“In the case of male and female slaves, the people are not to stand in a

row, nor to say the benediction of the mourners, nor the consolations of

the mourners; but, as one says, to a man whose ox or ass is dead, God

replace your loss, so one is to say, in the case of a male or female

slave who has died.” (Ibid., 377.) Volumes could not so clearly set

forth the genius of Judaism, and the spirit of its authors, as this one

short law. It exhibits the founders of Judaism, not only as void of all

true religious sentiment, but absolutely dead to all the natural

feelings of humanity. If mourners of any description require sympathy

and respect, surely they are the mourning family of a slave, for,

excepting crime, there is not anything that can aggravate the bitterness

of death more than slavery. Here religion should pour in its oil and

wine, and as it alleviated the miseries of life, diminish from the pangs

of death. At such an hour, religion should assert the liberty of the

soul, and remind the children of pride, that in the life after death the

distinction of master and slave is unknown; that there eternal and

spiritual liberty awaits all the children of God, whatever their outward

condition here. At such an hour, religion should especially console the

survivors with the hope, that there is another and better state of

existence, where the slave and the freeman are equally regarded, and

dealt with according to one eternal rule of justice. But the religion of

the oral law, on the contrary, carries the degradation of slavery even

down to the grave, and helps it to survive the period of bondage. It

ordains that the usual religious rites should not be observed, and

places the slave on the same level with the brute that perisheth. It

prescribes no consolation for the slave’s afflicted family, but ordains

that his master should receive the same words of comfort, as if he had

lost an ox or ass. The death of the slave is looked upon as nothing; it

is only for the slave-owner’s loss that the oral law has any

consideration. The fact of his having been a human being, an inheritor

of God’s image, and an heir of everlasting life, is entirely overlooked

by the rabbies. He was a slave, and they think, therefore, that as he

was treated like a beast whilst he lived, he may be buried like a beast

now that he is dead. If these slaves had been Gentiles, it would not

have been surprising that the oral law should treat them with such

little ceremony. But we must remember that all such slaves were

compelled to become proselytes to Judaism. They were, therefore,

co-religionists with their masters; but even this could not procure them

the respect due to human beings. Because the providence of God had made

them slaves, the oral law endeavoured to turn them into beasts. We are

sure that many Jews of the present day will revolt with horror from such

a doctrine; and acknowledge that it is a libel upon religion. They will

be ready to confess, that the poor slave is a fellow-creature, and an

expectant of life eternal; but let such persons stop to consider whence

they have derived these sentiments, so much more just, more merciful,

and more worthy of religion, than those expressed in the oral law. That

they have not derived them from Judaism is clear. May they not, then, be

indebted for them to the influence and atmosphere of Christianity in

which they live? Certain it is, that the New Testament contains very

different principles, respecting the treatment of slaves, from those

which we have discovered in the oral law. But, further, would it not be

well for those who disapprove these rabbinic principles, to ask

themselves why they profess the rabbinic religion? If it be true that a

slave is something better than an ox or an ass, Judaism, which classes

them altogether, must be false: and the men who made such laws, must be

confessed to be very unfit teachers of religion. Nay more, Judaism must

be acknowledged as a religion most unfit to promote the happiness of the

human race. If Judaism should prevail again, and, as its advocates

expect, prevail universally, slavery would also prevail in the same

degree: slaves would again be compelled to become proselytes, and again

be treated as beasts. Such is the great consummation, the regeneration

that Judaism promises the world. We therefore ask every Jewish reader,

Whether he can pray for such a state of things, and whether he wishes to

be thus enabled to degrade and trample upon his fellow-sinners? If he

does not, there must be something wrong in the religious system which he

professes—and if he only detects this one error, or acknowledges only

this one falsehood respecting the classification of slaves with oxen and

asses, it is sufficient to shake the whole rabbinic fabric: and if he

has any concern for the honour of the Jewish nation, he will endeavour

to deliver them from such a foul imputation upon their mercy and their

humanity.

