EAST OR WEST?
“For East is East, and West is West,
And never the twain shall meet.”
RUDYARD KIPLING.
IT is characteristic of Mr. Lloyd George that, when his mind once seizes
hold of an idea, he is wholly possessed with it until either he can
bring it to accomplishment or he is fully convinced of its
impracticability. It was so with regard to this great scheme of
outflanking the Central Powers by an attack from the Near East. The more
he reflected upon it the more there seemed to lie in this plan one great
chance of bringing a speedy decision to the war. But, for better or for
worse, the reinforcements were now being directed to the Western Front;
and the policy of the Western Allies was more and more concentrated on
that sphere of offence and defence—France, from absorption in her
immediate danger, and Great Britain for her instinctive military
preference for campaigning nearer to her sacred seas.
Out-voted in that larger proposal, Mr. Lloyd George now fell back on a
smaller design. The cautious diplomacy of the Allies had shrunk from the
large, bold strokes necessary for combining the Balkan States as an
eastern wing of our offensive against the Central Powers; their military
chiefs had hesitated to supply the means. Never at that stage did the
Governments of the Allies fully realise the full proportionate value of
the Balkan States in the vast scheme of the great European struggle.
But it was soon clear that, if the Western Powers were inclined to leave
the Balkan States to themselves, the Central Powers had no such
intention. Quite early in the war Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston
Churchill scented the danger of German intrigue in the Balkans, and the
vast lure of that easy “corridor” to the East offered by the
trans-Balkan railway system. In September 1914 they induced the Foreign
Office to send the Buxton brothers to Sofia; and the proposals which
those delegates brought back in January 1915 played an important part in
the negotiations of February.[64]
Some time before the end of January 1915, indeed, the British Government
got to know that Germany was already preparing a large army for the
invasion of Serbia. Mr. Lloyd George instantly realised the gravity and
urgency of this peril. It was largely due to his initiative that a note
was sent to Greece and Rumania, urging those states to come to the
assistance of Serbia.
No note was sent to Bulgaria. It was already dimly realised that this
State was being drawn into the far-flung net of the Central Powers. The
“Prussia of the Balkans” presented too rich a field to be left
unharvested by the needy gleaners of Germany. The anxious and
hard-pressed diplomats of Berlin, seeking eagerly for friends in a world
growing more and more hostile, were already tapping at the doors of
Sofia, offering golden and honeyed gifts to a State which had fed too
long on the east wind.
Rumours of these approaches grew so strong and convincing that Mr. Lloyd
George was moved by them to take fresh action along his old lines. It
was now no longer a question of a great offensive with a gigantic army
on the Near Eastern flank of the enemy. Fate does not repeat her
opportunities; and the chances of that great diversion were already
slipping away. It was now rather a question whether we should be in time
even to save our smaller friends in the Near East—whether we should be
able to prevent this threatened gigantic “sortie” of the Central Powers
from the siege of the Entente Allies. Already, in January, Mr. Lloyd
George saw, in that flashing way of his, all the tragic possibilities
that might flow from a German “break-through” in the Balkans. Already he
foresaw the fearful and disastrous fate of a conquered Serbia.
With this tragedy ever clearly in his mind’s eye, Mr. Lloyd George left
no stone unturned to avert it. In the middle of January he succeeded in
persuading his colleagues to offer a whole army corps to Greece on
condition that she would agree to join us in the war. Lord Kitchener
agreed to spare the troops, and approved the wording of the offer. But
it was necessary to obtain the approval of the Allies.
France was not for the moment happy at the idea of sending troops to the
Near East. There came from across the Channel a breath of acute anxiety,
the anxiety of an invaded and ravaged country.
The result was that the official note was held back and somewhat
modified. The military offer of help to Greece and Serbia began to
become vaguer. The army corps began to become a little ghostly. We can
see the great plan still further dwindling into shadows.
