In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign commodities which

can come into competition with those of our own growth or manufacture, the

interest of the home consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the

producer. It is altogether for the benefit of the latter, that the former

is obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost

always occasions.

It is altogether for the benefit of the producer, that bounties are

granted upon the exportation of some of his productions. The home consumer

is obliged to pay, first the tax which is necessary for paying the bounty;

and, secondly, the still greater tax which necessarily arises from the

enhancement of the price of the commodity in the home market.

By the famous treaty of commerce with Portugal, the consumer is prevented

by duties from purchasing of a neighbouring country, a commodity which our

own climate does not produce; but is obliged to purchase it of a distant

country, though it is acknowledged, that the commodity of the distant

country is of a worse quality than that of the near one. The home consumer

is obliged to submit to this inconvenience, in order that the producer may

import into the distant country some of his productions, upon more

advantageous terms than he otherwise would have been allowed to do. The

consumer, too, is obliged to pay whatever enhancement in the price of

those very productions this forced exportation may occasion in the home

market.

But in the system of laws which has been established for the management of

our American and West Indian colonies, the interest of the home consumer

has been sacrificed to that of the producer, with a more extravagant

profusion than in all our other commercial regulations. A great empire has

been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers,

who should be obliged to buy, from the shops of our different producers,

all the goods with which these could supply them. For the sake of that

little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our

producers, the home consumers have been burdened with the whole expense of

maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose, and for this

purpose only, in the two last wars, more than two hundred millions have

been spent, and a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy millions has

been contracted, over and above all that had been expended for the same

purpose in former wars. The interest of this debt alone is not only

greater than the whole extraordinary profit which, it never could be

pretended, was made by the monopoly of the colony trade, but than the

whole value of that trade, or than the whole value of the goods which, at

an average, have been annually exported to the colonies.

It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of

this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose

interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest

has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class, our

merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In

the mercantile regulations which have been taken notice of in this

chapter, the interest of our manufacturers has been most peculiarly

attended to; and the interest, not so much of the consumers, as that of

some other sets of producers, has been sacrificed to it.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, OR OF

THOSE SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WHICH REPRESENT THE PRODUCE OF LAND, AS

EITHER THE SOLE OR THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF THE REVENUE AND WEALTH OF EVERY

COUNTRY.

The agricultural systems of political economy will not require so long an

explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the

mercantile or commercial system.

That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the

revenue and wealth of every country, has so far as I know, never been

adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations

of a few men of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not,

surely, be worth while to examine at great length the errors of a system

which never has done, and probably never will do, any harm in any part of

the world. I shall endeavour to explain, however, as distinctly as I can,

the great outlines of this very ingenious system.

Mr Colbert, the famous minister of Lewis XIV. was a man of probity, of

great industry, and knowledge of detail; of great experience and acuteness

in the examination of public accounts; and of abilities, in short, every

way fitted for introducing method and good order into the collection and

expenditure of the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately

embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and

essence a system of restraint and regulation, and such as could scarce

fail to be agreeable to a laborious and plodding man of business, who had

been accustomed to regulate the different departments of public offices,

and to establish the necessary checks and controls for confining each to

its proper sphere. The industry and commerce of a great country, he

endeavoured to regulate upon the same model as the departments of a public

office; and instead of allowing every man to pursue his own interest his

own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice, he

bestowed upon certain branches of industry extraordinary privileges, while

he laid others under as extraordinary restraints. He was not only

disposed, like other European ministers, to encourage more the industry of

the towns than that of the country; but, in order to support the industry

of the towns, he was willing even to depress and keep down that of the

country. In order to render provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the

towns, and thereby to encourage manufactures and foreign commerce, he

prohibited altogether the exportation of corn, and thus excluded the

inhabitants of the country from every foreign market, for by far the most

important part of the produce of their industry. This prohibition, joined

to the restraints imposed by the ancient provincial laws of France upon

the transportation of corn from one province to another, and to the

arbitrary and degrading taxes which are levied upon the cultivators in

almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept down the agriculture of

that country very much below the state to which it would naturally have

risen in so very fertile a soil, and so very happy a climate. This state

of discouragement and depression was felt more or less in every different

part of the country, and many different inquiries were set on foot

concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared to be the

preference given, by the institutions of Mr Colbert, to the industry of

the towns above that of the country.

If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb, in order to make it

straight, you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who

have proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source

of the revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this

proverbial maxim; and, as in the plan of Mr Colbert, the industry of the

towns was certainly overvalued in comparison with that of the country, so

in their system it seems to be as certainly under-valued.

The different orders of people, who have ever been supposed to contribute

in any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour of the

country, they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the

proprietors of land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of

farmers and country labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar

appellation of the productive class. The third is the class of artificers,

manufacturers, and merchants, whom they endeavour to degrade by the

humiliating appellation of the barren or unproductive class.

The class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce, by the expense

which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land, upon

the buildings, drains, inclosures, and other ameliorations, which they may

either make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators are

enabled, with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and

consequently to pay a greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered

as the interest or profit due to the proprietor, upon the expense or

capital which he thus employs in the improvement of his land. Such

expenses are in this system called ground expenses (depenses foncieres).

The cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce, by what are

in this system called the original and annual expenses (depenses

primitives, et depenses annuelles), which they lay out upon the

cultivation of the land. The original expenses consist in the instruments

of husbandry, in the stock of cattle, in the seed, and in the maintenance

of the farmer’s family, servants, and cattle, during at least a great part

of the first year of his occupancy, or till he can receive some return

from the land. The annual expenses consist in the seed, in the wear and

tear of instruments of husbandry, and in the annual maintenance of the

farmer’s servants and cattle, and of his family too, so far as any part of

them can be considered as servants employed in cultivation. That part of

the produce of the land which remains to him after paying the rent, ought

to be sufficient, first, to replace to him, within a reasonable time, at

least during the term of his occupancy, the whole of his original

expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock; and, secondly, to

replace to him annually the whole of his annual expenses, together

likewise with the ordinary profits of stock. Those two sorts of expenses

are two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation; and unless they

are regularly restored to him, together with a reasonable profit, he

cannot carry on his employment upon a level with other employments; but,

from a regard to his own interest, must desert it as soon as possible, and

seek some other. That part of the produce of the land which is thus

necessary for enabling the farmer to continue his business, ought to be

considered as a fund sacred to cultivation, which, if the landlord

violates, he necessarily reduces the produce of his own land, and, in a

few years, not only disables the farmer from paying this racked rent, but

from paying the reasonable rent which he might otherwise have got for his

land. The rent which properly belongs to the landlord, is no more than the

neat produce which remains after paying, in the completest manner, all the

necessary expenses which must be previously laid out, in order to raise

the gross or the whole produce. It is because the labour of the

cultivators, over and above paying completely all those necessary

expenses, affords a neat produce of this kind, that this class of people

are in this system peculiarly distinguished by the honourable appellation

of the productive class. Their original and annual expenses are for the

same reason called, In this system, productive expenses, because, over and

above replacing their own value, they occasion the annual reproduction of

this neat produce.

The ground expenses, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out

upon the improvement of his land, are, in this system, too, honoured with

the appellation of productive expenses. Till the whole of those expenses,

together with the ordinary profits of stock, have been completely repaid

to him by the advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced

rent ought to be regarded as sacred and inviolable, both by the church and

by the king; ought to be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it

is otherwise, by discouraging the improvement of land, the church

discourages the future increase of her own tithes, and the king the future

increase of his own taxes. As in a well ordered state of things,

therefore, those ground expenses, over and above reproducing in the

completest manner their own value, occasion likewise, after a certain

time, a reproduction of a neat produce, they are in this system considered

as productive expenses.

The ground expenses of the landlord, however, together with the original

and the annual expenses of the farmer, are the only three sorts of

expenses which in this system are considered as productive. All other

expenses, and all other orders of people, even those who, in the common

apprehensions of men, are regarded as the most productive, are, in this

account of things, represented as altogether barren and unproductive.

