In still another respect distrust of monarchy and aversion to the

"tyranny" on which Antigonus Gonatas had based his Greek empire, are

betrayed in the institutions of the Achæans. The rule of a city by a

tyrant and membership in the league were regarded as incompatible

with one another. This was, doubtless, a requirement of the federal

laws, which, consisting of treaties negotiated between the original

cities in 275 B.C. and at the admission of new cities thereafter,

of oaths by which these treaties were sanctioned, and of general

enactments made from time to time by special legislative process,

bound the citizens of the individual cities no less than did the local

laws which they themselves passed. Otherwise the city-states were at

liberty to adopt whatever form of government they chose. The league

championed neither democracy nor oligarchy, though its working favored

the well-to-do classes. At most it compelled a certain uniformity in

local administration, its general attitude being admirably symbolized

by its monetary arrangements, wherein the standard was determined by

the federal authority while the coins were issued by the constituent

cities.[133]

* * * * *

The very constitutions of the Achæan and the Ætolian leagues disclose

the importance of the part which the Greek policy of Antigonus Gonatas

played in the creation of these dangerous adversaries of himself and

his country. It is true that his son, Demetrius II, fought them to a

standstill, wrested from Ætolia a large part of its acquisitions, and

might have dissolved both leagues by force, had not Epirus deserted him

and gone over to their side; had not the Illyrian pirates whom he let

loose on this new enemy provoked the Romans to cross the Adriatic; and

had not the Dardanians moved down on Macedon and defeated and killed

him in battle. Such "had nots" belonged, however, to the constant

possibilities, and complications of this sort were ever occurring in

the struggle of Macedon for the hegemony of Greece. On this occasion

their issue was so disastrous for Macedon that the hour of the two

leagues seemed come.

But what should have been their triumph proved to be their destruction.

For the frustration of their hopes Polybius,[134] who voices the

opinion of Aratus, held the Ætolians responsible, and it is likely that

he was in the main right. For just at this critical moment, when the

Achæans were face to face with the most serious problem which their

federal system presented, namely, the reluctance of states, like Sparta

and Athens, which were markedly stronger than the common run of the

Achæan cities, to accept mere equality with them, the Ætolians not only

left them in the lurch and made an advantageous peace for themselves

with Antigonus Doson, the new king of Macedon, but, by ceding to Sparta

their Arcadian cities (Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, and Caphiæ), they

made it possible for Cleomenes, the young Spartan monarch, to rally

round himself all the Peloponnesian opposition to the Achæans, and to

make a brilliant effort to establish once again the Spartan hegemony

in the peninsula. Another view of the matter is that the downfall of

the Achæan league--which, to escape Cleomenes, threw itself into the

arms of Antigonus Doson--was due to the intervention of Ptolemy III,

who backed up Sparta, Athens, and Ætolia by his friendship and his

money,[135] and would have gladly seen Achæa eliminated in order that

Greece might present a united front to Antigonus Doson. In any case it

was Antigonus Doson who reaped the benefits, and it seems unlikely that

they were wholly an unearned increment. What he was capable of he had

already shown by joining heartily in the international guarantee of

the neutrality of Athens which had robbed Aratus of that choice prize.

He was clearly no common man, and had he not died an untimely death

shortly after the great victory he gained over Cleomenes at Sellasia

(222 B.C.), he would probably have been much better known in history.

His energetic and tactful conduct in this crisis contrasts sharply with

the nerveless backdown of Egypt, for which the only excuse was the

imminent demise of Euergetes and the threatening attitude of Antiochus

the Great. It cannot be denied that Antigonus Doson made a good use of

all his opportunities.

His settlement of Hellenic affairs was characterized by the revival of

the general synod established by the great Philip.[136] Representatives

of the Hellenic states met in formal assembly at Corinth (224 B.C.),

and chose the king of Macedon as their hegemon. Subsequently the synod

was to meet at a time and place to be designated by its head. A mere

enumeration of the states which took this action tells the story of

the constitutional development of Hellas in the Macedonian age. They

were Macedon, Thessaly, Epirus, Acarnania, Locris, Phocis, Boeotia,

Euboea, Achæa, and probably the Islanders. Of these the first was a

kingdom,[137] but all the others were leagues. The city-states, which

had been everything in Philip's synod, have disappeared, swallowed

up in the federations. Whether each of the units had now an equal

number of votes, or, as in the time of Philip, a number proportionate

to its size, we do not know, though the second alternative is the

more probable one. In both cases Macedonian deputies took part in the

meetings of the synod and served as heads of the Macedonian interest.

