It now seemed opportune to effect a more complete organization of the
civil government of the Cuban Republic, and for that purpose a
convention was held in the Valley of the Yara, at which on July 15 a
Declaration of Cuban Independence was proclaimed, and on August 7, near
Camaguey the action of May 18 was confirmed and amplified, Bartolome
Maso being retained as President; Maximo Gomez as Vice-President and
Minister of War; Salvador Cisneros as Minister of the Interior; Gonzalo
Quesada as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, with residence in the United
States; Antonio Maceo as General in Chief of the Army; and Jose Maceo as
Commander of the Army of Oriente.
This was not, however, a finality. A national Constitutional Convention
was called, at Najasa, near Guiamaro, in the Province of Camaguey, at
which were present regularly elected representatives from all six
provinces of the island. It afterward removed to Anton, in the same
province, where it completed its labors on September 23, when the
Constitution of the Republic of Cuba was completed and promulgated.
Salvador Cisneros y Betancourt, Marquis of Santa Lucia, was chosen by
acclamation to preside over the deliberations of this important body,
and associated with him were the ablest and best minds of the Cuban
nation.
This Constitution provided for the government of Cuba by a Council of
Ministers, until such time as the achievement of independence and the
signing of a treaty of peace with Spain should make it practicable for a
Legislative Assembly to be convoked and to meet for the performance of
its functions. The Council of Ministers was to consist of six members: a
President, Vice-President, and Secretaries of War, Foreign Affairs,
Interior, and Treasury. This Council was to have full governmental
powers, both legislative and administrative, civil and military; to levy
taxes, contract loans, raise and equip armies, declare reprisals against
the enemy when necessary, and in the last resort to control the military
operations of the Commander in Chief. Treaties were to be made by the
President and ratified by the Council. It was provided, however, that
the treaty of peace with Spain, when made, must be ratified not only by
the Council but also by the National Legislative Assembly which was then
to be organized. No decree of the Council was valid unless approved by
four of the six members, including the President. The President had
power to dissolve the Council, in which case a new Council had to be
formed within ten days. It was required that all Cubans should be
obliged to serve the republic personally or with their property, as they
might be able. But all property of foreigners was to be exempt from
taxation or other levy, provided that their governments recognized the
belligerency of Cuba. It was provided that there should be a national
judiciary entirely independent of the legislature and executive.
Under this system the Council was organized as follows: President,
Salvador Cisneros y Betancourt, of Camaguey; Vice-President, Bartolome
Maso, of Manzanillo, Oriente; Secretaries--of War, Carlos Roloff, of
Santa Clara; of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Portuondo, of Santiago; of the
Treasury, Severa Pina, of Sancti Spiritus; of the Interior, Santiago J.
Canizares, of Los Remedios. Each Secretary appointed his own Deputy, who
should have full power when taking his chief's place, as follows: War,
Mario G. Menocal, of Matanzas; Foreign Affairs, Fermin G. Dominguez;
Treasury, Joaquin Castillo Duany, of Santiago; Interior, Carlos Dubois,
of Baracoa. The Commander in Chief was Maximo Gomez; the
Lieutenant-General, or Vice-Commander in Chief was Antonio Maceo, and
the Major Generals were Jose Maceo, Maso Capote, Serafin Sanchez, and
Fuerto Rodriguez. Tomas Estrada Palma was minister plenipotentiary and
diplomatic agent abroad. Later Bartolome Maso and General de Castillo
were made special envoys to the United States.
Salvador Cisneros, the President, has already been frequently mentioned
in this history. He came of distinguished ancestry, the names of
Cisneros and Betancourt frequently occupying honorable places in the
annals of Cuba. Born in 1832, he was by this time past the prime of
life, but he was just as zealous and efficient in the cause of Cuban
freedom as he was when he sacrificed his title of Marquis of Santa
Lucia, and sacrificed his estates, too, which were confiscated by the
Spanish government, when he joined the Ten Years' War, later to succeed
the martyred Cespedes as President. Of Bartolome Maso, too, we have
spoken much. He also was advanced in years, having been born in 1831,
and he, too, had served through the Ten Years' War and had in
consequence of his patriotism lost all his estates.
Carlos Roloff, the Secretary of War, was a Pole, who had come to Cuba in
his youth and settled at Cienfuegos; bringing with him the passionate
love of freedom which had long been characteristic of the Poles. He
fought through the Ten Years' War and gained distinction therein, by his
valor and military skill.
