There could be no greater mistake than that which has been too often and
too persistently made, in regarding the destruction of the _Maine_ as
the cause of American, intervention in Cuba. The declarations of policy
which we have already quoted from the messages of President Cleveland
and President McKinley, the former fourteen months and the latter two
months before that vessel went to Havana, are ample indications of the
purpose of the American government to intervene unless there were a
satisfactory amelioration of Cuban affairs. But there was no such
amelioration, and therefore war was declared. It unquestionably would
have been declared just the same, perhaps at a later and perhaps at an
earlier date, if there had been no _Maine_ at all.
Beginning before the destruction of the _Maine_, and accelerated after
that event, both sides were preparing for war. Nevertheless diplomatic
negotiations continued, chiefly conducted by the American Minister,
Stewart L. Woodford, at Madrid. In order to facilitate such
negotiations, President McKinley withheld the report on the _Maine_ from
Congress for a time. Spain asked that the pacification of Cuba, which
the United States was urging, be left to the Autonomist Legislature,
which was to meet on May 4. The United States, declaring that it did not
want Cuba but did want peace in Cuba, proposed an armistice to begin at
once and to last until October 1, itself meantime to act as mediator
between the Cubans and Spain. Spain replied that an armistice would be
granted, to last at the pleasure of the Spanish commander, if the Cubans
would ask for it themselves; and that already General Blanco had
abandoned the "concentration" system. This was of course regarded as
entirely unsatisfactory to the United States, but the peace-loving
President McKinley hesitated to report to Congress his dissatisfaction
with it.
Meantime the Pope semi-officially expressed to both governments his
earnest desire for the maintenance of peace; but to no effect. The
German government, strongly sympathizing with Spain and seeking to
foment ill-feeling between the United States and Great Britain, had its
Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Von Holleben, form a cabal of the chief
members of the Diplomatic Corps, to call on the President with what
amounted to a suggestion of mediation, maliciously persuading the
British Ambassador to act as spokesman of the delegation, in order that
any resentment or odium should fall upon him and his country; but the
President with admirable temper and resolution declined with thanks all
foreign meddling in a controversy which concerned only the United States
and Spain. The Spanish government proclaimed on April 10 a suspension of
hostilities, in deference to the wishes of the Pope and of the great
European powers. It was reported officially to the United States
government that this armistice was granted without conditions, though
General Blanco's proclamation declared that it was to continue only at
the pleasure of the Spanish commanders. The Cuban government, through
Maximo Gomez, replied that it had not sought the armistice and would not
accept it unless Spain agreed to evacuate Cuba.
The President of the United States at last, on April 11, laid the whole
matter before Congress in a message which for calm moderation in the
presence of unspeakable provocation, for convincing logic, for lofty and
unselfish benevolence, for keen and just perception of existing
conditions, and for valorous resolution to deal with them in the only
satisfactory way, must take high rank among the great historic state
documents of the world. After reviewing the story of the Cuban
revolution and the condition into which it had plunged the island, he
said: "The war in Cuba is of such a nature that, short of subjugation or
extermination, a military victory for either side seems impracticable."
Then, recounting the efforts of the United States to effect a just
settlement by negotiation, he added: "The only hope of relief and repose
from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced
pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of
civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us
the right and duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop. In
view of these facts and these considerations I ask the Congress to
authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full
and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and
the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a
stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its
international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the
security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and
naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these
purposes."
It is to be observed that the President spoke of the war "between the
government of Spain and the Cuban people"--the Cuban people, not the
Cuban government. There had as yet been no official recognition of the
Cuban government, either as independent or as belligerent, and the
President could therefore not properly refer to it. At the same time he
spoke of "the Cuban people" and not of merely a part of them,
recognizing by inference that fact that the Cuban people were
substantially a unit in revolting against Spain and in demanding
independence.
Spain made it dear that she bitterly resented what she regarded as the
unwarrantable meddling of the United States in Cuban affairs, and that
she would prefer war to yielding to that meddling. France and Austria,
at German suggestion, made one more effort at mediation by the great
powers, but abandoned it when Great Britain refused to have anything to
do with it and indicated clearly her sympathy with the United States.
