The fifth Presidential campaign of the Republic of Cuba occurred in
1916. The Conservative candidate for President was General Mario G.
Menocal, who was thus seeking reelection, and the candidate for
Vice-President was General Emilio Nuñez, of whom we have already heard
as the leader of the Veterans' Association in its legitimate and orderly
resistance to the corruption and despotism of the Gomez administration,
who had had a distinguished career in the Liberating Army in the War of
Independence, and who was at this time serving as Secretary of
Agriculture, Industry and Commerce in the cabinet of President Menocal.
[Illustration: GEN. D. EMILIO NUÑEZ]
On the Liberal side, in accordance with the compact formerly made
between him and José Miguel Gomez, the Presidential candidate was Dr.
Alfredo Zayas, and the Vice-Presidential candidate was Carlos Mendieta,
a journalist and Representative in Congress, who had long been
conspicuous in the practical management of the Liberal Party.
The general prosperity which Cuba had been enjoying under the
administration of President Menocal excited the envy and cupidity of the
Liberal place-seekers and roused them to extraordinary efforts to regain
possession of the government. A shameless attempt was made to force a
bill through Congress disqualifying a President for reelection unless he
resigned his office at least sixty days before the election; but it
failed of success. Long in advance of the actual contest a vigorous
propaganda was started all over the island on lines similar to those
which had been successful in causing the overthrow of Estrada Palma.
While few ventured to asperse the character of President Menocal
himself, his administration was vilified as corrupt and inefficient. It
was charged that he did not, like Gomez, "divide the spoils" with his
party followers, that he was both selfish and weak, and that his fatal
weakness in office had been more than amply demonstrated, and would
justify them in overthrowing his government. The Liberal newspapers
asserted that at least three quarters of the inhabitants of the island
were not in sympathy with the Conservative position and with the
President, but had been deluded into voting for him; that they did not
approve of his persistent acquiescence in every little hint and
suggestion that might come from the United States; and that having been
graduated from an American University, he was more American in his ideas
and ideals than he was true Cuban, and deserved defeat at the next
election.
This was largely for the purpose of preparing the public for the claim,
which was made before the polls had been open two hours, that the
Liberals were sweeping the country, and that the Conservatives could
make no possible or effective showing in the election. In pursuance of
this propaganda, it was so arranged that the local boards of the larger
towns and cities, where there was an excess of the rank and file of the
Liberal party, should rush in their returns. These records were sent in
immediately and seemed to indicate a sweeping victory for the Liberal
party. The country districts, where were registered the votes of the
farmers, the sugar planters, and the people of property who believed in
work and the maintenance of law and order, being remote from the
capital, came in much later, and in many instances, owing to distance
and the uncertainty of travel, reliable returns from these districts
were delayed until the next day, so that at midnight it looked as though
the election had been carried by the Liberal party. On the following
day, however, as the returns began to arrive from the remote districts,
a decided change in the aspect of the situation became apparent, and by
that night it was seen that a very closely contested election had taken
place, and that the result would probably be in doubt, as it was in the
United States, for several days.
This delay gave occasion for charges and accusations of fraud on both
sides, and each prepared itself for a hard struggle. It was discovered
that the matter would have to be settled by electoral boards and courts
established for that purpose. In the meantime, the Liberals demanded
that General Menocal acknowledge his defeat and proclaimed the election
of Dr. Zayas on all sides, and openly demanded to have the government
immediately turned over to them, or there would be serious trouble in
store for the Conservatives and the country. In the meantime, pressure
was brought to bear on the United States government, and protection was
asked by the Liberals against the manifest danger that they would be
cheated of their success at the polls. Threats were also heard that a
revolution would undoubtedly follow as a protest against the usurpation,
as it was termed, of their legitimate right to take control of the
government, and Dr. Alfredo Zayas, in a private conversation with the
American minister, hinted at this, and predicted that if a revolution
should become necessary, it would undoubtedly be successful, since he
knew that two-thirds of the army was with him in sympathy, and would
follow the Liberal command to overthrow the Menocal government if he
should see fit to give such a command.
