SERBIA
“We here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in
vain.”—ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1863.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE now turned from the disappointments and tragedies of
the Near East to look more closely into the situation at home.
The opening of 1915 was a season of hope in Great Britain. The great
effort to force the Dardanelles filled the public mind with visions.
That attempt was then most lyrically applauded by those who afterwards
rushed to denounce it. The whole outlook was magically irradiated with
the mirage of that golden promise.
Here was a quick cure for all our troubles.
Men dreamt of a speedy blow that would cut off the Central Powers from
Turkey, and open to Russia an easy door to the West.
They thought little at that moment, and knew less, of the blows which
Germany was preparing for Russia.
The story of the Dardanelles expedition has been fully told.[72] We all
know the origin and history of that expedition, and can apportion with
some fairness the proper spheres of blame and praise. Mr. Lloyd George
took little active personal part in the planning and preparations for
it, though he was a member of the War Council, and later in June, became
a member of the Dardanelles Committee.[73] His own proposal had been
frustrated by events. Here was an alternative, hatched by other brains,
inspired by other hopes. It was a serious thing to oppose it outright.
His attitude from the beginning was one of suspended judgment.
“Whatever you do, do thoroughly; if you do it at all, put your full
strength into it”—that may be summed up as his constantly reiterated
counsel in regard to the Dardanelles.
If this advice had been adopted perhaps even that ill-starred enterprise
might have met with better fortune.
But meanwhile, on other fields of war a situation was developing even
more menacing to Europe as a whole. The great Teutonic attack on Russia
began to develop with terrible success in the early spring; and Mr.
Lloyd George took from the first a most serious view of this tremendous
onslaught.
In the middle of February vast new armies of Germans, prepared in the
winter, advanced to the invasion of Courland, Poland, and Galicia. The
Russian armies still in Eastern Prussia had been speedily driven back
across the frontier in wholesale defeat; and the northern German armies
began to advance on to Russian soil. In the centre of Eastern Europe the
Germans advanced victoriously to within fifty miles of Warsaw before
they met with a serious check. In the south the Austrians drove the
Russians from Bukovina. The whole German-Austrian line was advanced
throughout the length of Europe, from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian
Mountains; and the hosts of the Central Empires were preparing for that
great dramatic thrust which in May drove the Russians clean out of
Galicia.
Such was the situation which British statesmen had now to face. It was
impossible to regard it with indifference.
Mr. Lloyd George refused to be deceived by any rosy hopes either in East
or West. His own view was that a firm grasp of reality was the first
step to success. Unless they looked facts in the face, they could not
grapple with them.
He came to be regarded as the Cassandra of the war; but, as Lord Morley
once remarked, the worst thing about Cassandra was that she proved to be
in the right!
Surveying the prospects of the great war in Europe as a whole, Mr. Lloyd
George was seriously concerned about several vital matters.
The most important of these was that, comparing the available military
man-power on both sides in this great contest, the Entente Allies were
at that moment hopelessly outnumbered.
Germany and Austria at that moment had under arms or preparing to be
armed—according to the intelligence supplied to the Government—no less
than 8,700,000 men. Turkey had 500,000; she was soon, indeed, to supply
a far greater number of her population as mercenaries to Germany.
On the other hand were France, Great Britain, Russia, and Serbia. Italy
had not yet come into the war; and America was still afar off. The
trouble with Russia was that, though she had such an immense population,
she had many exemptions and few rifles. France was always doing her very
best; but her census figures spoke for themselves. Great Britain was
doing wonders with her voluntary system. But the question now for the
first time faced him full front—Would our voluntary system suffice to
keep up our armies, much less to supply the still greater armies that
might be required for victory?
He still, at that moment, clung to the voluntary system. He thought that
the necessary men could be still obtained by the voluntary system if it
were properly applied. His own idea at that moment was that the best
method of obtaining these men along voluntary lines was to follow the
quota system. He was in favour of letting each county and town know
clearly what was the proper proportion of men for them to supply for the
national need, and then to leave the rest to local pressure and local
patriotism. He firmly believed that if, for instance, it was officially
announced that a particular county ought to supply, say, 10,000 men, and
if that county had hitherto supplied 6,000, the remaining 4,000 would be
forced to come in by the strength of local pride.
That scheme was never really tried. For some reason or other, there were
forces at work against the territorial system of recruiting ever since
the beginning of the war; and thus one of the greatest springs of
national energy remained untapped.
It was also his opinion that at that time the Dominions would send far
larger forces of men if they were fully informed about the real facts of
the situation, instead of being fed by news from agencies whose chief
motive seemed to be to feed the popular vanity. That sensible policy was
afterwards so strongly urged by Dominion statesmen that it was to some
small extent adopted.
