The attack of December, 1915--The Allies’ good training tells--The
casualties analysed--The new element of surprise--Evidences of the
use of phosgene--The incident of the bulb--Improved alarms--The
Strombos sirens--Accidents to the horns--The Tear Gas Shell--Its
chemical analysis--Combated by anti-gas goggles--Tommies scoff at
Tear Gas--The Germans make it formidable.
The expected German gas attack was actually made on December 19, 1915,
at about 5:15 A. M., just before “Stand to” in the morning, the venue
being the north of the Ypres salient, from the canal bank at Boesinghe
down to Wieltje, a distance of three miles. It was preceded by the
appearance of parachute lights of an unusual kind and by a number of
red rocket flares. Almost immediately afterward gas was smelt in the
front trenches. In some cases a hissing sound made by the gas’s leaving
the cylinders was heard and was taken as a warning by the soldiers in
the trenches. In other cases the noise seems to have been deadened
by rifle fire. Taking it altogether, however, there was very little
warning, as the wind was favourable and the gas traveled surprisingly
quickly.
There was absolutely no confusion, and the men put on their helmets at
once and lined the parapets within a minute. Where the trenches were
close together the men had some difficulty in getting on their helmets
in time. This was particularly the case in listening posts where we
had patrols out quite close to the German wire. In the support and
reserve trenches the arrangements for spreading the warning were not
so good as those in the front line, and a number of men were caught by
the gas before they had their helmets on. Indeed in a number of cases,
especially in batteries, the gas was smelt before the receipt of the
warning.
The actual gas wave lasted only about half or three-quarters of an
hour, but in some places the helmets had to be kept on for four hours,
as the gas hung about in hollows and dugouts for a long time. This was
particularly noticeable in the neighbourhood of the canal. The cloud
was felt as far back as Vlamertinghe, eighty-five hundred yards behind
the line, and was still visible at this point. For at least three
miles back behind the front-line helmets had to be put on everywhere,
and for six miles behind the line the smoke helmets were generally
worn, some men who did not put them on at this distance being gassed.
The actual gas wave was accompanied by a heavy bombardment of the
front line and of Ypres and the villages behind it, shrapnel and
high-explosive shell and also tear shell being used, the latter shell
being fired particularly against our artillery. This bombardment
lasted throughout the day and most of the following night. Though our
wire had been cut in many places by the artillery fire, the Germans
made no serious infantry attack, and small patrols which left their
trenches in a few places were immediately shot down, as our fellows
were continually on the alert and had not suffered to any considerable
degree.
Altogether a large number of troops were exposed to the gas, but,
compared with its extent, the cloud caused only a small number of
casualties. This was very satisfactory after our experiences of the
spring. Men who were gassed but not killed were all subsequently
questioned as to the reason for their being gassed, and in each case a
definite reason was forthcoming. In no single instance was the fault
laid at the door of the smoke helmet, which apparently had been quite
capable of standing up to the highest concentrations in any part of the
cloud.
Among the reasons given for the casualties were things like the
following: Some men in the fire trenches did not get on their helmets
quickly enough owing to the short distance between the trenches, lack
of warning in the support line and insufficient practice. Some officers
and men sleeping in dugouts did not have their helmets attached to them
or they were caught away from their dugouts without helmets. Helmets
in many cases were under the overcoats, which made it very difficult
to get them and put them on quickly, as it was necessary to undo the
overcoat, the top button of the jacket and the cardigan waistcoat
before the helmet could be tucked in. One cause of casualties was that
the “P” helmet smelt very strongly of carbolic, and a lot of men who
had not had this explained to them thought that the peculiar smell
was that of gas coming in and they took their helmets off with a
view to replacing them with other helmets. This of course was fatal.
One sergeant was gassed through his helmet’s being holed by a bullet,
though he himself was not wounded. In some cases wounded men tried to
remove their helmets and were gassed in this way, and it was found
necessary to watch men who were hit to prevent this.
In many ways this attack of the Germans was of the greatest importance,
as it displayed all of the features on which the subsequent
development of the gas cloud was based. These features were: Increased
concentration; the use of new material; surprise. These three things
are really the basis of all gas warfare, even at the present day,
whether the attacks are made in the form of clouds or by the use of gas
shells or other projectiles.
The increased concentration was obtained chiefly by the reduction in
the time occupied by the attack. The first attack of all lasted about
one hour and a half. The next attack lasted about three hours. The one
in question lasted only thirty minutes, so that if the same amount of
gas was used the concentration of the cloud must obviously have been
increased six times over that of May twenty-fourth, as there is little
doubt that the cylinders had been installed in approximately the same
numbers--that is, one to a meter of front.