Mario G. Menocal, the Assistant Secretary of War, was a native of Jaguey
Grande, Matanzas, at this time only twenty-nine years old. He came of a
family eminent in Cuban history, and indeed in the history of North
America, since he was a nephew of that A. G. Menocal who was perhaps the
most distinguished and efficient of all the engineers and surveyors for
the Isthmian Canal schemes, both at Nicaragua and Panama. He himself
was, even thus early in life, one of the foremost engineers of Cuba.
[Illustration: ANICETO G. MENOCAL]
Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was another
young man--born at Santiago in 1867--of distinguished family and high
ability. His Assistant Secretary, Fermin Valdes Dominguez, was one of
the most eminent physicians of Havana, and was one of those students
who, as hitherto related, were falsely accused by the Volunteers of
desecrating an officer's grave. He escaped the fate of shooting, which
was meted out to one in every five of his comrades, but was sent to
life-long penal servitude at Ceuta. After the Treaty of Zanjon he was
released and returned to Havana, where he attained great distinction in
his profession.
Severa Pina, Secretary of the Treasury, belonged to one of the oldest
families of Sancti Spiritus. His Assistant, Dr. Joaquin Castillo Duany,
has already been mentioned as one of the organizers of the Cuban Junta
in New York. He had served on the United States Naval relief expedition
which went to the Arctic regions in quest of the survivors of the
_Jeannette_ exploring expedition.
Santiago J. Canizares, Secretary of the Interior, was one of the
foremost citizens of Los Remedios, and his Assistant, Carlos Dubois,
enjoyed similar rank at Baracoa.
Meantime Martinez Campos was straining every effort to fulfil his
promise of victory. At the middle of July he had nearly 40,000 regular
infantry, more than 2,500 cavalry, more than 1,000 artillery and
engineers, 4,400 civil guards, 2,700 marines, and nearly 1,200
guerrillas. His navy comprised 15 vessels, to which were to be added six
which were approaching completion in Spain and 19 which were being
purchased of other European nations. Thus his troops outnumbered the
Cubans by just about two to one. For the latter aggregated only 24,000,
of whom 12,000 were under Maceo in Oriente, 9,000 in Camaguey under
Gomez, and 3,000 under Roloff and Sanchez in Santa Clara. In August
large reenforcements for Campos arrived from Spain, and they were no
longer, as before, half trained boys, but were the very flower of the
Spanish army. They brought the total that had been sent to Cuba up to
80,000, of whom 60,000 were regular infantry. However, probably between
18,000 and 20,000 must be subtracted from those figures, for killed,
deserted, and died of yellow fever and other diseases. But even if thus
reduced to 60,000, the Spanish were still twice as many as the Cubans,
who had increased their forces to not more than 30,000.
The plans of campaign gave the Cubans, however, a great advantage. Fully
half of the Spaniards had to remain on garrison duty in the cities and
towns, especially along the coast, so that the number free to take the
field against the Cubans was no greater than that of the latter. With
numbers anywhere near equal, the Cubans were almost sure to win, because
of their superior morale and their better knowledge of the country.
The Cubans suffered much, it is true, from lack of supplies, and this
lack became the more marked and grievous as the Spaniards increased
their naval forces and drew tighter and tighter their double cordon of
vessels around the island. Several costly expeditions which were fitted
out in the United States during the year came to grief, being either
restrained from sailing by the United States authorities or intercepted
and captured by the Spanish. One such vessel, fully laden with valuable
supplies, was seized at the mouth of the Delaware River, as it was
setting out for Cuba, and the cargo was confiscated. The company of
Cubans in command of the vessel were arrested and brought to trial, but
were acquitted since the mere exportation of arms and ammunition in an
unarmed merchant vessel was no violation of law. Far different was the
fate of any such who were captured by the Spanish at the other end of
the voyage, as they were approaching the Cuban coast. The mildest fate
they could expect was a term of many years of penal servitude at Ceuta.
Such was the sentence imposed upon sailors who were guilty of nothing
more than smuggling the contraband goods into Cuba. As for Juan
Gualberto Gomez and his comrades in an expedition which presumptively
was intended for fighting as well as smuggling, twenty years at Ceuta
was their sentence.