Together with the deputies from Thessaly and other subservient states

they probably formed a majority in the synod. In both Philip II and

Antigonus Doson, Macedon had, accordingly, at once hegemons and kings.

We hear of nothing in the revived Hellenic league comparable with the

Committee of Public Safety of the old one; but nothing similar was

now required, since the generals of the constituent leagues were the

natural representatives of these bodies when the synod was not in

session. They had thus a place provided for them in the scheme of

Antigonus Doson.

The republican reaction against the policy of Antigonus Gonatas had

by no means spent its force. This is shown in the seriousness with

which it was now reckoned with by Antigonus Doson. He could not ignore

the well established practice of the league assemblies to decide all

important questions of foreign policy. Hence his synod differs from

that of Philip II particularly in this important respect, that its

action in declaring war, concluding peace, and other like matters was

taken subject to ratification by the league authorities, and was,

seemingly, binding only on such of them as ratified it.[138] His synod,

in other words, stood to the league assemblies as the Achæan synod

stood to the Achæan _syncletus_. Naturally, the confederates could not

withdraw from the hegemony at pleasure, much less join its enemies;

so that the refusal of a league to accept a decision of the synod to

declare war meant only that it assumed a position of neutrality. In

Philip's time each city had had to pay per day a fine of thirty drachmæ

for every horseman, twenty drachmæ for every hoplite, ten drachmæ

for every light-armed soldier, and seven or eight drachmæ for every

sailor who was absent from a duly authorized expedition.[139] Now the

leagues could refuse to coöperate without suffering any penalty. They

surrendered their liberty to fight one another, and their right to

contract alliances with outside states; but they did not surrender

their diplomacy entirely to the hegemon, though they agreed to enter

into no negotiations with any outside king.[140] They gave their

hegemon no right whatever to interfere in their local concerns.[141]

Such were the generous concessions to local sentiment by means of which

Antigonus Doson sought to place the hegemony of the kings of Macedon

in Hellas on a secure basis. Never before in the history of the people

had a conqueror made so noble a use of his power. Antigonus Doson went

in fact so far in conciliating the Greek states that had he withdrawn

Macedonian troops from Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth,--the three

shackles of Hellas,--added new conquests like Orchomenus, Sparta,

and Messene to the constituent leagues instead of to the central

organization, and possessed less personal prestige, it is difficult

to imagine how the Hellenic league could ever have been brought into

action. Probably all that he cared to be absolutely sure of was the

neutrality of the confederates who did not support him in the field.

In any case that was all that his successor Philip V was able to

accomplish, when, in 220 B.C., he had the Hellenic synod accept the

repeated challenge of war offered to him by the Ætolians, who, taking

advantage of the accession of a young and untried king to the throne

of Macedon, assailed his hegemony in Greece while it was still

precarious. Had Doson lived to wage the Social War (220-217 B.C.),

he might have crushed the Ætolians by sheer weight of numbers, and

have completed the unification of Hellas. Philip V fought bravely and

skillfully and won the respect of both his friends and his foes; but

before any definite issue of the struggle had arrived, the campaign

between Hannibal and the Romans had reached such a point that the

hegemon of Hellas dared not neglect it any longer.