General Menocal stated very frankly that the determination of the
contest must be left to the local boards and to the courts for decision,
and whatever that might be, regardless of any injustice that might be
imposed upon him and his party, he would acquiesce, and would be the
first man to shake the hand of the successful candidate. A similar
statement was never made by the Liberals. They continued the cry of
fraud, and openly stated that if they did not succeed a revolution would
follow. The judges of the courts, excepting the chief justice of the
Supreme Court, Senor Pichardo, had been appointed by Gomez, and
naturally great pressure was brought to bear on them to "save the
constitution," as it was called, for the Liberals. In the decisions that
followed, the Conservatives stated frankly that they believed this
pressure was producing manifestly unfair decisions, but made at no time
any attempt to ignore them or set them aside.
The court decided that in two districts, Victoria de las Tunas, in the
province of Oriente, and another town in Santa Clara, new elections must
be held. In the first one the Liberals had, at four o'clock in the
morning previous to the day of election, set fire to the town hall,
burning all of the electoral lists, so that an election was absolutely
impossible. This was probably due to the fact that Victoria de las Tunas
held General Menocal in great esteem, since, owing to his personal valor
in leading the charges against the Spanish army, when in command of that
town, the Cubans had been victorious. In the city of Santa Clara
province, the frauds claimed by both sides rendered it so impossible to
determine the true result of the election that a second election was
deemed necessary. According to the records of the Liberal party, the
vote of these two towns, or possibly either one of them, would determine
the election, and Dr. Alfredo Zayas felt quite confident that he would
be the successor of General Menocal, and openly so stated.
The Conservatives, on the other hand, said, "We can only await and abide
by the decisions of the courts, and will surrender nothing until such
decisions are handed down." The supporters of Dr. Zayas stated that the
soldiers, who had been sent there to maintain order, had been sent there
for the sole purpose of preventing the Liberals from approaching the
polls. At this General Nuñez, the Vice Presidential candidate, invited
Dr. Zayas, the Liberal leader, to accompany him thither and to point out
any Liberal in that district who wished to vote, promising that he would
furnish a machine and any protection that might be necessary to see that
he and every Liberal in the district deposited his vote, and that they
together would witness the count.
Dr. Zayas never had an opportunity to bring this matter to a decision,
owing to the fact that General Gomez, who hated Dr. Zayas bitterly, and
who had opposed him in public print more strongly than any other man,
saw immediately the possibility of riding into power as the man of the
hour, as the real, dominating force of the republic, and as the only
man, as he expressed it, able to save the electoral campaign from
becoming one of protracted discord and dispute. So he forbade Dr. Zayas
to go to the town where the election was to be held, or to accept
General Nuñez's invitation, and stated that he was himself tired of the
whole thing, and that he was going to take his yacht and go on a fishing
trip, which he did, leaving at midnight with about thirty trusted
friends, including all of the prominent Liberal leaders. Passing around
Cape San Antonio, the yacht anchored off the coast near Tunas de Zaza,
and there met a group of men by previous arrangement, and started a
revolution or a "popular uprising," as he termed it, against the Menocal
government.
In the meantime, a carefully laid plot, that had been planned months
before, for seizing control of the armed forces of the island was put
into execution. On Saturday night, February 14, 1917, without warning,
two companies of men stationed at the Columbia barracks, at a previously
arranged signal of two shots, jumped from their beds, grabbed their arms
and ammunition, and started across the parade ground for the open
country, of the west. Although the details of this plot were known,
other loyal companies at the command of their officers were called into
immediate action, charged the Liberals and captured more than half of
them and killed a few of the remainder, who at first had succeeded in
escaping. This was the only apparent disloyalty in the western end of
the island. Matanzas, Pinar del Rio and Havana remained loyal to the
government. Among the forces stationed at the City of Santiago, far
removed from the immediate control of the commanding generals of the
army, seeds of sedition, which consisted largely of promises of
immediate promotion of all officers, were planted. Every sergeant was to
be made a captain, every captain a colonel, every lieutenant a major,
with promises of increased pay, and the incidental rewards that come to
the successful revolutionist. This was also true of the Province of
Camaguey, where, at almost the same hour that the uprising took place in
Camp Columbia barracks, several companies of men seized control, made
prisoners of their comrades who were loyal to the government or shot
them dead, captured and imprisoned the civil governors, intimidated the
police, or made them prisoners, and took charge of the customhouse and
the accumulated funds, and all moneys deposited in banks, belonging to
either the state or the federal government. Incidentally all moneys that
were accessible were seized at the same time, which belonged to said
banks, on the ground that there was no time to discriminate. In the City
of Santiago several millions of dollars were thus seized by the three or
four Liberal leaders in command. These men, when the failure of the
revolution became apparent, escaped from the island, carrying some two
or three millions in United States currency and Cuban gold with them,
and landed in Santo Domingo, where some of them were afterward captured,
while the others escaped to the United States.
