which he has sworn, as, if he should swear not to eat this bread, and
afterwards should eat it; and if, after he has eaten it, before he
brings his sacrifice, in case he did it ignorantly, or before he is
flogged, in case he did it presumptuously—he repent and ask a wise man,
and he absolve him, behold such an one is exempt from the sacrifice or
from the flogging: and not only so, but if they had actually bound him
in order to flog him, and he ask a wise man, and he absolve him before
the flogging has commenced, he is exempt.” (Ibid. 18.) In this rabbinic
decision there are two cases, and both contrary to the Word of God.
First, we have the case of the man who has broken his oath ignorantly,
and respecting whom God has decided in the following words: “If a soul
swear, pronouncing with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever
it be that a man shall pronounce with an oath, and it be hid from him;
when he knoweth of it, then he shall be guilty in one of these. And it
shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall
confess that he hath sinned in that thing: and he shall bring his
trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned,” &c.
(Levit. v. 4, &c.) Here God positively commands, first, that he should
confess his sin, and secondly, that he should bring a sacrifice in order
to obtain forgiveness; and, by the above law, the rabbies as positively
declare that obedience to these commands is superfluous. A man need only
say that he has changed his mind, and get a rabbi to absolve him, and
then he can set the Word of God at defiance, he need neither confess his
sin, nor bring the sacrifice. How can the men who profess such a
religion pretend to have any regard for the law of Moses, or how can
they with any consistency reproach Christians with the non-observance of
the ceremonial precepts, when they themselves profess religious
principles which unceremoniously subvert such plain commands? The second
case is, however, far more flagrant. It supposes a man to have sworn
that he would not do a certain thing, but afterwards wilfully to have
done it—that is, it supposes a man to have been guilty of wilful
perjury, and yet declares that he may be delivered both from the guilt
and the punishment, by going to a rabbi and getting absolution. This
oral law, which would flog a poor starving creature for eating Gentile
food, or meat and milk together, devises an expedient for delivering him
who is guilty of the grave crime of perjury—that is, though cruel to the
poor, it is merciful to the criminal. If this be not to violate the laws
of God with a high hand, then we know not what sin is. Here both classes
of the precepts, negative and affirmative, are treated with the same
contempt; both equally trampled under foot. The guilty are absolved, not
only from doing what God commands, but from the penalty of actual
transgression. The rabbies presume not only to absolve a man from doing
what he has sworn to do, but also to turn perjury actually committed
into innocence. They have assumed the high prerogative of God, have
abrogated his laws, and taught the guilty to set his threatenings at
defiance. We verily believe that the mass of the Jewish people have been
ignorant of this gross contempt for the Mosaic law, or they could never
have continued so long in such a system, nor so long have suffered the
name of God to be profaned by the attempt to pass off such a religion as
proceeding from Him. Now, then, we call on every reader of this paper to
decide whether the oral law can really be from God? Has this doctrine of
absolution from oaths anything resembling the character of the Divine
Being as a God of truth? Is it possible that God should give an oral law
directly subversive of that which he has given in writing; or will any
one dare to say that the Almighty, when he wished to give a law
permitting absolution from oaths, knew so little of the Hebrew language
as to enunciate it in words which directly forbid it? Let no one
misunderstand us, as if we applied the passages quoted from the oral law
generally to the case of all oaths, or as if we attributed this doctrine
of the oral law to all Israel. We do neither the one nor the other; in a
future number we hope to consider the case of an oath between man and
man, and at present our only intention is to show that the oral law is
dishonouring to God, subversive of the commands given by Moses, and
injurious to the best interests of the Jewish people; nay, that it is
actually a libel on the children of Abraham; and that, therefore, if
they have any love to God, any reverence for Moses, and any respect for
themselves and their brethren, they are bound publicly to renounce the
principles which it inculcates, and by which they have been deluded for
so many centuries. It is possible to do one of two things—either to
approve the doctrine of absolution from oaths, or to disapprove of it.