Artificers and manufacturers, in particular, whose industry, in the common

apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude produce of

land, are in this system represented as a class of people altogether

barren and unproductive. Their labour, it is said, replaces only the stock

which employs them, together with its ordinary profits. That stock

consists in the materials, tools, and wages, advanced to them by their

employer; and is the fund destined for their employment and maintenance.

Its profits are the fund destined for the maintenance of their employer.

Their employer, as he advances to them the stock of materials, tools, and

wages, necessary for their employment, so he advances to himself what is

necessary for his own maintenance; and this maintenance he generally

proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of their

work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to

himself, as well as the materials, tools, and wages, which he advances to

his workmen, it evidently does not repay to him the whole expense which he

lays out upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock, therefore, are not,

like the rent of land, a neat produce which remains after completely

repaying the whole expense which must be laid out in order to obtain them.

The stock of the farmer yields him a profit, as well as that of the master

manufacturer; and it yields a rent likewise to another person, which that

of the master manufacturer does not. The expense, therefore, laid out in

employing and maintaining artificers and manufacturers, does no more than

continue, if one may say so, the existence of its own value, and does not

produce any new value. It is, therefore, altogether a barren and

unproductive expense. The expense, on the contrary, laid out in employing

farmers and country labourers, over and above continuing the existence of

its own value, produces a new value the rent of the landlord. It is,

therefore, a productive expense.

Mercantile stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing

stock. It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing

any new value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which

its employer advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or

till he receives the returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part

of the expense which must be laid out in employing it.

The labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds any thing to the

value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds,

indeed, greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the

consumption which, in the mean time, it occasions of other parts, is

precisely equal to the value which it adds to those parts; so that the

value of the whole amount is not, at any one moment of time, in the least

augmented by it. The person who works the lace of a pair of fine ruffles

for example, will sometimes raise the value of, perhaps, a pennyworth of

flax to £30 sterling. But though, at first sight, he appears thereby to

multiply the value of a part of the rude produce about seven thousand and

two hundred times, he in reality adds nothing to the value of the whole

annual amount of the rude produce. The working of that lace costs him,

perhaps, two years labour. The £30 which he gets for it when it is

finished, is no more than the repayment of the subsistence which he

advances to himself during the two years that he is employed about it. The

value which, by every day’s, month’s, or year’s labour, he adds to the

flax, does no more than replace the value of his own consumption during

that day, month, or year. At no moment of time, therefore, does he add any

thing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the

land: the portion of that produce which he is continually consuming, being

always equal to the value which he is continually producing. The extreme

poverty of the greater part of the persons employed in this expensive,

though trifling manufacture, may satisfy us that the price of their work

does not, in ordinary cases, exceed the value of their subsistence. It is

otherwise with the work of farmers and country labourers. The rent of the

landlord is a value which, in ordinary cases, it is continually producing

over and above replacing, in the most complete manner, the whole

consumption, the whole expense laid out upon the employment and

maintenance both of the workmen and of their employer.

Artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, can augment the revenue and

wealth of their society by parsimony only; or, as it is expressed in this

system, by privation, that is, by depriving themselves of a part of the

funds destined for their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing

but those funds. Unless, therefore, they annually save some part of them,

unless they annually deprive themselves of the enjoyment of some part of

them, the revenue and wealth of their society can never be, in the

smallest degree, augmented by means of their industry. Farmers and country

labourers, on the contrary, may enjoy completely the whole funds destined

for their own subsistence, and yet augment, at the same time, the revenue

and wealth of their society. Over and above what is destined for their own

subsistence, their industry annually affords a neat produce, of which the

augmentation necessarily augments the revenue and wealth of their society.

Nations, therefore, which, like France or England, consist in a great

measure, of proprietors and cultivators, can be enriched by industry and

enjoyment. Nations, on the contrary, which, like Holland and Hamburgh, are

composed chiefly of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, can grow

rich only through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations so

differently circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common

character of the people. In those of the former kind, liberality,

frankness, and good fellowship, naturally make a part of their common

character; in the latter, narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition,

averse to all social pleasure and enjoyment.

The unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers,

is maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the two other

classes, of that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish

it both with the materials of its work, and with the fund of its

subsistence, with the corn and cattle which it consumes while it is

employed about that work. The proprietors and cultivators finally pay both

the wages of all the workmen of the unproductive class, and the profits of

all their employers. Those workmen and their employers are properly the

servants of the proprietors and cultivators. They are only servants who

work without doors, as menial servants work within. Both the one and the

other, however, are equally maintained at the expense of the same masters.

The labour of both is equally unproductive. It adds nothing to the value

of the sum total of the rude produce of the land. Instead of increasing

the value of that sum total, it is a charge and expense which must be paid

out of it.

The unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful,

to the other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants,

artificers, and manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can

purchase both the foreign goods and the manufactured produce of their own

country, which they have occasion for, with the produce of a much smaller

quantity of their own labour, than what they would be obliged to employ,

if they were to attempt, in an awkward and unskilful manner, either to

import the one, or to make the other, for their own use. By means of the

unproductive class, the cultivators are delivered from many cares, which

would otherwise distract their attention from the cultivation of land. The

superiority of produce, which in consequence of this undivided attention,

they are enabled to raise, is fully sufficient to pay the whole expense

which the maintenance and employment of the unproductive class costs

either the proprietors or themselves. The industry of merchants,

artificers, and manufacturers, though in its own nature altogether

unproductive, yet contributes in this manner indirectly to increase the

produce of the land. It increases the productive powers of productive

labour, by leaving it at liberty to confine itself to its proper

employment, the cultivation of land; and the plough goes frequently the

easier and the better, by means of the labour of the man whose business is

most remote from the plough.

It can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators, to

restrain or to discourage, in any respect, the industry of merchants,

artificers, and manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this

unproductive class enjoys, the greater will be the competition in all the

different trades which compose it, and the cheaper will the other two

classes be supplied, both with foreign goods and with the manufactured

produce of their own country.

It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the

other two classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains

after deducting the maintenance, first of the cultivators, and afterwards

of the proprietors, that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The

greater this surplus, the greater must likewise be the maintenance and

employment of that class. The establishment of perfect justice, of perfect

liberty, and of perfect equality, is the very simple secret which most

effectually secures the highest degree of prosperity to all the three

classes.

The merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states,

which, like Holland and Hamburgh, consist chiefly of this unproductive

class, are in the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the

expense of the proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference

is, that those proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them,

placed at a most inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and

manufacturers, whom they supply with the materials of their work and the

fund of their subsistence; are the inhabitants of other countries, and the

subjects of other governments.

Such mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful,

to the inhabitants of those other countries. They fill up, in some

measure, a very important void; and supply the place of the merchants,

artificers, and manufacturers, whom the inhabitants of those countries

ought to find at home, but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do

not find at home.

It can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them

so, to discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states, by

imposing high duties upon their trade, or upon the commodities which they

furnish. Such duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve

only to sink the real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with

which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which those

commodities are purchased. Such duties could only serve to discourage the

increase of that surplus produce, and consequently the improvement and

cultivation of their own land. The most effectual expedient, on the

contrary, for raising the value of that surplus produce, for encouraging

its increase, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their

own land, would be to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all

such mercantile nations.

This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient

for supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers,

and merchants, whom they wanted at home; and for filling up, in the

properest and most advantageous manner, that very important void which

they felt there.

The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land would, in due

time, create a greater capital than what would be employed with the

ordinary rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and

the surplus part of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of

artificers and manufacturers, at home. But these artificers and

manufacturers, finding at home both the materials of their work and the

fund of their subsistence, might immediately, even with much less art and

skill be able to work as cheap as the little artificers and manufacturers

of such mercantile states, who had both to bring from a greater distance.