Probably the most important feature of the attack was the introduction
of phosgene. Now there never was any actual chemical evidence of the
poisons of phosgene in the German gas clouds until some of their
cylinders were captured by us when they retreated on the Somme in the
beginning of 1917. But unfortunately the peculiar effects of phosgene
on our men who were gassed were only too apparent. There were a large
number of “delayed” cases--men who thought they were only slightly
gassed but who became ill or even died several hours or sometimes a day
or so later from heart failure, especially if they had taken any heavy
exercise in between.
In these cases there was hardly any coughing. What was really wanted
was rest, but this was not realised at the time, and many men walked
to the dressing stations--sometimes a mile or more--through deep
mud and became quite exhausted. One officer of the Durhams had been
slightly gassed at the beginning of the attack but felt perfectly all
right until about noon, when he became faint and exhausted, though
not apparently seriously ill. After lying down he felt better, but in
the evening got worse again, and in walking to the ambulance to go to
the field dressing station he suddenly collapsed and died. This was
fourteen hours after the attack.
Another weighty piece of evidence as to the nature of the gas was given
by the smell, which to trained observers was quite different from the
typical chloride-of-lime smell of chlorine; and by the peculiar effects
on the taste of tobacco to men who had smelt the gas. If you take a
good smell of dilute phosgene and then smoke a cigarette the tobacco
tastes like nothing on earth. Tommy’s nearest description of the taste
and smell is “mouldy hay.” This peculiar effect is quite typical of
phosgene and is known as the “tobacco reaction.”
In the hope of getting samples of the German gas clouds for analysis
a large number of gas vacuum bulbs were distributed up and down the
line, and selected men were taught how to use them. This was supposed
to be done by nipping off the drawn-out end of the gas bulb, whereby
the contaminated air would rush in. The end was then to be closed with
a hollow stopper containing wax.
To get these samples was asking a great deal. Even when packed in
special boxes glass bulbs are somewhat fragile things for trench life,
and the wooden boxes made excellent kindling wood, which was always
being sought for. The result is that when the cloud does come along
the vacuum bulbs are often conspicuous only by their absence. Even
if they are kept whole it is asking rather a lot of a man to take an
accurate scientific sample during the excitement of a gas attack which
is accompanied by a bombardment by explosive shells and gas shells.
For a long time none of the bulbs found their way back to the field
laboratory. Eventually one did come, carefully packed in shavings and
wadding. I happened to be present when it was brought in, and there was
a good deal of excitement at the little prodigal’s return. The bulb was
taken out, but under it was found a leaf from a field-service note
book, on which was written: “Danger. This bulb was found in a hedge.
It seems to have been dropped from an aeroplane and probably contains
cholera germs. Fortunately it has not been broken.”
The “surprise effect,” which was mentioned above as being the third
fresh feature of this new-era gas-cloud attack, took the form of making
the attack in the dark and at a time when men were least prepared--that
is, just before the morning “Stand to,” the hour before dawn, when all
troops in the trenches stand to arms. By making the attack at night,
or at any rate in the dark, the boche achieved two objects: First of
all, there were better wind conditions for an attack, because the
night winds tend to flow down toward the earth and keep the gas cloud
low-lying and thick, whereas in the day the sun warms the ground and
produces so many upward currents of air that the cloud gets lifted up
and dissipated; in the second place it was impossible to see the cloud
when it was first liberated, and this reduced the means of detecting
the attack to only two--the hissing noise of the gas escaping from the
cylinders and the smell of the advanced parts of the cloud.
Later on it was known that the best hours for all gas attacks, both
cloud and shell bombardment, are in the night; and as a matter of
fact practically all gas warfare is now carried out at night, but at
that time the significance of this was not grasped, and many of our
casualties were due to lack of preparedness, numbers of men being
caught “on the hop” and overwhelmed.
Some most important steps in improving our protecting measures were
taken as a result of the lessons learned from the attack; in fact, it
may be taken that all measures in defence against gas have been learned
from bitter experience, and to this extent the sufferings of the
victims may be taken as having at any rate some compensating value. In
such a new and strange and continually developing kind of warfare very
little can be done by _a priori_ argument. This fact we have always
tried to impress on the men--that the gas warfare orders, sometimes
apparently trivial and frequently wearisome and annoying, have all been
made as the result of lessons learned from actual attacks.