Then, on January 26th, a new development occurred. M. Venizelos sent to
London the Greek reply to the first note of the Allies, asking for help
on behalf of Serbia. The reply was that, on certain conditions, Greece
agreed to join in the war on the side of the Allies. If those conditions
were fulfilled, then Greece—so the answer ran—was willing to give its
assistance to Serbia, and to place the whole of its resources at the
service of a “just and liberal cause.”
But the chief of the conditions was that Bulgaria should come in as well
on the Allied side. If not, then Rumania must come in and Bulgaria
remain neutral.[65]
So far, so good. It now remained to persuade France.
On February 5th there was to be held in Paris one of those Allied
Conferences on policy and strategy which have been held periodically
throughout the war.
These Conferences were, indeed, originally Mr. Lloyd George’s own
special and favourite plan for bringing the Allies into a better
sympathy of mind and purpose; and he had always promoted them with zeal
and enthusiasm, which grew with his friendship for M. Albert Thomas. On
this occasion—February 5th, 1915—he had been selected to go over
himself to Paris as the British delegate.
He proposed that M. Venizelos should come from Greece and meet him in
Paris. But the domestic crisis in Greece was now passing into a stage
far too acute for M. Venizelos to leave Athens. That eminent man was
making his last effort to work with King Constantine.
Mr. Lloyd George went to Paris and won his case. That gallant nation,
anxious to help the weak, and threatened even in the midst of her own
agony, consented to join in the expedition. The French Cabinet were
willing to send a French division to work with the British division to
which Lord Kitchener had already agreed.
Returning to London, he informed the British military authorities, who
in their turn offered to “go one better,” and to spare two British
divisions.
Mr. Lloyd George was now all eager for instant action.
He urged that the new Joint Note, offering military aid, should be sent
at once. He brushed aside for the moment the idea of arriving at a
general Balkan agreement on the lines of the proposals brought back by
the Buxtons from Sofia. The Bulgarian suggestion that Serbia should make
a considerable surrender of territory seemed to him impossible for
Serbia after their recent struggles and sufferings. He had already a
very deep perception that Bulgaria was hardening against the Entente. He
saw definite evidence of it in Germany’s known willingness to lend her
money. It did not seem to him conceivable that Germany should be
advancing money to Bulgaria without some assurance as to Bulgaria’s
action in certain contingencies. The Germans were not such fools.
Besides, Rumania seemed to him now less friendly. All the more need,
then, for prompt and energetic action to clinch the friendliness of our
most probable ally, Greece.
He felt very acutely at this moment the evil and harm of a dilatory
policy. It was on his mind all the time that, if they failed to act in
time to save Serbia, their responsibility would be a terrible one. Even
days seemed to him to count in the great issues that lay before them.
It was a great design, greatly urged. It is impossible to say now
whether it would have fulfilled the hopes of its chief sponsor. He had
won over to his side all the chief forces in the West. The expedition
that was about to start would have probably forestalled and averted that
ill-starred enterprise of the Dardanelles-Gallipoli attack which opened
on February 25th.
But just on the eve of fruition other forces intervened. While Mr. Lloyd
George had been working in the West of Europe, the Central Powers had
been busy in the Near East. On January 26th had come the conditional
Greek offer to intervene in the war. On February 6th came their definite
refusal.
The crash came suddenly. Russia had just promised 10,000 men towards the
new Balkan enterprise. Then, at that moment of apparent success, M.
Venizelos suddenly informed the British Minister at Athens that Greece
had decided not to join the Allies in the war.
The refusal was abruptly worded, and the grounds given were very
definite. They were that Greece found herself unable to obtain the
conditions laid down in the reply of January 26th. One of those
conditions was that Bulgaria should either join Greece in declaring war,
or should promise neutrality. She had refused to do either. Another
condition had been that Rumania should join. But Rumania, still
hesitating between the two belligerent groups, would give no decided
answer. It was at that moment the fear of Greece that, if she sent an
army northwards to the help of Serbia, then Bulgaria would move to the
south, seize Kavalla, and would strike westwards into Macedonia to drive
a wedge between Greece and Serbia. In such a case it seemed more than
possible that Greece would be crushed.