Even though, from want of art and skill, they might not for some time be

able to work as cheap, yet, finding a market at home, they might be able

to sell their work there as cheap as that of the artificers and

manufacturers of such mercantile states, which could not be brought to

that market but from so great a distance; and as their art and skill

improved, they would soon be able to sell it cheaper. The artificers and

manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would immediately be

rivalled in the market of those landed nations, and soon after undersold

and justled out of it altogether. The cheapness of the manufactures of

those landed nations, in consequence of the gradual improvements of art

and skill, would, in due time, extend their sale beyond the home market,

and carry them to many foreign markets, from which they would, in the same

manner, gradually justle out many of the manufacturers of such mercantile

nations.

This continual increase, both of the rude and manufactured produce of

those landed nations, would, in due time, create a greater capital than

could, with the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture

or in manufactures. The surplus of this capital would naturally turn

itself to foreign trade and be employed in exporting, to foreign

countries, such parts of the rude and manufactured produce of its own

country, as exceeded the demand of the home market. In the exportation of

the produce of their own country, the merchants of a landed nation would

have an advantage of the same kind over those of mercantile nations, which

its artificers and manufacturers had over the artificers and manufacturers

of such nations; the advantage of finding at home that cargo, and those

stores and provisions, which the others were obliged to seek for at a

distance. With inferior art and skill in navigation, therefore, they would

be able to sell that cargo as cheap in foreign markets as the merchants of

such mercantile nations; and with equal art and skill they would be able

to sell it cheaper. They would soon, therefore, rival those mercantile

nations in this branch of foreign trade, and, in due time, would justle

them out of it altogether.

According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most

advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers,

manufacturers, and merchants of its own, is to grant the most perfect

freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all

other nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of its

own land, of which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund,

which, in due time, necessarily raises up all the artificers,

manufacturers, and merchants, whom it has occasion for.

When a landed nation on the contrary, oppresses, either by high duties or

by prohibitions, the trade of foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its

own interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all

foreign goods, and of all sorts of manufactures, it necessarily sinks the

real value of the surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what

comes to the same thing, with the price of which, it purchases those

foreign goods and manufactures. Secondly, by giving a sort of monopoly of

the home market to its own merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, it

raises the rate of mercantile and manufacturing profit, in proportion to

that of agricultural profit; and, consequently, either draws from

agriculture a part of the capital which had before been employed in it, or

hinders from going to it a part of what would otherwise have gone to it.

This policy, therefore, discourages agriculture in two different ways;

first, by sinking the real value of its produce, and thereby lowering the

rate of its profits; and, secondly, by raising the rate of profit in all

other employments. Agriculture is rendered less advantageous, and trade

and manufactures more advantageous, than they otherwise would be; and

every man is tempted by his own interest to turn, as much as he can, both

his capital and his industry from the former to the latter employments.

Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raise

up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own, somewhat sooner

than it could do by the freedom of trade; a matter, however, which is not

a little doubtful; yet it would raise them up, if one may say so,

prematurely, and before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raising up too

hastily one species of industry, it would depress another more valuable

species of industry. By raising up too hastily a species of industry which

duly replaces the stock which employs it, together with the ordinary

profit, it would depress a species of industry which, over and above

replacing that stock, with its profit, affords likewise a neat produce, a

free rent to the landlord. It would depress productive labour, by

encouraging too hastily that labour which is altogether barren and

unproductive.

In what manner, according to this system, the sum total of the annual

produce of the land is distributed among the three classes above

mentioned, and in what manner the labour of the unproductive class does no

more than replace the value of its own consumption, without increasing in

any respect the value of that sum total, is represented by Mr Quesnai, the

very ingenious and profound author of this system, in some arithmetical

formularies. The first of these formularies, which, by way of eminence, he

peculiarly distinguishes by the name of the Economical Table, represents

the manner in which he supposes this distribution takes place, in a state

of the most perfect liberty, and, therefore, of the highest prosperity; in

a state where the annual produce is such as to afford the greatest

possible neat produce, and where each class enjoys its proper share of the

whole annual produce. Some subsequent formularies represent the manner in

which he supposes this distribution is made in different states of

restraint and regulation; in which, either the class of proprietors, or

the barren and unproductive class, is more favoured than the class of

cultivators; and in which either the one or the other encroaches, more or

less, upon the share which ought properly to belong to this productive

class. Every such encroachment, every violation of that natural

distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, must,

according to this system, necessarily degrade, more or less, from one year

to another, the value and sum total of the annual produce, and must

necessarily occasion a gradual declension in the real wealth and revenue

of the society; a declension, of which the progress must be quicker or

slower, according to the degree of this encroachment, according as that

natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, is

more or less violated. Those subsequent formularies represent the

different degrees of declension which, according to this system,

correspond to the different degrees in which this natural distribution of

things is violated.

Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the

human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet

and exercise, of which every, the smallest violation, necessarily

occasioned some degree of disease or disorder proportionate to the degree

of the violation. Experience, however, would seem to shew, that the human

body frequently preserves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect

state of health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under

some which are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly

wholesome. But the healthful state of the human body, it would seem,

contains in itself some unknown principle of preservation, capable either

of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of

a very faulty regimen. Mr Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very

speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind

concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive

and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of

perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered, that

in the political body, the natural effort which every man is continually

making to better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable

of preventing and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a

political economy, in some degree both partial and oppressive. Such a

political economy, though it no doubt retards more or less, is not always

capable of stopping altogether, the natural progress of a nation towards

wealth and prosperity, and still less of making it go backwards. If a

nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and

perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have

prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature has

fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of

the folly and injustice of man; it the same manner as it has done in the

natural body, for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance.

The capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its

representing the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, as

altogether barren and unproductive. The following observations may serve

to shew the impropriety of this representation:—

First, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces annually the value of

its own annual consumption, and continues, at least, the existence of the

stock or capital which maintains and employs it. But, upon this account

alone, the denomination of barren or unproductive should seem to be very

improperly applied to it. We should not call a marriage barren or

unproductive, though it produced only a son and a daughter, to replace the

father and mother, and though it did not increase the number of the human

species, but only continued it as it was before. Farmers and country

labourers, indeed, over and above the stock which maintains and employs

them, reproduce annually a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. As a

marriage which affords three children is certainly more productive than

one which affords only two, so the labour of farmers and country labourers

is certainly more productive than that of merchants, artificers, and

manufacturers. The superior produce of the one class, however, does not,

render the other barren or unproductive.

Secondly, it seems, on this account, altogether improper to consider

artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, in the same light as menial

servants. The labour of menial servants does not continue the existence of

the fund which maintains and employs them. Their maintenance and

employment is altogether at the expense of their masters, and the work

which they perform is not of a nature to repay that expense. That work

consists in services which perish generally in the very instant of their

performance, and does not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity,

which can replace the value of their wages and maintenance. The labour, on

the contrary, of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, naturally does

fix and realize itself in some such vendible commodity. It is upon this

account that, in the chapter in which I treat of productive and

unproductive labour, I have classed artificers, manufacturers, and

merchants among the productive labourers, and menial servants among the

barren or unproductive.

Thirdly, it seems, upon every supposition, improper to say, that the

labour of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, does not increase the

real revenue of the society. Though we should suppose, for example, as it

seems to be supposed in this system, that the value of the daily, monthly,

and yearly consumption of this class was exactly equal to that of its

daily, monthly, and yearly production; yet it would not from thence

follow, that its labour added nothing to the real revenue, to the real

value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. An

artificer, for example, who, in the first six months after harvest,

executes ten pounds worth of work, though he should, in the same time,

consume ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, yet really adds

the value of ten pounds to the annual produce of the land and labour of

the society. While he has been consuming a half-yearly revenue of ten

pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, he has produced an equal value

of work, capable of purchasing, either to himself, or to some other

person, an equal half-yearly revenue. The value, therefore, of what has

been consumed and produced during these six months, is equal, not to ten,

but to twenty pounds. It is possible, indeed, that no more than ten pounds

worth of this value may ever have existed at any one moment of time. But

if the ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries which were consumed

by the artificer, had been consumed by a soldier, or by a menial servant,

the value of that part of the annual produce which existed at the end of

the six months, would have been ten pounds less than it actually is in

consequence of the labour of the artificer. Though the value of what the

artificer produces, therefore, should not, at any one moment of time, be

supposed greater than the value he consumes, yet, at every moment of time,

the actually existing value of goods in the market is, in consequence of

what he produces, greater than it otherwise would be.

