The administration of General Marin lasted only a few weeks, but it was
marked with strenuous doings. His first effort was to do what Campos had
failed to do, namely, to maintain an impassable barrier between Pinar
del Rio and Havana. He massed troops on the line between Havana and
Batabano, and took command himself at the centre, hoping to draw Maceo
into a general engagement. But Maceo sent Perico Diaz with 1,400 men
from Artemisia to create a diversion just north of the centre, which was
done very effectively, Diaz and General Jil drawing a large Spanish
force into a trap and inflicting terrible slaughter with a cavalry
machete charge. Taking advantage of this, Maceo with a small detachment
easily crossed the trocha at the south. At once the Spanish forces all
rushed in that direction, to head off Maceo and to prevent him from
joining Gomez, whereupon the remainder of Maceo's troops crossed the
trocha at the centre and north. After raiding Havana Province at will,
and capturing fresh supplies, Maceo returned to Pinar del Rio, fought
and won a pitched battle at Paso Real, won another at Candelaria, where
the Spanish General Cornell was killed, and captured the city of Jaruco
and its forts with 80 guns.
By this time the new Captain-General had arrived. This was General
Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau; the man most of all desired--and indeed
earnestly asked for--by the Volunteers and other extremists among the
Spanish party in Cuba, the man most undesired by the Autonomists, and
the man most hated by the Cuban revolutionists. He had made himself
unspeakably odious in the Ten Years' War as the chief aid of Valmaseda
in his savage outrages, and he was confidently expected to renew in Cuba
the horrors of that campaign; as he did. Upon the announcement of his
appointment the Autonomists largely abandoned hope of any amicable
arrangement, and those of them who were mayors or other officers
promptly resigned their places, being unwilling to serve under him. Many
of them left Cuba altogether, dreading the horrors which they knew were
impending. As for the masses of the Cuban people, they flocked to the
standard of the revolution in greater numbers than before. Within a
month after Weyler's arrival at Havana, more than 15,000 fresh recruits
were following the banners of Gomez and Maceo.
[Illustration: GENERAL WEYLER]
It was on February 10 that Weyler landed in Cuba. He promptly issued a
number of decrees addressed to both the Spanish Loyalists and the Cuban
Revolutionists. He chided the former for their indifference and fears,
warned them that they must expect to make sacrifices and endure
sufferings, and demanded of them that they should themselves undertake
the guardianship of their cities and towns so as to release all his
troops for service in the field. The latter he threatened with all
possible pains and penalties if they persisted in their contumacy. Death
or life imprisonment was to be the fate of all who circulated news
unfavorable to the government, who interfered with the operation of
railroads, telegraphs or telephones, who by word of mouth disparaged
Spain or Spanish soldiers or praised the enemy, who aided the enemy in
any way, or who failed to help the government and to injure the
revolutionists at every opportunity. All inhabitants of Oriente,
Camaguey and the district of Sancti Spiritus in Santa Clara were
required to register at military headquarters and receive permits to go
about their business. Later he ordered all persons living in rural
districts to move into fortified towns, and confiscated the property of
all who were absent from their homes without leave. It should be added
that at the beginning of his administration he sought to curb and even
reproved and punished the cruelties of his subordinates.
In spite of the repudiation of Campos and his policy of pacification,
and the accession of Weyler and his policy of severity, the Spanish
Prime Minister, Canovas del Castillo, determined to make another attempt
at amicable settlement. Elections for a new Cortes were to be held, and
he directed that they should be held in Cuba as well as in the
Peninsula. To that end it was desirable to raise the state of siege in
at least the three western provinces, and on March 8 Weyler issued an
order which he hoped would conduce to that end. The civil guard, or
rural military police, was to be restored to duty, amnesty was offered
to all insurgents who surrendered within fifteen days and who had not
been guilty of burning or confiscating property, and all others were to
be treated as bandits, to be put summarily to death. All loyal
inhabitants were required actively to assist in repairing railroads,
telegraph lines, etc. A similar proclamation was issued for the other
provinces.
