By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discourages the

improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the difference

between what the land actually produces, and what, by the application of a

certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this difference affords a

greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal capital in any

mercantile employment, the improvement of land will draw capital from all

mercantile employments. If the profit is less, mercantile employments will

draw capital from the improvement of land. Whatever, therefore, raises the

rate of mercantile profit, either lessens the superiority, or increases

the inferiority of the profit of improvement: and, in the one case,

hinders capital from going to improvement, and in the other draws capital

from it; but by discouraging improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards

the natural increase of another great original source of revenue, the rent

of land. By raising the rate of profit, too, the monopoly necessarily

keeps up the market rate of interest higher than it otherwise would be.

But the price of land, in proportion to the rent which it affords, the

number of years purchase which is commonly paid for it, necessarily falls

as the rate of interest rises, and rises as the rate of interest falls.

The monopoly, therefore, hurts the interest of the landlord two different

ways, by retarding the natural increase, first, of his rent, and,

secondly, of the price which he would get for his land, in proportion to

the rent which it affords.

The monopoly, indeed, raises the rate of mercantile profit and thereby

augments somewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the

natural increase of capital, it tends rather to diminish than to increase

the sum total of the revenue which the inhabitants of the country derive

from the profits of stock; a small profit upon a great capital generally

affording a greater revenue than a great profit upon a small one. The

monopoly raises the rate of profit, but it hinders the sum of profit from

rising so high as it otherwise would do.

All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of

land, and the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant

than they otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little

order of men in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of

men in that country, and of all the men in all other countries.

It is solely by raising the ordinary rate of profit, that the monopoly

either has proved, or could prove, advantageous to any one particular

order of men. But besides all the bad effects to the country in general,

which have already been mentioned as necessarily resulting from a higher

rate of profit, there is one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put

together, but which, if we may judge from experience, is inseparably

connected with it. The high rate of profit seems everywhere to destroy

that parsimony which, in other circumstances, is natural to the character

of the merchant. When profits are high, that sober virtue seems to be

superfluous, and expensive luxury to suit better the affluence of his

situation. But the owners of the great mercantile capitals are necessarily

the leaders and conductors of the whole industry of every nation; and

their example has a much greater influence upon the manners of the whole

industrious part of it than that of any other order of men. If his

employer is attentive and parsimonious, the workman is very likely to be

so too; but if the master is dissolute and disorderly, the servant, who

shapes his work according to the pattern which his master prescribes to

him, will shape his life, too, according to the example which he sets him.

Accumulation is thus prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally

the most disposed to accumulate; and the funds destined for the

maintenance of productive labour, receive no augmentation from the revenue

of those who ought naturally to augment them the most. The capital of the

country, instead of increasing, gradually dwindles away, and the quantity

of productive labour maintained in it grows every day less and less. Have

the exorbitant profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon augmented the

capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the poverty, have they

promoted the industry, of those two beggarly countries? Such has been the

tone of mercantile expense in those two trading cities, that those

exorbitant profits, far from augmenting the general capital of the

country, seem scarce to have been sufficient to keep up the capitals upon

which they were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves,

if I may say so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is

to expel those foreign capitals from a trade which their own grows every

day more and more insufficient for carrying on, that the Spaniards and

Portuguese endeavour every day to straiten more and more the galling bands

of their absurd monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz and

Lisbon with those of Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how differently

the conduct and character of merchants are affected by the high and by the

low profits of stock. The merchants of London, indeed, have not yet

generally become such magnificent lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon; but

neither are they in general such attetitive and parsimonious burghers as

those of Amsterdam. They are supposed, however, many of them, to be a good

deal richer than the greater part of the former, and not quire so rich as

many of the latter: but the rate of their profit is commonly much lower

than that of the former, and a good deal higher than that of the latter.

Light come, light go, says the proverb; and the ordinary tone of expense

seems everywhere to be regulated, not so much according to the real

ability of spending, as to the supposed facility of getting money to

spend.

It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a

single order of men, is in many different ways hurtful to the general

interest of the country.

To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of

customers, may at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of

shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of

shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced

by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of

fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and

treasure of their fellow-citizens, to found and maintain such an empire.

Say to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my

clothes at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I

can have them for at other shops; and you will not find him very forward

to embrace your proposal. But should any other person buy you such an

estate, the shopkeeper will be much obliged to your benefactor if he would

enjoin you to buy all your clothes at his shop. England purchased for some

of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy at home, a great estate in a

distant country. The price, indeed, was very small, and instead of thirty

years purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present times, it

amounted to little more than the expense of the different equipments which

made the first discovery, reconnoitered the coast, and took a fictitious

possession of the country. The land was good, and of great extent; and the

cultivators having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some

time at liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became, in the

course of little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660),

so numerous and thriving a people, that the shopkeepers and other traders

of England wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom.

Without pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the

original purchase money, or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they

petitioned the parliament, that the cultivators of America might for the

future be confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods which

they wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of

their own produce as those traders might find it convenient to buy. For

they did not find it convenient to buy every part of it. Some parts of it

imported into England, might have interfered with some of the trades which

they themselves carried on at home. Those particular parts of it,

therefore, they were willing that the colonists should sell where they

could; the farther off the better; and upon that account proposed that

their market should be confined to the countries south of Cape Finisterre.

A clause in the famous act of navigation established this truly shopkeeper

proposal into a law.

The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more

properly, perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great

Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed,

consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet afforded

either revenue or military force for the support of the civil government,

or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the principal badge

of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has hitherto been

gathered from that dependency. Whatever expense Great Britain has hitherto

laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really been laid out in order

to support this monopoly. The expense of the ordinary peace establishment

of the colonies amounted, before the commencement of the present

disturbances to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the expense of the

artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions, with which it was

necessary to supply them; and to the expense of a very considerable naval

force, which was constantly kept up, in order to guard from the smuggling

vessels of other nations, the immense coast of North America, and that of

our West Indian islands. The whole expense of this peace establishment was

a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the

smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother

country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we must add to the

annual expense of this peace establishment, the interest of the sums

which, in consequence of their considering her colonies as provinces

subject to her dominion, Great Britain has, upon different occasions, laid

out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the whole

expense of the late war, and a great part of that of the war which

preceded it. The late war was altogether a colony quarrel; and the whole

expense of it, in whatever part of the world it might have been laid out,

whether in Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the

account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions

sterling, including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the

two shillings in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were

every year borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war which began in

1739 was principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent

the search of the colony ships, which carried on a contraband trade with

the Spanish Main. This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty which has

been given in order to support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was

to encourage the manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great

Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile

profit, and to enable our merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of

which the returns are more slow and distant than those of the greater part

of other trades, a greater proportion of their capital than they otherwise

would have done; two events which, if a bounty could have prevented, it

might perhaps have been very well worth while to give such a bounty.

Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives

nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.

To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority

over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact

their own laws, and to make peace and war, as they might think proper,

would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be,

adopted by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the

dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it,

and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion

to the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might

frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the

pride of every nation; and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence,

they are always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of

it, who would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust

and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction,

which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the

people, the most unprofitable province, seldom fails to afford. The most

visionary enthusiasts would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure,

with any serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was

adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from

the whole annual expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but

might settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually

secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of the

people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at

present enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the natural affection of the

colonies to the mother country, which, perhaps, our late dissensions have

well nigh extinguished, would quickly revive. It might dispose them not

only to respect, for whole centuries together, that treaty of commerce

which they had concluded with us at parting, but to favour us in war as

well as in trade, and instead of turbulent and factious subjects, to

become our most faithful, affectionate, and generous allies; and the same

sort of parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the

other, might revive between Great Britain and her colonies, which used to

subsist between those of ancient Greece and the mother city from which

they descended.

In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it

belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the public,

sufficient not only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace

establishment, but for contributing its proportion to the support of the

general government of the empire. Every province necessarily contributes,

more or less, to increase the expense of that general government. If any

particular province, therefore, does not contribute its share towards

defraying this expense, an unequal burden must be thrown upon some other

part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue, too, which every province

affords to the public in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to

bear the same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the whole empire,

which its ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither the

ordinary nor extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her

colonies, bears this proportion to the whole revenue of the British

empire, will readily be allowed. The monopoly, it has been supposed,

indeed, by increasing the private revenue of the people of Great Britain,

and thereby enabling them to pay greater taxes, compensates the deficiency

of the public revenue of the colonies. But this monopoly, I have

endeavoured to show, though a very grievous tax upon the colonies, and

though it may increase the revenue of a particular order of men in Great

Britain, diminishes, instead of increasing, that of the great body of the

people, and consequently diminishes, instead of increasing, the ability of

the great body of the people to pay taxes. The men, too, whose revenue the

monopoly increases, constitute a particular order, which it is both

absolutely impossible to tax beyond the proportion of other orders, and

extremely impolitic even to attempt to tax beyond that proportion, as I

shall endeavour to show in the following book. No particular resource,

therefore, can be drawn from this particular order.

The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies, or by the

parliament of Great Britain.

That the colony assemblies can never be so managed as to levy upon their

constituents a public revenue, sufficient, not only to maintain at all

times their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their proper

proportion of the expense of the general government of the British empire,

seems not very probable. It was a long time before even the parliament of

England, though placed immediately under the eye of the sovereign, could

be brought under such a system of management, or could be rendered

sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and military

establishments even of their own country. It was only by distributing

among the particular members of parliament a great part either of the

offices, or of the disposal of the offices arising from this civil and

military establishment, that such a system of management could be

established, even with regard to the parliament of England. But the

distance of the colony assemblies from the eye of the sovereign, their

number, their dispersed situation, and their various constitutions, would

render it very difficult to manage them in the same manner, even though

the sovereign had the same means of doing it; and those means are wanting.