Such were broadly Mr. Lloyd George’s views and feelings in February,
1915. He was still leaning to the Eastern field of war and looking out
anxiously for any chance of resuming his Eastern plan if Greece should
become more friendly or Bulgaria repent of her Teutonic affections. But
in the British scheme of war the plan of breaking through in the West
had now resumed its hold on military minds; and in March the new armies
made their first great attempt in the attack known as the battle of
Neuve Chapelle. The valour and heroism of our troops in that splendid
effort broke against the tangled defences of the German hosts; and in
April and March our armies were once more fighting for their bare
existence in the second battle of Ypres. In May came Dunajec, the
smashing climax to the onslaught of the Germans on the Russians in
Galicia.
Tremendously occupied as he was through the spring and summer with the
great national effort to supply our armies with adequate munitions, Mr.
Lloyd George was never blind or indifferent to the general trend of what
followed.
Events began to succeed one another with fearful rapidity. In May and
June the Russians were cleared out of Galicia. Then began that great
rush forward of the central German armies which swept over fortress
after fortress “like castles of sand,” and submerged all the fairest
towns of Western Central Russia.[74]
To these disasters there were, indeed, compensations in other fields of
war. On May 23rd Italy declared war against Austria. In July Botha
conquered South-West Africa. In the West the British and French troops
still held on against the overwhelming forces of Germany attempting to
snatch the Channel coast with every devilish device of gas and flame.
But, on the whole, the balance was against the Allies. The fact that
stared Mr. Lloyd George in the face, wherever he looked at the fields of
war, was that the Allied armies were outnumbered by the stupendous and
unexpected man-power of Central Europe.
It was this fact that led him in this autumn to give to the public the
first intimation that he, hitherto a convinced voluntaryist, was now
being converted, against his will, to compulsory military service. The
intimation was given in the preface written to a collection of his early
war speeches.[75]
In the burning words of that remarkable address to the nation he
communicated the views which he had slowly formed from a close and
prolonged study of the facts throughout the summer:
“I know what we are doing: our exertions are undoubtedly
immense. But can we do more, either in men or material? Nothing
but our best and utmost can pull us through. Are we now
straining every nerve to make up for lost time? Are we getting
all the men we shall want to put into the fighting line next
year to enable us even to hold our own? Does every man who can
help, whether by fighting or by providing material, understand
clearly that ruin awaits remissness?”
Then came the dramatic climax:
“If the nation hesitates, when the need is clear, to take the
necessary steps to call forth its manhood to defend honour and
existence; if vital decisions are postponed until too late; if
we neglect to make ready for all probable eventualities; if, in
fact, we give ground for the accusation that we are slouching
into disaster as if we were walking along the ordinary paths of
peace without an enemy in sight—then I can see no hope. But if
we sacrifice all we own, and all we like for our native land; if
our preparations are characterised by grip, resolution, and a
prompt readiness in every sphere—then victory is assured.”
The meaning of this appeal was obvious. “To call forth its manhood,”
could only mean conscription for the war; and it was to that policy,
indeed, that Mr. Lloyd George had been driven by what seemed to him the
inevitable logic of the terrible events in the fields of war. In no
other way, indeed, did he think that the effort could be sustained.
There was no man who had thrown himself more vigorously into the
volunteer recruiting campaign; there was no man who had more sincerely
believed in it. His speech to the young men at the City Temple on
November 10th, 1914, is a splendid expression of that appeal. It is
still the best attempt to argue with that extreme pacifist spirit which
he has always treated with respect—with that imaginative sympathy which
understands while it condemns.[76]
But now he had come—reluctantly but irrevocably—with the terrible
honesty of a man up against facts—to the conclusion that the voluntary
system would not suffice against this tornado. “You cannot haggle with
an earthquake.” Here was a thing that transcended all theories—a
convulsion of nature itself.
Having reached this conclusion, he never veered. He stood by silent
through all the experiments of those days—the “Derby scheme,” the
quarrel between the married and the single, the “starring” and
“unstarring”—until slowly the whole of the Ministry swung round to his
point of view. Assailed by old friends with a hurricane of
abuse—maligned and misinterpreted by men who season peace with
venom—he yet held on steadily to his view. There are many things one
has to dare and endure for country and fatherland. Perhaps the hardest
thing of all in this country is to profess a change of opinion.
“They say—let them say.” He paid little attention to these assaults.
More terrible things were absorbing his attention.