It is fair also to say that Bulgaria’s refusal of a promise of
neutrality was for Greece an ominous and formidable fact. It is
inevitable that Greece should have been looking rather at her resentful
neighbour than at those larger aims of European interest which filled
the policies of the Western Powers; it was natural and human that their
first and possessing fear should be lest the work of the war of 1913
should be undone. For in that terrible war the price of victory had been
appallingly high for so small a nation. No less than 30,000 Greek
soldiers had been killed within a few days in that tremendous onslaught
which had driven back the treacherous Bulgarian attack. Greece, with her
small supply of men, could not lightly contemplate the repetition of
such a sacrifice, or the loss of the gains which had been so fearfully
purchased.
Mr. Lloyd George did not give up hope. He knew enough to foresee, for
instance, that the new attack of Bulgaria was bound to come, and that
the most prudent course was to forestall it. It was at this moment that
the suggestion came from Greek sources,[66] that Mr. Lloyd George should
himself go out to the Balkans as a Commissioner to bring together the
Balkan States. Mr. Lloyd George himself consented; and Mr. Asquith
approved. But it was soon found that Mr. Lloyd George was wanted too
urgently at the centre to be spared for distant missions.
The Greek Government held to its refusal. The Greek General Staff had
pronounced strongly against Greek military intervention as long as
Bulgaria remained even neutral; and M. Venizelos had now grave cause to
believe that Bulgaria was pledged to the Central Powers. He hesitated to
bind himself with the Army and the Crown against him.
As for the Greek King Constantine, he was already drifting along that
fatal course which led ultimately to his exile. It was reported to the
British Government that he saw the German military Attaché every day,
while he refused to see the British Attaché at all.
Thus cut off for the moment from effective intervention on the Danube,
the British Government drifted towards that tremendous Dardanelles
enterprise[67] which took the place of the Serbian proposal. The first
bombardment of the Dardanelles forts (February 25th to 26th) seemed to
go prosperously; and at the opening of March Russia began to do well.
Once more there was a new twist in the designs of the Greek Crown
Government; and on March 6th the Crown Council assembled at Athens
offered the whole Greek fleet and one Greek division for co-operation in
the attack on the Dardanelles.
But already the curt refusal of the previous overtures had driven the
Allies to other designs; and the pro-Bulgarian influences in Russia were
now very strong. Bulgaria was now astutely offering to lend her armies
for an attack on Constantinople from the north-west while the fleets
were hammering at the Straits. The old Russian Court Government, always
fearful of Greek designs on Constantinople, leaned towards Bulgaria,
and, now that a choice seemed possible, preferred Bulgarian help to
Greek.
As far as we can peer through the mists of Balkan intrigue, the success
of the earlier bombardments of the Dardanelles outer forts swung
Bulgaria for the time away from her Teutonic bearings. She was for the
moment inclined to join the Entente, if only from fear of the
consequences.[68] Whether she had signed an agreement with Germany or
not, does not seem to have troubled the statesmen at Sofia, and
certainly not the King.[69] The sanctity of a treaty would probably not
have affected the policy of a country already strongly bitten with the
virus of Prussia’s world-politics. Bulgaria was, in fact, during that
time making offers to both sides; she was, in vulgar language, waiting
to see “how the cat jumped.” For the moment, therefore, she became
“pro-Entente.” But immediately that the failure of the Dardanelles
attack became apparent she swung back into the Teutonic orbit. The
diplomatic situation was, as Lord Grey fairly claimed,[70] “overshadowed
by the military.”
Deeply disappointed with Greece, Mr. Lloyd George now held aloof from
her overtures, and was inclined, for the moment, to hope something even
from the Bulgarian alternative. During the spring and summer of 1915 the
Russian campaign diverted the German resources for a while from the
meditated attack on Serbia. The position along the Danube became less
threatening. It became the German design to throw back Russia from
Galicia and Poland before she entered upon her great Near Eastern
enterprise. The result was a temporary lull for Serbia.