It would be absolutely impossible to distribute among all the leading

members of all the colony assemblies such a share, either of the offices,

or of the disposal of the offices, arising from the general government of

the British empire, as to dispose them to give up their popularity at

home, and to tax their constituents for the support of that general

government, of which almost the whole emoluments were to be divided among

people who were strangers to them. The unavoidable ignorance of

administration, besides, concerning the relative importance of the

different members of those different assemblies, the offences which must

frequently be given, the blunders which must constantly be committed, in

attempting to manage them in this manner, seems to render such a system of

management altogether impracticable with regard to them.

The colony assemblies, besides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of

what is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire. The

care of that defence and support is not entrusted to them. It is not their

business, and they have no regular means of information concerning it. The

assembly of a province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge very

properly concerning the affairs of its own particular district, but can

have no proper means of judging concerning those of the whole empire. It

cannot even judge properly concerning the proportion which its own

province bears to the whole empire, or concerning the relative degree of

its wealth and importance, compared with the other provinces; because

those other provinces are not under the inspection and superintendency of

the assembly of a particular province. What is necessary for the defence

and support of the whole empire, and in what proportion each part ought to

contribute, can be judged of only by that assembly which inspects and

super-intends the affairs of the whole empire.

It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by

requisition, the parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which

each colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing and

levying it in the way that suited best the circumstances of the province.

What concerned the whole empire would in this way be determined by the

assembly which inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire;

and the provincial affairs of each colony might still be regulated by its

own assembly. Though the colonies should, in this case, have no

representatives in the British parliament, yet, if we may judge by

experience, there is no probability that the parliamentary requisition

would be unreasonable. The parliament of England has not, upon any

occasion, shewn the smallest disposition to overburden those parts of the

empire which are not represented in parliament. The islands of Guernsey

and Jersey, without any means of resisting the authority of parliament,

are more lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain. Parliament, in

attempting to exercise its supposed right, whether well or ill grounded,

of taxing the colonies, has never hitherto demanded of them anything which

even approached to a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow

subjects at home. If the contribution of the colonies, besides, was to

rise or fall in proportion to the rise or fall of the land-tax, parliament

could not tax them without taxing, at the same time, its own constituents,

and the colonies might, in this case, be considered as virtually

represented in parliament.

Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces

are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in

which the sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay,

and in some provinces assesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while in

others he leaves it to be assessed and levied as the respective states of

each province shall determine. In some provinces of France, the king not

only imposes what taxes he thinks proper, but assesses and levies them in

the way he thinks proper. From others he demands a certain sum, but leaves

it to the states of each province to assess and levy that sum as they

think proper. According to the scheme of taxing by requisition, the

parliament of Great Britain would stand nearly in the same situation

towards the colony assemblies, as the king of France does towards the

states of those provinces which still enjoy the privilege of having states

of their own, the provinces of France which are supposed to be the best

governed.

But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just

reason to fear that their share of the public burdens should ever exceed

the proper proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home, Great

Britain might have just reason to fear that it never would amount to that

proper proportion. The parliament of Great Britain has not, for some time

past, had the same established authority in the colonies, which the French

king has in those provinces of France which still enjoy the privilege of

having states of their own. The colony assemblies, if they were not very

favourably disposed (and unless more skilfully managed than they ever have

been hitherto, they are not very likely to be so), might still find many

pretences for evading or rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of

parliament. A French war breaks out, we shall suppose; ten millions must

immediately be raised, in order to defend the seat of the empire. This sum

must be borrowed upon the credit of some parliamentary fund mortgaged for

paying the interest. Part of this fund parliament proposes to raise by a

tax to be levied in Great Britain; and part of it by a requisition to all

the different colony assemblies of America and the West Indies. Would

people readily advance their money upon the credit of a fund which partly

depended upon the good humour of all those assemblies, far distant from

the seat of the war, and sometimes, perhaps, thinking themselves not much

concerned in the event of it? Upon such a fund, no more money would

probably be advanced than what the tax to be levied in Great Britain might

be supposed to answer for. The whole burden of the debt contracted on

account of the war would in this manner fall, as it always has done

hitherto, upon Great Britain; upon a part of the empire, and not upon the

whole empire. Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only

state which, as it has extended its empire, has only increased its

expense, without once augmenting its resources. Other states have

generally disburdened themselves, upon their subject and subordinate

provinces, of the most considerable part of the expense of defending the

empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate

provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expense.

In order to put Great Britain upon a footing of equality with her own

colonies, which the law has hitherto supposed to be subject and

subordinate, it seems necessary, upon the scheme of taxing them by

parliamentary requisition, that parliament should have some means of

rendering its requisitions immediately effectual, in case the colony

assemblies should attempt to evade or reject them; and what those means

are, it is not very easy to conceive, and it has not yet been explained.

Should the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully

established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the

consent of their own assemblies, the importance of those assemblies would,

from that moment, be at an end, and with it, that of all the leading men

of British America. Men desire to have some share in the management of

public affairs, chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them.

Upon the power which the greater part of the leading men, the natural

aristocracy of every country, have of preserving or defending their

respective importance, depends the stability and duration of every system

of free government. In the attacks which those leading men are continually

making upon the importance of one another, and in the defence of their

own, consists the whole play of domestic faction and ambition. The leading

men of America, like those of all other countries, desire to preserve

their own importance. They feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies,

which they are fond of calling parliaments, and of considering as equal in

authority to the parliament of Great Britain, should be so far degraded as

to become the humble ministers and executive officers of that parliament,

the greater part of their own importance would be at an end. They have

rejected, therefore, the proposal of being taxed by parliamentary

requisition, and, like other ambitious and high-spirited men, have rather

chosen to draw the sword in defence of their own importance.

Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who had

borne the principal burden of defending the state and extending the

empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens.

Upon being refused, the social war broke out. During the course of that

war, Rome granted those privileges to the greater part of them, one by

one, and in proportion as they detached themselves from the general

confederacy. The parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the

colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a parliament in which they are

not represented. If to each colony which should detach itself from the

general confederacy, Great Britain should allow such a number of

representatives as suited the proportion of what it contributed to the

public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its being subjected to the

same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with

its fellow-subjects at home; the number of its representatives to be

augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards augment;

a new method of acquiring importance, a new and more dazzling object of

ambition, would be presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of

piddling for the little prizes which are to be found in what may be called

the paltry raffle of colony faction, they might then hope, from the

presumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good

fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which sometimes come from the

wheel of the great state lottery of British politics. Unless this or some

other method is fallen upon, and there seems to be none more obvious than

this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the ambition of the

leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will ever

voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider, that the blood which

must be shed in forcing them to do so, is, every drop of it, the blood

either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow

citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to

which things have come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force

alone. The persons who now govern the resolutions of what they call their

continental congress, feel in themselves at this moment a degree of

importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel.

From shopkeepers, trades men, and attorneys, they are become statesmen and

legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for

an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and

which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most

formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred different people,

perhaps, who, in different ways, act immediately under the continental

congress, and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under those five

hundred, all feel, in the same manner, a proportionable rise in their own

importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in America

fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station superior, not only to what

he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and

unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his

leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of

that station.

It is a remark of the President Heynaut, that we now read with pleasure

the account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which, when they

happened, were not, perhaps, considered as very important pieces of news.

But everyman then, says he, fancied himself of some importance; and the

innumerable memoirs which have come down to us from those times, were the

greater part of them written by people who took pleasure in recording and

magnifying events, in which they flattered themselves they had been

considerable actors. How obstinately the city of Paris, upon that

occasion, defended itself, what a dreadful famine it supported, rather

than submit to the best, and afterwards the most beloved of all the French

kings, is well known. The greater part of the citizens, or those who

governed the greater part of them, fought in defence of their own

importance, which, they foresaw, was to be at an end whenever the ancient

government should be re-established. Our colonies, unless they can be

induced to consent to a union, are very likely to defend themselves,

against the best of all mother countries, as obstinately as the city of

Paris did against one of the best of kings.

The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the people

of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they

had no other means of exercising that right, but by coming in a body to

vote and deliberate with the people of that other state. The admission of

the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman

citizens, completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer possible

to distinguish between who was, and who was not, a Roman citizen. No tribe

could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could be introduced into

the assemblies of the people, could drive out the real citizens, and

decide upon the affairs of the republic, as if they themselves had been

such. But though America were to send fifty or sixty new representatives

to parliament, the door-keeper of the house of commons could not find any

great difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not a

member. Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined

by the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the

least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union

of Great Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary,

would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The

assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every

part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to

have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however,

could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties,

might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of

none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise,

not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the

people, both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

We on this side the water are afraid lest the multitude of American

representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and

increase too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or

the force of the democracy on the other. But if the number of American

representatives were to be in proportion to the produce of American

taxation, the number of people to be managed would increase exactly in

proportion to the means of managing them, and the means of managing to the

number of people to be managed. The monarchical and democratical parts of

the constitution would, after the union, stand exactly in the same degree

of relative force with regard to one another as they had done before.

The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their distance

from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions; but

their representatives in parliament, of which the number ought from the

first to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all

oppression. The distance could not much weaken the dependency of the

representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that

he owed his seat in parliament, and all the consequence which he derived

from it, to the good-will of the latter. It would be the interest of the

former, therefore, to cultivate that good-will, by complaining, with all

the authority of a member of the legislature, of every outrage which any

civil or military officer might be guilty of in those remote parts of the

empire. The distance of America from the seat of government, besides, the

natives of that country might flatter themselves, with some appearance of

reason too, would not be of very long continuance. Such has hitherto been

the rapid progress of that country in wealth, population, and improvement,

that in the course of little more than a century, perhaps, the produce of

the American might exceed that of the British taxation. The seat of the

empire would then naturally remove itself to that part of the empire which

contributed most to the general defence and support of the whole.