Securing control of Santiago de Cuba, and having access to the cables,
the rebels immediately wired to the revolutionary headquarters in New
York, which had been established by Dr. Orestes Ferrara, one of the
moving figures in the previous uprising of 1906, in company with Dr.
Raimundo Cabrera, for the dissemination of news favorable to the Liberal
side. Matter was issued, to be used in the American papers, for the
purpose of preparing the United States for the usurpation of the
government of Cuba by General Gomez, and defending such action on the
ground that it was the only solution of a bad electoral muddle, and that
the real choice of the people was General Gomez, who should have been,
and was ultimately, the leader of their party. It was said that Dr.
Zayas, without justification, had usurped and endeavored to maintain the
permanent control of the Liberal party, and that his lack of popularity
had been indicated by his defeat four years before. The entire island
was represented, and especially the army, as having voluntarily gone
over to the side of the Liberals. General Gomez was pictured as having
landed and by previous arrangement placed himself at the head of 12,000
men, who were marching upon the City of Havana; while the President of
the republic was variously reported as having been shot, and afterward
as having fled in abject fear from the palace, and as having at last
found shelter in the home of the American minister, Mr. William E.
Gonzales. It was added that Havana was under the control of the
Liberals, as was the remainder of the island, and that all that was
necessary was the triumphant march of General Gomez into the capital,
where he would assume authority as Liberal Dictator until the island
should assume its normal and peaceful condition, when another election
would be called, in which the people would have an opportunity to choose
and place the power in the hands of the only real man of destiny,
General Gomez.
In the Province of Camaguey, the insurgents followed the same program as
did those in Oriente, intimidating the police, by firing two volleys
into police headquarters and assassinating those men who were forming a
council, the civil government and various other officers having been
imprisoned. They took immediate control of the railroads, and the
rolling stock, placed Liberal or disloyal troops on trains, and started
them across the border to Santa Clara, where they joined General Gomez,
who, with his men, was marching north to the railroad.
In the meantime, General Menocal and the loyal troops of the island, in
the west, started a vigorous campaign to prevent the island from falling
into the hands of the rebels. Officers whose loyalty was beyond question
were placed in command of troops, and sent at once into Santa Clara,
Camaguey and Oriente, and one of Cuba's gunboats, with a company of 300
men, was dispatched to the City of Santiago de Cuba, to drive the
disloyal element from that place. Colonel Pujol was sent to take
measures to restore order in Camaguey. Colonel Collazo and Lieutenant
Colonel Lozama and other officials known for their courage, efficiency
and valor were placed in command of three separate bodies of troops,
with orders to surround Gomez, and give him and his supporters immediate
battle, and capture or annihilate them. These men were equipped with
machine guns, well armed and prepared for a campaign of extermination,
if necessary. In the meantime, the Secretary of Government, Colonel
Hevea, who, according to the Cuban law has control over and is
responsible for order in the interior districts, traveled by locomotive
and automobile, day and night, reporting to the President all that
occurred, and giving those orders which seemed wise for suppressing the
uprising. The American Minister, representing the sentiment of the
United States, which seriously deprecated Cuba's falling into the
revolutionary habit, visited the palace every day, with his military
aide, then Major Wittemeyer, kept in close touch with Washington, and
reported every change in the drama that was being presented in Cuba. In
the meantime, one of the Cuban officials had effectively thwarted
General Gomez in his proposed triumphant march into Havana, by blowing
up the large bridge over the Zaza river, thus preventing the
insurrectionists from gaining control of the railroads in the western
half of the island.