During the summer of 1895 a severe but necessary order was issued by the
Cuban commander in chief. This, addressed to the people of Camaguey
Province, directed the cessation of all plantation work, save such as
was necessary for the food supply of the families there resident; and
also strictly forbade the supplying of any food to the Spanish garrisons
in the towns and cities. Disobedience to these orders, it was plainly
stated, would mean the destruction of the offending plantation. It was
the purpose of General Gomez to deprive the Spaniards of all local
supplies and make them dependent upon shipments of food, even, from
Spain. This meant, no doubt, much hardship to the Cuban people. But
there was little complaint, and it was seldom that the rule was
violated. Whenever a flagrant violation was detected, the torch was
applied, and canefield and buildings were reduced to ashes. There was
also much destruction of railroads, bridges, telegraph lines and what
not, to deprive the Spanish of means of transport and communication. It
was a fine demonstration of the patriotism of the Cuban people that they
almost universally acquiesced in this plan of campaign, without demur
and without repining, although it of course meant heavy loss and untold
inconvenience and often severe suffering, to them. They realized that
they were at war, and that war was not to be waged with lace fans and
rosewater.
At the end of September, after the close of the Constitutional
Convention, preparations were made for renewing the military campaign
with more aggressive vigor. Jose Maceo was assigned to the command of
the eastern part of Oriente, General Capote and General Sanchez took
respectively the northern and southern parts of the western half, and
General Rodriguez led the advance into Camaguey. Maximo Gomez himself
accompanied Rodriguez's army, and was presently joined by Antonio Maceo,
and together they planned the great campaign of the war, which was
conceived by Gomez and executed by Maceo. This was nothing less than the
extension of the war into every province and indeed every district and
village of the island, by marching westward from Oriente to the further
end of Pinar del Rio.
Early in October Antonio Maceo set out to join Gomez in Camaguey, taking
with him 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. At San Nicolas he suffered a
setback at the hands of General Aldave and a superior force of
Spaniards, but resolutely continued his progress. Gomez meanwhile pushed
on into Santa Clara, established headquarters near Las Tunas, where he
could be in touch with expeditions from Jamaica, and began the
aggressive against the Spaniards around Sancti Spiritus. Roloff,
meanwhile, was operating at the northern part of the province, at
Vueltas. Martinez Campos himself was in the field near Sancti Spiritus,
but failed to check the Cuban advance. In fact, at almost every point
the campaign was going steadily against the Spanish; so much against
them that Campos feared to let the truth be known to the world.
Accordingly he issued a decree forbidding the publication of any news
concerning the war save that which was officially given out at his
headquarters or by his chief of staff at Havana. Only Spanish and
foreign--no Cuban--correspondents were permitted to accompany the army,
and they only on their compliance with the rules.
Still Campos appeared to cherish the thought that he could end the war
by compromise, through pursuing a policy of leniency toward at least the
rank and file of the insurgents; and in this he had the support of the
Madrid government. That government had staked its all upon him, and was
naturally disposed to give him a free hand and to approve everything
that he did. However, it insisted that the rebellion must be crushed and
that no further reforms for Cuba could be considered until that was
done. It was feeling the strain of the war severely, especially since
its last loan for war funds had to be placed at more than fifty per cent
discount.
October was a disastrous month for the Spanish at sea. One of their
gunboats was wrecked on a key, and another, which had just been
purchased in the United States, was boarded and seized by a party of
revolutionists in the Cauto River, stripped of all its guns and
ammunition, and disabled and scuttled. General Enrique Collazo, who
earlier in the season had several times been baffled in such attempts,
at last got away from Florida with a strong party of Cubans and
Americans and effected a safe landing in Cuba. A little later Carlos
Manuel de Cespedes did the same, bringing a large cargo of arms. Two
expeditions also came from Canada, under General Francisco Carillo and
Colonel Jose Maria Aguirre. The latter, by the way, was an American
citizen who had been arrested in Havana at the very beginning of the
war, along with Julio Sanguilly, but was released at the very urgent
insistence of the United States government. Sanguilly, who was suspected
by some Cubans of having betrayed their cause, was held, tried, and
condemned to life imprisonment; a fact which cleared him of suspicion of
complicity with the Spaniards.