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the

Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded

in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been great;

but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which has

elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole

extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits or what

misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, no

human wisdom can foresee. By uniting in some measure the most distant

parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to

increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s

industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the

natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial

benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost

in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes,

however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from any thing in

the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these

discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on

the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity

every sort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the

natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow

weaker; and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may

arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual

fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some

sort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more

likely to establish this equality of force, than that mutual communication

of knowledge, and of all sorts of improvements, which an extensive

commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather

necessarily, carries along with it.

In the mean time, one of the principal effects of those discoveries has

been, to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and glory

which it could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of that

system to enrich a great nation, rather by trade and manufactures than by

the improvement and cultivation of land, rather by the industry of the

towns than by that of the country. But in consequence of those

discoveries, the commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the

manufacturers and carriers for but a very small part of the world (that

part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic ocean, and the countries

which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas), have now become the

manufacturers for the numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and

the carriers, and in some respects the manufacturers too, for almost all

the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have

been opened to their industry, each of them much greater and more

extensive than the old one, and the market of one of them growing still

greater and greater every day.

The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade

directly to the East Indies, enjoy indeed the whole show and splendour of

this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the

invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently

enjoy a greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and

Portugal, for example, give more real encouragement to the industry of

other countries than to that of Spain and Portugal. In the single article

of linen alone, the consumption of those colonies amounts, it is said (but

I do not pretend to warrant the quantity ), to more than three millions

sterling a-year. But this great consumption is almost entirely supplied by

France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany. Spain and Portugal furnish but a

small part of it. The capital which supplies the colonies with this great

quantity of linen, is annually distributed among, and furnishes a revenue

to, the inhabitants of those other countries. The profits of it only are

spent in Spain and Portugal, where they help to support the sumptuous

profusion of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon.

Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself

the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to

the countries in favour of which they are established, than to those

against which they are established. The unjust oppression of the industry

of other countries falls back, if I may say so, upon the heads of the

oppressors, and crushes their industry more than it does that of those

other countries. By those regulations, for example, the merchant of

Hamburg must send the linen which he destines for the American market to

London, and he must bring back from thence the tobacco which he destines

for the German market; because he can neither send the one directly to

America, nor bring the other directly from thence. By this restraint he is

probably obliged to sell the one somewhat cheaper, and to buy the other

somewhat dearer, than he otherwise might have done; and his profits are

probably somewhat abridged by means of it. In this trade, however, between

Hamburg and London, he certainly receives the returns of his capital much

more quickly than he could possibly have done in the direct trade to

America, even though we should suppose, what is by no means the case, that

the payments of America were as punctual as those of London. In the trade,

therefore, to which those regulations confine the merchant of Hamburg, his

capital can keep in constant employment a much greater quantity of German

industry than he possibly could have done in the trade from which he is

excluded. Though the one employment, therefore, may to him perhaps be less

profitable than the other, it cannot be less advantageous to his country.

It is quite otherwise with the employment into which the monopoly

naturally attracts, if I may say so, the capital of the London merchant.

That employment may, perhaps, be more profitable to him than the greater

part of other employments; but on account of the slowness of the returns,

it cannot be more advantageous to his country.

After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to

engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies, no

country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing but the expense

of supporting in time of peace, and of defending in time of war, the

oppressive authority which it assumes over them. The inconveniencies

resulting from the possession of its colonies, every country has engrossed

to itself completely. The advantages resulting from their trade, it has

been obliged to share with many other countries.

At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America

naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To the

undiscerning eye of giddy ambition it naturally presents itself, amidst

the confused scramble of politics and war, as a very dazzling object to

fight for. The dazzling splendour of the object, however, the immense

greatness of the commerce, is the very quality which renders the monopoly

of it hurtful, or which makes one employment, in its own nature

necessarily less advantageous to the country than the greater part of

other employments, absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of the

country than what would otherwise have gone to it.

The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second

book, naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most advantageous

to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade, the country to

which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all the countries

whose trade that stock carries on. But the owner of that stock necessarily

wishes to dispose of as great a part of those goods as he can at home. He

thereby saves himself the trouble, risk, and expense of exportation; and

he will upon that account be glad to sell them at home, not only for a

much smaller price, but with somewhat a smaller profit, than he might

expect to make by sending them abroad. He naturally, therefore, endeavours

as much as he can to turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade of

consumption, If his stock, again, is employed in a foreign trade of

consumption, he will, for the same reason, be glad to dispose of, at home,

as great a part as he can of the home goods which he collects in order to

export to some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour, as much as he

can, to turn his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. The

mercantile stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the

near, and shuns the distant employment: naturally courts the employment in

which the returns are frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant

and slow; naturally courts the employment in which it can maintain the

greatest quantity of productive labour in the country to which it belongs,

or in which its owner resides, and shuns that in which it can maintain

there the smallest quantity. It naturally courts the employment which in

ordinary cases is most advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary

cases is least advantageous to that country.

But if, in any one of those distant employments, which in ordinary cases

are less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rise

somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference

which is given to nearer employments, this superiority of profit will draw

stock from those nearer employments, till the profits of all return to

their proper level. This superiority of profit, however, is a proof that,

in the actual circumstances of the society, those distant employments are

somewhat understocked in proportion to other employments, and that the

stock of the society is not distributed in the properest manner among all

the different employments carried on in it. It is a proof that something

is either bought cheaper or sold dearer than it ought to be, and that some

particular class of citizens is more or less oppressed, either by paying

more, or by getting less than what is suitable to that equality which

ought to take place, and which naturally does take place, among all the

different classes of them. Though the same capital never will maintain the

same quantity of productive labour in a distant as in a near employment,

yet a distant employment maybe as necessary for the welfare of the society

as a near one; the goods which the distant employment deals in being

necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many of the nearer employments. But if

the profits of those who deal in such goods are above their proper level,

those goods will be sold dearer than they ought to be, or somewhat above

their natural price, and all those engaged in the nearer employments will

be more or less oppressed by this high price. Their interest, therefore,

in this case, requires, that some stock should be withdrawn from those

nearer employments, and turned towards that distant one, in order to

reduce its profits to their proper level, and the price of the goods which

it deals in to their natural price. In this extraordinary case, the public

interest requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those

employments which, in ordinary cases, are more advantageous, and turned

towards one which, in ordinary cases, is less advantageous to the public;

and, in this extraordinary case, the natural interests and inclinations of

men coincide as exactly with the public interests as in all other ordinary

cases, and lead them to withdraw stock from the near, and to turn it

towards the distant employments.

It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals

naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments which

in ordinary cases, are most advantageous to the society. But if from this

natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those

employments, the fall of profit in them, and the rise of it in all others,

immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any

intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of men

naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society

among all the different employments carried on in it; as nearly as

possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the

whole society.

All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily derange

more or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But

those which concern the trade to America and the East Indies derange it,

perhaps, more than any other; because the trade to those two great

continents absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches

of trade. The regulations, however, by which this derangement is effected

in those two different branches of trade, are not altogether the same.

Monopoly is the great engine of both; but it is a different sort of

monopoly. Monopoly of one kind or another, indeed, seems to be the sole

engine of the mercantile system.

In the trade to America, every nation endeavours to engross as much as

possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all

other nations from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of

the sixteenth century, the Portuguese endeavoured to manage the trade to

the East Indies in the same manner, by claiming the sole right of sailing

in the Indian seas, on account of the merit of having first found out the

road to them. The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European

nations from any direct trade to their spice islands. Monopolies of this

kind are evidently established against all other European nations, who are

thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for

them to turn some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods

which that trade deals in, somewhat dearer than if they could import them

themselves directly from the countries which produced them.

But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has

claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the

principal ports are now open to the ships of all European nations. Except

in Portugal, however, and within these few years in France, the trade to

the East Indies has, in every European country, been subjected to an

exclusive company. Monopolies of this kind are properly established

against the very nation which erects them. The greater part of that nation

are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient

for them to turn some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the

goods which that trade deals in somewhat dearer than if it was open and

free to all their countrymen. Since the establishment of the English East

India company, for example, the other inhabitants of England, over and

above being excluded from the trade, must have paid, in the price of the

East India goods which they have consumed, not only for all the

extraordinary profits which the company may have made upon those goods in

consequence of their monopoly, but for all the extraordinary waste which

the fraud and abuse inseparable from the management of the affairs of so

great a company must necessarily have occasioned. The absurdity of this

second kind of monopoly, therefore, is much more manifest than that of the

first.

Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural

distribution of the stock of the society; but they do not always derange

it in the same way.

Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in

which they are established a greater proportion of the stock of the

society than what would go to that trade of its own accord.

Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the

particular trade in which they are established, and sometimes repel it

from that trade, according to different circumstances. In poor countries,

they naturally attract towards that trade more stock than would otherwise

go to it. In rich countries, they naturally repel from it a good deal of

stock which would otherwise go to it.

Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would probably

have never sent a single ship to the East Indies, had not the trade been

subjected to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a company

necessarily encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them against

all competitors in the home market, and they have the same chance for

foreign markets with the traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows

them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity of

goods, and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great quantity.

Without such extraordinary encouragement, the poor traders of such poor

countries would probably never have thought of hazarding their small

capitals in so very distant and uncertain an adventure as the trade to the

East Indies must naturally have appeared to them.

Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the

case of a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it

actually does. The limited stock of the Dutch East India company probably

repels from that trade many great mercantile capitals which would

otherwise go to it. The mercantile capital of Holland is so great, that it

is, as it were, continually overflowing, sometimes into the public funds

of foreign countries, sometimes into loans to private traders and

adventurers of foreign countries, sometimes into the most round-about

foreign trades of consumption, and sometimes into the carrying trade. All

near employments being completely filled up, all the capital which can be

placed in them with any tolerable profit being already placed in them, the

capital of Holland necessarily flows towards the most distant employments.

The trade to the East Indies, if it were altogether free, would probably

absorb the greater part of this redundant capital. The East Indies offer a

market both for the manufactures of Europe, and for the gold and silver,

as well as for the several other productions of America, greater and more

extensive than both Europe and America put together.

Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily

hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling

from a particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by

attracting towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come

to it. If, without any exclusive company, the trade of Holland to the East

Indies would be greater than it actually is, that country must suffer a

considerable loss, by part of its capital being excluded from the

employment most convenient for that port. And, in the same manner, if,

without an exclusive company, the trade of Sweden and Denmark to the East

Indies would be less than it actually is, or, what perhaps is more

probable, would not exist at all, those two countries must likewise suffer

a considerable loss, by part of their capital being drawn into an

employment which must be more or less unsuitable to their present

circumstances. Better for them, perhaps, in the present circumstances, to

buy East India goods of other nations, even though they should pay

somewhat dearer, than to turn so great a part of their small capital to so

very distant a trade, in which the returns are so very slow, in which that

capital can maintain so small a quantity of productive labour at home,

where productive labour is so much wanted, where so little is done, and

where so much is to do.

Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country

should not be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it

will not from thence follow, that such a company ought to be established

there, but only that such a country ought not, in these circumstances, to

trade directly to the East Indies. That such companies are not in general

necessary for carrying on the East India trade, is sufficiently

demonstrated by the experience of the Portuguese, who enjoyed almost the

whole of it for more than a century together, without any exclusive

company.

No private merchant, it has been said, could well have capital sufficient

to maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the East Indies,

in order to provide goods for the ships which he might occasionally send

thither; and yet, unless he was able to do this, the difficulty of finding

a cargo might frequently make his ships lose the season for returning; and

the expense of so long a delay would not only eat up the whole profit of

the adventure, but frequently occasion a very considerable loss. This

argument, however, if it proved any thing at all, would prove that no one

great branch of trade could be carried on without an exclusive company,

which is contrary to the experience of all nations. There is no great

branch of trade, in which the capital of any one private merchant is

sufficient for carrying on all the subordinate branches which must be

carried on, in order to carry on the principal one. But when a nation is

ripe for any great branch of trade, some merchants naturally turn their

capitals towards the principal, and some towards the subordinate branches

of it; and though all the different branches of it are in this manner

carried on, yet it very seldom happens that they are all carried on by the

capital of one private merchant. If a nation, therefore, is ripe for the

East India trade, a certain portion of its capital will naturally divide

itself among all the different branches of that trade. Some of its

merchants will find it for their interest to reside in the East Indies,

and to employ their capitals there in providing goods for the ships which

are to be sent out by other merchants who reside in Europe. The

settlements which different European nations have obtained in the East

Indies, if they were taken from the exclusive companies to which they at

present belong, and put under the immediate protection of the sovereign,

would render this residence both safe and easy, at least to the merchants

of the particular nations to whom those settlements belong. If, at any

particular time, that part of the capital of any country which of its own

accord tended and inclined, if I may say so, towards the East India trade,

was not sufficient for carrying on all those different branches of it, it

would be a proof that, at that particular time, that country was not ripe

for that trade, and that it would do better to buy for some time, even at

a higher price, from other European nations, the East India goods it had

occasion for, than to import them itself directly from the East Indies.

What it might lose by the high price of those goods, could seldom be equal

to the loss which it would sustain by the distraction of a large portion

of its capital from other employments more necessary, or more useful, or

more suitable to its circumstances and situation, than a direct trade to

the East Indies.

Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon the

coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established, in

either of those countries, such numerous and thriving colonies as those in

the islands and continent of America. Africa, however, as well as several

of the countries comprehended under the general name of the East Indies,

is inhabited by barbarous nations. But those nations were by no means so

weak and defenceless as the miserable and helpless Americans; and in

proportion to the natural fertility of the countries which they inhabited,

they were, besides, much more populous. The most barbarous nations either

of Africa or of the East Indies, were shepherds; even the Hottentots were

so. But the natives of every part of America, except Mexico and Peru, were

only hunters and the difference is very great between the number of

shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent of equally fertile

territory can maintain. In Africa and the East Indies, therefore, it was

more difficult to displace the natives, and to extend the European

plantations over the greater part of the lands of the original

inhabitants. The genius of exclusive companies, besides, is unfavourable,

it has already been observed, to the growth of new colonies, and has

probably been the principal cause of the little progress which they have

made in the East Indies. The Portuguese carried on the trade both to

Africa and the East Indies, without any exclusive companies; and their

settlements at Congo, Angola, and Benguela, on the coast of Africa, and at

Goa in the East Indies though much depressed by superstition and every

sort of bad government, yet bear some resemblance to the colonies of

America, and are partly inhabited by Portuguese who have been established

there for several generations. The Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good

Hope and at Batavia, are at present the most considerable colonies which

the Europeans have established, either in Africa or in the East Indies;

and both those settlements are peculiarly fortunate in their situation. The

Cape of Good Hope was inhabited by a race of people almost as barbarous,

and quite as incapable of defending themselves, as the natives of America.

It is, besides, the half-way house, if one may say so, between Europe and

the East Indies, at which almost every European ship makes some stay, both

in going and returning. The supplying of those ships with every sort of

fresh provisions, with fruit, and sometimes with wine, affords alone a

very extensive market for the surplus produce of the colonies. What the

Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every part of the East Indies,

Batavia is between the principal countries of the East Indies. It lies

upon the most frequented road from Indostan to China and Japan, and is

nearly about mid-way upon that road. Almost all the ships too, that sail

between Europe and China, touch at Batavia; and it is, over and above all

this, the centre and principal mart of what is called the country trade of

the East Indies; not only of that part of it which is carried on by

Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians; and

vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan, of Tonquin,

Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are frequently to be

seen in its port. Such advantageous situations have enabled those two

colonies to surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an

exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their growth. They have

enabled Batavia to surmount the additional disadvantage of perhaps the

most unwholesome climate in the world.

The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no

considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made

considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner in which they

both govern their new subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive company

has shewn itself most distinctly. In the spice islands, the Dutch are said

to burn all the spiceries which a fertile season produces, beyond what

they expect to dispose of in Europe with such a profit as they think

sufficient. In the islands where they have no settlements, they give a

premium to those who collect the young blossoms and green leaves of the

clove and nutmeg trees, which naturally grow there, but which this savage

policy has now, it is said, almost completely extirpated. Even in the

islands where they have settlements, they have very much reduced, it is

said, the number of those trees. If the produce even of their own islands

was much greater than what suited their market, the natives, they suspect,

might find means to convey some part of it to other nations; and the best

way, they imagine, to secure their own monopoly, is to take care that no

more shall grow than what they themselves carry to market. By different

arts of oppression, they have reduced the population of several of the

Moluccas nearly to the number which is sufficient to supply with fresh

provisions, and other necessaries of life, their own insignificant

garrisons, and such of their ships as occasionally come there for a cargo

of spices. Under the government even of the Portuguese, however, those

islands are said to have been tolerably well inhabited. The English

company have not yet had time to establish in Bengal so perfectly

destructive a system. The plan of their government, however, has had

exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I am well assured,

for the chief, that is, the first clerk or a factory, to order a peasant

to plough up a rich field of poppies, and sow it with rice, or some other

grain. The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the real

reason, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a

large quantity of opium which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon

other occasions, the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or

other grain has been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation

of poppies, when the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to

be made by opium. The servants of the company have, upon several

occasions, attempted to establish in their own favour the monopoly of some

of the most important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland

trade of the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is impossible

that they should not, at some time or another, have attempted to restrain

the production of the particular articles of which they had thus usurped

the monopoly, not only to the quantity which they themselves could

purchase, but to that which they could expect to sell with such a profit

as they might think sufficient. In the course of a century or two, the

policy of the English company would, in this manner, have probably proved

as completely destructive as that of the Dutch.

Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of

those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which they

have conquered, than this destructive plan. In almost all countries, the

revenue of the sovereign is drawn from that of the people. The greater the

revenue of the people, therefore, the greater the annual produce of their

land and labour, the more they can afford to the sovereign. It is his

interest, therefore, to increase as much as possible that annual produce.

But if this is the interest of every sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one

whose revenue, like that of the sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a

land-rent. That rent must necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and

value of the produce; and both the one and the other must depend upon the

extent of the market. The quantity will always be suited, with more or

less exactness, to the consumption of those who can afford to pay for it;

and the price which they will pay will always be in proportion to the

eagerness of their competition. It is the interest of such a sovereign,

therefore, to open the most extensive market for the produce of his

country, to allow the most perfect freedom of commerce, in order to

increase as much as possible the number and competition of buyers; and

upon this account to abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints

upon the transportation of the home produce from one part of the country

to another, upon its exportation to foreign countries, or upon the

importation of goods of any kind for which it can be exchanged. He is in

this manner most likely to increase both the quantity and value of that

produce, and consequently of his own share of it, or of his own revenue.

But a company of merchants, are, it seems, incapable of considering

themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or

buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal

business, and by a strange absurdity, regard the character of the

sovereign as but an appendix to that of the merchant; as something which

ought to be made subservient to it, or by means of which they may be

enabled to buy cheaper in India, and thereby to sell with a better profit

in Europe. They endeavour, for this purpose, to keep out as much as

possible all competitors from the market of the countries which are

subject to their government, and consequently to reduce, at least, some

part of the surplus produce of those countries to what is barely

sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to what they can expect to

sell in Europe, with such a profit as they may think reasonable. Their

mercantile habits draw them in this manner, almost necessarily, though

perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary occasions, the little and

transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent revenue of

the sovereign; and would gradually lead them to treat the countries

subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat the Moluccas. It is

the interest of the East India company, considered as sovereigns, that the

European goods which are carried to their Indian dominions should be sold

there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian goods which are brought

from thence should bring there as good a price, or should be sold there as

dear as possible. But the reverse of this is their interest as merchants.

As sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with that of the country

which they govern. As merchants, their interest is directly opposite to

that interest.

But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns its

direction in Europe, is in this manner essentially, and perhaps incurably

faulty, that of its administration in India is still more so. That

administration is necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a

profession no doubt extremely respectable, but which in no country in the

world carries along with it that sort of authority which naturally

overawes the people, and without force commands their willing obedience.

Such a council can command obedience only by the military force with which

they are accompanied; and their government is, therefore, necessarily

military and despotical. Their proper business, however, is that of

merchants. It is to sell, upon their master’s account, the European goods

consigned to them, and to buy, in return, Indian goods for the European

market. It is to sell the one as dear, and to buy the other as cheap as

possible, and consequently to exclude, as much as possible, all rivals

from the particular market where they keep their shop. The genius of the

administration, therefore, so far as concerns the trade of the company, is

the same as that of the direction. It tends to make government subservient

to the interest of monopoly, and consequently to stunt the natural growth

of some parts, at least, of the surplus produce of the country, to what is

barely sufficient for answering the demand of the company.

All the members of the administration besides, trade more or less upon

their own account; and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing so.

Nothing can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerk of a

great counting-house, at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently

almost quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their master,

give up at once doing any sort of business upon their own account abandon

for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in

their hands; and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those

masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can seldom be

augmented, being commonly as large as the real profits of the company

trade can afford. In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the

company from trading upon their own account, can have scarce any other

effect than to enable its superior servants, under pretence of executing

their master’s order, to oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the

misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The servants naturally

endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of their own private

trade as of the public trade of the company. If they are suffered to act

as they could wish, they will establish this monopoly openly and directly,

by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in

which they choose to deal; and this, perhaps, is the best and least

oppressive way of establishing it. But if, by an order from Europe, they

are prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to

establish a monopoly of the same kind secretly and indirectly, in a way

that is much more destructive to the country. They will employ the whole

authority of government, and pervert the administration of Justice, in

order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of

commerce, which by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not

publicly avowed, they may choose to carry on. But the private trade of the

servants will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles than

the public trade of the company. The public trade of the company extends

no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a part only of the

foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the servants may

extend to all the different branches both of its inland and foreign trade.

The monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the natural growth of

that part of the surplus produce which, in the case of a free trade, would

be exported to Europe. That of the servants tends to stunt the natural

growth of every part of the produce in which they choose to deal; of what

is destined for home consumption, as well as of what is destined for

exportation; and consequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole

country, and to reduce the number of its inhabitants. It tends to reduce

the quantity of every sort of produce, even that of the necessaries of

life, whenever the servants of the country choose to deal in them, to what

those servants can both afford to buy and expect to sell with such a

profit as pleases them.

From the nature of their situation, too, the servants must be more

disposed to support with rigourous severity their own interest, against

that of the country which they govern, than their masters can be to

support theirs. The country belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid

having some regard for the interest of what belongs to them; but it does

not belong to the servants. The real interest of their masters, if they

were capable of understanding it, is the same with that of the country;

{The interest of every proprietor of India stock, however, is by no means

the same with that of the country in the government of which his vote

gives him some influence.—See book v, chap. 1, part ii.}and it is

from ignorance chiefly, and the meanness of mercantile prejudice, that

they ever oppress it. But the real interest of the servants is by no means

the same with that of the country, and the most perfect information would

not necessarily put an end to their oppressions. The regulations,

accordingly, which have been sent out from Europe, though they have been

frequently weak, have upon most occasions been well meaning. More

intelligence, and perhaps less good meaning, has sometimes appeared in

those established by the servants in India. It is a very singular

government in which every member of the administration wishes to get out

of the country, and consequently to have done with the government, as soon

as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it, and

carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the

whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake.

I mean not, however, by any thing which I have here said, to throw any

odious imputation upon the general character of the servants of the East

India company, and touch less upon that of any particular persons. It is

the system of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I

mean to censure, not the character of those who have acted in it. They

acted as their situation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured

the loudest against them would probably not have acted better themselves.

In war and negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta, have upon

several occasions, conducted themselves with a resolution and decisive

wisdom, which would have done honour to the senate of Rome in the best

days of that republic. The members of those councils, however, had been

bred to professions very different from war and politics. But their

situation alone, without education, experience, or even example, seems to

have formed in them all at once the great qualities which it required, and

to have inspired them both with abilities and virtues which they

themselves could not well know that they possessed. If upon some

occasions, therefore, it has animated them to actions of magnanimity which

could not well have been expected from them, we should not wonder if, upon

others, it has prompted them to exploits of somewhat a different nature.

Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect;

always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are

established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall

under their government.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM.

Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of

importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile system

proposes to enrich every country, yet, with regard to some particular

commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage

exportation, and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however,

it pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous

balance of trade. It discourages the exportation of the materials of

manufacture, and of the instruments of trade, in order to give our own

workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell those of other

nations in all foreign markets; and by restraining, in this manner, the

exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it proposes to

occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of others. It

encourages the importation of the materials of manufacture, in order that

our own people may be enabled to work them up more cheaply, and thereby

prevent a greater and more valuable importation of the manufactured

commodities. I do not observe, at least in our statute book, any

encouragement given to the importation of the instruments of trade. When

manufactures have advanced to a certain pitch of greatness, the

fabrication of the instruments of trade becomes itself the object of a

great number of very important manufactures. To give any particular

encouragement to the importation of such instruments, would interfere too

much with the interest of those manufactures. Such importation, therefore,

instead of being encouraged, has frequently been prohibited. Thus the

importation of wool cards, except from Ireland, or when brought in as

wreck or prize goods, was prohibited by the 3rd of Edward IV.; which

prohibition was renewed by the 39th of Elizabeth, and has been continued

and rendered perpetual by subsequent laws.

The importation of the materials of manufacture has sometimes been

encouraged by an exemption from the duties to which other goods are

subject, and sometimes by bounties.

The importation of sheep’s wool from several different countries, of

cotton wool from all countries, of undressed flax, of the greater part of

dyeing drugs, of the greater part of undressed hides from Ireland, or the

British colonies, of seal skins from the British Greenland fishery, of pig

and bar iron from the British colonies, as well as of several other

materials of manufacture, has been encouraged by an exemption from all

duties, if properly entered at the custom-house. The private interest of

our merchants and manufacturers may, perhaps, have extorted from the

legislature these exemptions, as well as the greater part of our other

commercial regulations. They are, however, perfectly just and reasonable;

and if, consistently with the necessities of the state, they could be

extended to all the other materials of manufacture, the public would

certainly be a gainer.

The avidity of our great manufacturers, however, has in some cases

extended these exemptions a good deal beyond what can justly be considered

as the rude materials of their work. By the 24th Geo. II. chap. 46, a

small duty of only 1d. the pound was imposed upon the importation of

foreign brown linen yarn, instead of much higher duties, to which it had

been subjected before, viz. of 6d. the pound upon sail yarn, of 1s. the

pound upon all French and Dutch yarn, and of £2:13:4 upon the hundred

weight of all spruce or Muscovia yarn. But our manufacturers were not long

satisfied with this reduction: by the 29th of the same king, chap. 15, the

same law which gave a bounty upon the exportation of British and Irish

linen, of which the price did not exceed 18d. the yard, even this small

duty upon the importation of brown linen yarn was taken away. In the

different operations, however, which are necessary for the preparation of

linen yarn, a good deal more industry is employed, than in the subsequent

operation of preparing linen cloth from linen yarn. To say nothing of the

industry of the flax-growers and flaxdressers, three or four spinners at

least are necessary in order to keep one weaver in constant employment;

and more than four-fifths of the whole quantity of labour necessary for

the preparation of linen cloth, is employed in that of linen yarn; but our

spinners are poor people; women commonly scattered about in all different

parts of the country, without support or protection. It is not by the sale

of their work, but by that of the complete work of the weavers, that our

great master manufacturers make their profits. As it is their interest to

sell the complete manufacture as dear, so it is to buy the materials as

cheap as possible. By extorting from the legislature bounties upon the

exportation of their own linen, high duties upon the importation of all

foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home consumption of some

sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their own goods as dear as

possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign linen yarn, and

thereby bringing it into competition with that which is made by our own

people, they endeavour to buy the work of the poor spinners as cheap as

possible. They are as intent to keep down the wages of their own weavers,

as the earnings of the poor spinners; and it is by no means for the

benefit of the workmen that they endeavour either to raise the price of

the complete work, or to lower that of the rude materials. It is the

industry which is carried on for the benefit of the rich and the powerful,

that is principally encouraged by our mercantile system. That which is

carried on for the benefit of the poor and the indigent is too often

either neglected or oppressed.

Both the bounty upon the exportation of linen, and the exemption from the

duty upon the importation of foreign yarn, which were granted only for

fifteen years, but continued by two different prolongations, expire with

the end of the session of parliament which shall immediately follow the

24th of June 1786.

The encouragement given to the importation of the materials of manufacture

by bounties, has been principally confined to such as were imported from

our American plantations.

The first bounties of this kind were those granted about the beginning of

the present century, upon the importation of naval stores from America.