Those who approve of it will, of course, endeavour to uphold it, and
will thereby continue the profanation of God’s name; and, so far as they
can, stamp dishonour upon the religion of Israel. Those, who disapprove
the idea of a rabbi’s absolving from a solemn oath, and think that oaths
are not to be tampered with, are bound not only to protest against this
particular abuse, but to reject the whole oral law. The rabbies declare
that this doctrine is not an ordinance of the scribes, but an oral
tradition from Moses; if then it be false, the rabbies are again
convicted of passing off an invention of their own as an ordinance of
God, and are therefore wholly unworthy of credit. The oral law depends
altogether upon the validity of the testimony, and if the witnesses can
be proved, in any one instance, to have spoken falsehood, the credit of
the whole is destroyed. Now this is eminently the case, for not only
have they said what is false, but have endeavoured to establish a
principle subversive of all reverence for truth. It would be difficult
for any man, who was known as one in the habit of getting dispensation
from oaths, to find belief or credit in the world, and he would scarcely
be admitted as a valid witness in a court of justice; but the man who
propounds dispensation from oaths as a religious doctrine, and teaches
it systematically as agreeable to the will of God, is a more suspicious
person still, and such are the authors of the oral law. The former might
be regarded as a deluded person, who only broke his oaths when he got
dispensation, but the latter would be considered an artful underminer of
principle, and a wilful despiser of truth; his testimony would,
therefore, have no weight. Now, it is upon the testimony of such persons
that the authority of the oral law entirely depends. It is confessed,
that until the Mishna and Gemara were compiled, there was no written
record of its contents, but that it was propagated from mouth to mouth.
If, therefore, it appear that those who transmitted it were men whose
love for truth was equivocal, we cannot be sure that they did not
transmit a forgery. The doctrine, which we have just considered, shows
that they did not love truth, and that they have actually libelled the
memory of Moses, the servant of God, by asserting that he taught them
how to get absolution from oaths. It is for the Jews to consider whether
they will still be deluded by such incompetent witnesses, and still,
even silently, uphold a doctrine so dishonouring to their religion.
No. LVII.
DOCTRINE OF OATHS, CONTINUED.
Every one naturally thinks that his own religion is the true one. The
Mussulman thinks thus of Mahometanism, the Christian of Christianity,
and the Jew of Judaism, and yet it is plain that they cannot all be
right—two out of the three must necessarily be in error. What then is to
be done? Are they all to go on in listless and lazy indifference, and
leave it to another world to find out whether or not they have been in
the right, or are we to lay it down as a maxim that every one is to
continue in that religion in which he was born, whether right or wrong,
and that therefore the Turk is to remain a Mahometan, and the Hindoo an
idolater, to his life’s end? There are very many in the world who seem
to think so, and who adhere to a religion simply because it was the
religion of their forefathers. Now we grant that no man should
carelessly or lightly abandon the religion of his childhood, and have no
scruple in saying that he who changes his religion as he would his
clothes must be a fool, or something worse. But we must say, at the same
time, that he who retains his religion, merely as a matter of prejudice
or interest, is not a great deal better, and can hardly be considered as
a rational being. Every being, whom the Creator has endowed with reason,
ought to have a religion and to know why he prefers it to all others.