The elections were set for April 12, and were then held. The Reformist
faction of Spaniards refused to take part in them, not approving the
policy of Weyler. The Cuban Autonomists also refused to vote, or to
nominate candidates, excepting for Deputies from the University of
Havana and the Economical Society of Havana. They did this at great risk
to themselves, because Weyler after trying persuasions resorted to the
most ominous threats against them if they would not take part in the
elections, and there really was much danger that at least their leaders
would be arrested and imprisoned for treason. The outcome was that only
Constitutionalists voted, and only their candidates were elected;
representing an insignificant fraction of the Cuban people.
Meantime the war raged unceasingly. Having failed to keep the Cubans
from invading Pinar del Rio, and then from emerging from that province,
Weyler again formed a trocha from Havana to Batabano to prevent them
from moving further east. But both Gomez and Maceo broke through, the
former marching into the heart of Matanzas and playing havoc with the
sugar plantations, and the latter going southward to the Cienaga de
Zapata and thence into Santa Clara, where he received strong
reenforcements from Oriente and Camaguey. Then, when Weyler was massing
his troops in Santa Clara, Maceo with 10,000 men swept back to the very
gates of Havana. With the adoption of Weyler's policy as announced in
his proclamations, the war became a campaign of destruction on both
sides, each burning towns in order that they might not be occupied by
the other. In this fashion in a few weeks there were burned or laid in
ruins in Pinar del Rio the towns of Cabanaz, Cayajabos, Vinales,
Palacios, San Juan Martinez, Montezuelo, Los Arroyos, Cuano, San Diego,
Nunez, Bahia Honda, Hacha and Quiobra; in Havana there perished La
Catalina, San Nicolas, Nueva Paz, Bejucal, Jaruco, Wajay, Melena and
Bainoa; in Matanzas, Los Ramos, Macagua, Roque, San Jose and Torriente;
and in Santa Clara, Amaro, Flora, Mata, Maltiempo, Ranchuelo, Salamanca
and San Juan. Many other towns were partially destroyed. On March 13
Maceo attacked Batabano, one of the most strongly defended Spanish coast
towns, took 50 guns and much ammunition, and destroyed the town. Nine
days later Gomez sent troops into the city of Santa Clara, and captured
240,000 rounds of ammunition. He established his headquarters so near
Las Cruces that General Pando fled from that place to Cienfuegos; for
which cowardice he was recalled to Spain, as were several other
generals. Maceo, after his exploit at Batabano, returned to Pinar del
Rio, routed General Linares at Candelaria and another Spanish army at
Cayajibaos, and destroyed part of the town of Pinar del Rio.
Filibustering was now rife. In spite of the vigilance of the United
States government and of the Spanish navy, numerous expeditions carried
men and arms to the Cuban patriots. Those which were successful were
little heard of by the public, while those which failed often attracted
much attention. General Calixto Garcia, one of the most resolute and
daring veterans of the Ten Years' War, sent one on the steamer
_Hawkins_, which was lost at sea. He organized another on the British
steamer _Bermuda_, which was detained by the United States authorities
on February 24, and he was arrested and tried for "organizing a military
expedition," but was acquitted. A little later he reorganized the
expedition and reached Cuba with it in safety. Enrique Collazo and
others sent an expedition from Cedar Keys on the _Stephen R. Mallory_,
which was detained, for a time, but finally got off and landed most of
the cargo in Matanzas. The Danish steamer _Horsa_ was seized by the
United States authorities for carrying a military expedition. The
_Commodore_ carried a cargo of arms safely from Charleston, S. C. The
_Bermuda_ took another expedition from Jacksonville under Col. Vidal and
Col. Torres, but was attacked by a Spanish gunboat before all the cargo
was landed, and took to flight, throwing the rest of the cargo
overboard. Other successful expeditions in the early part of 1896 were
five on the steamer _Three Friends_, one of which was led by Julian
Zarraga and one by Dr. Joaquin Castillo Duany; three on the _Laurada_,
of which one was led by Juan Fernandez Ruiz and one by Rafael Portuondo;
several led by Rafael Cabrera, one by General Carlos Roloff, and one by
Juan Ruiz Rivera. One came from France, under Fernando Freyre y Andrade,
bringing 5,000 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges. President Cleveland
issued a warning, that all violators of the United States neutrality
laws would be prosecuted and severely punished, and General Weyler
offered large rewards for information leading to the capture of such
expeditions, but the chief effect was to stimulate Cuban patriots to
greater efforts, if also to increased precautions.