But there is one point more in these laws respecting mourners, which it

is necessary to notice. The oral law forbids the mourner, as we have

seen above, to read in the words of the law for seven days:—

אבל אסור לקרות בתורה ונביאים וכתובים , ואסור לשנות במשנה תלמוד הלכות

ואגדות ׃

“The mourner is forbidden to read in the law, the prophets, and the

Hagiographa: it is also forbidden to study in the Mishna, Talmud,

Constitutions, and Agadoth.” That a mourner would have no great loss in

not being allowed to study in the oral law, we can readily believe; but

why should he be prohibited from going to the great fountain of

consolation—the revealed Word of God? If there be one season of life

more fit than another for studying the Word of God, surely it is when

death has entered a family, and reminded all its inmates that the wages

of sin is death. If a husband or wife be left to mourn over the

bereavement of a beloved partner, what consolation can be equal to that

which they find in God’s promise of a world where there is neither

sorrow nor death, and where those who meet shall never part again? If

children be left to mourn over the removal of their parents, whither

should they flee for consolation rather than to that Word which tells

them of him who is the father of the fatherless? Every reasonable person

will think also that, when the heart is softened by the paternal

chastisement, then is a peculiarly appropriate season for learning his

precepts and taking heed to his exhortations—and yet the oral law, with

a sort of most perverse ingenuity, has just selected that period of

human life, in which the consolations of God’s Word are most necessary

and its instruction likely to be of most use, to forbid the reading of

it altogether. And here, the rabbies have not scrupled to set aside the

plain command of God. God says of his law, “Thou shalt meditate therein

day and night and makes no exception for the seven days of mourning for

the dead.” In describing the character of the righteous he says, “His

delight is in the law of the Lord, and in his law doth he meditate day

and night and pronounces a blessing upon such a character.” But the

rabbies, in contempt both of the command and of the promised blessing,

forbid the already afflicted mourner to obey the command and to seek the

blessing. Even when the scribes and rabbies were in the plenitude of

their power as civil magistrates in the land of Israel, obedience to

such a command would have been unlawful, as implying disobedience to the

command of God. The law of God and the law of man are here plainly in

collision; the former commanding Israel to study in his law day and

night; the latter prohibiting all study for the seven days of the

mourning; but whenever these two authorities are opposed, no rational

being can doubt that it is Israel’s duty to obey God rather than man.

But, in the present day, when the oral law is not the law of the land,

when, therefore, the ordinances of the scribes have no authority

whatever, it is impossible to conceive why Israel should obey this

prohibition, unless they wish, by some public act, to exhibit their

determination to transgress the laws or God. Every one who abstains from

the study of God’s Word for seven days, plainly disobeys the Divine

command as given by Moses and the prophets; how then can the Jews of the

present day deceive themselves by supposing that they have the religion

of Moses? The main difference between Heathenism and the religion of

Moses is, that the latter gives a revelation of God’s will to guide us

in difficulty and to comfort us in affliction. The main difference

between a Heathen and a Jewish mourner ought to be, that the Jew flees

for consolation to God and his Word, whilst the Heathen indulges in

sorrow as those that have no hope. The oral law, however, breaks down

with this distinction, and reduces the Jew to the level of the Heathen,

by robbing him in his hour of need of God’s promises, and commanding him

to abstain for seven days from all study of God’s Word. These laws

respecting mourning, then, as being oppressive to the poor, insulting to

the unlearned, degrading to humanity, and contrary to the express

precepts of the Divine law, have no intrinsic merit to commend them to

Israel, and no claim upon their obedience.

No. LVI.

DISPENSATION FROM AN OATH.