Realizing the grave danger that threatened Cuba in the destruction of
the cane through fire, which had already begun on a large scale, and in
the stealing, and killing of both cattle and horses on the part of the
insurrectionists, Major Wittemeyer, with the authority of the War
Department in Washington, communicated to President Menocal the fact
that the United States government would gladly land whatever force was
deemed necessary to assist in the maintenance of order and the
protection of property. This offer the President refused, stating that
he believed that there was a sufficient force absolutely loyal to his
government to control the situation, adding that he was thoroughly aware
of the plans of the Liberals, that he was in close touch with his own
command and was confident that his officers would succeed in quelling
the insurrection in a comparatively short time. He added that he thought
it wise for the government of Cuba to demonstrate its ability to
maintain itself, and to suppress any uprising that might occur of that
nature, and thus avoid the rather unpleasant task, on the part of the
United States, of being compelled to interfere with the personal and
political affairs of their sister republic.
That General Menocal's prediction was based on sound logic was
demonstrated by the fact that within twenty-three days the forces of
ex-President Gomez were surrounded, defeated and captured. The General,
his son, his aides and his entire staff were taken prisoners and brought
to Havana and placed in the penitentiary on Principe Hill. In General
Gomez's saddle bags were found military orders instructing his chiefs to
burn every sugar plantation on the Island not known to be the property
of Liberals, and tear up every mile of railroad, together with
information demonstrating that he was preparing to blow up every bridge
through the island, thus attempting to prevent the government from
sending forces against him. This work of destruction, in so far as
possible before the capture, had been carried out to the letter. The
railroads along which the revolutionists had control were out of
commission for several months, and much valuable property was
destroyed.
The disappointment in the Liberal ranks consequent upon the capture of
General Gomez and his staff, and the inevitable failure of the movement,
was general and profound, but the last desperate hope seemed to inspire
them to continue the struggle under the leadership of Carlos Mendieta,
who had been their candidate for Vice-President. The plan adopted by
them was to revert to the desperate methods of some former wars. In
brief, it was to divide into small bands, who were to carry on a reign
of terror and destruction throughout the island, the purpose of which
was solely to bring about another American intervention; the argument
was used that they had succeeded in doing this in 1906, and thus had
secured a tacit recognition of the Liberal party, and their ultimate
control of the government. "We were successful," they argued, "and since
the commercial, industrial and political relations between the two
republics are so intimate and the Platt Amendment authorizes the United
States to enter Cuba at any time when, in their estimation, the
circumstances justify such action, if we continue long enough, burn
enough, destroy enough, and succeed in keeping up this state of turmoil
long enough, the American authorities will, sooner or later, be
compelled to come here, and put an end to affairs that will undoubtedly
bring about the resignation of Menocal. His life will be made
intolerable and our several plans for his assassination, that have
heretofore met with misfortune, if followed, will later bear fruit."
At the middle of March, Carlos Mendieta, as leader of this bushranging
rebellion, issued a manifesto threatening the destruction of foreign
property and declaring that there would be no guarantee for the safety
of American lives unless the United States undertook the supervision of
the elections in Santa Clara and Oriente provinces.
In their manifesto the rebels promised to lay down their arms if the
government would hold new elections in Santa Clara Province. If the
government refused to hold such elections the rebels threatened to
continue the revolution and to proclaim Mendieta Provisional President.
The activities of the revolutionary conspirators and propagandists in
the United States, under the direction of Orestes Ferrara in New York,
meanwhile became so offensive that the United States government felt
compelled to take action. Accordingly on March 25, the State Department
at Washington warned Dr. Ferrara that unless he ceased his pernicious
operations he and his associate, Raimundo Cabrera, would be placed under
arrest. This had the result of tempering somewhat the zeal of the
conspirators, though their propaganda was still furtively maintained.