Maceo advanced through Camaguey and on November 12 reached Las Villas
with an army of 8,000 men. Gomez had meanwhile moved northward almost to
the Gulf coast, and was operating with 5,000 men between Los Remedios
and Sagua la Grande, where he joined forces with Sanchez, who had
marched westward, and with Roloff, Suarez, Cespedes and Collazo. He
established headquarters near the Matanzas border, where he was in touch
with Lacret, Matagas and other guerrilla leaders who were actively
engaged in the latter province. In that same month Maceo fought a
pitched battle with General Navarro, near Santa Clara, and a few days
later Gomez similarly fought General Suarez Valdes in the same region.
These were two of the greatest battles of the war, in point of numbers
engaged and losses suffered, and were both handsomely won by the
Cubans.
In view of these losses, Campos welcomed the arrival of 30,000
additional troops from Spain, under General Pando and General Marin. He
also resorted to recruiting troops in some of the South American
countries, particularly in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, thinking to
find them hardier and better able to endure the climate and the
hardships of Cuba than men from the Peninsula. Such recruiting was not
regarded with favor in those countries, where sympathy was generally on
the side of the Cubans; but a considerable number of adventurers were
found who were willing to serve for good pay as soldiers of fortune.
More and more, too, the Spanish soldiery indulged in excesses against
the inhabitants of Cuba as well as against the revolutionists in the
field, and the conflict showed symptoms of degenerating into the
savagery which marked it at a later date. It is to be recalled to the
credit of Campos that he resisted all such tendencies, and that he
indeed sent back to Spain two prominent Generals, Bazan and Salcedo,
because of their barbarous methods and their criticisms of his humanity.
General Pando, on arriving with the fresh troops from Spain, was placed
in command at Santiago; General Marin was assigned to Santa Clara;
General Mella operated in Camaguey; and General Arderius was charged
with the hopeless task of guarding Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio
from invasion by the revolutionists.
The Cuban government, of President Cisneros and his colleagues,
established its headquarters at Las Tunas, and there approved another
military proclamation by the Commander in Chief, ordering the burning of
all cane fields and the laying waste of all plantations which were
providing or were likely to provide supplies to the Spaniards, and
threatening with death all persons found giving the Spaniards aid or
comfort. One notable blow was struck at the south, before the final
advance was made toward Havana and the west. This was at the middle of
December. Campos himself was at Cienfuegos, with 20,000 troops, and
Gomez and Maceo decided to give him battle. The redoubtable negro
farmer, Quintin Bandera, from Oriente, who at the age of sixty-three
years had become one of the most agile, daring and successful guerrilla
leaders, raided the Spanish lines and drew out a considerable force,
upon which the Cubans fell at Mal Tiempo, thirty miles north of
Cienfuegos. Only a couple of thousand men were engaged on each side, but
it was one of the most significant battles of the war, because it was
the first in which the Cubans relied upon the machete, and the result of
the experiment made that fearful weapon thereafter their favorite arm,
particularly in cavalry charges, and it struck a terror into the hearts
of the Spanish soldiers such as nothing else could do. The machete was
an enormous knife, as long as a cavalry sabre or longer, with a single
edge as sharp as a razor on a blade almost as heavy as the head of a
woodsman's axe. It had been used on sugar plantations, for cutting cane,
and was so heavy that a single stroke was sufficient to cut through half
a dozen of the thickest canes. Swung by the expert and sinewy arm of a
Cuban soldier, it would sever a man's head from his body, or cut off an
arm or leg, as surely as the blade of a guillotine. At Mal Tiempo a
whole company of Spanish regulars was set upon by Cuban horsemen armed
with nothing but machetes, and every one of them was killed.
Turning swiftly away from Mal Tiempo, where they had both been present,
Gomez and Maceo led their troops swiftly to the northwest and before
Campos realized what their objective was they were raiding and defeating
Spanish troops around Colon, in the east central part of the Province
of Matanzas, between Campos and Havana. The distracted Captain-General
hastened thither and, learning that they were retiring eastward toward
the town of Santo Domingo, in Santa Clara, directed his course thither;
only to find himself outwitted by the Cubans who had really moved
further toward Colon. At last he came into contact with them, and with
Emilio Nunez who had joined them, near the little village of Coliseo,
and there he was badly worsted in the fight, and came near to losing his
life, his adjutant being shot and killed at his side. The coming of
night saved him from further losses. But then the Cubans, pursuing
Fabian tactics, withdrew to Jaguey Grande, in Santa Clara, well content
with their achievement, where they took counsel over plans for the great
drive which was to carry them through Matanzas and Havana clear into
Pinar del Rio.