Finally, on April 20 President McKinley signed the act of Congress which
was made in response to his message of April 11. That memorable act, the
Magna Charta of the Cuban Republic, declared that the people of Cuba
were and of right ought to be free and independent; that it was the duty
of the United States to demand, and it accordingly did demand, that
Spain should immediately relinquish her authority and government in Cuba
and withdraw her military and naval forces from that island and its
waters; that the President be authorized to employ the army and navy of
the United States as might be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect; and that the United States disclaimed any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over Cuba,
except for the pacification thereof, and asserted its determination,
when that was accomplished, to leave the government and control of the
island to its people.
Before signing this act the President cabled its substance to General
Woodford at Madrid, in an ultimatum to the Spanish government, giving
Spain three days in which to comply with the demands. Before the three
days expired the Spanish Minister at Washington asked for his passports
and departed, and the Spanish government notified General Woodford that
diplomatic relations between the two countries were at an end. He
thereupon took his passports and departed. It should be added that on
April 21 the Autonomist government of Cuba issued a proclamation to the
people of the island, urging them to unite in support of the Spanish
government in its resistance to the war of conquest which the United
States was about to wage for the seizure and annexation of the island.
The success of the United States, it added, would mean that Cuba would
be subjugated, dominated and absorbed by an alien race, opposed to
Cubans in temperament, traditions, language, religion and customs.
Thus the War of Independence entered a new and final phase, with the
armed might of the United States assisting that Cuban cause the success
of which had already become practically certain. The Cuban army rapidly
grew in numbers and improved in morale, and was of course abundantly
supplied with arms and ammunition, while the sending of reenforcements
and supplies to the Spaniards was interfered with by the United States
navy. As soon as the state of war began three United States agents were
sent to Cuba, to investigate the condition and strength of the
revolutionary army, and to arrange for its reenforcement and for
cooperation between it and the American troops. Lieutenant Henry Whitney
was thus sent to visit Maximo Gomez in the centre of the island;
Lieutenant A. S. Rowan was sent to Oriente, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. H.
Dorst was sent to Pinar del Rio.
Lieutenant Whitney reached the camp of Gomez in Santa Clara Province on
April 28, found affairs in a most promising state, and arranged for the
prompt forwarding of supplies and of a considerable company of Cubans
who had been enlisted in the United States for the revolutionary army.
Gomez had an effective force of 3,000 men, and reenforcements of 750
under General Lacret, with supplies of food and munitions, were promised
him. But the expeditions, in two steamers, failed to reach him, and
after waiting for them on the coast for two weeks, until his supplies of
food were exhausted, he was compelled to disband his army. Domingo
Mendez Capote, Vice-President of the Cuban Republic, hastened to
Washington, to explain to the government the urgent need of sending
supplies, and as a result renewed efforts were made to land expeditions,
but with little success.
The mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst to Pinar del Rio was similarly
unsuccessful. A few United States troops were landed under protection of
the fire of gunboats, on May 12, but an attempt to deliver a great cargo
of rifles and cartridges to the Cubans was defeated by the Spaniards,
and the American troops were compelled to return to their ship and
depart.
In Oriente Lieutenant Rowan was more successful, owing to the fact that
few Spanish forces remained in that province. He found the Spanish,
indeed, in possession of only the three towns of Santiago, Bayamo and
Manzanillo, and the forts along the railroad; and on April 29 they
evacuated Manzanillo, which was thereupon occupied by Calixto Garcia.
Lieutenant Rowan reported to Washington that Garcia was able to put
8,000 efficient troops in the field, and presently considerable supplies
were sent to him with little difficulty.
Perhaps the most significant information obtained by these American
envoys, and particularly by Lieutenant Whitney in his visit to the Cuban
Commander in Chief, was that the Cubans, while exulting in American
intervention, did not welcome but rather deprecated American invasion
of the island. Maximo Gomez said frankly that he would prefer that not a
single American soldier should set foot on the island, unless it were a
force of artillery, which was an arm in which the Cubans were sorely
lacking. All he asked was that the United States should supply the
Cubans with arms and ammunition, and prevent supplies from reaching the
Spaniards. If that were done, the Cubans would do the rest, and would
expel the Spanish from the island without the loss of a single drop of
American blood.