Much attention was meanwhile paid to Cuban affairs by the United States
government, not only in trying to check filibustering but also in
looking after the rights--and wrongs--of American citizens, and also in
seeking an ending of a war which was commercially ruinous and humanely
most distressing. Several joint resolutions were introduced in the
Congress at Washington, for recognizing the Cubans as belligerents, for
inquiry into the state and conditions of the war, for intervention, and
for recognizing the independence of the Cuban Republic. There were
finally adopted on April 6 resolutions favoring recognition of Cuban
belligerency and the tender of good offices for the settlement of the
war on the basis of Cuban independence. It was of course necessarily
left to the discretion of the President to execute these designs. He did
not deem it expedient to recognize Cuban belligerence, but he did
promptly, on April 9, direct the American Minister at Madrid to make the
tender of good offices for ending the war on the basis of reforms which
would be satisfactory to the Cuban people. True, it had been made clear
that the great mass of the Cuban people would accept nothing short of
independence; but the American Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, believed
that if a genuine measure of Home Rule were granted and put into effect,
the Cubans and their friends in the United States would withdraw their
support from the revolution and thus constrain the revolutionists to
yield and accept the compromise. To this overture of the United States
government Spain made no reply; nor did it to a similar suggestion
offered by the Pope. But Tomas Estrada Palma, speaking for the Cuban
Junta in New York and for Cubans and Cuban sympathizers throughout the
United States, declared that they were not at all interested in any such
scheme, and that they would consider nothing short of absolute
independence.
The Spanish government did, indeed, consider a scheme of so-called
autonomy, somewhat resembling that of Senor Abarzuza at the beginning of
the war; but in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Cortes
on May 11 it was frankly recognized that the revolutionists would accept
nothing short of independence, and that therefore it would be expedient
to attempt any such reforms until the insurrection had been subdued by
force of arms; which was, of course, General Weyler's policy.
There were numerous diplomatic controversies between Spain and the
United States over Cuban affairs. The American Consul-General at Havana,
Ramon O. Williams, intervened in behalf of numerous American citizens
who had been arrested for complicity in the revolution, insisting upon
their trial by civil and not by military courts. In the case of five
American sailors taken on a filibustering expedition, death by shooting
was ordered by Weyler, but the Spanish government quashed the sentence
and ordered a civil trial on Mr. Williams's threat to close the
Consulate and thus suspend relations. Antagonism between the consul and
the Captain-General became so intense that Mr. Williams offered to
resign his office, but the President requested him to remain. However he
finally retired, at his own volition, and was succeeded on June 3 by
Fitzhugh Lee; who proved equally resolute in his protection of American
interests.
Meantime, what of the revolutionary civil government of the Republic of
Cuba? At the beginning it was a fugitive in the mountain fastnesses of
the Sierra Maestra, in the southern part of Oriente, between Santiago
and Manzanillo. Thence it removed to Las Tunas, in the same province.
But after the great eastward drive by Gomez and Maceo it established
itself permanently in the Sierra de Cubitas, in the Province of
Camaguey, midway between the city of Camaguey and the north coast of
Cuba. There it remained, in a practically impregnable stronghold, and
there it surrounded itself with such military industries as it was
capable of conducting--largely the manufacture of dynamite, machetes,
and of clothing. From that capital it directed an efficient
administration of the major part of the island. It levied and collected
taxes, and gave to about two-thirds of the island a mail service at
least as efficient as that of the Spanish government had ever been. A
complete judicial and police system was maintained, and was more
respected by the people than that of Spain. In brief it was
substantially true, as President Cisneros declared, that the island was
peaceful, law-abiding and well-governed, excepting in those places where
the Spanish invaders were making trouble!
But the Spanish did make trouble. Weyler once more strove to place an
impassable barrier between Pinar del Rio and Havana, to keep Maceo shut
up in the former province. He constructed it so strongly, with ditches,
block houses, barbed wire fences, artillery and what not as to make it
almost impossible of passage. Then he put 10,000 of his best troops west
of it, to fight Maceo, and distributed 28,000 more along the trocha to
keep Maceo from breaking out. The result was most unfortunate for the
Spanish troops west of the trocha. They were there to hunt down Maceo.