When the patrons of this system assert, that the consumption of

artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, is equal to the value of what

they produce, they probably mean no more than that their revenue, or the

fund destined for their consumption, is equal to it. But if they had

expressed themselves more accurately, and only asserted, that the revenue

of this class was equal to the value of what they produced, it might

readily have occurred to the reader, that what would naturally be saved

out of this revenue, must necessarily increase more or less the real

wealth of the society. In order, therefore, to make out something like an

argument, it was necessary that they should express themselves as they

have done; and this argument, even supposing things actually were as it

seems to presume them to be, turns out to be a very inconclusive one.

Fourthly, farmers and country labourers can no more augment, without

parsimony, the real revenue, the annual produce of the land and labour of

their society, than artificers, manufacturers, and merchants. The annual

produce of the land and labour of any society can be augmented only in two

ways; either, first, by some improvement in the productive powers of the

useful labour actually maintained within it; or, secondly, by some

increase in the quantity of that labour.

The improvement in the productive powers of useful labour depends, first,

upon the improvement in the ability of the workman; and, secondly, upon

that of the machinery with which he works. But the labour of artificers

and manufacturers, as it is capable of being more subdivided, and the

labour of each workman reduced to a greater simplicity of operation, than

that of farmers and country labourers; so it is likewise capable of both

these sorts of improvement in a much higher degree {See book i chap. 1.}

In this respect, therefore, the class of cultivators can have no sort of

advantage over that of artificers and manufacturers.

The increase in the quantity of useful labour actually employed within any

society must depend altogether upon the increase of the capital which

employs it; and the increase of that capital, again, must be exactly equal

to the amount of the savings from the revenue, either of the particular

persons who manage and direct the employment of that capital, or of some

other persons, who lend it to them. If merchants, artificers, and

manufacturers are, as this system seems to suppose, naturally more

inclined to parsimony and saving than proprietors and cultivators, they

are, so far, more likely to augment the quantity of useful labour employed

within their society, and consequently to increase its real revenue, the

annual produce of its land and labour.

Fifthly and lastly, though the revenue of the inhabitants of every country

was supposed to consist altogether, as this system seems to suppose, in

the quantity of subsistence which their industry could procure to them;

yet, even upon this supposition, the revenue of a trading and

manufacturing country must, other things being equal, always be much

greater than that of one without trade or manufactures. By means of trade

and manufactures, a greater quantity of subsistence can be annually

imported into a particular country, than what its own lands, in the actual

state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of a town,

though they frequently possess no lands of their own, yet draw to

themselves, by their industry, such a quantity of the rude produce of the

lands of other people, as supplies them, not only with the materials of

their work, but with the fund of their subsistence. What a town always is

with regard to the country in its neighbourhood, one independent state or

country may frequently be with regard to other independent states or

countries. It is thus that Holland draws a great part of its subsistence

from other countries; live cattle from Holstein and Jutland, and corn from

almost all the different countries of Europe. A small quantity of

manufactured produce, purchases a great quantity of rude produce. A

trading and manufacturing country, therefore, naturally purchases, with a

small part of its manufactured produce, a great part of the rude produce

of other countries; while, on the contrary, a country without trade and

manufactures is generally obliged to purchase, at the expense of a great

part of its rude produce, a very small part of the manufactured produce of

other countries. The one exports what can subsist and accommodate but a

very few, and imports the subsistence and accommodation of a great number.

The other exports the accommodation and subsistence of a great number, and

imports that of a very few only. The inhabitants of the one must always

enjoy a much greater quantity of subsistence than what their own lands, in

the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of

the other must always enjoy a much smaller quantity.

This system, however, with all its imperfections, is perhaps the nearest

approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of

political economy; and is upon that account, well worth the consideration

of every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that

very important science. Though in representing the labour which is

employed upon land as the only productive labour, the notions which it

inculcates are, perhaps, too narrow and confined; yet in representing the

wealth of nations as consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money,

but in the consumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the

society, and in representing perfect liberty as the only effectual

expedient for rendering this annual reproduction the greatest possible,

its doctrine seems to be in every respect as just as it is generous and

liberal. Its followers are very numerous; and as men are fond of

paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what surpasses the

comprehensions of ordinary people, the paradox which it maintains,

concerning the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has not,

perhaps, contributed a little to increase the number of its admirers. They

have for some years past made a pretty considerable sect, distinguished in

the French republic of letters by the name of the Economists. Their works

have certainly been of some service to their country; not only by bringing

into general discussion, many subjects which had never been well examined

before, but by influencing, in some measure, the public administration in

favour of agriculture. It has been in consequence of their

representations, accordingly, that the agriculture of France has been

delivered from several of the oppressions which it before laboured under.

The term, during which such a lease can be granted, as will be valid

against every future purchaser or proprietor of the land, has been

prolonged from nine to twenty-seven years. The ancient provincial

restraints upon the transportation of corn from one province of the

kingdom to another, have been entirely taken away; and the liberty of

exporting it to all foreign countries, has been established as the common

law of the kingdom in all ordinary cases. This sect, in their works, which

are very numerous, and which treat not only of what is properly called

Political Economy, or of the nature and causes or the wealth of nations,

but of every other branch of the system of civil government, all follow

implicitly, and without any sensible variation, the doctrine of Mr

Qttesnai. There is, upon this account, little variety in the greater part

of their works. The most distinct and best connected account of this

doctrine is to be found in a little book written by Mr Mercier de la

Riviere, some time intendant of Martinico, entitled, The natural and

essential Order of Political Societies. The admiration of this whole sect

for their master, who was himself a man of the greatest modesty and

simplicity, is not inferior to that of any of the ancient philosophers for

the founders of their respective systems. ‘There have been since the world

began,’ says a very diligent and respectable author, the Marquis de

Mirabeau, ‘three great inventions which have principally given stability

to political societies, independent of many other inventions which have

enriched and adorned them. The first is the invention of writing, which

alone gives human nature the power of transmitting, without alteration,

its laws, its contracts, its annals, and its discoveries. The second is

the invention of money, which binds together all the relations between

civilized societies. The third is the economical table, the result of the

other two, which completes them both by perfecting their object; the great

discovery of our age, but of which our posterity will reap the benefit.’

As the political economy of the nations of modern Europe has been more

favourable to manufactures and foreign trade, the industry of the towns,

than to agriculture, the industry of the country; so that of other nations

has followed a different plan, and has been more favourable to agriculture

than to manufactures and foreign trade.

The policy of China favours agriculture more than all other employments.

In China, the condition of a labourer is said to be as much superior to

that of an artificer, as in most parts of Europe that of an artificer is

to that of a labourer. In China, the great ambition of every man is to get

possession of a little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and

leases are there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be

sufficiently secured to the lessees. The Chinese have little respect for

foreign trade. Your beggarly commerce! was the language in which the

mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr De Lange, the Russian envoy,

concerning it {See the Journal of Mr De Lange, in Bell’s Travels, vol.

ii. p. 258, 276, 293.}. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on,

themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign trade; and it

is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even admit the

ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade, therefore, is, in China, every

way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it would

naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in

their own ships, or in those of foreign nations.

Manufactures, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value,

and can upon that account be transported at less expense from one country

to another than most parts of rude produce, are, in almost all countries,

the principal support of foreign trade. In countries, besides, less

extensive, and less favourably circumstanced for inferior commerce than

China, they generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an

extensive foreign market, they could not well flourish, either in

countries so moderately extensive as to afford but a narrow home market,

or in countries where the communication between one province and another

was so difficult, as to render it impossible for the goods of any

particular place to enjoy the whole of that home market which the country

could afford. The perfection of manufacturing industry, it must be

remembered, depends altogether upon the division of labour; and the degree

to which the division of labour can be introduced into any manufacture, is

necessarily regulated, it has already been shewn, by the extent of the

market. But the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of

its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions

in its different provinces, and the easy communication by means of

water-carriage between the greater part of them, render the home market of

that country of so great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very

great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of

labour. The home market of China is, perhaps, in extent, not much inferior

to the market of all the different countries of Europe put together. A

more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this great home market

added the foreign market of all the rest of the world, especially if any

considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese ships, could

scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, and to

improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry. By

a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn the art of

using and constructing, themselves, all the different machines made use of

in other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and industry

which are practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon their

present plan, they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the

example of any other nation, except that of the Japanese.