Among the chief things that were done after the December nineteenth
attack was the improvement of our system of alarms.
The bells and horns in the front line had been found quite
insufficient, especially for warning people in the rear; and the
telephone could not be depended on for this purpose owing to the
possibilities of the wires being cut by shell fire. To protect them
from being cut, all wires would have to be buried at least six feet
deep in the ground, and this is practically impossible owing to the
work involved.
It would consequently be fatal to depend on telephonic communication,
especially as a gas attack is nearly always accompanied by a pretty
heavy bombardment of rear lines. In one case I knew, during just such
a bombardment, the staff captain at a brigade headquarters was talking
to one of the battalions when the whole telephone instrument seemed
to burst into a sheet of flame in his hands, owing to a cut wire. The
battalion concerned was isolated for more than an hour as a result,
and anything might have happened in the meantime.
For these reasons it was decided to adopt for gas alarms sirens worked
by compressed air, which would make a noise sufficiently loud and
distinctive to be heard long distances away. The type of siren which
was used has been kept in use ever since in continually increasing
numbers and has proved extraordinarily useful. It is known as the
Strombos horn, and consists of the horn proper and two iron cylinders
of compressed air charged to a pressure of one hundred and fifty
atmospheres. Only one cylinder at a time is connected to the horn, the
other being kept as a reserve.
The Strombos horns are mounted in the trenches in such a way as to
protect them from shell splinters as far as possible. This is generally
done by packing them round carefully with sandbags, only the mouth of
the horn being displayed and pointing toward the rear. Every sentry
must know how and when to sound the horn. All he has to do when he
realises that a gas attack is being made, or on receiving instructions
from an officer to do so, is to loosen the tap on the cylinder one
complete turn, when the horn will sound continuously for more than a
minute. The noise is terrific and in an enclosed space or in a quiet
region it is absolutely deafening. In the trenches, however, it is none
too loud, and the distances between the horns in the front system of
trenches are never more than four or five hundred yards. Farther back
in the chain, toward the rear, the distances can be increased. Horns
are now installed at battalion, brigade and divisional headquarters.
By turning them on when the noise of those in front is heard it is
possible to pass the alarm in an incredibly short space of time and
thus forestall the cloud of gas to such an extent that every man in the
support trenches or in rest billets or the villages behind the firing
line is aware that an attack is in progress and gets ready to protect
himself.
Naturally, things don’t always work out exactly according to schedule.
The horns are frequently damaged. In one place I was at, just this
side of the canal, near Boesinghe, a heavy German trench mortar
wrecked three of our Strombos horns within a week, and another and
less suitable position had to be found for the alarm. Then there are
occasional false alarms. These sometimes arise from individual men
“getting the wind up” from a bombardment by gas shell and thinking that
a cloud attack is being made. Others I am afraid have been more in the
nature of experiments “to see how it works.” After all, it must be a
great temptation to a sentry to be in charge of a Strombos horn and
never have the pleasure of turning it on.
False alarms are a great nuisance, however, and good arrangements have
now been made to prevent their spreading. It is possible to avoid
all the unnecessary disturbance to which troops are subjected by a
false gas alarm. This disturbance is particularly objectionable in
back areas where regiments returned from the trenches are in billets.
When the alarm goes everybody has to turn out--probably in the middle
of the night. Sentries wake the officers and men in all the billets;
messengers have to be sent post-haste to outlying villages or farms
with which there is no telephonic communications; respirators are
hurriedly inspected and placed in the alert position; the gas-proof
curtains of cellars and dugouts are adjusted; the officers move about
in the darkness to see that all their men are accounted for and ready;
every one is in a state of expectancy--and then the word comes through
that it is a false alarm, and the men go back, cursing, to their
billets. Not only is an occurrence of this kind wearying to tired
troops, but it has the old disadvantage of crying “Wolf, wolf!” when
there is no wolf--the consequent determination on the part of the men
not to take the next alarm so seriously.
Though it was not realised at the time, it is almost certain that the
Germans started to use gas in shell almost simultaneously, and probably
actually in the first attack, with the use of the poisonous gas clouds
in the attacks of April and May, 1915. Many instances came to notice of
men’s eyes being strongly affected to such an extent that they could
not keep them open. There seemed to be something in the air which made
an unprotected man weep copiously if he tried to keep his eyes open,
and of course if he closed them he could not see what he was doing.