"Let Greece," said Agelaus of Naupactus at the peace conference which

followed,[142] "be united; let no Greek state make war upon any other;

let them thank the Gods if they can all live in peace and agreement,

if, as men in crossing rivers grasp one another's hands, so they can

hold together and save themselves and their cities from barbarian

inroads. If it is too much to hope that it should be so always, let

it at least be so just now; let Greeks, now at least, unite and keep

on their guard, when they behold the vastness of the armies and the

greatness of the struggle going on in the West. No man who looks at

the state of things with common care can doubt what is coming. Whether

Rome conquers Carthage or Carthage conquers Rome, the victor will not

be content with the dominion of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily; he will

extend his plans and his warfare much further than suits us or our

welfare. Let all Greece be on its guard, and Philip above all. Your

truest defense, O King," he continued, "will be found in the character

of the chief and protector of the Greeks. Leave off destroying Greek

cities; leave off weakening them till they become a prey to every

invader. Rather watch over Greece, as you watch over your own body;

guard the interests of all her members as you guard the interest of

what is your own. If you follow such a course as this, you will win

the good will of Greece; you will have every Greek bound to you as

a friend and as a sure supporter in all your undertakings; foreign

powers will see the confidence which the whole nation reposes in you,

and will fear to attack either you or them. If you wish for conquest

and military glory, another field invites you. Cast your eyes to the

West; look at the war raging in Italy; of that war you may easily, by

a skilful policy, make yourself the arbiter; a blow dealt in time may

make you master of both the contending powers. If you cherish such

hopes, no time bids fairer than the present for their accomplishment.

But as for disputes and wars with Greeks, put them aside till some

season of leisure; let it be your main object to keep in your own hands

the power of making war and peace with them when you will. If once the

clouds which are gathering in the West should advance and spread over

Greece and the neighboring lands, there will be danger indeed that

all our truces and wars, all the child's play with which we now amuse

ourselves, will be suddenly cut short. We may then pray in vain to the

Gods for the power of making war and peace with one another, and indeed

of dealing independently with any of the questions which may arise

among us."

The speaker was right, and Philip took his advice. But when he became

embroiled with Rome, it was the speaker's own countrymen, the Ætolians,

who, by attacking Macedon in the rear, contributed most to the dreaded

sequel: that never after 212 B.C. did the Greeks have an opportunity

of dealing independently with any of the questions which arose among

them. At the time of the Social War Macedon missed its last chance of

establishing a single state in European Hellas.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Droysen, J.G. _Geschichte des Hellenismus_,^2 III: _Geschichte der

Epigonen_ (1877).

2. Freeman, E. _History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy_^2

(1893). Ed. by J.B. Bury.

3. Niese, B. _Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten._

Especially vol. II (1899).

4. Beloch, J. _Griechische Geschichte_, III (1904).

5. Kärst, J. _Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters_, II, I (1909).

6. Ferguson, W.S. _Hellenistic Athens_ (1911).

7. Pozzi, Emilio. _Le Battaglie di Cos e di Andro e la Politica

marittima di Antigono Gonata._ In _Memorie della Reale Accademia delle

Scienze di Torino_: serie II, tom. LXIII (1912).

8. Tarn, W.W. _Antigonus Gonatas_ (1913).

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 116: Tarn, W.W., _Journal of Hellenic Studies_, XXIX (1909),

pp. 269 _f._; Beloch, _Griechische Geschichte_, III, 1, pp. 386 _f._;

_Hellenistic Athens_, p. 190.]

[Footnote 117: Mahaffy, _The Progress of Hellenism in Alexander's

Empire_ (1905), p. 32.]

[Footnote 118: Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von, _Staat und

Gesellschaft der Griechen: D. Die makedonischen Königreiche_, pp. 139

_ff._]

[Footnote 119: For their revival of the Hellenic league, in which

Macedon formed simply one unit, see Klotzsch, _Epirotische Geschichte_,

p. 130, n. 1, and _Hellenistic Athens_, pp. 121 _f._]

[Footnote 120: For the date see Mayer, _Philologus_, LXXI (1912), p.

227.]

[Footnote 121: _Hellenistic Athens_, p. 148.]

[Footnote 122: Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, _Antigonos von Karystos_, p.

218; Kärst, _Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters_, II, 1, pp.

121, 125. Tarn (_Antigonus Gonatas_, pp. 276 _ff._) bases Antigonus's

system of tyrants on expediency, not on philosophy.]

[Footnote 123: For the peace between Egypt and Macedon made in 261 B.C.

see _Inscriptiones Græcæ_, XI, 2, 114.]