In passing, it may be stated that a part of the general plan--indeed the
first step in the proposed uprising--was to assassinate General Menocal,
while on his way from the palace to his estate, eight miles distant,
known as El Chico. The mayor of the suburb of Marianao, together with
the chief of police of that village, and four soldiers, who had agreed
for a consideration to take part in the assassination, were stationed at
a point carefully selected, with orders to fire a charge of buckshot
into the President's back from the step of his automobile, and then
behind the screen of trees and underbrush which lined the roadside to
make their escape. It was proposed to assassinate the chauffeurs and all
others who might be in the car in order to prevent immediate pursuit.
Since General Menocal was in the habit of going to his country home
every afternoon between five and six, the plan probably would have
succeeded, had it not been for an attack of conscience on the part of
one of the soldiers, who, after agreeing, lost heart, and a few hours
before the departure of the machine hastened to the palace and insisted
upon seeing the President, to whom he gave all the details of the plot.
The betrayal of the plot by the soldier, who was suspected when he did
not make his appearance in company with the others, and the machine not
leaving the palace at the usual hour, which was to have been telephoned
to the plotters, convinced them that discovery was more than probable.
The mayor, with the chief of police, and the others, immediately fled
from Marianao. Pursuit was given, in spite of which they resisted
capture for several days. Exhausted and wounded, they were finally taken
in an old sugar mill near Bahia Honda, in the Province of Pinar del Rio.
Not discouraged by this failure, numerous other plans for the
assassination of the President were arranged, among others the
manufacture of a highly explosive bomb, and an arrangement by which four
Liberals agreed to attempt to place or throw it under the President's
desk. In order to make this plan work, it was necessary to have some man
who could gain access to the palace, and to the office of the President,
and this could be done through the assistance of some one of the
soldiers who had been stationed on guard duty on the upper floor of the
executive mansion. After several months of careful study, one of these
soldiers was selected, and after another conference, the matter was
settled, and the man was intrusted with the bomb, which was delivered to
him at the appointed hour, and with which he ascended the palace stairs
and eventually succeeded in reaching the President, to whom he delivered
the bomb, with his evidence and the whole story. Of course, this second
betrayal of the plans of the conspirators brought about their capture,
and they were tried and condemned to various terms in prison. Various
other plots were formed, none of which was successful.
[Illustration: JOSÉ LUIS AZCARATA SECRETARY OF JUSTICE]
As a natural result of the revolution started a few days before, the two
additional elections ordered by the Supreme Court, were necessarily
postponed, since the island had been thrown into a turmoil by the action
of General Gomez. They were, however, afterwards held, and resulted in
decided Conservative majorities, which were carried by the electoral
boards to the Central Electoral Junta, presided over by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Señor Pichardo, and justified that body in
announcing the election of General Menocal to a second term as
President. In spite of this decision of the courts, which General
Menocal had previously agreed to abide by, the insurrectionary elements
of the Liberal party still insisted that General Menocal's second term
was secured through deliberate and carefully planned frauds and
intimidation of the voters at the polls. The fact is that the election
laws of Cuba forbid and prevent any soldier from standing even in the
doorway of a polling place. He cannot approach nearer than the corner of
the building in which the votes are being deposited, nor can he leave
his post and come closer to the polls, unless some serious disturbance,
where lives are threatened, occurs, with which the police of the
district cannot cope. Since the minority is represented during the time
of voting, and during the count by a man selected for that purpose, no
fraud could well be perpetrated without the consent of someone
responsible to the opposition.
The army officers who had been led by José Miguel Gomez to revolt, had
been captured with arms in their hands, fighting to overthrow the
constitutional government of the island; a purpose of which they had
made no secret. They were therefore guilty of sedition and treason, and
were subject to trial by court martial and to capital punishment upon
conviction of their crime. They were thus tried, and some were condemned
to death and others to long terms of imprisonment; but the extreme
sentence was never executed upon one of them, while many of the prison
sentences were shortened and some of the men were pardoned outright.
This generous action of President Menocal's was performed through the
same spirit of magnanimity that moved Estrada Palma to like clemency,
years before; and it was as ill requited. Some of the men whom he had
thus saved from the gallows or the firing squad promptly resumed
criminal conspiracies against him; while the Liberal party as a whole
demanded that the pardoned officers should be at once reinstated in the
army with full rank and back pay for the time which they had spent in
insurrection and in prison, and railed against President Menocal for not
granting that additional act of grace!