Campos made the best of his way hastily back to Havana, in a far
different frame of mind from that in which he had come to Cuba eight
months before. He had at that time in the island more than 100,000
troops in active service. Since his appointment as Captain-General
nearly 80,000 men had been sent thither from Spain. In addition there
were the Volunteers, or what was left of them. According to Spanish
authorities at Havana at that time the Volunteers numbered 63,000. True,
they would not take the field. But they were serviceable for police and
garrison duty in cities and towns, thus permitting all the regular army
to be put into the field. The same authorities declared that with the
Volunteers, marines and all other branches, Campos had at his disposal
189,000 men. It is probable that the entire force under Gomez and Maceo
in that first invasion of Matanzas did not exceed 10,000 men. These
things gave "Spain's greatest General" much food for thought; not of
the most agreeable kind.
It gave others food for thought; the Spanish Loyalists of both
Constitutionalist and Reformist predilections, and the dwindling but
still resolute body of Cuban Autonomists. The last-named were at this
desperate conjuncture of affairs Campos's best friends. The
Constitutionalists were hostile to him. They had from the first
disapproved his moderate and humane methods, wishing to return to the
savagery of Valmaseda in the Ten Years' War. The Reformists were
hesitant; they had little faith in Campos, yet they doubted the
expedience of openly repudiating him. The Autonomists, having faith in
his sincerity, respecting his humanity, and deploring the devastation
and ruin which was befalling Cuba, urged that he should be supported
loyally in at least one last effort to pacify the island and abate the
horrors of civil war.
The intellectual and moral power of the Autonomists carried the day. The
Reformists first and then the Constitutionalists agreed to join them in
making a demonstration of loyalty and confidence to the Captain-General,
to cheer and sustain him in the depression--almost despair--which he was
certainly suffering. So the representatives of all three factions
appeared publicly before Campos. For the Constitutionalists, Santos
Guzman spoke; an intense reactionary, who could not altogether conceal
his feelings of disapproval of Campos's liberal course, or his
realization of the desperate plight in which the country was at that
time. But he made an impassioned pledge of the loyalty of his party to
the Captain-General. For the Autonomists, Dr. Rafael Montoro was the
spokesman, one of the foremost orators and scholars of the
Spanish-speaking world. He had been a Cuban Senator in the Spanish
Cortes, and perhaps more than any other man in Cuba commanded the
respect and confidence of all parties, Spanish and Cuban alike. He also
pledged to Campos the unwavering support of the Autonomists in what he
believed sincerely to be the best policy for both Cuba and Spain. A
representative of the Reformists spoke to the same effect. Then Campos
responded with a frank confession that he had meditated resignation,
fearing that he had lost the united confidence of the various parties;
but that after this demonstration of loyalty, he would continue his
military and civil administration with restored hope of success in
pacifying the island.
We have called the Autonomists at this time the best friends of Campos.
It might be possible, however, to argue successfully that they were his
worst friends, or at least badly mistaken friends. It might have been
better, that is to say, for him to have persisted in retirement at that
time, instead of merely postponing the day of wrath. For his renewed
efforts either to crush or to pacify the revolutionists were vain. At
the very moment when he was gratefully listening to those pledges of
loyal support, Gomez and Maceo were pushing unrelentingly forward, not
merely through Matanzas but far into Havana province itself. And like
Israel of old, they were guided or accompanied by a pillar of fire by
night and a pillar of cloud by day. The plantations near the capital
were sources of supply for the Spanish, and they must be destroyed. It
seemed savage to doom canefields and factories to the torch. But it was
more humane to do that and thus make the island uninhabitable for the
Spaniards, than to lose myriads of lives in battle. Moreover, the
destruction of the sugar crop, then ripe for harvest, would do more
than anything else to cripple the financial resources of Spain in the
island. All Spain wanted of Cuba, said Gomez, grimly but truly, was what
she could get out of it. Therefore if she was prevented from getting
anything out of it she would no longer desire it but would let it go.