The British Government hoped to avail herself of this lull to bring
together the Balkan States. Bulgaria assumed a willingness to join the
Allies on the condition of certain large concessions of territory from
Greece and Serbia. M. Venizelos even went so far as to imperil his
position in Greece by suggesting consent. Mr. Lloyd George was now more
hopeful of bringing together the old Balkan Federation on these lines.
His general idea was that the Allies should occupy the zone of Macedonia
as disputed between Serbia and Bulgaria, on condition that if they could
secure Bosnia and Herzegovina for Serbia in the final settlement they
should then hand the disputed territory over to Bulgaria.
But the sacrifices of the Serbian people in the previous three years had
been too great for the Serbian Government to be able to bring them to
agree to so large a concession. The Serbians were still filled with the
glow of their triple repulse of Austria; and for the moment the new
danger seemed to have drawn off. The great European thunderstorm was now
echoing far away in the mountains of Carpathia and the plains of Poland.
It was difficult for the Serbians to realise at that moment that a time
would come when security would be cheap at a great price.
In April there came another twist in the devious track of Balkan
intrigue. M. Venizelos had tendered his first resignation, and
Constantine was entering upon his first effort to build up an absolute
monarchy in Athens. On April 15th the Crown Council made a sudden offer
to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies. The Allies
gravely suspected the honesty of this offer. They knew that Greece was
already hand in glove with Germany; and there were strong reasons to
believe that the Royalist Government could not be entrusted with Allied
secrets. In any case, the Allies sent no reply; and it was not until
Venizelos regained power that they resumed friendly negotiations with
the Greek Government.
All through this time Mr. Lloyd George himself was resolute against
having any dealings whatever with the King’s party in Greece. He took
the strong line that the Allies, as guarantors of the Greek
constitution, should refuse to negotiate with any Government which
existed in contradiction to the elementary principles of democratic
constitutionalism.[71]
At long last (1917) this policy prevailed. That ancient and historic
torch-bearer of freedom, Greece, swung round to our side. She ended by
resisting the despotisms of the North as she resisted the despotisms of
the East in olden days. King Constantine went into exile. M. Venizelos
became the ruler at Athens. He threw the sword of Greece into the
trembling scales of the great European struggle, and helped to decide
the issue.
The end justified the hope to which Mr. Lloyd George clung through the
darkest hours of Royal Greek apostasy.
But who shall say what might have happened if he had not, through the
black years of 1915 and 1916, kept alive in Western Europe the
flickering sparks of faith in Greece?
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[64] On Sunday, August 26th, 1917, at Athens, M. Venizelos revealed the
details of an earlier entente between Greece and the Allies, planned by
him before the battle of the Marne. It was frustrated by King
Constantine. The Greek White Paper since published fully confirms this.
[65] These were the main points. The actual conditions were very
complex:
(_a_) That England should endeavour to bring about the
collaboration of Bulgaria with Greece, in which case Greece
would withdraw her opposition to Serbia ceding part of Macedonia
to Bulgaria.
(_b_) If this condition could not be obtained, then the Powers
should obtain the co-operation of Rumania, and the neutrality of
Bulgaria.
(_c_) If not, then Greece must be assisted by a substantial
British contingent, or a joint British and French contingent.
[66] This suggestion actually came from Sir John Stavridi, the Greek
Consul-General.
[67] See the Dardanelles Report _passim_, 1917, Cd. 8490.
[68] See Dardanelles Commission First Report, p. 39. “It can scarcely be
doubted that, had it not been for the Dardanelles Expedition, Bulgaria
would have joined the Central Powers at a far earlier date than was
actually the case. Mr. Asquith was strongly of this opinion in the
extracts quoted from his evidence. ‘Yes, I am certain of it,’ he said to
the Chairman.’” (Page 40.)
[69] The Greek White Book has revealed that an understanding existed
between Bulgaria, the Central Powers, and Turkey ever since August,
1914.
[70] Extract from his evidence in the Dardanelles Report.
[71] The treachery revealed by the Greek White Paper has since shown the
wisdom of this attitude. King Constantine, it is now known, was in close
and constant communication with the German Emperor.