Under this denomination were comprehended timber fit for masts, yards, and

bowsprits; hemp, tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty, however, of £1

the ton upon masting-timber, and that of £6 the ton upon hemp, were

extended to such as should be imported into England from Scotland. Both

these bounties continued, without any variation, at the same rate, till

they were severally allowed to expire; that upon hemp on the 1st of

January 1741, and that upon masting-timber at the end of the session of

parliament immediately following the 24th June 1781.

The bounties upon the importation of tar, pitch, and turpentine,

underwent, during their continuance, several alterations. Originally, that

upon tar was £4 the ton; that upon pitch the same; and that upon

turpentine £3 the ton. The bounty of £4 the ton upon tar was afterwards

confined to such as had been prepared in a particular manner; that upon

other good, clean, and merchantable tar was reduced to £2:4s. the ton. The

bounty upon pitch was likewise reduced to £1, and that upon turpentine to

£1:10s. the ton.

The second bounty upon the importation of any of the materials of

manufacture, according to the order of time, was that granted by the 21st

Geo. II. chap.30, upon the importation of indigo from the British

plantations. When the plantation indigo was worth three-fourths of the

price of the best French indigo, it was, by this act, entitled to a bounty

of 6d. the pound. This bounty, which, like most others, was granted only

for a limited time, was continued by several prolongations, but was

reduced to 4d. the pound. It was allowed to expire with the end of the

session of parliament which followed the 25th March 1781.

The third bounty of this kind was that granted (much about the time that

we were beginning sometimes to court, and sometimes to quarrel with our

American colonies), by the 4th. Geo. III. chap. 26, upon the importation

of hemp, or undressed flax, from the British plantations. This bounty was

granted for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1764 to the 24th June

1785. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of £8 the ton;

for the second at £6; and for the third at £4. It was not extended to

Scotland, of which the climate (although hemp is sometimes raised there in

small quantities, and of an inferior quality) is not very fit for that

produce. Such a bounty upon the importation of Scotch flax in England

would have been too great a discouragement to the native produce of the

southern part of the united kingdom.

The fourth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 5th Geo. III. chap.

45, upon the importation of wood from America. It was granted for nine

years from the 1st January 1766 to the 1st January 1775. During the first

three years, it was to be for every hundred-and-twenty good deals, at the

rate of £1, and for every load containing fifty cubic feet of other square

timber, at the rate of 12s. For the second three years, it was for deals,

to be at the rate of 15s., and for other squared timber at the rate of

8s.; and for the third three years, it was for deals, to be at the rate of

10s.; and for every other squared timber at the rate of 5s.

The fifth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 9th Geo. III. chap.

38, upon the importation of raw silk from the British plantations. It was

granted for twenty-one years, from the 1st January 1770, to the 1st

January 1791. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of £25

for every hundred pounds value; for the second, at £20; and for the third,

at £15. The management of the silk-worm, and the preparation of silk,

requires so much hand-labour, and labour is so very dear in America, that

even this great bounty, I have been informed, was not likely to produce

any considerable effect.

The sixth Bounty of this kind was that granted by 11th Geo. III. chap. 50,

for the importation of pipe, hogshead, and barrelstaves and leading from

the British plantations. It was granted for nine years, from 1st January

1772 to the 1st January 1781. For the first three years, it was, for a

certain quantity of each, to be at the rate of £6; for the second three

years at £4; and for the third three years at £2.

The seventh and last bounty of this kind was that granted by the 19th Geo.

III chap. 37, upon the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was granted in

the same manner as that for the importation of hemp and undressed flax

from America, for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1779 to the 24th

June 1800. The term is divided likewise into three periods, of seven years

each; and in each of those periods, the rate of the Irish bounty is the

same with that of the American. It does not, however, like the American

bounty, extend to the importation of undressed flax. It would have been

too great a discouragement to the cultivation of that plant in Great

Britain. When this last bounty was granted, the British and Irish

legislatures were not in much better humour with one another, than the

British and American had been before. But this boon to Ireland, it is to

be hoped, has been granted under more fortunate auspices than all those to

America. The same commodities, upon which we thus gave bounties, when

imported from America, were subjected to considerable duties when imported

from any other country. The interest of our American colonies was regarded

as the same with that of the mother country. Their wealth was considered

as our wealth. Whatever money was sent out to them, it was said, came all

back to us by the balance of trade, and we could never become a farthing

the poorer by any expense which we could lay out upon them. They were our

own in every respect, and it was an expense laid out upon the improvement

of our own property, and for the profitable employment of our own people.

It is unnecessary, I apprehend, at present to say anything further, in

order to expose the folly of a system which fatal experience has now

sufficiently exposed. Had our American colonies really been a part of

Great Britain, those bounties might have been considered as bounties upon

production, and would still have been liable to all the objections to

which such bounties are liable, but to no other.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture is sometimes discouraged

by absolute prohibitions, and sometimes by high duties.

Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other class

of workmen, in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the

nation depended upon the success and extension of their particular

business. They have not only obtained a monopoly against the consumers, by

an absolute prohibition of importing woollen cloths from any foreign

country; but they have likewise obtained another monopoly against the

sheep farmers and growers of wool, by a similar prohibition of the

exportation of live sheep and wool. The severity of many of the laws which

have been enacted for the security of the revenue is very justly

complained of, as imposing heavy penalties upon actions which, antecedent

to the statutes that declared them to be crimes, had always been

understood to be innocent. But the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will

venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison to some of those

which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has extorted from the

legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive

monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all

written in blood.

By the 8th of Elizabeth, chap. 3, the exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams,

was for the first offence, to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer a

year’s imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off in a market

town, upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the second

offence, to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly. To

prevent the breed of our sheep from being propagated in foreign countries,

seems to have been the object of this law. By the 13th and 14th of Charles

II. chap. 18, the exportation of wool was made felony, and the exporter

subjected to the same penalties and forfeitures as a felon.

For the honour of the national humanity, it is to be hoped that neither of

these statutes was ever executed. The first of them, however, so far as I

know, has never been directly repealed, and serjeant Hawkins seems to

consider it as still in force. It may, however, perhaps be considered as

virtually repealed by the 12th of Charles II. chap. 32, sect. 3, which,

without expressly taking away the penalties imposed by former statutes,

imposes a new penalty, viz. that of 20s. for every sheep exported, or

attempted to be exported, together with the forfeiture of the sheep, and

of the owner’s share of the sheep. The second of them was expressly

repealed by the 7th and 8th of William III. chap. 28, sect. 4, by which it

is declared that “Whereas the statute of the 13th and 14th of king Charles

II. made against the exportation of wool, among other things in the said

act mentioned, doth enact the same to be deemed felony, by the severity of

which penalty the prosecution of offenders hath not been so effectually

put in execution; be it therefore enacted, by the authority aforesaid,

that so much of the said act, which relates to the making the said offence

felony, be repealed and made void.”

The penalties, however, which are either imposed by this milder statute,

or which, though imposed by former statutes, are not repealed by this one,

are still sufficiently severe. Besides the forfeiture of the goods, the

exporter incurs the penalty of 3s. for every pound weight of wool, either

exported or attempted to be exported, that is, about four or five times

the value. Any merchant, or other person convicted of this offence, is

disabled from requiring any debt or account belonging to him from any

factor or other person. Let his fortune be what it will, whether he is or

is not able to pay those heavy penalties, the law means to ruin him

completely. But, as the morals of the great body of the people are not yet

so corrupt as those of the contrivers of this statute, I have not heard

that any advantage has ever been taken of this clause. If the person

convicted of this offence is not able to pay the penalties within three

months after judgment, he is to be transported for seven years; and if he

returns before the expiration of that term, he is liable to the pains of

felony, without benefit of clergy. The owner of the ship, knowing this

offence, forfeits all his interest in the ship and furniture. The master

and mariners, knowing this offence, forfeit all their goods and chattels,

and suffer three months imprisonment. By a subsequent statute, the master

suffers six months imprisonment.

In order to prevent exportation, the whole inland commerce of wool is laid

under very burdensome and oppressive restrictions. It cannot be packed in

any box, barrel, cask, case, chest, or any other package, but only in

packs of leather or pack-cloth, on which must be marked on the outside the

words WOOL or YARN, in large letters, not less than three inches long, on

pain of forfeiting the same and the package, and 8s. for every pound

weight, to be paid by the owner or packer. It cannot be loaden on any

horse or cart, or carried by land within five miles of the coast, but

between sun-rising, and sun-setting, on pain of forfeiting the same, the

horses and carriages. The hundred next adjoining to the sea coast, out of,

or through which the wool is carried or exported, forfeits £20, if the

wool is under the value of £10; and if of greater value, then treble that

value, together with treble costs, to be sued for within the year. The

execution to be against any two of the inhabitants, whom the sessions must

reimburse, by an assessment on the other inhabitants, as in the cases of

robbery. And if any person compounds with the hundred for less than this

penalty, he is to be imprisoned for five years; and any other person may

prosecute. These regulations take place through the whole kingdom.

But in the particular counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are

still more troublesome. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the sea

coast must give an account in writing, three days after shearing, to the

next officer of the customs, of the number of his fleeces, and of the

places where they are lodged. And before he removes any part of them, he

must give the like notice of the number and weight of the fleeces, and of

the name and abode of the person to whom they are sold, and of the place

to which it is intended they should be carried. No person within fifteen

miles of the sea, in the said counties, can buy any wool, before he enters

into bond to the king, that no part of the wool which he shall so buy

shall be sold by him to any other person within fifteen miles of the sea.

If any wool is found carrying towards the sea side in the said counties,

unless it has been entered and security given as aforesaid, it is

forfeited, and the offender also forfeits 3s. for every pound weight, if

any person lay any wool, not entered as aforesaid, within fifteen miles of

the sea, it must be seized and forfeited; and if, after such seizure, any

person shall claim the same, he must give security to the exchequer, that

if he is cast upon trial he shall pay treble costs, besides all other

penalties.