These effects, and a peculiar smell which was noticed both during and
after the gas-cloud attacks, gave rise to the belief that something
like formaldehyde was being used by the Germans mixed with some
chlorine gas. Others described the smell as being that of chloroform
or ether, but nobody could say definitely what the material actually
was. It was only after a number of blind shell had been obtained and
examined that it was realised that the Germans were firing shell filled
with liquid which had a powerful lachrymatory effect.
It does not appear certain whether the use of lachrymatory liquids
for putting men out of action by making their eyes water is in itself
contrary to The Hague Convention, as the vapours need not actually be
poisonous. This was the case with the first German gas shell, as it
was found that the liquid contained consisted only of a material known
chemically as “xylyl bromide.” The vapour of this liquid and of many
similar substances has a most powerful effect on the eyes, like that of
onions but much stronger. Except in very high concentrations it cannot
be regarded as poisonous--at any rate not in the sense that chlorine is
poisonous.
Examination of the German lachrymatory shells showed that the liquid
was contained inside the shell in a sealed lead vessel so that the
material should not come in contact with the steel of the shell, which
it destroys gradually. Shell of this kind, though termed gas shell, are
not really such, as the liquid has to be broken up into fine droplets
by the explosive charge of the shell before the vapour can produce its
effect. The liquid has no pressure of its own inside the shell and
depends entirely on the bursting charge to get it distributed into the
atmosphere.
The xylyl bromide used by the Germans was not pure, but contained a
big proportion of benzyl bromide, showing that it had been made by the
action of bromide on coal-tar light oil from which most of the toluene
had been removed for the manufacture of the well-known high explosive,
trinitrotoluene.
The effect of xylyl bromide on an unprotected man is instantaneous
and remarkable. Even such small proportions as one volume of vapour
diluted with one million volumes of air will at once make a man weep so
copiously that he cannot possible keep his eyes open.
Obviously a material of this kind has great military value, for though
it does not put men out of action permanently by killing them it
neutralises their effectiveness to such an extent that for the time
being they may be regarded as of no military importance. In strong
concentrations the effect on the eyes is most powerful. I have walked
into an area which was being bombarded with lachrymatory shells
and suddenly got the effect just as if I had been hit in the face.
Fortunately the lachrymation has no lasting effect on the eyes, and a
man on getting into pure air very quickly recovers.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1915 these lachrymatory shells
were used in considerable numbers, especially in the vicinity of
Ypres, and at times the ramparts of that much bombarded town reeked
of lachrymatory vapour and nobody could stay in certain spots for
any length of time without having his eyes protected by specially
constructed goggles or by wearing a gas helmet right over his head.
Taking it altogether we were not troubled nearly so much by this new
type of gas as were the French, in the southern part of the line. In
much the same way that the gas cloud was developed by the Germans
against the English the gas shell were developed chiefly against the
French, and very much larger numbers were employed against the French
positions than we had to contend with during the first six months or
so. Later on things were more equallised in this direction. Captured
German documents and statements by prisoners showed us that the
Germans were counting very considerably on the effect produced by the
lachrymatory shell, and detailed instructions for their use in various
circumstances were carefully laid down. The lachrymatory shell was
known by the Germans as “T-Shell,” and the xylyl bromide as “T-Stoff,”
and instructions were laid down for the use of this material. Another
kind of shell was known as “K-Shell,” which up to that time had not
been used against us, or at any rate had not been recognised.
The T-Shell was particularly to be used against positions which it
was not intended to occupy immediately, the reason for this being
that T-Stoff hangs about for a long time. Some of the liquid is apt
to be spread about the ground and gives off enough vapour to make the
neighbourhood of the shell hole uninhabitable for many hours, and in
favourable condition--for the enemy--for several days. The K-Shell, on
the other hand, was intended to be used against infantry positions and
strong-points which it was hoped to assault and capture within an hour
or two of the bombardment or on areas which it was hoped to traverse
during a big attack.
The advent of the lachrymatory T-Shell incommoded us considerably, but,
as it was quickly realised that the gas was not poisonous, the Tommies
were not much taken back, and the “tear shell,” as they were quickly
called, were not considered by the rank and file to have importance,
which as a matter of fact they have; but at the same time we heard
rather alarming stories of the effects of gas shell as used against
the French.
It was rumoured, for example, that in the Crown Prince’s big advance in
the Argonne, in the late spring of 1915, that such enormous numbers of
gas shell had been used against the French positions that the infantry
occupying them were not only put out of action by the effect on their
eyes but that the amount of gas used was so large that the French
soldiers were actually anæsthetised and were taken prisoners by the
Germans while in an unconscious condition.