The failure of the purely naval attack on the Dardanelles on March 18th
(1915) had been followed by the military preparations and landing on
April 25th, and the subsequent great military offensive on the heights
of Gallipoli. By the end of July that offensive had failed. At this
point in the development of events—at the end of July—Mr. Lloyd George
now definitely again urged on his colleagues in the Government to
consider once more the plan of going to the assistance of Serbia as
alternative to going further forward with the Gallipoli attack. At this
time he was very busy with his munition campaign in the country. But on
the few occasions when he was able to take part in the deliberations of
the Dardanelles Committee his attitude always was—the Germans are going
to break through Serbia as soon as they can; so either make certain of
getting to Constantinople quickly, or consider whether you ought not to
go to the assistance of Serbia with all the strength you can command.
The forces on Gallipoli were obviously the nearest available for such a
rescue. The alternative adopted of a renewed attack on Gallipoli by way
of Suvla Bay in August only resulted in a more tragic and wasteful
failure.
His forebodings in regard to Serbia were destined to be very quickly
fulfilled, for in October (1915) began that dastardly combined attack on
Serbia which Mr. Lloyd George had foreseen since the beginning of the
year. The Germans had now finished for the moment with Russia. With
deadly method they turned to their next victim; and now the Bulgarians
from the south and the Teutons from the north closed on that unhappy
little country.
Mr. Lloyd George witnessed this assault with an anguish of soul
inevitable to one born and bred in a little nation himself. Even at this
last hour he did his utmost to rescue Serbia from her fate. He racked
his brains to devise some method of saving Serbia. He pressed the
military authorities with a vehemence inconvenient in a world of steady
routine and disciplined ideas. He agitated, argued, pleaded.
But by this time the facts were too strong even for him. Between us and
Serbia lay a Royalist Greece now indifferent if not actually hostile,
coldly resolved to abandon her pledged word. Rumania was still
hesitating and fearful. Russia was for the moment exhausted. No help was
near enough to hand to save the doomed victim.
So the British Government were compelled to stand by helpless while the
very nation on whose account the war broke out was conquered and
outraged, her armies scattered, her population enslaved, and her
children scattered like sheep through the mountains.[77] No more tragic
chapter is recorded in the annals of Europe.
But the mischief did not end there. Not only did the conquest of Serbia
give to Germany the great link with the East for which she yearned, but
it completely destroyed all our remaining chances of success on
Gallipoli. The very enterprise which had already taken the place of the
Serbian expedition became futile from the moment of the Serbian
disaster. In the beginning of October the Turks had been running so
seriously short of ammunition that success for our arms seemed near at
hand. By the end of the month they were fully replenished. The
enterprise became plainly impossible from the moment that Germany,
having now, by the conquest of Serbia and the coming in of Bulgaria,
achieved a direct route to Constantinople, could pour through as much
ammunition and as many big guns as the Turks required for their
defence.[78]
On December 19th began the withdrawal from that fatal peninsula, and on
January 8th of the following year not a single British soldier remained
on those bloodstained shores.
Is it not possible that the more chivalrous and vigorous action on
behalf of Serbia for which Mr. Lloyd George had so importunately pressed
might have been also the best policy for the prosperity of the Allies in
the war as a whole?
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[72] In two Reports, 1917—Cd. 8490 6^{d} and Cmd. 371, 2^{s} (Part II).
The second, dealing with the military operations, is very sensational,
and has not received enough attention.
[73] The Dardanelles Committee, which took over the control of the war
from the War Council on June 7th, 1915, consisted of eleven members of
the Coalition Government. The War Council were all Liberals. That was
superseded on November 3rd, 1915, by the War Committee, consisting of
seven Ministers. Mr. Lloyd George was a member of all these Committees.
[74] Swallowing up Warsaw on August 4th, Ivangorod on August 5th,
Siedlce on August 12th, Kovno on August 17th, Novo-Georgievsk on August
19th, Brest-Litovsk on August 25th, and Grodno on September 2nd.
[75] _Through Terror to Triumph._ Arranged by F. L. Stevenson, B.A.
(Lond.) (Hodder & Stoughton.)
[76] “To precipitate ideals is to retard their advent. . . . The surest
method of establishing the reign of peace on earth is by making the way
of the transgressor of the peace of nations too hard for the rulers of
men to tread.”
[77] Some 30,000 Serbian boys were sent across the mountains to the sea
to escape from the invader. Less than half reached the sea.
[78] See Lord Kitchener’s final telegram of November 22nd, 1915, which
decided the War Cabinet to evacuate (p. 57 of Pt. II, the Final Report
of the Dardanelles Commission).