[Footnote 124: The enmity of Rhodes and Philadelphia is proved by

Blinkenberg's _La chronique du temple Lindien_. It is, accordingly,

probable that the defeat of Chremonides by Agathostratus at Ephesus

belongs to this struggle, though something may still be said, I think,

for 242 B.C. See _Hellenistic Athens_, p. 197, n. 2.]

[Footnote 125: For this peace see _Inscriptiones Græcæ_, XI, 2, 116.

Its effect is perceptible in Athens (_Hellenistic Athens_, p. 191) and

in Achæa (_Ibid._, n. 1).]

[Footnote 126: Tarn (_Antigonus Gonatas_, pp. 321 _ff._, 449 _ff._)

has Demetrius slain in 258 B.C., and Berenice married to Euergetes, in

247-246 B.C. This position, which Beloch challenged (_Griech. Gesch._,

III, 2, pp. 133 _ff._), leaves unexplained the extraordinary delay

in the marriage of the young couple and in the reunion of the two

kingdoms.]

[Footnote 127: De Sanctis, _Contributi alla Storia dell' Impero

Seleucidico_ (_Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino_,

XLVII, pp. 11 _ff._).]

[Footnote 128: The account given in the text differs from that given in

_Hellenistic Athens_ mainly because (led by Dürrbach, _Inscriptiones

Græcæ_, XI, 2, pp. vi _f._ and Pozzi, _op. cit._ in Select Bibliography

at the end of the chapter) I now return to Homolle's Delian chronology.

It differs only in a few details from that given by Pozzi. Tarn's

masterly biography (_Antigonus Gonatas_) reached me only when this

chapter was already in type. The complete data which it contains agree

well, I believe, with the construction given above.]

[Footnote 129: Swoboda, _Die ätolische Komenverfassung_ (_Wiener

Studien_, XXXIV, 1912, pp. 37 _ff._).]

[Footnote 130: Above, chapter I.]

[Footnote 131: De Sanctis, _Rivista di Filol._ XXXVI (1908), pp. 252

_ff._]

[Footnote 132: Swoboda, _Studien zu den griechischen Bünden_, I

(_Klio_, XI, 1911, pp. 456 _ff._).]

[Footnote 133: Swoboda, _Studien zu den griechischen Bünden_, II. _Die

Städte im achäischen Bünde_ (_Klio_, XII, 1912, pp. 17 _ff._).]

[Footnote 134: II, 45.]

[Footnote 135: _Hellenistic Athens_, pp. 240 _f._]

[Footnote 136: Freeman, _History of Federal Government_, pp. 379 _ff._]

[Footnote 137: And in all probability, a league as well. Tarn,

_Antigonus Gonatas_, p. 54. n. 36.]

[Footnote 138: Polybius, IV, 26.]

[Footnote 139: Wilhelm, _Attische Urkunden_, I, p. 36.]

[Footnote 140: Plut., _Aratus_, 45.]

[Footnote 141: Polybius, IV, 24.]

[Footnote 142: Polybius, V. 104. (Translated by Freeman, _History of

Federal Government_, pp. 435 _f._)]

THE END

INDEX

INDEX

Absolutism, creation of, 135;

legalized in Greece, 147 _f._

Acarnania, 234.

Achæa. _See_ League.

Ætolia. _See_ League.

Agelaus of Naupactus, speech of, 246.

_Agon_, in Athens, 58 _ff._

Alexander of Corinth, rebellion of, 230;

death of, 232.

Alexander the Great, 4;

deification of, 36;

accession of, to throne, 116, 123 _f._;

character of, 119;

training of, 119 _ff._;

and Aristotle, 119 _ff._;

love of symbolism of, 123, 128, 139;

destroys Thebes, 123 _f._;

spares Pindar's house, 124;

visits Troy, 124 _f._;

cuts Gordian knot, 125 _f._;

plan of Persian campaign of, 126 _f._;

son of Zeus, 128, 133, 162 _f._;

in Persepolis, 129;

dissolves Hellenic league, 129 _f._;

ceases to be hegemon of Hellas, 130;

ceases to be king of Macedon, 130 _f._;

marries Roxane, 130;

adopts Persian costume, 130;

tries to establish Hellenism in Asia, 133 _f._;

founds city-states, 134 _f._;

plans conquest of West, 134;

and absolute monarchy, 135;

changes opinion as to Iranians, 135 _f._;

tries to fuse dominant peoples of Europe and Asia, 136 _ff._;

marries Persian princesses, 137;

plans of, 144,

rejected by the Macedonians, 150;

demands recognition as a god, 146;

departs from the life among men, 149.