So night after night "the midnight sky was red" with the glow of blazing
canefields and factories, and day after day the tropic sun was half
obscured by rolling clouds of smoke from the same conflagrations; while
behind them the advancing armies left a broad swath of blackened
desolation, above which gaunt, tall chimneys towered solitary, above
twisted and ruined machinery, grim monuments of the passing of the
destroyer. Day after day the inexorable terror rolled toward the
capital. On the last day of the year the vanguard of the patriot army
was at Marianao, only ten miles from Havana, and every railroad leading
out of the city was either cut or had suspended operations. Two days
later Campos proclaimed martial law and a state of siege in the
Provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. Thus the new year opened with the
entire island involved in the War of Independence. Nor was it merely a
nominal state of war. Already Pinar del Rio was overrun by bands of
Cuban irregulars, who destroyed the cane fields of Spanish Loyalists and
ravaged the tobacco plantations of the famous Vuelta Abajo. But this was
not enough. On January 5, 1896, Gomez, leaving Maceo and Quintin Bandera
to hold Campos in check at Havana, drove straight at the centre of the
Spanish line which strove to bar his progress westward, broke through
it, and marched his whole army into Pinar del Rio.
That was the beginning of the end for Campos. In desperation he flung
all available troops in a line across the western part of Havana
Province vainly hoping, since he had not been able thus to keep him out
of Pinar del Rio, that thus he could keep Gomez shut up in that
province, deprived of supplies or succor. Meantime he sent three of his
ablest generals, Luque, Navarro and Valdez, into the western province,
in hope of capturing Gomez. But the wily Cuban chieftain played with
them, marching and countermarching at will and wearing them out, until
he had completed his work there. Then as if to show his scorn at
Campos's military barriers, he burst out of Pinar del Rio and reentered
Havana, sweeping like a besom of wrath through the southern part of that
province, and defeating the army of Suarez Valdez near Batabano. Then,
while all the Spanish columns were in full cry after Gomez, Maceo
crossed the border into Pinar del Rio at the north, and marched along
the coast as far as Cabanas, destroying several towns on his way.
From Batabano the Cubans under Gomez and Angel Guerra turned northward
again, and by January 12 were at Managuas, in the outskirts of Havana,
from which the sound of firing could be heard in the capital itself. The
railroads had been stopped before, and now all telegraph communication
with Havana was cut, save that by submarine cable. The city was not
merely in a technical state of siege but was actually besieged, and if
Jose Maceo and Jesus Rabi, who were on the eastern border of the
province, had been able promptly to join Gomez and Bandera, Havana would
probably have been captured. In this state of affairs the Spanish
inhabitants of the city were frantic with fear, and with faultfinding
against Campos for his inability to protect them from the
revolutionists. The Volunteers mutinied outright refusing to serve
longer under his orders unless he would alter his policy to one of
extreme severity. The Spanish political leaders openly inveighed against
him.
In these circumstances Campos invited the leaders of the various
parties, the very men who shortly before had pledged their support to
him, to meet him again for a conference. They came, but in a different
spirit from before. Santos Guzman was first to speak. He declared that
the Constitutionalists had lost confidence in the Captain-General and
did not approve his policy, and that they could no longer support him.
The spokesman of the Reformists was less violent of phrase but no less
hostile in intent and purport. From neither of the factions of the
Spanish party could Campos hope for further support. There remained the
Cuban Autonomists, and with a constancy which would have been sublime if
only it had been exercised in a better cause, they reaffirmed their
loyalty to Campos and to his policy and renewed their pledges of
support. But this was in vain. Campos realized that a Spanish
Captain-General who had not the support and confidence of the Spanish
party would be an impossible anomaly. He would not resign, but he
reported to Madrid the state of affairs, and placed himself, like a good
soldier, at the commands of the government; excepting that he would not
change his policy for one of ruthless severity. If he was to remain in
Cuba, his policy of conciliation, in cooperation with the Autonomists,
must be maintained.
The answer was not delayed. On January 17 a message came from Madrid,
directing Campos to turn over his authority to General Sabas Marin, who
would exercise it until a permanent successor could be appointed and
could arrive; and to return forthwith to Spain. Of course there was
nothing for him to do but to obey. In relinquishing his office to his
temporary successor he spoke strongly in defence of the policy which he
had pursued. Later, out of office, he talked with much bitterness of the
political conspiracies which had been formed against him by the
Spaniards of Cuba, of their moral treason to the cause of Spain, and of
the sordid tyranny which they exercised. He declared that Spain herself
was at fault for the Cuban revolution, which never would have occurred
if the island had been treated as an integral province of Spain and not
as a subject and enslaved country; and he prophesied that the verdict of
history would be, as it had been in the case of Central and South
America, that Spain had lost her American empire through the perverse
faults of the Spaniards themselves. "My successor," he added, "will
fail." Three days later he sailed for Spain.