A religion which is plainly contrary to any of the Divine attributes,

must necessarily be false. For instance, God is a holy God: a religion,

therefore, which would promote unholiness could not have the Holy One of

Israel for its author. God is also a merciful and a just God: a

religion, therefore, which is characterized by cruelty or injustice,

cannot proceed from him; and for this reason, amongst others, we believe

that the religion of the oral law cannot be that true religion which God

gave to Moses and the prophets. The oral law is most unjust in its laws

respecting Gentiles, slaves, and unlearned men, and most unmerciful in

very many of its enactments. But if there be one attribute more than

another, which is distinctive of the true God, it is truth. In the

prophecies of Jeremiah, He is even identified with truth, as it is

said:—

וה׳ אלהים אמת ׃

“The Lord God is Truth.” (Jer. x. 10.) And in that prediction, which he

put into the mouth of Balaam, he says, that it is by this attribute that

he is distinguished from the sons of men. “God is not a man that he

should lie; neither the son of man that he should repent: hath he said,

and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it

good?” (Numbers xxiii. 19.) Men may be wicked enough to promise what

they do not intend to perform, or after promising, may change their

mind, and refuse to fulfil their engagements; but God is too holy to

deceive wilfully, or to alter what has proceeded out of his mouth. A

religion, therefore, which in any wise tends to lessen our reverence for

truth, or encourages men to alter a solemn engagement, or, what is still

worse, teaches how to absolve from oaths, cannot proceed from the God of

truth; and this is what the oral law does in certain cases. We do not

mean to accuse it of teaching, as the religion of Rome does, that

dispensation may be had from every kind of oath. On the contrary, the

rabbies assume the power of dispensation only in the case of שבועות

בטוי, “rash oaths;” but we mean to assert, that even that assumption is

contrary to the Word of God, and injurious to the cause of truth; and,

therefore, sufficient to overthrow the credit of the oral law as a

religion given by God. The doctrine itself is as follows:—

מי שנשבע שבועת בטוי ונחם על שבועתו וראה שהוא מצטער אם קיים שבועה זו

ונהפכה דעתו לדעת אחרת , או שנולד לו דבר שלא היה בדעתו בשעת השבועה וניחם

בגללו הרי זה נשאל להכם אחד או לשלשה הדיוטות במקים שאי שם חכם ומתירין לו

שבועתו , ויהיה מותר לעשות דבר שנשבע שלא לעשותו או שלא לעשות דבר שנשבע

לעשותו וזה הוא הנקרא היתר שבועות , ודבר זה אין לו עיקר כלל בתורה שבכתב ,

אלא כך למדו ממשה רבינו מפי הקבלה שזה הכתוב לא יחל דברו שלא יחלל הוא

בעצמו דרך קלות ראש בשאט נפש כענין שנאמר וחללת את שם אלהיך אבל אם נחם

וחזר בו חכם מתיר לו ׃

“If any man swear a rash oath, and afterwards repent of it, because he

sees that if he keep this oath it will cause him grief, and therefore

changes his mind; or if something should occur to him which was not in

his mind at the time when he swore, and he repent on that account;

behold, a person, in such circumstances, is to ask one wise man (rabbi),

or three common men in any place where there is not a wise man, and they

absolve him from his oath; and then it will be lawful to do a thing

which he had sworn not to do, or to leave undone a thing which he had

sworn to do: and this is what is called absolution from oaths. _This

matter has no foundation whatever in the written law_, but it has been

learned from Moses, our master, by oral tradition, that the Scripture,

‘He shall not profane his word,’ (Numbers xxx. 3, in the English Bible

2,) means, that a man shall not himself profane his word in a way of

levity and with a contemptuous mind, according as it is written,

‘Neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God’ (Levit. xix. 12); but

if a man repent and change his mind, a wise man is to absolve him.”

(Hilchoth Sh’vuoth, c. vi. 1, 2.) Here it is plainly taught, that if a

man has reason to fear any personal inconvenience, or even if he changes

his mind, he may escape from the most solemn obligation that can be laid

upon the consciences of men; and that, after appealing to God in

confirmation of his declaration to do or to leave undone some particular

action, one or more of his fellow-sinners can remit his duty to his

Creator, and give him a license to do the very contrary of that which he

had promised before and unto God, that he would do. Now let every

Israelite reader first consult his own reason, and reflect whether this

doctrine is agreeable to the character of God, as set forth in the

Scripture. The God of the Bible is a God of eternal and immutable truth.

One of his peculiar characteristics, that he keepeth covenant and mercy.

A man, therefore, who breaks his word, and still more so, a man who

breaks an oath, is unlike God. Is it probable, then, that God would give

a religion with a special provision for making men unlike himself?

Again, God is a God of knowledge, and therefore knows that the children

of men are in a great degree the children of habit; he knows also that

by habit the evil propensities are strengthened, and that there is in

men a strong propensity to shrink from their word, if it cause any

trouble or damage: is it likely, then, that God would give a law

directly tending to strengthen that evil propensity by forming a habit

of breaking one’s word, even under the solemn circumstances of an oath?

Reason decides that such a law cannot proceed from the God of Israel.

Has it then any support in the written Word of God? It would be strange,

indeed, if the Word of God should contain anything contrary to reason.