Instead, Maceo hunted them. If they ventured to attack him, he repulsed
them. More often he attacked them, and almost invariably routed them. At
Lechuza he cut to pieces Colonel Debos's column and drove its survivors
to the shelter of a gunboat at the shore. At Bahia Honda and Punta Brava
the Spanish were badly beaten. In the Rubi Hills a Spanish force was all
but annihilated, and the commanders began to clamor for reenforcements;
though Maceo had only 11,000 men, and the Spanish had 50,000 along the
trocha to keep him from crossing it. During the summer the campaign
slackened a little, though Maceo won several spirited engagements and
maintained his control of practically all the province excepting parts
of the coast. In the early fall, with his army increased to 20,000 he
resumed the aggressive; using for the first time a dynamite gun which
thoroughly demoralized the Spaniards. Near Pinar del Rio city, at Las
Tumbas Torino, at San Francisco, at Guayabitos and at Vinales, he
defeated the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. The same record was made
early in October at San Felipe, at Tunibar del Torillo, at Manaja, at
Ceja del Negro, and Guamo. A solitary Spanish victory was won at
Guayabitos.
Like the general government at Cubitas, Maceo had headquarters in the
mountains, and there guarded effectively a large and fertile region,
where supplies ample for feeding his army could be produced. He also
conducted workshops for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Against
this position, in his rage and desperation, Weyler himself in November
led an army of 36,000 picked troops, with six Generals. For several days
attack after attack was made, every one being repulsed by Maceo with
heavy loss to the Spaniards, until at last, with a third of his army
destroyed, Weyler abandoned the attempt and retreated. Unfortunately, on
December 4 Maceo with his staff and a small force decided to undertake a
secret expedition to seek a conference with leaders in Havana Province.
They accordingly crossed the Bay of Mariel in a small boat and thus
reached the eastern side of the trocha. Messages were sent to
revolutionary chiefs in Havana and Matanzas, asking them to come to a
council of war at a designated point near Punta Brava, familiar to them
all as secure rendezvous. A few came promptly, but in some way the
secret of the meeting became known to the Spanish. In consequence, on
December 7, while he was expecting the arrival of more of his friends,
Maceo heard the sound of firing at the outposts of his camp. Riding to
the scene, he found Spanish troops attacking him. He rallied his troops
and under his directions they were soon mastering the enemy, when a shot
struck Maceo and he fell mortally wounded; his last words, referring to
the progress of the skirmish, being, "It goes well."
[Illustration: JOSÉ ANTONIO MACEO
Born at Santiago de Cuba in 1849, of a family of patriots and brave
fighters, and dying in battle at Punta Brava, near Havana, on December
7, 1896, José Antonio Maceo was one of the most gallant soldiers in the
Ten Years' War and one of the very foremost chieftains of the War of
Independence. Gifted with military genius and with leadership of men, he
was the greatest strategist and the most popular commander in the
Liberating Army, and the greatest terror to the foe. Partly of Negro
blood, he was an equal honor to both races, and finely typified in
himself their union in the cause of Cuban independence. A monument to
his imperishable memory crowns Cacagual Hill, where his remains were
buried.]
At his fall his troops were panic stricken and gave way, so that the
Spaniards occupied the field and plundered and stripped the dead. It was
said that they did not know that it was Maceo whom they had killed until
a native guide who was with them recognized his body. While they were
still plundering the dead Cuban reenforcements under Pedro Diaz came up,
furious at the loss of their peerless chief, and a desperate fight
ensued, which ended in the rout of the Spaniards and the recovery of
Maceo's body by the Cubans. When the defeated Spaniards got back to
headquarters and reported that they had slain Maceo, they were not
believed. It was not considered possible that he had crossed the trocha.