But perhaps some reader will say, I have a religion—I am a Jew, and I
prefer this religion to all others, because God himself gave it to Moses
on Mount Sinai. To this we reply, But how do you know that you have got
the religion of Moses? If you really had Moses’ religion you could not
be wrong, but how can you prove that the religion which you now profess
is really that true religion? Your fathers in the times of old often
forsook Moses and the Prophets, and taught their children a false
religion, how, then, can you be sure that this is not the case with what
you have got at present? Certainty can be had only by examination and
comparison. The Judaism of the present day must be compared with the Law
and the Prophets. If it agrees with them, then the Jews have reason to
believe that they are in the right; but if not, then they must be in the
wrong. Our own firm conviction is, that modern Judaism is altogether
spurious, and plainly opposed to that religion which God gave to your
fathers. The doctrine of dispensation from oaths is sufficient to prove
this, as was shown in the last number. But we have more objections still
to make against that doctrine, and all confirmatory of the conclusion to
which we have come. We saw in our last, that if a man swear an oath to
himself only, where others are not concerned, he can have absolution,
but we now come to consider the case of an oath, made to another person,
respecting which the oral law teaches us as follows:—
ראובן שהשביע לשמעון וענה אמן או קבל השבועה ונחם שמעון על שבועתו ונשאל
עליה אין מתירן לו אלא בפני ראובן שהשביעו , וכן אם נשבע ראובן או נדר שלא
יהנה בשמעון או שלא יהנה בו שמעון ונחם ונשאל לחכם אין מתירין לו אלא בפני
שמעון שנדר ממנו הנאה ואפילו היה שידע הנידר שהתיר זה נדרו או שבועתו
ולפיכך יהנה ממנו או יהנה לו ׃
“If Reuben should adjure Simeon, and he answer Amen, or accept the oath;
and afterwards Simeon should repent of his oath, and ask concerning it,
he is not to be absolved except in the presence of Reuben who adjured
him. In like manner, if Reuben should swear an oath not to receive any
profit from Simeon, or that Simeon should receive no profit from him,
and afterwards should repent and ask a wise man, he is not to be
absolved except in the presence of Simeon, concerning whose profit he
had vowed: yea, even though Simeon were an infant or a Gentile, he is
not to be absolved except in his presence, in order that he, with
respect to whom the vow was made, may know that the other has got
absolution from his oath or vow, and that therefore he may receive from
or confer profit upon him.” (Hilchoth Sh’vuoth, c. vi. 7.) Now in
considering this doctrine, we must not withhold that measure of
approbation which is due to the rabbies. There is here a certain degree
of honesty and plain dealing. The rabbies have determined that where one
man swears to another, he is not to be absolved, except in the presence
of that other, and are in so far vastly superior in morality to those
who hold and teach, not only that all oaths may be absolved, but that
they may be absolved secretly, so that he who is most affected by the
dispensation, knows nothing about it. Bad as the oral law is, it does
not descend to such a depth of hypocrisy and profaneness. Another trait
which deserves notice is, that it does not teach that no faith is to be
kept towards those who have got another religion, but expressly
determines, that if a Jew swear to a Gentile, he is not to be absolved
without that Gentile’s knowledge. We readily admit that this is greatly
superior to a doctrine of dispensation, taught and practised by some who
call themselves Christians; but, having made this admission, and given
the rabbies their due, We must also say, that the doctrine of absolution
here taught is plainly contrary to reason and Scripture, and if
extensively practised, would destroy all confidential intercourse or
dealings between man and man. Just suppose that the law of this country
was, that any one who had entered into a solemn engagement with another,
could be enabled to break it, simply, by calling up the person to whom
he had mode the promise before a magistrate, and by declaring, in his
presence, that he repented of what he had done, who would ever trust
another, or value even an oath? Not only would the commercial
transactions of the country be at an end, but the very bonds of society
would be rent asunder. The existence of human society depends upon that
measure of confidence which a man can place in his brother, but if the
rabbinical doctrine prevailed and were acted upon, there could be no
confidence more. A man’s oath would be good for nothing, and if so, the
value of his word still less. But, besides this, the doctrine that a
rabbi may absolve Simeon from his sworn obligation to Reuben, is absurd.
If Simeon swear to Reuben a lawful oath, no one on earth but Reuben can
release him; but here we are told that a rabbi, who has nothing at all
to do with the matter, may remit the obligation. He might, with as much
reason and with less profanity, undertake to absolve Simeon from his
pecuniary debts. That the dispensation must take place in the presence
of the party to whom Simeon swore, is but poor satisfaction, and would
not remove the inconvenience, nor diminish the guilt. Suppose, for
instance, that Simeon should promise Reuben with an oath, that within a
given time he would complete certain business, or lend him a certain sum
of money, or anything else of the kind, and that Reuben should arrange
his affairs in dependence upon this oath, what satisfaction would it be
to Reuben to be present at the absolution! It would not remove the
inconvenience nor indemnify him for the loss to which the non-fulfilment
of the oath exposed him, nor abate the vexation and sorrow which he must
feel to see a teacher of religion trampling upon the most solemn
sanction with which religion guards the intercourse between man and man.