Alexandria, 155, 157, 163, 213;

new Athens, 158;

trade of, 161 _f._;

imperial cult of Ptolemies in, 164 _ff._;

_vs._ Memphis, 170;

laws of, 177;

classes of population in, 181.

Ammon, god of Cyrene, 126 _ff._;

visited by Alexander, 139.

_Ancient City_, of Fustel de Coulanges, criticized, 7.

Andros, battle of, 159, 233.

Antigonids, constitutional government of, 216;

wars of, with Rome, 217 _f._;

alliance of, with Seleucids, 223.

Antigonus I, Monophthalmus, 183;

tries to take Alexander's place and fails, 184 _f._;

policy of, 218 _f._;

monarchy of, 220 _f._

Antigonus II, Gonatas, victories of, at Cos and Andros, 159;

rightful heir of Macedonian crown, 220;

suzerain of Greece, 220;

king of Macedon, 220, 223;

education of, 222 _f._;

reign of, 223-233;

peace of, with Egypt, 223;

hostility of, with Epirus, 224;

protects Greece from barbarians, 224;

tyrants of, in Greece, 224 _ff._;

relation of, to Stoa, 225 _f._;

refuses deification, 225 _f._;

struggle of, with Ptolemy Philadelphus, 226, 229;

renews alliance with Seleucids, 229;

deserted by Antiochus II, 230;

recovers Ægean, 232;

treaty of, with Ætolians, 232;

empire of, 233;

death of, 233;

failure of, in Greece, 235.

Antigonus III, Doson, Hellenic league of, 34;

makes peace with Ætolians, 241;

hegemon of Hellas, 243.

Antiochus I, Soter, 185.

Antiochus II, Theos, 185;

deserts Macedon, 230.

Antiochus III, the Great, 187 _ff._;

wrests Palestine from Egypt, 188;

and Hannibal, 189;

peace of, with Rome, 190.

Antiochus IV, Epiphanes, policy of, 212;

and the Jews, 212 _f._;

invades Egypt, 213.

Antiochus Hierax, 187.

Antipater, house of, 219.

Antipater II, 220.

Antony, and Cleopatra, 153;

as Ammon, 162.

Apama, wife of Seleucus, 195.

Aratus, of Sicyon, 236;

seizes Sicyon, 230;

seizes Corinth, 232.

Areus I, correspondence of, with Jews, 79.

Aristocracy, supported by Sparta, 20;

defined, 20 _f._;

destroyed in Sparta, 83;

championed by Sparta, 94.

Aristophanes, view of, as to extending Athenian citizenship, 31.

Aristotle, 26, 36;

on equality of states, 33;

training of, 108;

a poor historian, 108 _f._;

theory of progress of, 109;

empiricism of, 110 _f._;

compared with Machiavelli, 110 _ff._;

neglects the acquisition of power, 111;

makes city-state the ultimate political unit, 112 _ff._;

aversion of, for imperialism, 113;

"strength" in the political system of, 113 _f._;

and conquest of Asia, 114;

defect in politics of, 114;

and Alexander, 119 _ff._;

teacher of poetry, 119,

of politics, 120 _f._;

view of, as to Asiatics, 122;

and deification of rulers, 135, 147.

Armenia, 188;

conquers Syria, 192.

Arsinoë Philadelphus, 157;

death of, 160;

deified, 164;

imperial policy of, 227.

Art, in Athens, 59.

Artemis, temple of, in Sardis, 202.

Asia Minor, priestly communities in, 197 _f._

Astral religion, 143.

Atargatis, temple of, 197.