The policy of ancient Egypt, too, and that of the Gentoo government of

Indostan, seem to have favoured agriculture more than all other

employments.

Both in ancient Egypt and Indostan, the whole body of the people was

divided into different casts or tribes each of which was confined, from

father to son, to a particular employment, or class of employments. The

son of a priest was necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier;

the son of a labourer, a labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son

of a tailor, a tailor, etc. In both countries, the cast of the priests

holds the highest rank, and that of the soldiers the next; and in both

countries the cast of the farmers and labourers was superior to the casts

of merchants and manufacturers.

The government of both countries was particularly attentive to the

interest of agriculture. The works constructed by the ancient sovereigns

of Egypt, for the proper distribution of the waters of the Nile, were

famous in antiquity, and the ruined remains of some of them are still the

admiration of travellers. Those of the same kind which were constructed by

the ancient sovereigns of Indostan, for the proper distribution of the

waters of the Ganges, as well as of many other rivers, though they have

been less celebrated, seem to have been equally great. Both countries,

accordingly, though subject occasionally to dearths, have been famous for

their great fertility. Though both were extremely populous, yet, in years

of moderate plenty, they were both able to export great quantities of

grain to their neighbours.

The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the

Gentoo religion does not permit its followers to light a fire, nor

consequently to dress any victuals, upon the water, it, in effect,

prohibits them from all distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and

Indians must have depended almost altogether upon the navigation of other

nations for the exportation of their surplus produce; and this dependency,

as it must have confined the market, so it must have discouraged the

increase of this surplus produce. It must have discouraged, too, the

increase of the manufactured produce, more than that of the rude produce.

Manufactures require a much more extensive market than the most important

parts of the rude produce of the land. A single shoemaker will make more

than 300 pairs of shoes in the year; and his own family will not, perhaps,

wear out six pairs. Unless, therefore, he has the custom of, at least, 50

such families as his own, he cannot dispose of the whole product of his

own labour. The most numerous class of artificers will seldom, in a large

country, make more than one in 50, or one in a 100, of the whole number of

families contained in it. But in such large countries, as France and

England, the number of people employed in agriculture has, by some authors

been computed at a half, by others at a third and by no author that I know

of, at less that a fifth of the whole inhabitants of the country. But as

the produce of the agriculture of both France and England is, the far

greater part of it, consumed at home, each person employed in it must,

according to these computations, require little more than the custom of

one, two, or, at most, of four such families as his own, in order to

dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. Agriculture, therefore,

can support itself under the discouragement of a confined market much

better than manufactures. In both ancient Egypt and Indostan, indeed, the

confinement of the foreign market was in some measure compensated by the

conveniency of many inland navigations, which opened, in the most

advantageous manner, the whole extent of the home market to every part of

the produce of every different district of those countries. The great

extent of Indostan, too, rendered the home market of that country very

great, and sufficient to support a great variety of manufactures. But the

small extent of ancient Egypt, which was never equal to England, must at

all times, have rendered the home market of that country too narrow for

supporting any great variety of manufactures. Bengal accordingly, the

province of Indostan which commonly exports the greatest quantity of rice,

has always been more remarkable for the exportation of a great variety of

manufactures, than for that of its grain. Ancient Egypt, on the contrary,

though it exported some manufactures, fine linen in particular, as well as

some other goods, was always most distinguished for its great exportation

of grain. It was long the granary of the Roman empire.

The sovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms

into which Indostan has, at different times, been divided, have always

derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue,

from some sort of land tax or land rent. This land tax, or land rent, like

the tithe in Europe, consisted in a certain proportion, a fifth, it is

said, of the produce of the land, which was either delivered in kind, or

paid in money, according to a certain valuation, and which, therefore,

varied from year to year, according to all the variations of the produce.

It was natural, therefore, that the sovereigns of those countries should

be particularly attentive to the interests of agriculture, upon the

prosperity or declension of which immediately depended the yearly increase

or diminution of their own revenue.

The policy of the ancient republics of Greece, and that of Rome, though it

honoured agriculture more than manufactures or foreign trade, yet seems

rather to have discouraged the latter employments, than to have given any

direct or intentional encouragement to the former. In several of the

ancient states of Greece, foreign trade was prohibited altogether; and in

several others, the employments of artificers and manufacturers were

considered as hurtful to the strength and agility of the human body, as

rendering it incapable of those habits which their military and gymnastic

exercises endeavoured to form in it, and as thereby disqualifying it, more

or less, for undergoing the fatigues and encountering the dangers of war.

Such occupations were considered as fit only for slaves, and the free

citizens of the states were prohibited from exercising them. Even in those

states where no such prohibition took place, as in Rome and Athens, the

great body of the people were in effect excluded from all the trades which

are now commonly exercised by the lower sort of the inhabitants of towns.

Such trades were, at Athens and Rome, all occupied by the slaves of the

rich, who exercised them for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth,

power, and protection, made it almost impossible for a poor freeman to

find a market for his work, when it came into competition with that of the

slaves of the rich. Slaves, however, are very seldom inventive; and all

the most important improvements, either in machinery, or in the

arrangement and distribution of work, which facilitate and abridge labour

have been the discoveries of freemen. Should a slave propose any

improvement of this kind, his master would be very apt to consider the

proposal as the suggestion of laziness, and of a desire to save his own

labour at the master’s expense. The poor slave, instead of reward would

probably meet with much abuse, perhaps with some punishment. In the

manufactures carried on by slaves, therefore, more labour must generally

have been employed to execute the same quantity of work, than in those

carried on by freemen. The work of the farmer must, upon that account,

generally have been dearer than that of the latter. The Hungarian mines,

it is remarked by Mr Montesquieu, though not richer, have always been

wrought with less expense, and therefore with more profit, than the

Turkish mines in their neighbourhood. The Turkish mines are wrought by

slaves; and the arms of those slaves are the only machines which the Turks

have ever thought of employing. The Hungarian mines are wrought by

freemen, who employ a great deal of machinery, by which they facilitate

and abridge their own labour. From the very little that is known about the

price of manufactures in the times of the Greeks and Romans, it would

appear that those of the finer sort were excessively dear. Silk sold for

its weight in gold. It was not, indeed, in those times an European

manufacture; and as it was all brought from the East Indies, the distance

of the carriage may in some measure account for the greatness of the

price. The price, however, which a lady, it is said, would sometimes pay

for a piece of very fine linen, seems to have been equally extravagant;

and as linen was always either an European, or at farthest, an Egyptian

manufacture, this high price can be accounted for only by the great

expense of the labour which must have been employed about It, and the

expense of this labour again could arise from nothing but the awkwardness

of the machinery which is made use of. The price of fine woollens, too,

though not quite so extravagant, seems, however, to have been much above

that of the present times. Some cloths, we are told by Pliny {Plin. 1.

ix.c.39.}, dyed in a particular manner, cost a hundred denarii, or

£3:6s:8d. the pound weight. Others, dyed in another manner, cost a

thousand denarii the pound weight, or £33:6s:8d. The Roman pound, it must

be remembered, contained only twelve of our avoirdupois ounces. This high

price, indeed, seems to have been principally owing to the dye. But had

not the cloths themselves been much dearer than any which are made in the

present times, so very expensive a dye would not probably have been

bestowed upon them. The disproportion would have been too great between

the value of the accessory and that of the principal. The price mentioned

by the same author {Plin. 1. viii.c.48.}, of some triclinaria, a sort of

woollen pillows or cushions made use of to lean upon as they reclined upon

their couches at table, passes all credibility; some of them being said to

have cost more than £30,000, others more than £300,000. This high price,

too, is not said to have arisen from the dye. In the dress of the people

of fashion of both sexes, there seems to have been much less variety, it

is observed by Dr Arbuthnot, in ancient than in modern times; and the

very little variety which we find in that of the ancient statues, confirms

his observation. He infers from this, that their dress must, upon the

whole, have been cheaper than ours; but the conclusion does not seem to

follow. When the expense of fashionable dress is very great, the variety

must be very small. But when, by the improvements in the productive powers

of manufacturing art and industry, the expense of any one dress comes to

be very moderate, the variety will naturally be very great. The rich, not

being able to distinguish themselves by the expense of any one dress, will

naturally endeavour to do so by the multitude and variety of their

dresses.

The greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation, it

has already been observed, is that which is carried on between the

inhabitants of the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the

town draw from the country the rude produce, which constitutes both the

materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence; and they pay

for this rude produce, by sending back to the country a certain portion of

it manufactured and prepared for immediate use. The trade which is carried

on between these two different sets of people, consists ultimately in a

certain quantity of rude produce exchanged for a certain quantity of

manufactured produce. The dearer the latter, therefore, the cheaper the

former; and whatever tends in any country to raise the price of

manufactured produce, tends to lower that of the rude produce of the land,

and thereby to discourage agriculture. The smaller the quantity of

manufactured produce, which any given quantity of rude produce, or, what

comes to the same thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude

produce, is capable of purchasing, the smaller the exchangeable value of

that given quantity of rude produce; the smaller the encouragement which

either the landlord has to increase its quantity by improving, or the

farmer by cultivating the land. Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in

any country the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish

the home market, the most important of all markets, for the rude produce

of the land, and thereby still further to discourage agriculture.

Those systems, therefore, which preferring agriculture to all other

employments, in order to promote it, impose restraints upon manufactures

and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and

indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to

promote. They are so far, perhaps, more inconsistent than even the

mercantile system. That system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign

trade more than agriculture, turns a certain portion of the capital of the

society, from supporting a more advantageous, to support a less

advantageous species of industry. But still it really, and in the end,

encourages that species of industry which it means to promote. Those

agricultural systems, on the contrary, really, and in the end, discourage

their own favourite species of industry.

It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary

encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater

share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it,

or, by extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of

industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in

it, is, in reality, subversive of the great purpose which it means to

promote. It retards, instead of accelerating the progress of the society

towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing,

the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour.

All systems, either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus

completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty

establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not

violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own

interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into

competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is

completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he

must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper

performance of which, no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be

sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and

of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interests of

the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has

only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed,

but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of

protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent

societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every

member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other

member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of

justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public

works, and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the

interest of any individual, or small number of individuals to erect and

maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any

individual, or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do

much more than repay it to a great society.

The proper performance of those several duties of the sovereign

necessarily supposes a certain expense; and this expense again necessarily

requires a certain revenue to support it. In the following book,

therefore, I shall endeavour to explain, first, what are the necessary

expenses of the sovereign or commonwealth; and which of those expenses

ought to be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society; and

which of them, by that of some particular part only, or of some particular

members of the society: secondly, what are the different methods in which

the whole society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expenses

incumbent on the whole society; and what are the principal advantages and

inconveniencies of each of those methods: and thirdly, what are the

reasons and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to

mortgage some part of this revenue, or to contract debts; and what have

been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce

of the land and labour of the society. The following book, therefore, will

naturally be divided into three chapters.

APPENDIX TO BOOK IV

The two following accounts are subjoined, in order to illustrate and

confirm what is said in the fifth chapter of the fourth book, concerning

the Tonnage Bounty to the Whit-herring Fishery. The reader, I believe, may

depend upon the accuracy of both accounts.

An account of Busses fitted out in Scotland for eleven Years, with the

Number of empty Barrels carried out, and the Number of Barrels of Herrings

caught; also the Bounty, at a Medium, on each Barrel of Sea-sricks, and on

each Barrel when fully packed.

Years Number of Empty Barrels Barrels of Her- Bounty paid on

Busses carried out rings caught the Busses

£. s. d.

1771 29 5,948 2,832 2,885 0 0

1772 168 41,316 22,237 11,055 7 6

1773 190 42,333 42,055 12,510 8 6

1774 240 59,303 56,365 26,932 2 6

1775 275 69,144 52,879 19,315 15 0

1776 294 76,329 51,863 21,290 7 6

1777 240 62,679 43,313 17,592 2 6

1778 220 56,390 40,958 16,316 2 6

1779 206 55,194 29,367 15,287 0 0

1780 181 48,315 19,885 13,445 12 6

1781 135 33,992 16,593 9,613 15 6

Totals 2,186 550,943 378,347 £165,463 14 0

Sea-sticks 378,347 Bounty, at a medium, for each

barrel of sea-sticks, £ 0 8 2¼

But a barrel of sea-sticks

being only reckoned two thirds

of a barrel fully packed, one

third to be deducted, which

⅓ deducted 126,115 brings the bounty to £ 0 12 3¾

Barrels fully

packed 252,231

And if the herrings are exported, there is besides a

premium of £ 0 2 8

So the bounty paid by government in money for each

barrel is £ 0 14 11¾

But if to this, the duty of the salt usually taken

credit for as expended in curing each barrel, which

at a medium, is, of foreign, one bushel and one-

fourth of a bushel, at 10s. a-bushel, be added, viz 0 12 6

the bounty on each barrel would amount to £ 1 7 5¾

If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will

stand thus, viz.

Bounty as before £ 0 14 11¾

But if to this bounty, the duty on two bushels of

Scotch salt, at 1s.6d. per bushel, supposed to be

the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each

barrel is added, viz. 0 3 0

The bounty on each barrel will amount to £ 0 17 11¾

And when buss herrings are entered for home

consumption in Scotland, and pay the shilling a

barrel of duty, the bounty stands thus, to wit,

as before £ 0 12 3¾

From which the shilling a barrel is to be deducted 0 1 0

£ 0 11 3¾

But to that there is to be added again, the duty of

the foreign salt used curing a barrel of herring viz 0 12 6

So that the premium allowed for each barrel of her-

rings entered for home consumption is £ 1 3 9¾

If the herrings are cured in British salt, it will

stand as follows viz.

Bounty on each barrel brought in by the busses, as

above £ 0 12 3¾

From which deduct 1s. a-barrel, paid at the time

they are entered for home consumption 0 1 0

£ 0 11 3¾

But if to the bounty, the the duty on two bushel

of Scotch salt, at 1s.6d. per bushel supposed to

be the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each

barrel, is added, viz 0 3 0

the premium for each barrel entered for home

consumption will be £ 1 14 3¾

Though the loss of duties upon herrings exported cannot, perhaps, properly

be considered as bounty, that upon herrings entered for home consumption

certainly may.

An account of the Quantity of Foreign Salt imported into Scotland, and of

Scotch Salt delivered Duty-free from the Works there, for the Fishery,

from the 5th. of April 1771 to the 5th. of April 1782 with the Medium of

both for one Year.

Foreign Salt Scotch Salt delivered

PERIOD imported from the Works

Bushels Bushels

From 5th. April 1771 to

5th. April 1782 936,974 168,226

Medium for one year 85,159½ 15,293¼

It is to be observed, that the bushel of foreign salt weighs 48lbs., that

of British weighs 56lbs. only.

BOOK V.

OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER I.

OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.

PART I. Of the Expense of Defence.

The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the

violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed

only by means of a military force. But the expense both of preparing this

military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is

very different in the different states of society, in the different

periods of improvement.

Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as

we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a

warrior, as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his

society, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other

societies, he maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as

when he lives at home. His society (for in this state of things there is

properly neither sovereign nor commonwealth) is at no sort of expense,

either to prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we

find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner, a

warrior. Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either

in tents, or in a sort of covered waggons, which are easily transported

from place to place. The whole tribe, or nation, changes its situation

according to the different seasons of the year, as well as according to

other accidents. When its herds and flocks have consumed the forage of one

part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. In

the dry season, it comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet

season, it retires to the upper country. When such a nation goes to war,

the warriors will not trust their herds and flocks to the feeble defence

of their old men, their women and children; and their old men, their women

and children, will not be left behind without defence, and without

subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering

life, even in time of peace, easily takes the field in time of war.

Whether it marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen,

the way of life is nearly the same, though the object proposed by it be

very different. They all go to war together, therefore, and everyone does

as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the women have been frequently

known to engage in battle. If they conquer, whatever belongs to the

hostile tribe is the recompence of the victory; but if they are

vanquished, all is lost; and not only their herds and flocks, but their

women and children become the booty of the conqueror. Even the greater

part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him for the

sake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated and

dispersed in the desert.

The ordinary life, the ordinary exercise of a Tartar or Arab, prepares him

sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the

javelin, drawing the bow, etc. are the common pastimes of those who live

in the open air, and are all of them the images of war. When a Tartar or

Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks,

which he carries with him, in the same manner as in peace. His chief or

sovereign (for those nations have all chiefs or sovereigns) is at no sort

of expense in preparing him for the field; and when he is in it, the

chance of plunder is the only pay which he either expects or requires.

An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men. The

precarious subsistence which the chace affords, could seldom allow a

greater number to keep together for any considerable time. An army of

shepherds, on the contrary, may sometimes amount to two or three hundred

thousand. As long as nothing stops their progress, as long as they can go

on from one district, of which they have consumed the forage, to another,

which is yet entire; there seems to be scarce any limit to the number who

can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the

civilized nations in their neighbourhood; a nation of shepherds may.

Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America;

nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion has

frequently been in Asia. The judgment of Thucydides, that both Europe and

Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been verified by the

experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceless

plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the

dominion of the chief of some conquering horde or clan; and the havock and

devastation of Asia have always signalized their union. The inhabitants of

the inhospitable deserts of Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds,

have never been united but once, under Mahomet and his immediate

successors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthusiasm

than of conquest, was signalized in the same manner. If the hunting

nations of America should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would

be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present.

In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen

who have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures but those

coarse and household ones, which almost every private family prepares for

its own use, every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior, or easily

becomes such. Those who live by agriculture generally pass the whole day

in the open air, exposed to all the inclemencies of the seasons. The

hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to

some of which their necessary occupations bear a great analogy. The

necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches,

and to fortify a camp, as well as to inclose a field. The ordinary

pastimes of such husbandmen are the same as those of shepherds, and are in

the same manner the images of war. But as husbandmen have less leisure

than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those pastimes.

They are soldiers but soldiers not quite so much masters of their

exercise. Such as they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or

commonwealth any expense to prepare them for the field.

Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement,

some sort of fixed habitation, which cannot be abandoned without great

loss. When a nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole

people cannot take the field together. The old men, the women and

children, at least, must remain at home, to take care of the habitation.

All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and in small

nations of this kind, have frequently done so. In every nation, the men of

the military age are supposed to amount to about a fourth or a fifth part

of the whole body of the people. If the campaign, too, should begin after

seedtime, and end before harvest, both the husbandman and his principal

labourers can be spared from the farm without much loss. He trusts that

the work which must be done in the mean time, can be well enough executed

by the old men, the women, and the children. He is not unwilling,

therefore, to serve without pay during a short campaign; and it frequently

costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field

as to prepare him for it. The citizens of all the different states of

ancient Greece seem to have served in this manner till after the second

Persian war; and the people of Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian

war. The Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field in

the summer, and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman people, under

their kings, and during the first ages of the republic, served in the same

manner. It was not till the seige of Veii, that they who staid at home

began to contribute something towards maintaining those who went to war.

In the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman

empire, both before, and for some time after, the establishment of what is

properly called the feudal law, the great lords, with all their immediate

dependents, used to serve the crown at their own expense. In the field, in

the same manner as at home, they maintained themselves by their own

revenue, and not by any stipend or pay which they received from the king

upon that particular occasion.

In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to

render it altogether impossible that they who take the field should

maintain themselves at their own expense. Those two causes are, the

progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it

begins after seedtime, and ends before harvest, the interruption of his

business will not always occasion any considerable diminution of his

revenue. Without the intervention of his labour, Nature does herself the

greater part of the work which remains to be done. But the moment that an

artificer, a smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his

workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature

does nothing for him; he does all for himself. When he takes the field,

therefore, in defence of the public, as he has no revenue to maintain

himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the public. But in a

country, of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and

manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be drawn from

those classes, and must, therefore, be maintained by the public as long as

they are employed in its service.

When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate

and complicated science; when the event of war ceases to be determined, as

in the first ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle;

but when the contest is generally spun out through several different

campaigns, each of which lasts during the greater part of the year; it

becomes universally necessary that the public should maintain those who

serve the public in war, at least while they are employed in that service.

Whatever, in time of peace, might be the ordinary occupation of those who

go to war, so very tedious and expensive a service would otherwise be by

far too heavy a burden upon them. After the second Persian war,

accordingly, the armies of Athens seem to have been generally composed of

mercenary troops, consisting, indeed, partly of citizens, but partly, too,

of foreigners; and all of them equally hired and paid at the expense of

the state. From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received

pay for their service during the time which they remained in the field.

Under the feudal governments, the military service, both of the great

lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after a certain period,

universally exchanged for a payment in money, which was employed to

maintain those who served in their stead.

The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number

of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a rude

state of society. In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained

altogether by the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the

former can never exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above

maintaining, in a manner suitable to their respective stations, both

themselves and the other officers of government and law, whom they are

obliged to maintain. In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a

fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered the

themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take the field.

Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed,

that not more than the one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any

country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which

pays the expense of their service.

The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become

considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the

field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all the

different republics of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises,

was a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free

citizen. In every city there seems to have been a public field, in which,

under the protection of the public magistrate, the young people were

taught their different exercises by different masters. In this very simple

institution consisted the whole expense which any Grecian state seems ever

to have been at, in preparing its citizens for war. In ancient Rome, the

exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose with those of

the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many

public ordinances, that the citizens of every district should practise

archery, as well as several other military exercises, were intended for

promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well.

Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution

of those ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been

universally neglected; and in the progress of all those governments,

military exercises seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great

body of the people.

In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of

their existence, and under the feudal governments, for a considerable time

after their first establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a

separate, distinct trade, which constituted the sole or principal

occupation of a particular class of citizens; every subject of the state,

whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his

livelihood, considered himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit

likewise to exercise the trade of a soldier, and, upon many extraordinary

occasions, as bound to exercise it.

The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so,

in the progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes one of the most

complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as some other

arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of

perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time.

But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary

that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular

class of citizens; and the division of labour is as necessary for the

improvement of this, as of every other art. Into other arts, the division

of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find

that they promote their private interest better by confining themselves to

a particular trade, than by exercising a great number. But it is the

wisdom of the state only, which can render the trade of a soldier a

particular trade, separate and distinct from all others. A private

citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular

encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of his time

in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in

them, and amuse himself very well; but he certainly would not promote his

own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only, which can render it for

his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar

occupation; and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their

circumstances had become such, that the preservation of their existence

required that they should have it.

A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of

husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The

first may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial

exercises; the second may employ some part of it; but the last cannot

employ a single hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his

own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Those

improvements in husbandry, too, which the progress of arts and

manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as little

leisure as the artificer. Military exercises come to be as much neglected

by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and the great

body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the same

time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and

manufactures, and which, in reality, is no more than the accumulated

produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their

neighbours. An industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation, is

of all nations the most likely to be attacked; and unless the state takes

some new measure for the public defence, the natural habits of the people

render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.

In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the

state can make any tolerable provision for the public defence.

It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of

the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people,

enforce the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the

citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some

measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they

may happen to carry on.

Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in

the constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a

soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its

military force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is

said to consist in a standing army. The practice of military exercises is

the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and

the maintenance or pay which the state affords them is the principal and

ordinary fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is

only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they

derive the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from some

other occupation. In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer,

or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier; in a standing army,

that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this

distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two

different species of military force.

Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries, the

citizens destined for defending the state seem to have been exercised

only, without being, if I may say so, regimented; that is, without being

divided into separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which

performed its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers. In

the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, each citizen, as long as he

remained at home, seems to have practised his exercises, either separately

and independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best; and not to

have been attached to any particular body of troops, till he was actually

called upon to take the field. In other countries, the militia has not

only been exercised, but regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I

believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect

military force of this kind has been established, every militiaman is,

even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which

performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the

soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the

use of their arms. Strength and agility of body were of the highest

consequence, and commonly determined the fate of battles. But this skill

and dexterity in the use of their arms could be acquired only, in the same

manner as fencing is at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but

each man separately, in a particular school, under a particular master, or

with his own particular equals and companions. Since the invention of

fire-arms, strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity

and skill in the use of arms, though they are far from being of no

consequence, are, however, of less consequence. The nature of the weapon,

though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts

him more nearly so than he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill,

it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough

acquired by practising in great bodies.

Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which,

in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of

battles, than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their

arms. But the noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to

which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes

within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be

well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any

considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even

in the beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle, there was no

noise but what arose from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was

no invisible cause of wounds or death. Every man, till some mortal weapon

actually did approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him.

In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their

own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good

deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity and order, not

only in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an ancient

battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits

of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired

only by troops which are exercised in great bodies.

A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or

exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well

exercised standing army.

The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a-month, can

never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised

every day, or every other day; and though this circumstance may not be of

so much consequence in modern, as it was in ancient times, yet the

acknowledged superiority of the Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very

much to their superior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that

it is, even at this day, of very considerable consequence.

The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a-week, or

once a-month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their

own affairs their own way, without being, in any respect, accountable to

him, can never be under the same awe in his presence, can never have the

same disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and

conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even rise and go

to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In

what is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia

must always be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may

sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise, or in the management

and use of its arms. But, in modern war, the habit of ready and instant

obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable superiority

in the management of arms.

Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the

same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the

best. In respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they

approach nearest to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served

under its own chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind. As the

Highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as

they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times,

accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place; so, in time of

war, they were less willing to follow him to any considerable distance, or

to continue for any long time in the field. When they had acquired any

booty, they were eager to return home, and his authority was seldom

sufficient to detain them. In point of obedience, they were always much

inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the Highlanders,

too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air,

they were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were less

expert in the use of their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for

several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a

standing army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their

arms, and, being constantly under the command of their officers, are

habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing

armies. What they were before they took the field, is of little

importance. They necessarily become in every respect a standing army,

after they have passed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America

drag out through another campaign, the American militia may become, in

every respect, a match for that standing army, of which the valour

appeared, in the last war at least, not inferior to that of the hardiest

veterans of France and Spain.

This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will

be found, hears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well

regulated standing army has over a militia.

One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct account in

any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent

wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek

cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which

in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a

standing army. When he was at peace, which he was very seldom, and never

for any long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It

vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the

gallant and well exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient

Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill

exercised militia of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek

republics, and of the Persian empire was the effect of the irresistible

superiority which a standing arm has over every other sort of militia. It

is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history

has preserved any distinct and circumstantial account.

The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second.

All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very

well be accounted for from the same cause.

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war,

the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under

three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Amilcar,

his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal: first in chastising their

own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of

Africa; and lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army

which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those

different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a

standing army. The Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been

altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in

any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is

generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal

encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were militia opposed to a

standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than

any other to determine the fate of those battles.

The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the like

superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it; and, in a

few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal,

expelled them almost entirely from that country.

Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually

in the field, became, in the progress of the war, a well disciplined and

well exercised standing army; and the superiority of Annibal grew every

day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or

almost the whole, of the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the

assistance of his brother in Italy. In this march, he is said to have been

misled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know, was

surprised and attacked, by another standing army, in every respect equal

or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him

but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia,

and, in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well

disciplined and well exercised standing army. That standing army was

afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to

oppose it. In order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recal the

standing army of Annibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated African

militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part

of the troops of Annibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the

two rival republics.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman

republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The

standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms. In the height

of their grandeur, it cost them two great wars, and three great battles,

to subdue that little kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have

been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last

king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of

Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the

standing armies of Rome. The militias of some barbarous nations defended

themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates

drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the

most formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the second

Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too, were always

respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very considerable

advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman

armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much superior;

and if the Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or

Germany, it was probably because they judged that it was not worth while

to add those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too

large. The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or

Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners

of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or

Tartars, a nation of wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same

chiefs whom they were accustomed to follow in peace. ‘Their militia was

exactly of the same kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom,

too, they were probably descended.’

Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman

armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the

days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them,

their heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their

laborious exercises were neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the

Roman emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly

which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to

their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own

generals. In order to render them less formidable, according to some

authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine, first withdrew them

from the frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great

bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in

small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were

scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion.

Small bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns,

and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves trades men,

artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the

military character; and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated

into a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of

resisting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which soon

afterwards invaded the western empire. It was only by hiring the militia

of some of those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors

were for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western

empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which

ancient history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account. It

was brought about by the irresistible superiority which the militia of a

barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a

nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers,

and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias have

generally been, not over standing armies, but over other militias, in

exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such were the victories

which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire; and such,

too, were those which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that

of the Austrians and Burgundians.

The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established

themselves upon ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be

of the same kind in their new settlements, as it had been in their

original country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in

time of war, took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom

it was accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well

exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced,

however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great

body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the

discipline and the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went

gradually to ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to supply

the place of it. When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once

been adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its

neighbours should follow the example. They soon found that their safety

depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia was altogether

incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy,

yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops,

and, the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face

the hardiest and most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army

marched into Poland, the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear

inferior to that of the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the

hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire,

however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and

could at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When

the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace

for about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of her soldiers, however, far

from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than

in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that

unfortunate war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes

forget their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been kept

up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at

all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to

be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized

countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural

superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized

nation. A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such

an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation,

so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and

barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore,

that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even

preserved, for any considerable time.

As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a civilized

country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous

country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized. A standing army

establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through

the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of regular

government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever

examines with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced

into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves

into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is the

instrument which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That

degree of order and internal peace, which that empire has ever since

enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army, as

dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the

general, and that of the principal officers, are not necessarily connected

with the support of the constitution of the state. The standing army of

Caesar destroyed the Roman republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned

the long parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the

general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief

officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command

of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil

authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that

authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the

contrary, it may, in some cases, be favourable to liberty. The security

which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome

jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the

minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of

every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by

the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular

discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few

hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be

employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. To

a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the

natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing army,

the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances,

can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his

consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That

degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated

only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated

standing army. It is in such countries only, that the public safety does

not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary

power, for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious

liberty.

The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society

from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows

gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in

civilization. The military force of the society, which originally cost the

sovereign no expense, either in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in

the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war,

and afterwards even in time of peace.

The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of

fire-arms, has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and

disciplining any particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that

of employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are

become more expensive. A musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin

or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta.

The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably, and

occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and arrows which were

thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked up again, and

were, besides, of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are not

only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta;

and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but

to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery, too, over

that of the ancients, is very great; it has become much more difficult,

and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town, so as to resist,

even for a few weeks, the attack of that superior artillery. In modern

times, many different causes contribute to render the defence of the

society more expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of

improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great

revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of

gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

In modern war, the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to

the nation which can best afford that expense; and, consequently, to an

opulent and civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times,

the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against

the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times, the poor and barbarous

find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized.

The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to

be so pernicious, is certainly favourable, both to the permanency and to

the extension of civilization.

PART II. Of the Expense of Justice