For, after all, the main objection to the doctrine is, that it allows
what God forbids, as we showed in the last number, and under the
pretence of religion, makes perjury systematic.
But to estimate this doctrine fully, and also the character of the men
with whom it originated, we must look at the original passage in the
Talmud, on which the above-cited decision is founded:—
המודר הנאה מחברו אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו מנהני מילי אמר רב נחמן דכתיב
ויאמר ה׳ אל משה במדין לך שוב מצרימה כי מתו כל האנשים אמר לו במדין נדרת
לך והתר נדרך במדין דכתיב ויואל משה אין אלה אלא שבועה דכתיב ויבא אותו
באלה וגם במלך נבוכדנצר מרד אשר השביעו באלהים חיים מאי מרדותים אשכחיה
צדקיהו לנבוכדנצר דהוה קאכיל ארנבת חייא אמר ליה אישתבע לי דלא מגלית עלוי
ולא תיפוק מילתא אישתבע ליה לסוף הוה קא מצטער צדקיהו בגופיה איתשיל
אשבועתיה ואמר שמע נבוכדנצר דקא מבזין ליה שלח ואייתי סנהדרין וצדקיהו אמר
להון חזיתין מאי קא עביד צדקיהו לאו הכי אישתבע בשמא דשמיא דלא מגלינא אמר
ליה איתשלי אשבעתיה [ אמר ליה מתשלין אשבועתא ] אמרי ליה אין אמר להו בפניו
או שלא בפניו אמרי בפניו וכו׳ ׃
“He that has a vow upon him, with respect to profit from his neighbour,
is not to be absolved, except in that neighbour’s presence. How is this
proved? Rav Nachman says, it is proved by the words, ‘And the Lord said
unto Moses, in Midian, Go return into Egypt; for all the men are dead
which sought thy life;’ he said to him, In Midian thou hast vowed, go
and get absolution from thy vow in Midian, for it is written, וַיּוֹאֶל
משֶׁה , ‘And Moses was content.’ (Exodus ii. 21.) Now this word means
nothing else but swearing, as it is written, ‘And he took an oath of
him.’ (Ezek. xvii. 13.) It is farther proved by the words, ‘And he also
rebelled against King Nebuchadnezzar, who had made him swear by God.’ (2
Chron. xxxvi. 13.) What was the nature of his rebellion? Zedekiah found
Nebuchadnezzar eating a live hare, whereupon Nebuchadnezzar said to him,
swear to me not to reveal this, nor to report the matter. Zedekiah
swore, but afterwards he was grieved, and went and got his oath absolved
and told. Nebuchadnezzar heard that they despised him, and sent and
fetched the Sanhedrin and Zedekiah, and said to them, Ye see what
Zedekiah has done, although he swore by the name of God not to reveal
the matter. They said to him, He got a dispensation from his oath. He
said, Is it lawful, then, to get dispensation from an oath? They said,
Yes. He said again, Is this to be done in the other’s presence or
absence? They say, In his presence,” &c. (Nedarim, fol. lxv. 1.) Now
this passage not only illustrates the doctrine of dispensation, but
throws much light upon the character and knowledge of the men from whom
the tradition is derived. In the first place, it shows a strange
confusion of mind to derive וַיּוֹאֶל, “he was willing,” from אלה, “he
sware;” but it is stranger still out of this mistranslation, to invent a
story of Moses having sworn and got absolution; but the most strange of
all is, that any one should be found who can believe this a sufficient
warrant for the doctrine of dispensation from an oath made to a
fellow-creature. If even it were true, as the rabbies say, that Moses
had sworn to Jethro not to return into Egypt, still this is not a case
in point; for Moses did not get absolution from any third person, but
received express permission from Jethro himself to return, as we find in
the chapter referred to, where it is said, “And Moses went and returned
to Jethro, his father-in-law, and said unto him, Let me go, I pray thee,
and return unto my brethren which are in Egypt, and see whether they be
yet alive. And Jethro said to Moses, Go in peace.” (Exod. iv. 18.) If
there was any oath, we see that it was dispensed with, not by a wise
man, nor by any third person or persons, but by him to whom the oath was