But a little later convincing confirmation came to them from a Cuban
source. This was furnished when Dr. Maximo Zertucha, who had been
Maceo's surgeon-general and who was the only member of his staff who had
survived the disastrous fight at Punta Brava, came to Spanish
headquarters and surrendered himself. He explained that he did so
because he had seen Maceo killed, and he regarded the loss of that
leader as certainly fatal to the cause of the Cuban revolution. The
Spanish authorities accepted his surrender and granted him full amnesty,
a circumstance which caused many Cubans to suspect that he had betrayed
his chief, by sending word of his whereabouts to the Spanish commander.
Of this there appears, however, to have been no proof. Thus perished
Antonio Maceo, who would have been the generalissimo of the Cuban forces
but for the prudent fear that maligners might then have spread
successfully the damaging libel that the revolution was nothing but a
negro insurrection; a fear which he himself felt, and on account of
which he insisted that Maximo Gomez should be the Commander in Chief of
the Cuban Revolutionary armies. Thus perished Antonio Maceo, a soldier
and a man without a superior in either of the contending armies, and a
commander, indeed, who, in personal valor, in strategic skill, in
resource, in resolution, in knowledge of the art of war, and in all the
elements of military greatness, was worthy to be ranked among the great
captains of all lands and of all time. The loss of him was irreparable.
But it was not fatal to the Cuban cause. Thereafter the effort of every
Cuban soldier and patriot was to increase his own efficiency to some
degree, so that the aggregate would atone for the loss that had been
sustained.
While Maceo was thus baffling the Spanish in the far west of the island,
Gomez and his lieutenants were more than holding their own in the other
five provinces. Jose Maceo in April marched from Oriente all the way to
the western side of Havana, where he was joined by Serafin Sanchez,
Rodriguez, Lacret, Maso, Aguirre and others, until nearly 20,000 Cubans
were gathered there. Gomez remained in Santa Clara, where the Spaniards
had a precarious foothold at Cienfuegos, protected by their fleet.
Colonel Gonzalez, commanding in the district of Remedios, routed the
forces of General Oliver. Then, the Spanish power in the three great
eastern provinces having been rendered negligible, a general movement
westward was undertaken, following in the trail of the two Maceos. Gomez
himself took supreme command, and Collazo, Calixto Garcia and others
marched their forces to join him. Calixto Garcia, after only Maximo
Gomez and Antonio Maceo, was the foremost chieftain of the patriots, and
not unworthy to rank with them in a trinity of military prowess. He was
now advanced in years, having been born in 1839, at Holguin, Oriente.
From childhood a fervent patriot, at the outbreak of the Ten Years' War
he took the field under Donato Marmol. His native bent for military
achievement assured him advancement, and at Santa Rita and Baire he was
a Brigadier General under Gomez. In 1871 he besieged Guisa and Holguin,
and then, when Gomez marched westward into Camaguey, thence to force
passage of the trocha between Jucaro and Moron, Garcia was left in
supreme command in Oriente. In that capacity he was active, triumphing
at Santa Maria, Holguin, Chaparra, the siege and capture of Manzanillo,
and at Ojo de Agua de los Melones. Then came the incident which for the
time ended his military career and which gave him that scar in the
centre of his forehead which was ever after so conspicuous a feature. At
San Antonio de Baja he and only twenty of his men were surprised and
surrounded by a large force of Spaniards. Seeing that escape was
impossible, and having vowed never to fall alive into the hands of
Spain, he put the muzzle of a pistol beneath his chin and fired. The
bullet passed through the tongue, the roof of his mouth, behind his
nose, and out at the centre of his forehead. But not thus was he to die.
The Spaniards took him to a hospital at Santiago, where he recovered,
and then sent him to prison in Spain; whence he returned to Cuba after
the Treaty of Zanjon. He was a leader in the "Little War"; then,
enjoying the respect and friendship of Martinez Campos, he went back to
Spain and for a time was a bank clerk at Madrid. Thus he was engaged
when the War of Independence began. Suspected and watched, he was not
able to escape until a year later. But on March 24, 1896, he landed at
Baracoa with an important expedition, and thereafter he was a raging and
consuming flame of war.