The reasons for this reluctance to have American troops invade the
island were chiefly two. One was a certain praiseworthy pride in Cuban
achievements and a desire to retain for Cubans the credit of winning
their own independence. Gomez and his comrades had been fighting to that
end for years, and they wanted the satisfaction of completing the job
and of gaining for Cuba herself the glory of victory. The other reason
was the very natural fear that American invasion and occupation of the
island would mean American annexation, or at least perpetual American
domination of Cuban affairs. It seemed contrary to human nature,
contrary to all the experience and examples of the past, that it should
not be so. Of course, there was the promise in the act of intervention,
that the United States would leave the government of the island to its
own people. But it is probable that only a very small percentage of
Cubans ever so much as heard of it, while it would be surprising if more
than a small minority of those who did know of it had any real
confidence that it would be fulfilled. It will be recalled that a very
considerable proportion of the people of the United States regarded that
pledge as mere "buncombe" and declared unhesitatingly that it would not
be permitted for one moment to stand in the way of the annexation of
Cuba. Truly, it would have been miraculous if Cubans had esteemed the
integrity of an American promise more highly than Americans themselves.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL CERVERA]
[Illustration: ADMIRAL SCHLEY]
The first weeks of the war were confined chiefly to naval operations. A
blockade of Cuban ports was established and pretty well maintained,
beginning along the central and western part of the north coast on April
22. A number of small Spanish vessels were captured, and there were some
bombardments of shore towns and exchanges of shots with Spanish
gunboats. Despite the vigilance of the American scouts and blockading
squadrons, Admiral Cervera with several powerful Spanish warships,
sailing from Cadiz on April 8 and touching at Martinique on May 11,
succeeded in entering the harbor of Santiago on May 19. There he was
soon besieged by a more powerful American fleet under the command of
Commodore, afterward Admiral, Schley; who on June 1 was joined by
Admiral Sampson, who thereafter took command. Lieutenant Victor Blue was
sent ashore on June 11, to make a long detour to the hills back of the
city, from which he was able to see and identify the Spanish ships.
Meantime Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson with seven picked men in the
early morning of June 3 took the big coal hulk _Merrimac_ in to the
narrowest part of the harbor entrance and there sunk it with a torpedo,
hoping thus to block the passage and prevent Cervera's ships from coming
out. The exploit was not entirely successful, the vessel not being sunk
at quite the right point, though it did make exit much more difficult.
Hobson and his comrades were taken prisoners by the Spaniards, but were
treated with distinguished courtesy and consideration in recognition of
their daring exploit. Thereafter the blockading fleet kept close watch
day and night upon the harbor mouth, brilliantly illuminating it with
searchlights all night, to prevent the escape of the Spanish fleet.
Meanwhile General Nelson A. Miles, commander of the United States army,
was preparing for an invasion of the island. The Fifth Army Corps was
organized at Tampa, Florida, under the command of Major-General William
R. Shafter, and on June 14 was embarked on a fleet of 37 transports.
This fleet sailed around Cape Maysi to the southern coast of Cuba, and
on June 21 was off Santiago. General Shafter and Admiral Sampson went
ashore to confer with General Calixto Garcia at his camp at Acerradero,
and found the situation by no means as encouraging as they had hoped.
Garcia had only about 3,500 Cubans in his force, and they were not all
well armed, and there were 1,000 more at Guantanamo. General Shafter's
army numbered fewer than 16,000 men. Against these the Spaniards under
General Linares numbered about 40,000.
Averse as the Cubans had been to the landing of American troops, General
Garcia accepted the inevitable, and promptly offered to place all his
men under General Shafter's command. General Shafter accepted the offer,
though he reminded General Garcia that he could exercise no control
over the troops beyond what he, Garcia, authorized. He of course saw to
it that they were abundantly supplied with arms and ammunition, Garcia's
troops were then employed very effectively in protecting the landing of
the American troops, at Daiquiri; 6,000 of them being put ashore on June
22 and the remainder in the next two days. General Henry W. Lawton
promptly led the advance to Siboney, from which the Spaniards were
driven, being pursued after their evacuation by the Cubans under General
Castillo.