made. This passage is, therefore, decidedly against the rabbinic
doctrine, and therefore the rabbinic doctrine cannot be true. The second
case cited by the Talmud is still stronger, as a testimony, both against
the system and the men. It tells us that Zedekiah swore to
Nebuchadnezzar not to betray him in a certain matter, which no law,
either of God or man, compelled him to divulge—that he swore by the name
of the God of Israel, and yet that, after this most solemn transaction,
he did what he had sworn not to do. He betrayed a man from whom he had
received kindness, and equally disregarded the obligations of gratitude
and the sacred ties of an oath—in short, that he committed perjury. This
is in itself bad enough; but the Talmud proceeds further to tell us,
that this was not his own individual act, but the solemn decision of the
Supreme Council of the Sanhedrin. Zedekiah did not perjure himself
without having advice. He went to the Sanhedrin, and they absolved him
from the obligation of the oath, and that contrary to their own maxim,
that an oath sworn to a neighbour cannot be absorbed, except in his
presence. Here, then, the Talmud plainly confesses that the Sanhedrin
did wrong, in fact, that they were aiders and abettors in Zedekiah’s
perjury; that, therefore, they were men who had no regard to truth, and
no fear of God; and, consequently, that no man of any common sense would
believe a single word that came out of their mouths. What, then, becomes
of the whole fabric of Jewish tradition? It depends altogether upon the
unimpeachable character of the various Sanhedrins through whose hands it
passed. If, therefore, we should, find that any one Sanhedrin consisted
of notorious liars, the genuineness of the oral law is at an end. But
here the Talmud itself tells us that even before the deportation of
Zedekiah, the Sanhedrin consisted, not of common liars, but of false
swearers, of men who had so little regard for the name of the Lord, as
to absolve a solemn oath of which that name was the safeguard. If they
had done this in accordance with their traditions, there would be some
appearance of consistency, but they did it in the face of the tradition,
which says, that when an oath is sworn to another person absolution
cannot be given except in his presence. When Zedekiah demanded
absolution, they should have refused, and told him that it was contrary
to the oral law; but, whether from fear or from self-interest, they
acceded to the king’s wish, and helped hint to commit perjury: and these
are the men who have handed down the oral law; what trust, then, can be
placed in their word, when they disregard an oath? The story is either
true or false. If true, then all the members of the Sanhedrin were
guilty of perjury,—if false, then the Talmud has handed down a falsehood
as truth, and in neither case is it worthy of credit. Surely it is time
for the chosen people of God to use the reason which God has given, and
to examine the grounds upon which they profess Judaism. The ignorant and
the thoughtless may retain their profession as a mere matter of
prejudice, but it would be very strange if any, who think religion worth
a thought, should still adhere to a system for which there is not only
no evidence, but against which there is evidence so satisfactory.
According to the Talmud itself, and on its own showing, the persons
whose office it was to guard the traditions in the days of Zedekiah were
men who transgressed those traditions, and made themselves guilty of
perjury; what warrant, then, have the Jews for believing that those men
did not change the traditions, and hand down mere inventions of their
own? What was there to restrain them from such conduct, if they could
free themselves from the obligation of an oath by the name of the God of
Israel?