Athena Alcis, in China, 193 _f._

Athenians, democratic imperialists, 39;

self-confidence of, 40 _f._;

political capacity of, 56 _f._;

capacity of, in art and literature, 59 _f._;

demands upon time of, 63 _f._;

blame Sophists for decay of democracy, 77.

Athens, life in, 11 _f._;

empire of, a despotism, 23 _f._;

relation of, to allies, 24 _f._;

relation of, to cleruchies, 30;

inability of, to grant citizenship to allies, 30 _f._;

refuses to enter Achæan league, 32;

size of, 42;

size of empire of, 42;

sphere of interests of, 43;

empire of, compared with British empire, 43;

funeral customs of, 43 _f._;

institutions of, 49 _ff._;

judicial system, 50 _f._;

competition of citizens in, 58;

failure of, in foreign politics, 58, 61;

slavery in, 61;

absence of leisure in, 61;

grain supply of, 62;

raw materials of, imported, 62;

nation of noblemen, 65;

obligations of wealth in, 65;

the "school of Hellas," 65;

sea-power of, 66 _f._;

cost of sea-power of, 68 _ff._,

in lives, 70;

allies of, grievances of, 70 _ff._;

imperial litigation of, 72;

land policy of, 72 _f._;

promotes mediocrity, 73 _f._;

reputation of, 221;

neutrality of, 242.

Augustus, in Egypt, 154;

becomes Pharaoh, 154.

Autocracy, incompleteness of, 4.

Autonomy, urban in Greece, 96.

Bactria, Greek kingdoms in, 188, 193.

Bambyce, church at, 197.

Berenice, of Cyrene, 231.

Berenice, of Egypt, becomes wife of Antiochus II, 186, 230;

murdered 187.

Boeotarchs, 27.

Boeotia. _See_ League.

Branchidæ, Apollo of, 128.

Buildings, funds for, at Athens, 71.

Cæsarion, 153.

Callimachus, court poet, 160.

Capitalistic régime, in Plato, 106.

Carthage, 155.

Cassander, 219.

Charlemagne, 5.

China, contact of, with Hellenism, 192 _f._

Chremonidean War, 227.

Cinadon, conspiracy of, 91 _ff._

Cities, and freedom, 7 _ff._;

and culture, 7 _ff._;

in modern sense, 10;

contrast of, with country, 11 _ff._

City-states, relation of, to ethne, 6;

described, 9;

agrarian character of, 9;

commerce and industry of, 10;

family character of, 13 _f._;

care of, for dead, 14 _ff._;

laws of, 16 _f._;

biographies of, 17;

subordinated to districts, 29;

combined in territorial states, 33;

reconciled with imperialism, 36;

ultimate political units of Aristotle, 112;

Aristotle's view of, 121 _f._;

founded by Alexander, 133 _f._;

founded by Seleucus, 196,

by his successors, 196, 199, 205;

in Egypt, 171;

made out of priestly communities, 200;

racial fusion in, in Asia, 206;

at once nations and municipalities, 209;

loss of leadership of, 227 _f._;

as federal units, 237 _f._;

eclipse of, 243.

Civil administration, at Athens, 54 _ff._

Cleomenes, career of, 241 _f._

Cleon, on empire of Athens, 23 _f._

Cleopatra, the Great, 152;

and Antony, 153 _f._

Cleruchies, 30.

Cleruchs, in Egypt, 173 _ff._;

position of, 175 _f._;

Egyptianized, 180 _f._;

in Seleucid empire, 201.

Clisthenes, 51.

Comana, in Cappadocia, sacred city of Ma at, 197 _f._,

in Pontus, 198.

Commerce, in Athens, 12.

Committee of Public Safety, 28, 30.

Competition, in Athens, 58 _f._

Constantine, the Great, and deification of rulers, 36.

Constitutions, ancestral, 96 _f._

Cos, battle of, 159, 229.

Council of the Five Hundred, constitution and powers of, 51 _ff._

Crown lands, in Seleucid realm, how disposed of, 204.

Culture, origin of, in cities, 7 _ff._

Cyclades, lost to Egypt, 160.

_See_ League.

Cynocephalæ, battle of, 188.

Cyrene, 229, 231.

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