apparently not very important, occurred
between them, as to the military forces then in that department. In
February, 1868, the President directed his secretary to ask General
Emory to call upon him as early as practicable. In obedience to that
request General Emory called on the twenty-second day of February. The
President referred to the former conversation, and then inquired
whether any changes had been made, and especially within the recent
days, in the military forces under Emory's command. In the course of
the conversation growing out of these requests for information, General
Emory referred to an order which had then been recently issued which
embodied the provisions of the act of March, 1867, in regard to the
command of the army and the transmission of orders. The President
then said to Emory:
"What order do you refer to?"