The government of the United States is naturally always on the side of
law and order among its neighbors, and while it of course scrupulously
refrains from meddling in their affairs unless under intolerable
provocation, as in the case of Cuba in 1898, it has always given and
doubtless will always give its sympathy and moral support to those who
are striving for peace and progress and the security of life and
property. Toward Cuba its attitude is more marked than toward other
states, because of the special relations which exist between the two
countries. We have seen how it intervened in Cuban affairs for what it
supposed to be the restoration of tranquillity in 1906. While
unfortunately its influence was on that occasion made to appear as
though given to the revolutionary rather than the legitimate side, its
intent was unmistakable. In spite of the advantage which they took of
its intervention at that time, the Liberal leaders in Cuba have since
felt much aggrieved at it for standing in the way of their designs on
more than one occasion when they wished to revolt against constitutional
order.
The United States did not intervene in 1917. It was not, as President
Menocal confidently assured it, necessary for it to do so. But it is
pleasant to recall that it stood ready to do so, and there is of course
no possible doubt as to what the purport of its intervention would have
been. During that episode no fewer than five messages were addressed to
the people of Cuba by the government of the United States, warning them
against any attempt at forcible revolution. They breathed the spirit of
the epigram of John Hay in 1903: "Revolutions have gone out of fashion
in our neighborhood." Thus on February 19, 1917, the United States made
it known to the Cuban government and through it to the Cuban people
that--
"The American Government has in previous declarations defined its
attitude respecting the confidence and support it gives the
constitutional governments and the policy it has adopted toward any
disturbers of the peace through revolutionary ventures. The American
government again wishes to inform the Cuban people of the attitude it
has assumed in view of the present events:
"First--The government of the United States gives its support to and
stands by the Constitutional Government of the Republic of Cuba.
"Second--The present insurrection against the Constitutional Government
of Cuba is regarded by the American Government in the light of an
anti-constitutional and illegal act, which it will not tolerate.
"Third--The leaders of the revolt will be held responsible for the
damages which foreigners may suffer in their persons or their property.
"Fourth--The government of the United States will examine attentively
what attitude it will adopt respecting those concerned in the present
disturbance of the peace in Cuba, or those who are actually
participating in it."
At the beginning of March American Marines and Bluejackets were landed
at Santiago, Guantanamo, Manzanillo, Nuevitas, and El Cobre, for patrol
duty for the protection of American interests.
Again, on March 24 the American government sent a note saying:
"It has come to the knowledge of the United States Government that in
Cuba propaganda persists that in response to efforts of agents against
the constitutional government the United States is studying the adoption
of measures in their favor."
It was quite true. The remaining insurgents--Gomez and the other
principal leaders had already been captured--were declaring that just as
in 1906 American intervention had meant the success of the revolution,
so now the United States was about to intervene again to the same
effect. Wherefore this American note continued:
"The constitutional government of Cuba has been and will continue to be
sustained and backed by the government of the United States in its
efforts to reestablish order throughout the territory of the republic.
"The United States government, emphasizing its condemnation of the
reprehensible conduct of those rising against the constitutional
government in an effort to settle by force of arms controversies for
which existing laws establish adequate legal remedies, desires to make
known that until those in rebellion recognize their duties as Cuban
citizens, lay down their arms and return to legality, the United States
can hold no communication whatever with any of them and will be forced
to regard them as outside the law and unworthy of its consideration."
That was plain talk, and it had its effect. But the climax was yet to
come in a final message which stated that if destruction of property,
disturbance of public order and deliberate attempts to overthrow the
established government were continued, Cuba being an ally of the United
States, the United States would be compelled to regard the doers of such
deeds as enemies and to proceed against them as such. At that time both
the United States and Cuba were at war with Germany, and were therefore
allies in offense and defense, and it was quite logical for one ally to
regard as its enemy any enemy of the other ally. In brief, any one
waging war against the Cuban government was in effect waging war against
the government of the United States. That stern logic put a quietus upon
the attempted insurrection. "Our last recourse," said one of the rebel
leaders, "has been taken from us. There is no use in starting a
revolution if it is to be doomed to failure before it begins."