But as the men who handed down the traditions are described by their own
successors as wicked and ungodly persons, so the traditions which they
have handed down are of the same character, and, as we have said, if
generally acted upon, would rend asunder all the ties of human society,
and beget universal distrust and suspicion. The oral law plainly and
unequivocally allows a man to swear to his neighbour that he will do or
leave undone something that his neighbour requires, and then to get
absolution from that oath and do the contrary. It is true that it
requires this to be done in the presence of the other person, but that
does not much alter the matter. Whether Zedekiah divulged what he had
sworn to Nebuchadnezzar to keep secret, in his presence or behind his
back, is a thing of very little consequence; the oath is just as much
and as really broken, and the results might be just as pernicious and
injurious. Take, for example, the case of a manufacturer who
communicates to his servant some important secret in his trade, and for
his own security binds him by an oath not to divulge it. In a little
time, the servant, for some reason or other, finds it convenient or
profitable to make this secret known, and goes to a wise man, summons
the manufacturer to be present, gets absolution, and then divulges what
he had sworn to keep secret,—where is the difference as to all practical
purposes, or as to the actual guilt of perjury? But again, suppose that
the wise man was to act as the Sanhedrin did, and absolve the man
without summoning the person to whom he swore, it is a question whether
the servant would then he bound. Zedekiah evidently thought not. All he
was concerned about was to have absolution, and if there was any sin in
giving it, he evidently thought that the onus rested upon those who
gave, and not upon him who received it. According to the oral law, the
Sanhedrin was wrong in giving absolution under the circumstances: but,
according to the same oral law, Zedekiah was right in obeying their
decision. Implicit and universal obedience to the words of the Sanhedrin
and wise men is required by the Talmud; and, therefore, if a wise man
give absolution, even though he give it unlawfully, it is still the duty
of him who is absolved to obey his decision, and act upon it. A
Rabbinist is not allowed to reason; but as we have seen on a former
occasion, to believe that his right hand is his left, and _vice versa_,
if the rabbies say so—and, consequently, if a wise man absolve him, he
is not to trouble either his conscience or his reason as to the right or
the wrong; his duty is not to dispute, but to receive the determination
as the words of the living God. The provision, therefore, that if Simeon
swear to Reuben he is not to be absolved, except in Reuben’s presence,
affords but little protection. If it was possible for the Sanhedrin, a
body consisting of seventy-one persons, to disregard it, it is surely
possible that any other wise man might disregard it also, and absolve
Simeon, even in Reuben’s absence. Now the bare possibility of such
occurrences would make all promises, whether sanctioned by oaths or not,
of no value, and have the most pernicious effect as to the practice of
speaking truth. Men might reason from the greater to the less, and say,
If it be lawful, by means of absolution, to break an oath, קל וחומר, _à
fortiori_, it is lawful to break one’s word without absolution; and, at
all events, those to whom the promise was given would be likely to
reason thus, and say, If we cannot depend upon this man’s oath, much
less can we place confidence in his word. But what is worse still, such
a doctrine is calculated to make men despise all religion, and to render
them a prey to infidelity. The thoughtless and the rash are very likely
to say, If this be religion, better far to be without it; or, to
conclude that as such doctrine cannot possibly be the offspring of the
Divine mind, all revealed religion is a mere imposture. In every case it
is a reproach to the good sense and piety of Israel to profess such a
doctrine; or, if they do not believe it, to remain silent, and suffer
mankind to suppose that this is the religion of the children of Abraham.
So long as they profess that the oral law is the source of their
religion, so long are they responsible for the doctrines which it
teaches; and so long as they abstain from a public renunciation of the
oral law, they must be considered as believers in its authority. It will
not do to renounce one particular doctrine, whilst they profess faith in
the general system. The body of traditions is a whole which cannot be
parted. They have all come down, resting on the same evidence; if,
therefore, the evidence be invalid in any one case, it is invalid in
all; and if any one admits its validity in some cases, he cannot, if a
reasonable man, deny it in others. He may dispute about the conflicting
opinions of the rabbies, but if he admit any one of those doctrines
which are called traditions from Sinai, he must admit them all, and,
consequently, this which professes to be one of them. It remains,
therefore, for the Israelites of the present day to choose, whether they
will still retain the system of the oral law, and thereby sanction the
dispensation from oaths, or whether they will repudiate this doctrine,
and thereby renounce the whole oral law.
No. LVIII.
MERITORIOUSNESS OF CIRCUMCISION.