[Illustration: OLD FORT AT EL CANEY, WRECKED BY FIGHTING OF JULY, 1898]
The next attack was made upon the Spaniards at Las Guasimas, an action
in which material aid was rendered by Cubans, and which resulted in the
Spaniards being driven back a mile or more. By June 25 the Americans
were on the Ridge of Sevilla, looking down upon Santiago, only six miles
away, and two days later their outposts were within three miles of the
city. There followed on July 1 a desperate contest at the fortified
village of El Caney, resulting in the capture of that place by storm,
with great slaughter of the Spanish, who held their ground with stubborn
valor. Simultaneously an attack was made by another part of the American
forces upon Kettle Hill and San Juan Hill, where heavy losses were
sustained on both sides. The climax of this engagement was a charge of
Wheeler's division, the Tenth Cavalry, against the Spanish entrenched
lines. The van of this division was occupied by the "Rough Riders"
regiment, an organization recruited chiefly among western plainsmen and
"cowboys" by Theodore Roosevelt, who had resigned the Assistant
Secretaryship of the Navy thus to engage in active service. The charge
was led by Colonel Roosevelt in person, though he was in fact second in
command of the regiment, the chief command of which he had declined in
favor of his friend Leonard Wood, who was destined to play one of the
greatest parts in the establishment of Cuban independence. In this hot
engagement the Americans were also completely victorious.
[Illustration: THEODORE ROOSEVELT]
General Pando was now rushing 8,000 Spanish troops from the west to
reinforce General Linares at Santiago, and Calixto Garcia with his Cuban
forces undertook to hold him in check, though he was greatly outnumbered
by the Spanish. On July 2 fighting was resumed, the Spanish assuming the
aggressive, and before the day was done the Americans, greatly
outnumbered and exhausted by the incessant fighting and the heat of the
weather, began seriously considering withdrawal from positions which
they feared they would not be able to hold. General Shafter urged
Admiral Sampson to aid him by making an attack upon the city with his
fleet, but the latter demurred on account of the danger of entering a
mined harbor. It was arranged that the two commanders should meet again
for another council of war on the morning of July 3, and Admiral Sampson
actually started up the coast toward Siboney for that purpose, when a
dramatic event in a twinkling transformed the whole situation.
[Illustration: MONUMENTS ON SAN JUAN HILL, NEAR SANTIAGO]
This was the unexpected emergence of the Spanish fleet from the Santiago
harbor, on the morning of July 3, in a desperate attempt to break
through the American blockade and fight their way around to Havana. In
Admiral Sampson's temporary absence the command devolved upon Admiral
Schley, and orders instantly were given to close in and engage the
Spanish ships. The latter were four in number, the _Maria Teresa_, the
_Vizcaya_, the _Colon_ and the _Oquendo_, with two torpedo boats,
_Pluton_ and _Terror_. Admiral Sampson quickly retraced his course but
did not arrive until the close of the fight, which raged for hours,
along the coast for fifty miles westward from Santiago. The result was
the destruction of every one of the Spanish ships and the killing of
one-third of their crews. Admiral Cervera with 1,200 men surrendered. On
the American side only one man was killed and three were wounded, and
not one of the ships was seriously damaged.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL SAMPSON]
The Spaniards now knew that Santiago was doomed, though they continued
to hold out with stubborn valor. On the night of July 4 they sank a
vessel in the harbor mouth, in emulation of Hobson's deed, to shut the
American fleet out, but failed to get it in the right place.
Preparations were made for a joint attack by army and fleet on July 9, a
truce being arranged until that date, and thereafter more or less
continuous fighting prevailed, without important results, for three
days. On July 12 General Toral, who had taken the Spanish command in
place of General Linares, who was wounded at San Juan Hill, entered into
negotiations with General Miles and General Wheeler, and on July 17
terms of surrender were adopted. All the Spanish troops in Oriente save
10,000 at Holguin, were surrendered, about 22,000 in all. Some minor
naval operations followed at Manzanillo and Nipe, but there was no more
serious fighting. For all practical purposes the war was ended.
[Illustration: PEACE TREE NEAR SANTIAGO, UNDER WHICH SPANISH COMMANDER
OF SANTIAGO CAPITULATED JULY 16, 1898]
The next step was taken in behalf of Spain by the French Ambassador at
Washington, Spain having committed to the French government the care of
her diplomatic interests in America. M. Cambon on July 26 inquired of
President McKinley if he would consider negotiations for peace. The
President replied on July 30 that he was willing to discuss peace on the
basis of certain conditions, the first of which was that Spain should
relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or title to the island of Cuba,
and should immediately evacuate that island. That was significant. It
indicated that the United States purposed to fulfil its pledge
concerning the independence of Cuba. The next condition was that Spain
should cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico. But there was
no hint at her cession of Cuba to the United States. She was merely to
renounce her own sovereignty. These conditions were accepted by the
Spanish government through M. Cambon on August 12; the naval and
military commanders on both sides were ordered to cease hostilities, the
blockade of Cuba was discontinued; and the War of Independence was at a
triumphant end.