Whether this was true or whether it was exaggerated is not certain,
though it is certainly true that the Crown Prince’s advance was
prefaced by a hurricane bombardment of gas shell, the tactical effect
of which was considerable.
Stories of this kind, however, combined with the effects which we
ourselves were experiencing, made us realise that protection against
tear gas was essential, and for this purpose arrangements were made to
supply every officer and man in the front line with a pair of anti-gas
goggles. The earliest types of these goggles were very simple in
construction, and we are told were copied from a French pattern. They
consisted of a waterproof fabric lined with flannel containing a wire
spring for the nose and fitted with celluloid eyepieces. By bending the
wire to the shape of the nose it was possible to close the nostrils and
at the same time give a reasonably good fit to the flannel on the face.
In some cases the flannel was anointed with some kind of grease so as
to make a still closer fit, in order to keep out small traces of gas
which are quite sufficient to produce lachrymation. Later on we had a
much better type of goggle backed with rubber sponge to make a tight
fit to the face.
With the small numbers of gas shell used against us we had no
experience of any effect on the lungs, and it was found also that the
helmet form of respirator was enough to keep out, at any rate, low
concentrations of the lachrymator; but we got a rude awakening when
the boche began to use his tear shells in larger numbers. Such a case
happened to us in the beginning of 1916, at the celebrated village
of Vermelles, a little ruined town just behind the lines near Loos.
The enemy tried out an attack on us over about a mile front for the
purpose of bagging some of our trenches, and he attempted to keep
reinforcements from coming up to counter attack him by putting down a
tear-shell barrage through Vermelles and north and south of it over the
roads on which our fellows would have to advance. He used thousands
of his tear shells and the neighbourhood absolutely stank of them.
Fortunately, it was almost impossible to put down an effective standing
barrage with gas, and our reserves got through on two roads that had
not been blocked effectively. The boche attack was a fizzle, but
Vermelles was a little private hell of its own for that day and most of
the next forty-eight hours as well.
During and immediately after the bombardment, troops passing through
the village wore both goggles and gas helmets, but the concentration
of lachrymator was so great that many of our fellows were sick and
actually vomited inside their helmets. If you can imagine men going
up to a battle with these flannelette bags over their heads and
then being sick inside them, you can realise that the boche was not
particularly popular with us at the time.
Besides this, Vermelles was much used by troops in reserve and was full
of cellars and dugouts occupied by the waiting infantry and also by
signallers, headquarters of various kinds, and so on. The vapours--and
some of the shells themselves, for that matter--got down into these
cellars and made them almost uninhabitable for days, except in those
cases where they had been properly protected by double lines of
blankets hung at the entrances.
About the same time in 1916 the enemy began making surprise
bombardments with a new lachrymator and with the K-Shell mentioned
previously, for the purpose of assisting in raids. Both of these gases
rejoice in long names, the lachrymator being bromethylmethylketone, and
the K-Shell gas monochlormethylchloroformate. These gases are much more
poisonous and do not hang about as long as the old “T” tear gas.
One such raid in which they were used was carried out at a place
called La Boiselle--afterward famous as a jumping-off point in the
Somme Battle.
I was not in at the raid, but heard details of it afterward. The boche
rained his gas shells into the selected area and at the same time
prevented reinforcements from getting up by putting down a so-called
box barrage with explosive shells round the trenches to be attacked.
Our men were taken completely by surprise. Many of them were badly
gassed, all were temporarily blinded; and then after a short interval
the boche came in. He timed his arrival so that most of the gas had
disappeared. Then there was some very fierce fighting--so fierce that a
number of our men died afterward because of the exertion following on
the breathing of the K-gas.
But gassed and blinded men, however brave, cannot fight successfully
against others fresh and unaffected, and the enemy captured a number of
prisoners and two Lewis guns.
Curiously enough, during the Somme Battle a few months later we did
in properly the regiment which had carried out the raid and captured
the official report of the commander of the raiding party. In this
report he said: “... the men of the Royal Irish Rifles created a fine
impression both as regards their physique and their mode of repelling
an assault. Had it not been for the use of the gas shells it would have
been impossible to clear the section of trench attacked.”
Rather a fine tribute--and one thoroughly deserved!
Of course surprises of this kind cannot be pulled off twice, but
occurrences like this and the bombardment at Vermelles let us see that
the enemy intended to develop his gas-shell industry much more than
we had anticipated, and our protective measures were taken in hand so
as to meet future eventualities. In fact it was about this time that
the box respirator was being hurriedly developed so as to protect us
against any further devilment that Fritz might send along.