The westward march was marked with victory. On May 14 Colonel Segura's
whole battalion was captured. On June 9 and 10 near Najasa General
Jiminez Castellanos was soundly beaten and forced to retreat to
Camaguey. Then, hoping to bar the Cubans from Santa Clara, the Spanish
reconstructed the eastern trocha, from Jucaro to Moron, and sent forces
inland from Santiago and other coast towns to create a back fire in
Oriente. Calixto Garcia turned upon these latter, and routed them on the
Cauto River, at Venta de Casanova, and near Bayamo, and captured great
stores of supplies. At Santa Ana several stubbornly contested battles
occurred between Garcia and General Linares, in which the latter was
finally worsted. At Loma del Gato on July 5 the Cubans under Jose Maceo
and Perequito Perez defeated the forces of General Albert and Colonel
Vara del Rey, but at the heavy cost of Maceo's death. Meanwhile Juan B.
Zayas, Lacret and others penetrated Havana Province at will, in
guerrilla warfare; but Zayas was finally killed in an engagement near
Gabriel.
During the rainy season there was comparatively little activity, but in
the fall the advance westward began in earnest. Garcia captured
Guaimaro, and Gomez pushed on to Camaguey, but left the place to be
dealt with by Garcia and hastened on, with Rodriguez, Rabi, Bandera and
Carrillo. He crossed the trocha with ease, penetrated Santa Clara, and
was soon in Matanzas, where Aguirre joined them with 3,200 men. He put
an end to sugar making throughout most of the province, and then
encamped in the Cienaga de Zapata, leaving a number of active guerrilla
bands to harass and menace Havana. In the latter province at the
beginning of December Raoul Arango and Nicolas Valencia attacked the
town of Guanabacoa, only five miles from Havana, and seized great
stores of supplies. Beyond the western trocha Ruiz Rivera succeeded
Antonio Maceo in command, and carried on his work with much success.
Thus the second year of the war drew to a close with the patriots
despite some heavy losses decidedly in the ascendant, and the Spanish
campaign of ruthless severity no more successful than that of moderation
and conciliation had been.
One other incident of the year 1896 was highly significant. At the
beginning of December the President of the United States, Mr. Cleveland,
in his annual message to Congress, discussed the Cuban problem very
fully and frankly. He practically reasserted the historic policy toward
that island first enunciated by John Quincy Adams, as quoted in a
preceding volume of this history. He reasserted the Monroe Doctrine. He
made it clear that the United States had special interests in Cuba,
which not only all other nations but also Spain herself must recognize
and acknowledge. Concerning the war he said, most justly:
"The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one
of the most fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious
attention of the government and people of the United States in any
circumstances. In point of fact, they have a concern with it which is by
no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character. It lies so
near us as to be hardly separated from our territory. Our actual
pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and
government of Spain. It is reasonably estimated that at least from
$30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are invested in
plantations and in railroad, mining and other business enterprises on
the island. The volume of trade between the United States and Cuba,
which in 1889 amounted to about $64,000,000, rose in 1893 to about
$103,000,000, and in 1894, the year before the present insurrection
broke out, amounted to nearly $96,000,000. Beside this large pecuniary
stake in the fortunes of Cuba, the United States, finds itself
inextricably involved in the present contest in other ways both
vexatious and costly."
Then he added, in words the purport of which was unmistakable:
"When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection
has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a
hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife
which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and
the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a
situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty
of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge."
To those who knew Mr. Cleveland, and who appreciated the care with which
he selected every word in all important addresses, this could have but
one meaning. It meant that American intervention was inevitable. Note
that he did not say "_If_ the inability of Spain _should_ ... a
situation _would_ ..." as though the thing were still problematic. No;
but he said plumply "When the inability of Spain _has_ become manifest
... a situation _will_ be presented...." In his mind the thing was
certain to come. It had already come, and only awaited disclosure and
recognition. Remember, too, that of all men of his time Mr. Cleveland
was one of the most opposed to "jingoism," and meddling with the affairs
of other lands; while to any suggestion of conquest and annexation of
Cuba to the United States he would have offered the most resolute
opposition of which he was capable. In view of those facts, that
utterance in his message was of epochal import. It foreshadowed
precisely what did occur less than a year and a half later. It was in
effect a declaration of intervention and of war with Spain in behalf of
Cuban independence, made more than a year before the steamer _Maine_
entered Havana harbor.