As revealing the nature of Him who is incomprehensible, it may contain

things above our reason: but that in giving laws for man it should give

him license to do what his reason tells him is directly opposed to the

character of God, is altogether incredible. The rabbies, themselves,

however, do not endeavour to justify the doctrine by a reference to

Scripture. They say in plain terms, “_This matter has no foundation

whatever in the written law_,” and thus acknowledge that it is

altogether a matter of tradition, the argument against it, therefore,

becomes doubly strong. Every one knows, that a story loses nothing by

passing through many mouths, but that in the course of its progress it

gets so many additions, and undergoes so many changes as at last to be

scarcely recognisable. This circumstance makes all oral tradition

uncertain and unsatisfactory, but is particularly suspicious when it

appears, not only opposed to the Scripture character of God, but also

favourable to the evil propensities of man. If it had exacted a more

scrupulous regard to truth and a willing submission to hardship and

inconvenience for the sake of truth, then, as opposing the principles of

self-interest, it would have been less suspicious; but when it actually

tells men that to do what may save them from worldly trouble or personal

disadvantage is a Divine institution, one cannot help suspecting that it

is an invention of men, who found it convenient occasionally to escape

from the obligation of an oath. But after all, the great arbiter must be

the written Word of God. The rabbies say, That it has been learned from

Moses by oral tradition, that the words, “He shall not profane his

word,” mean that a man shall not himself profane his word in a way of

levity, but that he shall go to a wise man and get absolution; let us

then read the whole verse from which those words are taken:—

איש כי ידור נדר לה׳ או השבע שבועה לאסר אסר על נפשו לא יחל דברו ככל היוצא

מפיו יעשה ׃

“If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul

with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all

that proceedeth out of his mouth.” Now let any man of common sense and

honesty say, whether if it had been God’s intention to forbid all

absolution from oaths, He could have employed words more to the purpose

than these; or whether the plain simple grammatical meaning is not

directly opposed to the rabbinic doctrine? God says, If a man swear, he

shall not profane his word. The rabbies say, he may profane his word. To

prevent all mistake, God further adds, “He shall do according to all

that proceeds out of his mouth.” The rabbies say, he need not do what

proceeds out of his mouth; and yet they have the face to tell us, that

their doctrine is from Moses, and is the traditional interpretation of

words which signify the very reverse of what they say. It is only

wonderful that they should have referred to this verse at all, and the

fact can only be accounted for by the supposition that this verse was

too plain to be got over, and therefore they thought it best to take the

bull by the horns, by selecting this very verse as the basis of their

interpretation. That this verse in its grammatical construction is

directly opposed to the oral law no one can doubt, for it forbids what

the rabbies allow, and commands what the rabbies forbid. But the

opposition is not found in this verse only. The other verse to which the

rabbies also allude is equally plain against it. The words, “Ye shall

not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy

God. I am the LORD,” plainly forbid that absolution from oaths which the

rabbies teach not only as lawful, but as of Divine authority. We know

that the rabbies make a distinction between שבועת שקר a false oath and a

שבועת בטוי rash oath; but the distinction, as made by them is unfounded.

A rash oath, according to their doctrine, is an oath concerning

something which it is possible and lawful for a man to do or to leave

undone; for as soon as it interferes with the fulfilment of a Divine

command, it belongs to that class of oaths which they call שבועות שוא

vain oaths. If, therefore, a man swears to do what is both lawful and

possible for him to do, and afterwards draws back and does it not, what

man in his senses can doubt, that that individual, no matter what the

pretext for not keeping the oath, is guilty of having sworn falsely?

What is it to swear falsely, if voluntarily to refuse to do what a man

had previously sworn to do, constitute not that sin? A sinful falsehood

is a wilful departure from truth; here there is that wilful departure:

who, then, will dare to affirm, that such conduct is not contrary to the

express command of God? Rabbinists sometimes say, that though the oral

law sometimes commands more than is commanded in the Scriptures, it

never allows what God has forbidden; but here we have a plain example of

the contrary. Here the oral law allows false swearing, which God has

positively forbidden. The doctrine of absolution from oaths teaches men

to transgress three מטות לא תעשה negative precepts. The man who swears

to do anything and then does it not, because he has got absolution,

violates, first, the negative precept, “He shall not profane his word;”

he violates, secondly, the negative precept, “Ye shall not swear by my

name falsely;” and, lastly, he violates a negative precept more

important than either of the others; and that is, “Neither shalt thou

profane the name of thy God.” Any man, pretending to religion, who

should act upon these principles, first swear and then obtain absolution

from his oath, would expose his religion to the contempt and indignation

of all honest men, and thereby do all that in him lies to profane the

name of his God. Let, then, every Israelite who thinks that the negative

precepts are more important than the affirmative, remember, that in this

one instance the oral law teaches him to violate three such precepts;

and let him reflect further, that the upholding such a law as this is to

profane the name of the God of Israel before those who are ignorant of

the Scripture.

But the rabbinical doctrine does not stop at prospective absolution, it

goes so far as to absolve from the guilt of perjury actually committed:—

מי שנשבע שבועת בטוי להבא ושקר בשבועתו , כגון שנשבע שלא יאכל פת זו ואכלה

, ואחר שאכלה קודם שיביא קרבנו אם היה שוגג , או קודם שילקה אם היה מזיד ,

נחם ונשאל לחכם והתירה לו הרי זה פטור מן הקרבן או מן המלקות , ולא עוד אלא

אפילו כפתוהו ללקות ונשאל והתירו לו קודם שיתחילו להלקותו הרי זה פגור ׃

The old paths, or the Talmud tested by Scripture Being a comparison of the principles and doctrines of modern Judaism with the religion of Moses and the prophets · 第 45 / 49 段