When such restrictions are imposed upon the inland trade, the coasting

trade, we may believe, cannot be left very free. Every owner of wool, who

carrieth, or causeth to be carried, any wool to any port or place on the

sea coast, in order to be from thence transported by sea to any other

place or port on the coast, must first cause an entry thereof to be made

at the port from whence it is intended to be conveyed, containing the

weight, marks, and number, of the packages, before he brings the same

within five miles of that port, on pain of forfeiting the same, and also

the horses, carts, and other carriages; and also of suffering and

forfeiting, as by the other laws in force against the exportation of wool.

This law, however (1st of William III. chap. 32), is so very indulgent as

to declare, that this shall not hinder any person from carrying his wool

home from the place of shearing, though it be within five miles of the

sea, provided that in ten days after shearing, and before he remove the

wool, he do under his hand certify to the next officer of the customs the

true number of fleeces, and where it is housed; and do not remove the

same, without certifying to such officer, under his hand, his intention so

to do, three days before. Bond must be given that the wool to be carried

coast-ways is to be landed at the particular port for which it is entered

outwards; and if my part of it is landed without the presence of an

officer, not only the forfeiture of the wool is incurred, as in other

goods, but the usual additional penalty of 3s. for every pound weight is

likewise incurred.

Our woollen manufacturers, in order to justify their demand of such

extraordinary restrictions and regulations, confidently asserted, that

English wool was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other

country; that the wool of other countries could not, without some mixture

of it, be wrought up into any tolerable manufacture; that fine cloth could

not be made without it; that England, therefore, if the exportation of it

could be totally prevented, could monopolize to herself almost the whole

woollen trade of the world; and thus, having no rivals, could sell at what

price she pleased, and in a short time acquire the most incredible degree

of wealth by the most advantageous balance of trade. This doctrine, like

most other doctrines which are confidently asserted by any considerable

number of people, was, and still continues to be, most implicitly believed

by a much greater number: by almost all those who are either unacquainted

with the woollen trade, or who have not made particular inquiries. It is,

however, so perfectly false, that English wool is in any respect necessary

for the making of fine cloth, that it is altogether unfit for it. Fine

cloth is made altogether of Spanish wool. English wool, cannot be even so

mixed with Spanish wool, as to enter into the composition without spoiling

and degrading, in some degree, the fabric of the cloth.

It has been shown in the foregoing part of this work, that the effect of

these regulations has been to depress the price of English wool, not only

below what it naturally would be in the present times, but very much below

what it actually was in the time of Edward III. The price of Scotch wool,

when, in consequence of the Union, it became subject to the same

regulations, is said to have fallen about one half. It is observed by the

very accurate and intelligent author of the Memoirs of Wool, the Reverend

Mr John Smith, that the price of the best English wool in England, is

generally below what wool of a very inferior quality commonly sells for in

the market of Amsterdam. To depress the price of this commodity below what

may be called its natural and proper price, was the avowed purpose of

those regulations; and there seems to be no doubt of their having produced

the effect that was expected from them.

This reduction of price, it may perhaps be thought, by discouraging the

growing of wool, must have reduced very much the annual produce of that

commodity, though not below what it formerly was, yet below what, in the

present state of things, it would probably have been, had it, in

consequence of an open and free market, been allowed to rise to the

natural and proper price. I am, however, disposed to believe, that the

quantity of the annual produce cannot have been much, though it may,

perhaps, have been a little affected by these regulations. The growing of

wool is not the chief purpose for which the sheep farmer employs his

industry and stock. He expects his profit, not so much from the price of

the fleece, as from that of the carcase; and the average or ordinary price

of the latter must even, in many cases, make up to him whatever deficiency

there may be in the average or ordinary price of the former. It has been

observed, in the foregoing part of this work, that ‘whatever regulations

tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw hides, below what it

naturally would be, must, in an improved and cultivated country, have some

tendency to raise the price of butcher’s meat. The price, both of the

great and small cattle which are fed on improved and cultivated land, must

be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the

farmer, has reason to expect from improved and cultivated land. If it is

not, they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part of this price,

therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, must be paid by the

carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the

other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts

of the beast, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is

all paid to them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, their

interest as landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such

regulations, though their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the

price of provisions.’ According to this reasoning, therefore, this

degradation in the price of wool is not likely, in an improved and

cultivated country, to occasion any diminution in the annual produce of

that commodity; except so far as, by raising the price of mutton, it may

somewhat diminish the demand for, and consequently the production of, that

particular species of butcher’s meat, Its effect, however, even in this

way, it is probable, is not very considerable.

But though its effect upon the quantity of the annual produce may not have

been very considerable, its effect upon the quality, it may perhaps be

thought, must necessarily have been very great. The degradation in the

quality of English wool, if not below what it was in former times, yet

below what it naturally would have been in the present state of

improvement and cultivation, must have been, it may perhaps be supposed,

very nearly in proportion to the degradation of price. As the quality

depends upon the breed, upon the pasture, and upon the management and

cleanliness of the sheep, during the whole progress of the growth of the

fleece, the attention to these circumstances, it may naturally enough be

imagined, can never be greater than in proportion to the recompence which

the price of the fleece is likely to make for the labour and expense which

that attention requires. It happens, however, that the goodness of the

fleece depends, in a great measure, upon the health, growth, and bulk of

the animal: the same attention which is necessary for the improvement of

the carcase is, in some respect, sufficient for that of the fleece.

Notwithstanding the degradation of price, English wool is said to have

been improved considerably during the course even of the present century.

The improvement, might, perhaps, have been greater if the price had been

better; but the lowness of price, though it may have obstructed, yet

certainly it has not altogether prevented that improvement.

The violence of these regulations, therefore, seems to have affected

neither the quantity nor the quality of the annual produce of wool, so

much as it might have been expected to do (though I think it probable that

it may have affected the latter a good deal more than the former); and the

interest of the growers of wool, though it must have been hurt in some

degree, seems upon the whole, to have been much less hurt than could well

have been imagined.

These considerations, however, will not justify the absolute prohibition

of the exportation of wool; but they will fully justify the imposition of

a considerable tax upon that exportation.

To hurt, in any degree, the interest of any one order of citizens, for no

other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to

that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the

different orders of his subjects. But the prohibition certainly hurts, in

some degree, the interest of the growers of wool, for no other purpose but

to promote that of the manufacturers.

Every different order of citizens is bound to contribute to the support of

the sovereign or commonwealth. A tax of five, or even of ten shillings,

upon the exportation of every tod of wool, would produce a very

considerable revenue to the sovereign. It would hurt the interest of the

growers somewhat less than the prohibition, because it would not probably

lower the price of wool quite so much. It would afford a sufficient

advantage to the manufacturer, because, though he might not buy his wool

altogether so cheap as under the prohibition, he would still buy it at

least five or ten shillings cheaper than any foreign manufacturer could

buy it, besides saving the freight and insurance which the other would be

obliged to pay. It is scarce possible to devise a tax which could produce

any considerable revenue to the sovereign, and at the same time occasion

so little inconveniency to anybody.

The prohibition, notwithstanding all the penalties which guard it, does

not prevent the exportation of wool. It is exported, it is well known, in

great quantities. The great difference between the price in the home and

that in the foreign market, presents such a temptation to smuggling, that

all the rigour of the law cannot prevent it. This illegal exportation is

advantageous to nobody but the smuggler. A legal exportation, subject to a

tax, by affording a revenue to the sovereign, and thereby saving the

imposition of some other, perhaps more burdensome and inconvenient taxes,

might prove advantageous to all the different subjects of the state.

The exportation of fuller’s earth, or fuller’s clay, supposed to be

necessary for preparing and cleansing the woollen manufactures, has been

subjected to nearly the same penalties as the exportation of wool. Even

tobacco-pipe clay, though acknowledged to be different from fuller’s clay,

yet, on account of their resemblance, and because fuller’s clay might

sometimes be exported as tobacco-pipe clay, has been laid under the same

prohibitions and penalties.

By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap, 7, the exportation, not only of

raw hides, but of tanned leather, except in the shape of boots, shoes, or

slippers, was prohibited; and the law gave a monopoly to our boot-makers

and shoe-makers, not only against our graziers, but against our tanners.

By subsequent statutes, our tanners have got themselves exempted from this

monopoly, upon paying a small tax of only one shilling on the hundred

weight of tanned leather, weighing one hundred and twelve pounds. They

have obtained likewise the drawback of two-thirds of the excise duties

imposed upon their commodity, even when exported without further

manufacture. All manufactures of leather may be exported duty free; and

the exporter is besides entitled to the drawback of the whole duties of

excise. Our graziers still continue subject to the old monopoly. Graziers,

separated from one another, and dispersed through all the different

corners of the country, cannot, without great difficulty, combine together

for the purpose either of imposing monopolies upon their fellow-citizens,

or of exempting themselves from such as may have been imposed upon them by

other people. Manufacturers of all kinds, collected together in numerous

bodies in all great cities, easily can. Even the horns of cattle are

prohibited to be exported; and the two insignificant trades of the horner

and comb-maker enjoy, in this respect, a monopoly against the graziers.

Restraints, either by prohibitions, or by taxes, upon the exportation of

goods which are partially, but not completely manufactured, are not

peculiar to the manufacture of leather. As long as anything remains to be

done, in order to fit any commodity for immediate use and consumption, our

manufacturers think that they themselves ought to have the doing of it.

Woollen yarn and worsted are prohibited to be exported, under the same

penalties as wool even white cloths we subject to a duty upon exportation;

and our dyers have so far obtained a monopoly against our clothiers. Our

clothiers would probably have been able to defend themselves against it;

but it happens that the greater part of our principal clothiers are

themselves likewise dyers. Watch-cases, clock-cases, and dial-plates for

clocks and watches, have been prohibited to be exported. Our clock-makers

and watch-makers are, it seems, unwilling that the price of this sort of

workmanship should be raised upon them by the competition of foreigners.

By some old statutes of Edward III, Henry VIII. and Edward VI. the

exportation of all metals was prohibited. Lead and tin were alone

excepted, probably on account of the great abundance of those metals; in

the exportation of which a considerable part of the trade of the kingdom

in those days consisted. For the encouragement of the mining trade, the

5th of William and Mary, chap.17, exempted from this prohibition iron,

copper, and mundic metal made from British ore. The exportation of all

sorts of copper bars, foreign as well as British, was afterwards permitted

by the 9th and 10th of William III. chap 26. The exportation of

unmanufactured brass, of what is called gun-metal, bell-metal, and shroff

metal, still continues to be prohibited. Brass manufactures of all sorts

may be exported duty free.

The exportation of the materials of manufacture, where it is not

altogether prohibited, is, in many cases, subjected to considerable

duties.

By the 8th Geo. I. chap.15, the exportation of all goods, the produce of

manufacture of Great Britain, upon which any duties had been imposed by

former statutes, was rendered duty free. The following goods, however,

were excepted: alum, lead, lead-ore, tin, tanned leather, copperas, coals,

wool, cards, white woollen cloths, lapis calaminaris, skins of all sorts,

glue, coney hair or wool, hares wool, hair of all sorts, horses, and

litharge of lead. If you except horses, all these are either materials of

manufacture, or incomplete manufactures (which may be considered as

materials for still further manufacture), or instruments of trade. This

statute leaves them subject to all the old duties which had ever been

imposed upon them, the old subsidy, and one per cent. outwards.

By the same statute, a great number of foreign drugs for dyers use are

exempted from all duties upon importation. Each of them, however, is

afterwards subjected to a certain duty, not indeed a very heavy one, upon

exportation. Our dyers, it seems, while they thought it for their interest

to encourage the importation of those drugs, by an exemption from all

duties, thought it likewise for their own interest to throw some small

discouragement upon their exportation. The avidity, however, which

suggested this notable piece of mercantile ingenuity, most probably

disappointed itself of its object. It necessarily taught the importers to

be more careful than they might otherwise have been, that their

importation should not exceed what was necessary for the supply of the

home market. The home market was at all times likely to be more scantily

supplied; the commodities were at all times likely to be somewhat dearer

there than they would have been, had the exportation been rendered as free

as the importation.

By the above-mentioned statute, gum senega, or gum arabic, being among the

enumerated dyeing drugs, might be imported duty free. They were subjected,

indeed, to a small poundage duty, amounting only to threepence in the

hundred weight, upon their re-exportation. France enjoyed, at that time,

an exclusive trade to the country most productive of those drugs, that

which lies in the neighbourhood of the Senegal; and the British market

could not be easily supplied by the immediate importation of them from the

place of growth. By the 25th Geo. II. therefore, gum senega was allowed to

be imported (contrary to the general dispositions of the act of

navigation) from any part of Europe. As the law, however, did not mean to

encourage this species of trade, so contrary to the general principles of

the mercantile policy of England, it imposed a duty of ten shillings the

hundred weight upon such importation, and no part of this duty was to be

afterwards drawn back upon its exportation. The successful war which began

in 1755 gave Great Britain the same exclusive trade to those countries

which France had enjoyed before. Our manufactures, as soon as the peace

was made, endeavoured to avail themselves of this advantage, and to

establish a monopoly in their own favour both against the growers and

against the importers of this commodity. By the 5th of Geo. III.

therefore, chap. 37, the exportation of gum senega, from his majesty’s

dominions in Africa, was confined to Great Britain, and was subjected to

all the same restrictions, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties, as

that of the enumerated commodities of the British colonies in America and

the West Indies. Its importation, indeed, was subjected to a small duty of

sixpence the hundred weight; but its re-exportation was subjected to the

enormous duty of one pound ten shillings the hundred weight. It was the

intention of our manufacturers, that the whole produce of those countries

should be imported into Great Britain; and in order that they themselves

might be enabled to buy it at their own price, that no part of it should

be exported again, but at such an expense as would sufficiently discourage

that exportation. Their avidity, however, upon this, as well as upon many

other occasions, disappointed itself of its object. This enormous duty

presented such a temptation to smuggling, that great quantities of this

commodity were clandestinely exported, probably to all the manufacturing

countries of Europe, but particularly to Holland, not only from Great

Britain, but from Africa. Upon this account, by the 14th Geo. III.

chap.10, this duty upon exportation was reduced to five shillings the

hundred weight.

In the book of rates, according to which the old subsidy was levied,

beaver skins were estimated at six shillings and eight pence a piece; and

the different subsidies and imposts which, before the year 1722, had been

laid upon their importation, amounted to one-fifth part of the rate, or to

sixteen pence upon each skin; all of which, except half the old subsidy,

amounting only to twopence, was drawn back upon exportation. This duty,

upon the importation of so important a material of manufacture, had been

thought too high; and, in the year 1722, the rate was reduced to two

shillings and sixpence, which reduced the duty upon importation to

sixpence, and of this only one-half was to be drawn back upon exportation.

The same successful war put the country most productive of beaver under

the dominion of Great Britain; and beaver skins being among the enumerated

commodities, the exportation from America was consequently confined to the

market of Great Britain. Our manufacturers soon bethought themselves of

the advantage which they might make of this circumstance; and in the year

1764, the duty upon the importation of beaver skin was reduced to one

penny, but the duty upon exportation was raised to sevenpence each skin,

without any drawback of the duty upon importation. By the same law, a duty

of eighteen pence the pound was imposed upon the exportation of beaver

wool or woumbs, without making any alteration in the duty upon the

importation of that commodity, which, when imported by British, and in

British shipping, amounted at that time to between fourpence and fivepence

the piece.

Coals may be considered both as a material of manufacture, and as an

instrument of trade. Heavy duties, accordingly, have been imposed upon

their exportation, amounting at present (1783) to more than five shillings

the ton, or more than fifteen shillings the chaldron, Newcastle measure;

which is, in most cases, more than the original value of the commodity at

the coal-pit, or even at the shipping port for exportation.

The exportation, however, of the instruments of trade, properly so called,

is commonly restrained, not by high duties, but by absolute prohibitions.

Thus, by the 7th and 8th of William III chap.20, sect.8, the exportation

of frames or engines for knitting gloves or stockings, is prohibited,

under the penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such frames or engines,

so exported, or attempted to be exported, but of forty pounds, one half to

the king, the other to the person who shall inform or sue for the same. In

the same manner, by the 14th Geo. III. chap. 71, the exportation to

foreign parts, of any utensils made use of in the cotton, linen, woollen,

and silk manufactures, is prohibited under the penalty, not only of the

forfeiture of such utensils, but of two hundred pounds, to be paid by the

person who shall offend in this manner; and likewise of two hundred

pounds, to be paid by the master of the ship, who shall knowingly suffer

such utensils to be loaded on board his ship.

When such heavy penalties were imposed upon the exportation of the dead

instruments of trade, it could not well be expected that the living

instrument, the artificer, should be allowed to go free. Accordingly, by

the 5th Geo. I. chap. 27, the person who shall be convicted of enticing

any artificer, of or in any of the manufactures of Great Britain, to go

into any foreign parts, in order to practise or teach his trade, is

liable, for the first offence, to be fined in any sum not exceeding one

hundred pounds, and to three months imprisonment, and until the fine shall

be paid; and for the second offence, to be fined in any sum, at the

discretion of the court, and to imprisonment for twelve months, and until

the fine shall be paid. By the 23d Geo. II. chap. 13, this penalty is

increased, for the first offence, to five hundred pounds for every

artificer so enticed, and to twelve months imprisonment, and until the

fine shall be paid; and for the second offence, to one thousand pounds,

and to two years imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid.

By the former of these two statutes, upon proof that any person has been

enticing any artificer, or that any artificer has promised or contracted

to go into foreign parts, for the purposes aforesaid, such artificer may

be obliged to give security, at the discretion of the court, that he shall

not go beyond the seas, and may be committed to prison until he give such

security.

If any artificer has gone beyond the seas, and is exercising or teaching

his trade in any foreign country, upon warning being given to him by any

of his majesty’s ministers or consuls abroad, or by one of his majesty’s

secretaries of state, for the time being, if he does not, within six

months after such warning, return into this realm, and from henceforth

abide and inhabit continually within the same, he is from thenceforth

declared incapable of taking any legacy devised to him within this

kingdom, or of being executor or administrator to any person, or of taking

any lands within this kingdom, by descent, devise, or purchase. He

likewise forfeits to the king all his lands, goods, and chattels; is

declared an alien in every respect; and is put out of the king’s

protection.

It is unnecessary, I imagine, to observe how contrary such regulations are

to the boasted liberty of the subject, of which we affect to be so very

jealous; but which, in this case, is so plainly sacrificed to the futile

interests of our merchants and manufacturers.

The laudable motive of all these regulations, is to extend our own

manufactures, not by their own improvement, but by the depression of those

of all our neighbours, and by putting an end, as much as possible, to the

troublesome competition of such odious and disagreeable rivals. Our master

manufacturers think it reasonable that they themselves should have the

monopoly of the ingenuity of all their countrymen. Though by restraining,

in some trades, the number of apprentices which can be employed at one

time, and by imposing the necessity of a long apprenticeship in all

trades, they endeavour, all of them, to confine the knowledge of their

respective employments to as small a number as possible; they are

unwilling, however, that any part of this small number should go abroad to

instruct foreigners.

Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the

interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be

necessary for promoting that of the consumer.

The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt

to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is

almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to

consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object

of all industry and commerce.